The Adoption of Grace (a pseudonym)

[2025] NSWSC 1247

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

The Adoption of Grace (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWSC 1247

Hearing dates:

On the papers

Date of orders:

24 October 2025

Decision date:

24 October 2025

Jurisdiction:

Equity - Adoptions List

Before:

Nixon J

Decision:

Orders for adoption made; consent of birth parents dispensed with and change of name approved

Catchwords:

CHILD WELFARE – adoption – whether in child’s best interest that adoption order be made – whether birth parents’ consent should be dispensed with – whether adoption order clearly preferable – whether change of name should be approved

Legislation Cited:

Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), ss 8, 23, 52, 54, 55, 67, 68, 72, 88, 90, 92, 101

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1988 (NSW), Dictionary to the Act

Cases Cited:

Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391

Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391

Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7

Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680

Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813

Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27

Adoption of Tiana (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 1561

Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056

Director General Department of Family and Community Services; Re Stephen [2011] NSWSC 1521

Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369

In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793

Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241

Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751

Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71

Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087

The Adoption of Ashleigh (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 763

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Principal Officer, Anglican Community Services (Trading as Anglicare) (Plaintiff)

Representation:

Solicitors:
Anglican Community Services (Trading as Anglicare) (Plaintiff)

File Number(s):

2025/281734

Publication restriction:

This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

JUDGMENT

1. This proceeding concerns the proposed adoption of a child, whom I will call Grace Charlie Sloane, who is aged ten, by Dean Robert Higgins and Ruth Anna Higgins (the proposed adoptive parents) (not their real names). For convenience, and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to each of the individuals involved in this matter by his or her first name.

2. By Summons filed 21 July 2025, the Principal Officer, Anglican Community Services (trading as Anglicare) seeks the following orders:

1. orders, pursuant to section 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (the Act), dispensing with the consent of the child’s birth mother and birth father;

2. an order, pursuant to section 23 of the Act, for the adoption of Grace Charlie Sloane, in favour of the proposed adoptive parents, Dean Robert Higgins and Ruth Anna Higgins; and

3. an order, pursuant to section 101(1) of the Act, approving the name “Higgins” as the surname and “Grace Charlie Sloane” as the given names of Grace.

3. The Principal Officer also seeks a notation to the orders that the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in each of the maternal adoption plan and the paternal adoption plan are in Grace’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

The circumstances of the case

4. In February 2015, Grace was born at X Hospital, New South Wales.

5. Grace’s birth mother, as registered on her birth certificate, is Kathryn Lennox (not her real name), born in May 1976. Grace’s birth father, as registered on her birth certificate, is Jordan Sloane (not his real name), born in April 1972. Kathryn and Jordan are no longer in a relationship. Neither Kathryn nor Jordan has consented to Grace’s adoption.

6. On 9 February 2015, Grace was placed in the home of Dean and Ruth and has lived with the proposed adoptive parents continuously since that date. Grace was six days old at the time of placement.

7. The placement occurred in circumstances where the Department and Communities of Justice (DCJ) had recorded a history of child protection concerns relating to Kathryn and Jordan since 2013. In particular, the DCJ had recorded mental health concerns affecting the parenting capacity of each of Kathryn and Jordan. These included, in the case of Kathryn, recurring suicidal ideation and self-harm, in addition to a gambling addiction, and in the case of Jordan, a history of violent outbursts as a result of unmanaged schizophrenia.

8. Grace’s biological siblings, whom I will call Isabelle Charlie Sloane and Ben Charlie Sloane, were removed from the care of Kathryn and Jordan on 8 October 2013 and were restored to Kathryn’s sole care on 26 March 2014.

9. On 3 August 2014, six months before Grace’s birth, Kathryn was hospitalised due to mental health concerns and Isabelle and Ben were again removed from Kathryn’s care and placed under interim orders.

10. On 5 February 2015, Grace was assumed into care following her birth.

11. On 20 October 2015, the Children’s Court of New South Wales made final orders pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1988 (NSW), providing for Grace to be placed under the Parental Responsibility of the Minister for Families and Communities until Grace attains 18 years of age (Final Orders).

12. Final orders placing Isabelle and Ben under the Parental Responsibility of the Minister were also made on that occasion. These orders remain in effect.

13. Grace resides with the proposed adoptive parents, and one of their biological children, Jacinta Sophia Higgins (not her real name). The proposed adoptive parents have two further biological adult children, whom I will call Marcus Higgins and Annabelle Higgins, and an adult son, whom I will call James Higgins, whom they adopted.

14. Isabelle, who is 13 years old, and Ben, who is 12 years old, remain under the Parental Responsibility of the Minister until they attain 18 years of age and reside together with Anglicare authorised carers.

15. Grace also has two maternal half-siblings, Tim Stevens, who is 23 years of age, and Callum Stevens, who is 20 years of age (not their real names). They both reside with their birth father.

16. On 14 October 2024, the Minister’s delegate consented to the adoption of Grace.

17. On 30 July 2025 and 1 August 2025 respectively, each of Kathryn and Jordan was given notice, pursuant to s 72(1) of the Act, of the Plaintiff’s application for an order dispensing with the requirement of their consent to Grace’s adoption; and notice, pursuant to s 88(1)(a) of the Act, of the application for the adoption order. On 6 August 2025, Jordan was served with an additional copy these documents, translated into Simplified Chinese.

18. Neither Kathryn nor Jordan has appeared in this proceeding to oppose the orders sought.

Adoption orders generally and the “best interests” principles under the Act

19. The principles regarding the making of an adoption order are well established. I have adopted the following summary of those principles from my decision in The Adoption of Ashleigh (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 763.

20. The determination of applications for adoption is arguably the most important work of the Equity Division of this Court: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087 at [9] (Sackar J). An order for adoption is one of the most significant and far-reaching of all orders the Court has power to make: Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71 at [157] (Hallen J).

21. In Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS at [150], Hallen J described the far-reaching nature of an adoption order as follows:

“An adoption order is status changing. It severs, in law, but not in fact, the existing relationship of blood, and creates an adoptive relationship in place of the natural relationship, which in fact, although not in law, continues, unchanged. New family ties are created which approximate blood ties. The child becomes part of his, or her, adoptive parents’ family, solely through operation of law, and there is no necessity for any actual blood relationship to exist between them. He, or she, thereafter, is regarded, in law, as the child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents are regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(c) of the Act. The adopted child also ceases to be regarded, in law, as the child of the birth parents and the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(d) of the Act. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the birth parents. They no longer qualify as parents for the purpose of taking part in any future proceedings about the child. Thus, the adoption order directly affects three parties, namely the child, the birth parents and the adoptive parents.”

22. When making a decision about the adoption of a child, the paramount consideration to which I must have regard is the best interests of the child, both in childhood and later life: s 8(1)(a) of the Act. In Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7, Brereton J, at [12], described the key aspects of the paramountcy principle as follows:

"The 'paramountcy principle' contained in par (a) means that the inquiry is child and future focused: as the best interests of the children, both in childhood and later life, must be the paramount consideration, so it is necessary to evaluate the competing proposals (and any viable alternatives) so as to ascertain which will best serve the interests of these children now and in the future, given what has already happened, rather than revisiting the actual or perceived rights and wrongs of the past (save insofar as they may be indicative of the future)."

23. I must also have regard to the principles that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child; that no adult has a right to adopt the child; that, if the child is able to form their own views on a matter concerning their adoption, the child must be given an opportunity to express those views freely and such views are to be given due weight; and that the child’s given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties should, as far as possible, be identified and preserved: s 8(1)(b)-(e) of the Act.

24. I must not make an adoption order unless I am satisfied that the best interests of Grace will be promoted by the adoption and that, as far as practicable and having regard to Grace’s age and understanding, her wishes and feelings have been ascertained and due consideration given to them: s 90(1)(a)-(b) of the Act.

25. The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached which will be inherently imprecise: Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369 at [90] per Hallen J, citing Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241 at [16] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).

26. In determining the best interests of Grace, I must have regard to the matters set out in s 8(2) of the Act including, relevantly:

• any wishes expressed by Grace;

• Grace’s age, maturity and level of understanding;

• Grace’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including her sense of personal, family and cultural identity;

• any wishes expressed by Kathryn and Jordan;

• the nature of the relationship that Grace has with Kathryn, Jordan and any siblings or significant other people;

• the attitude of Dean and Ruth to Grace and to the responsibilities of parenthood;

• the nature of Grace’s relationship with Dean and Ruth;

• the suitability and capacity of Dean, Ruth, or any other person, to provide for Grace’s needs, including her emotional and intellectual needs; and

• the alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect on Grace, in both the short and longer term, of changes in her circumstances caused by an adoption, so that adoption is determined, among all alternative forms of care, to best meet the needs of Grace.

27. The Independent Assessor, Ms Joanne Breeze, has reported that Grace has demonstrated a sound understanding of the proposed adoption, including an understanding of the implications of the proposed adoption such as establishing a permanent legal connection to Ruth, Dean and their family, changing her surname, and the issuing of a new, integrated birth certificate. Grace has said that the proposed adoption is “a good idea” because “I’m officially legally part of the family but I still keep my other family”.

28. The Principal Officer of Anglicare, Ms Nicole Martin, gave evidence that “Grace’s developing understanding of adoption and what it means has been supported over the past 3 years” and has developed “in an age-appropriate way”.

29. Although Grace is below the age fixed by s 55 of the Act to provide consent to her own adoption, the Independent Assessor noted that Grace has indicated her desire to be adopted by Ruth and Dean on numerous occasions and did not express any ongoing questions or worries about adoption with the Independent Assessor. Grace has also given thought to, and expressed her views on, her name and what she would like it to be, should an adoption order be made.

30. The Independent Assessor has also given evidence of the close familial ties between Grace and the proposed adoptive parents, and that Grace “views Ruth and Dean as her parents”. The Independent Assessor has observed that “Ruth and Dean consistently spoke about Grace with pride, joy and humour”, stating that “Grace has a positive and trusting relationship with her prospective adoptive family” and that “[o]ver the course of her placement with Ruth, Dean and their family, Grace has developed in her relationship with them”. The Independent Assessor has further observed that “Grace appeared comfortable in the home and spoke fondly of family members with no hesitation”. In particular, it has been observed how Grace “smiled regularly when making eye contact with Ruth, Dean and Jacinta and the family showed their closeness, joking and laughing as they discussed how competitive each of them becomes when playing games”.

31. The Independent Assessor noted Ruth and Dean’s commitment to parenting Grace, stating that:

“Ruth and Dean expressed a strong commitment to their parenting role and a deep understanding of Grace’s personality and although they have previously parented four teenagers, they recognise that each child is different and remain mindful of the potential complexities adolescence can bring.”

32. The Independent Assessor further observed the strong connections established between Grace and her proposed adoptive family, emphasising that:

“Ruth and Dean are devoted to Grace and she has been accepted into their family. Marcus, Annabelle, Jacinta and James advised they view Grace as their sister and have a deep affection for her and all siblings supported the adoption of Grace by Ruth and Dean…”.

33. The Independent Assessor concludes that “Grace views Ruth and Dean as her parents and primary caregivers and views Marcus, Annabelle, Jacinta and James as her siblings” and that:

“Grace has lived with Ruth, Dean and their older children since shortly after her birth and considers them to be her family. Ruth and Dean presented as committed parents for Grace and described her in positive terms. Ruth and Dean have demonstrated an ability to advocate for Grace and support her…”

34. Grace is currently in Year 5 and is performing well academically. Grace’s school report from Semester Two of 2024 describes Grace as “softly spoken and kind with a passionate approach to learning”. The Independent Assessor reports that Grace is invited to birthday parties and outings with friends from school, and has grown in confidence and deepened her friendships at school this year. Grace is also reported to enjoy “playing outside, craft, watching television and listening to books being read to her”. Ruth and Dean described Grace as “articulate”, “creative” and “talented”, explaining that “her art work is phenomenal and her story writing is awesomely creative”.

35. Ruth and Dean have given evidence that Grace has presented with no behavioural concerns over the time that they have cared for her. Grace has been observed to be developing age-appropriate life skills such as managing her personal hygiene, packing her school lunch, emptying the dishwasher and feeding the family dog. Ruth and Dean have noted Grace’s tendency to be a “rule follower” and that she has a good understanding of boundaries. During late 2024 and early 2025, Grace was engaged with a psychologist for anxiety. In May 2025, the psychologist indicated that Grace no longer required professional psychological support. The Independent Assessor has also noted that Grace’s anxiety regarding assessments and her confidence at school have improved. The Independent Assessor reported that Ruth and Dean had expressed their understanding about the importance of “keeping an eye on Grace” regarding any future mental health concerns, and that they had indicated a willingness to engage professional advice should any concerns arise. The Independent Assessor found that Ruth and Dean’s openness to seeking professional guidance when needed was a strength in the projected parent-adolescent relationship.

36. The Independent Assessor has reported that Grace enjoys “general good health” and that no significant health concerns have been noted. The Principal Officer has given evidence that Grace’s immunisations are up to date, and that the proposed adoptive parents having demonstrated their ongoing dedication to caring for Grace’s medical needs, by facilitating her attendance at dental, optometrist and general practitioner appointments and check-ups and undertaking recommended actions.

37. The Principal Officer further reports that the proposed adoptive parents have demonstrated that they value the importance of Grace growing up knowing her identity and having a sense of belonging to two families. The Principal Officer notes that Grace has full awareness of her relationship with her mother, father, paternal grandmother, siblings and maternal siblings, and that Grace’s proposed adoptive parents have demonstrated a continued commitment to maintaining family relationships to support Grace’s development of a positive identity and sense of self. Grace refers to Kathryn as “mama” and Jordan as “papa”. She refers to Ruth as “mummy” and Dean as “daddy”. The Principal Officer has noted the ease with which Grace demonstrates her connectedness to the various figures within both her birth family and her proposed adopted family.

38. Grace’s mother, Kathryn, is ethnically Chinese but was born in Indonesia. Grace’s father is ethnically Chinese and was born in China. Ruth and Dean both identify as Anglo-Australian. A cultural plan developed by Anglicare in consultation with Kathryn, Jordan, Ruth and Dean outlines the ways in which the proposed adoptive parents support Grace’s cultural heritage, needs and ongoing development.

39. The Principal Officer gave evidence that Grace has identified that her family has cultural heritage from Indonesia, China and Australia; that she celebrates Chinese New Year; and has awareness of other areas of cultural significance such as a Chinese ice festival and Indonesian Batik art. The Independent Assessor gave evidence that Kathryn has expressed a hope for Grace to learn Indonesian to be able to connect with her extended family, and noted that “Grace has been engaging intermittently with the telephone application, ‘Duo Lingo’, to learn Indonesian, as per Kathryn’s wishes”. The Principal Officer further indicated that Ruth and Dean have demonstrated their commitment to ongoing cultural connection for Grace and recognised the importance of Grace’s birth family in facilitating Grace’s learning about her culture. The Independent Assessor further reported that Ruth and Dean have sought out people of Indonesian and Chinese cultural backgrounds in their church community to further “support Grace’s cultural understanding”, and that Grace’s school and church are both very multicultural, providing Grace with opportunities to connect with other people who are Chinese and Indonesian.

34. Both Ruth and Dean identify as Christian and are raising Grace, as they have their other children, in the Christian faith. Grace attends church weekly with Ruth and Dean and attends an Anglican school. Kathryn also identifies as Christian and has expressed her approval of Ruth and Dean raising Grace as Christian. Jordan does not identify with any religion and has not made any requests regarding Grace’s religious upbringing. The Principal Officer gave evidence that Jordan is aware of, and does not object to, Ruth and Dean raising Grace in the Christian faith.

35. Having regard to the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that Grace’s emotional, physical, educational and cultural needs are being met by Ruth and Dean.

Is adoption clearly preferable in the best interests of Grace?

42. I may not make an order for adoption unless I am satisfied that the making of such an order would be “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Grace than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to her care: s 90(3) of the Act.

43. I must be satisfied that there is more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14] (Brereton J). I must feel a degree of conviction in favour of adoption which is commensurate with the gravity of the decision: Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056 at [53] (Palmer J); Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391 at [13] (Sackar J).

44. Consideration of whether adoption would promote the best interests of the child and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order involves the identification of the likely effects of adoption and examining the benefits and detriments of each alternative from the perspective of the best interests of the child: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680 at [74] (Brereton J).

45. The alternatives to making an adoption order would appear to be as follows:

1. to make no order and to maintain the status quo (namely, that Grace is in the parental responsibility of the Minister until she attains the age of 18);

2. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to Dean and Ruth;

3. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to Kathryn; or

4. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to Jordan.

46. As set out more fully below, Kathryn has never formally sought restoration of Grace into her care. Kathryn has not taken any active steps to oppose the adoption and has not appeared in this proceeding to oppose the orders sought. Instead, Kathryn has herself identified that she is supportive of Grace’s adoption by the proposed adoptive parents.

47. Jordan, too, has never formally sought restoration of Grace into his care. Prior to Jordan attending a visit with Grace in April 2025, Jordan had not seen Grace since July 2022. The Independent Assessor reports that Jordan has previously indicated his support for the adoption of Grace by Ruth and Dean.

48. The Principal Officer has expressed the view that restoration of Grace to Kathryn or Jordan is not viable and not in Grace’s best interests. Grace has never been in the care of Kathryn or Jordan. The Principal Officer has given evidence that the child protection concerns that gave rise to Grace’s placement immediately following her birth are still present. Further, Grace has been in the care of Ruth and Dean since she was six days old and removing her from their care, their home and her familiar networks would likely be distressing for Grace and cause significant psychological harm to her.

49. Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that restoration of Grace to Kathryn or Jordan would introduce uncertainty and risk factors into Grace’s life which are not currently present and would therefore not be in Grace’s best interests.

50. If I were to make no order and were to maintain the status quo, Ruth and Dean would be unable to make significant decisions concerning Grace, as those decisions would require the approval of the Minister by his or her delegate. An order allocating parental responsibility for Grace to Ruth and Dean would alleviate some of the disadvantages of maintaining the status quo. However, this would remain a temporary order that would expire when Grace attains 18 years of age. It therefore lacks the permanency of an adoption order and would result in Grace losing her legal connection to her psychological family when she attains adulthood.

51. One of the principal benefits of adoption is to achieve a secure, stable, reliable, permanent, lifetime placement for the child in the adoptive family as the adoptive son or daughter of the adopters: In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at [64] (McFarlane LJ; Jackson and Lindblom LJJ agreeing). Adoption serves the identity needs of the child in question, in circumstances where the child is emotionally, psychologically and residentially already a member of the proposed adoptive family, by bringing the child’s legal status into conformity with reality, and by perfecting the child’s sense of permanent belonging in the family with which he or she identifies, not only during childhood but for life: Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58] (Brereton J).

52. In Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751 at [297], Hallen J said that:

“It is often referred to in the literature that a child placed with foster carers has an abiding need for a sense of security and identity and that she, or he, will feel most secure when she, or he, is assured that no one can take her, or him, away from the family of which she, or he, is a legal member. It is recognised that the sooner a child can feel this sense of security, the better for her, or his, development in the future: see Re Marcus [2009] NSWSC 697, per Palmer J, at [35].”

53. The Independent Assessor has recommended that an adoption order be made, indicating that “there was little doubt adoption by Ruth and Dean was in the best interests of Grace”. The Independent Assessor has expressed the view that “[a]doption offers Grace future security and provides her with the highest level of permanency” that will afford Grace “a certain future in Ruth and Dean’s care”. The Independent Assessor has concluded that “adoption is in Grace’s best interest for the present but more importantly for a certain future in Ruth and Dean’s care where she has lived her entire life”.

54. The Principal Officer has formed the view that “[t]here are distinct advantages in adoption for Grace. The permanence of an adoption order will create stability for Grace, provid[ing] her with a sense of belonging which cannot be achieved in long term foster care or under an order for parental responsibility to be allocated to the proposed adoptive parents”. The Principal Officer states that an adoption order reflects that “Grace is a fully integrated member of the Higgins family”, having lived in the Higgins household since she was six days old, and that “Grace is thriving in the care of the proposed adoptive parents and identifies them as her parents”. The Principal Officer also notes that adoption is in accordance with Grace’s wishes and that Kathryn and Jordan have previously “voiced support of adoption for Grace with the proposed adoptive parents”.

55. Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that the making of an adoption order would serve the best interests of Grace now, ensuring that she is legally a part of her psychological family, and would also serve her best interests in the future, including after she has attained the age of 18.

56. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the making of the proposed adoption order would be clearly preferable in the best interests of Grace than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to her care.

Application for consent dispense orders

57. Neither Kathryn nor Jordan has consented to Grace’s adoption. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff seeks orders under s 67 of the Act dispensing with the requirement for consent by each of Grace’s birth parents.

58. The Plaintiff, as the Principal Officer of the accredited adoption service provider concerned with the adoption, has standing to apply for the making of such “consent dispense orders”: s 68(b) of the Act.

Relevant Principles

59. Section 52(a) of the Act relevantly provides that the Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age unless consent has been given by each of the child’s parents. Consent may be dispensed with by the Court pursuant to s 54(1) of the Act.

60. Section 67 of the Act provides as follows:

(1)   The Court may make a consent dispense order dispensing with the requirement for consent of a person to a child’s adoption (other than the child) if the Court is satisfied that—

(a)    the person cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be found or identified, or

(b)    the person is in such a physical or mental condition as not to be capable of properly considering the question of whether he or she should give consent, or

(c)   if the person is a parent of, or person who has parental responsibility for, the child—there is serious cause for concern for the welfare of the child and it is in the best interests of the child to override the wishes of the parent or person who has parental responsibility, or

(d)   if an application has been made to the Court for the adoption of the child by one or more persons who are authorised carers or the guardians for the child—

(i)   the child has established a stable relationship with those carers or guardians, and

(ii)   the adoption of the child by those carers or guardians will promote the child’s welfare, and

(iii)   in the case of an Aboriginal child, alternatives to placement for adoption have been considered in accordance with section 36.

(2)   The Court must not make such a consent dispense order unless satisfied that to do so is in the best interests of the child.

(3)   In this section—

guardian has the same meaning as in section 79A (1) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998.

61. The proposed adoptive parents are "authorised carers" because they have care and responsibility for Grace under out-of-home care arrangements made under the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act: Dictionary to the Act.

62. As Meek J noted in Adoption of Tiana (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 1561 at [52], there is a difference in focus between, on the one hand, s 67(1)(a)-(c) and, on the other, s 67(1)(d) of the Act. The difference was explained by Slattery J in Director General Department of Family and Community Services; Re Stephen [2011] NSWSC 1521 at [58]-[59] as follows:

“Each of Adoption Act, s 67(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) is a gateway for the exercise of the s 67(1) discretion to make a consent dispense order. But there is a difference in focus between Adoption Act, s 67(1)(a), (b) and (c) and Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d). The difference is that s 67(1)(a), (b), (c) are each concerned with the situation of the birth parent or other person whose consent to an adoption order would otherwise be required under Adoption Act, s 52. These provisions deal with the inability of a person to provide consent, either because he or she cannot be found or because of incapacity or because issues concerning the welfare of the child displace the wishes of the parent or person with parental responsibility. All of these matters are concerned with the quality or the relative value of the consent of the parent or person with parental responsibility.

But Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d) has a different focal point. On its face it says nothing about the capacity or quality of the consent of the parent or person with parental responsibility. Rather, it looks to the child’s present situation. The threshold for the court’s exercise of Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d) discretion is that the authorised carers of the child have applied for the child’s adoption, that the child has established a stable relationship with those carers, and that the adoption of the child by those carers will promote the child’s welfare. Those matters are all well established here. Section 67(1)(d) does not expressly place a requirement on the exercise of the court’s s 67(1)(d) discretion that the court make a judgment about the quality or value of the consent of birth parent or other person with parental responsibility. But as Brereton J explained in Director General, Department of Community Services v D (2007) 37 Fam LR 595; [2007] NSWSC 762, parental consent is always a consideration; ‘Although the interest of the child are paramount, the Adoption Act does not entirely disregard the parental rights of the birth parents as is evident from the requirement for their consent’. Adoption Act, Chapter 4, Part 2, emphasizes the principle that an informed consent should be given by parents or persons with parental responsibility before an adoption order can be made. But when it applies, as has been stated, Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d) provides a different emphasis.”

63. Dispensing with the consent of a parent is a grave step, not lightly to be taken: Adoption of RCC and RZA at [17] (Brereton J). In Adoption of BL at [20], Sackar J noted that the “severance of the legal relationship will of course never sever the biological relationship nor will it detract from the potential for developing a meaningful relationship through ongoing contact.”

Determination

64. The proposed adoption of Grace has been discussed between Kathryn and either Anglicare case managers or the Independent Assessor, at various times over the past two and a half years. The Principal Officer has documented the progression of Kathryn’s attitudes towards the adoption of Grace throughout this period. On 21 October 2022, Kathryn indicated that she did not agree with adoption for Grace, and that it was her preference for Grace to remain in foster care, as was the case for Isabelle and Ben. However, since 30 October 2023, Kathryn has indicated increasing support for the adoption of Grace by the proposed adoptive parents, expressing gratitude toward Ruth and Dean and concluding that adoption is ultimately the best decision for Grace and that she “wants to do what is best for Grace”. Kathryn has also indicated that she did not intend to contest the proposed adoption of Grace.

65. On 16 April 2025, Kathryn spoke positively about Grace’s proposed adoption with the Independent Assessor but maintained that she did not wish to sign consent to the adoption, indicating “I don’t need to sign it… I am happy not to sign it”. On 23 April 2025, the Independent Assessor emailed Kathryn a copy of the Mandatory Written Information for parents, the draft maternal adoption plan and an example of the integrated birth certificate. A slightly amended version of the draft maternal adoption plan was emailed to Kathryn on 18 May 2025. On 30 July 2025, Kathryn was served with notice of the application for the adoption order and for an order dispensing with the requirement for her consent. Kathryn has signed the maternal adoption plan and has not subsequently taken any step in this proceeding.

66. The proposed adoption of Grace has also been discussed between Jordan and either Anglicare case managers or the Independent Assessor on various occasions over the past two and a half years. The Principal Officer gave evidence that, throughout this period, Jordan consistently expressed a deference to Kathryn’s wishes surrounding the proposed adoption of Grace while indicating that the “adoption of Grace is fine with him” and that he is “in support of the proposed adoption”.

67. On 14 April 2025, Jordan again indicated that “he would follow Kathryn’s lead” while reiterating his support for the adoption of Grace by Dean and Ruth. Regarding the provision of formal consent to the proposed adoption, the Independent Assessor noted that:

“Jordan expressed he would like to follow Kathryn’s lead and that if she signed, he would. Given Kathryn is saying she won’t, he won’t either.”

68. On 23 April 2025, the Independent Assessor emailed Jordan a copy of the Mandatory Written Information for parents, the draft paternal adoption plan and an example of the integrated birth certificate. A slightly amended version of the draft paternal adoption plan was emailed to Jordan on 18 May 2025. On 1 August 2025, Jordan was served with notice of the application for the adoption order and for an order dispensing with the requirement for his consent. On 6 August 2025, Jordan was served with an additional copy these documents, translated into Simplified Chinese. Jordan has signed the paternal adoption plan and has not taken any other step in the proceeding.

69. I may not make a consent dispense order unless I am satisfied that, relevantly, Grace has established a stable relationship with her authorised carers, Ruth and Dean, and that the adoption of Grace by Ruth and Dean will promote her welfare: ss 67(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Before making such an order, I must also be satisfied that to do so will be in the best interests of Grace: s 67(2) of the Act.

70. For the reasons given above when considering the proposed adoption order, I am comfortably satisfied about these matters. Having regard to the evidence of the proposed adoptive parents, the Independent Assessor and the Principal Officer, I am satisfied that Grace has a stable and loving relationship with Ruth and Dean and that they will continue to promote her welfare and continued development. They have demonstrated a willingness and ability to meet Grace’s needs, and to provide her with love and support. Grace’s relationship with Ruth, Dean, Marcus, Annabelle, Jacinta and James is the only close family relationship that she knows, having regard to the very young age at which she was placed in the care of her proposed adoptive parents. The making of a consent dispense order, so as to allow the making of the adoption order, is in the best interests of Grace so as to allow her close bond with her psychological family to be reflected in her legal status.

The Adoption Plans

The maternal adoption plan

71. Kathryn has agreed to and signed the maternal adoption plan. The maternal adoption plan was signed by Kathryn on 30 July 2025, Ruth and Dean on 11 July 2025 and the Principal Officer on 14 July 2025.

72. The maternal adoption plan makes provision for contact between Grace, Kathryn, Isabelle, Ben, Tim and Callum, in addition to outlining a plan to maintain Grace’s cultural identity. Provision is made for face-to-face visits to occur between Grace and Kathryn on a minimum of five occasions per year for a minimum of three hours on each occasion. Visits may be held jointly with Grace’s siblings, Isabelle and Ben. The maternal adoption plan also provides for Grace’s maternal siblings, Tim and Callum, to be invited to all planned visits.

73. The maternal adoption plan provides for Grace to have telephone and electronic communication with Kathryn, Isabelle, Ben, Tim and Callum. In addition, it provides for Ruth and Dean to give Kathryn, Isabelle, Ben, Tim and Callum updates on Grace’s progress and photographs four times per year.

74. The maternal adoption plan also provides for Ruth and Dean to assist Grace to engage with Chinese and Indonesian culture through language, music, customs, traditions and food.

The paternal adoption plan

75. Jordan has agreed to and signed the paternal adoption plan. The paternal adoption plan was signed by Jordan on 5 August 2025, Ruth and Dean on 11 July 2025 and the Principal Officer on 14 July 2025.

76. The paternal adoption plan makes provision for contact between Grace, Jordan, Isabelle, Ben and Grace’s paternal grandmother, whom I will call Xiao Chen Ying, in addition to outlining a plan to maintain Grace’s cultural identity.

77. The paternal adoption plan notes that Jordan has not attended face-to-face visits with Grace since 14 July 2022, although a subsequent visit has since occurred on 19 April 2025. The paternal adoption plan makes provision for face-to-face visits between Grace and Jordan on a minimum of five occasions per year. It is proposed that if Jordan is to engage in family time visits and should there be a further significant gap in family time visits between Grace and Jordan, Jordan may be asked to meet with Ruth and Dean prior to meeting with Grace to provide some basic information about himself, including photographs, that Ruth and Dean can use to assist Grace in preparing for visits with Jordan. Visits may be held jointly with Xiao Chen.

75. The paternal adoption plan notes that arrangements for visits with Isabelle and Ben are outlined in the maternal adoption plan, and that Jordan and Xiao Chen will also be invited to these visits.

76. The paternal adoption plan also provides for Grace to have telephone and electronic communication with Jordan and Xiao Chen, and for updates and photographs to be provided to Jordan four times per year, and to Xiao Chen once per year, and makes similar provision to the maternal adoption plan regarding Grace’s engagement with Chinese culture.

Consideration of maternal adoption plan and paternal adoption plan

80. The Principal Officer reported that the proposed adoptive parents have demonstrated a commitment to ensuring Grace maintains a relationship with Kathryn and Jordan, as well as her siblings Isabelle and Ben, maternal siblings Tim and Callum, and paternal grandmother Xiao Chen. The proposed adoptive parents have been observed to demonstrate openness by hosting family visits both within their home and within the community and have been “highly supportive of family time between Grace, Kathryn, Jordan, Xiao Chen and her siblings”.

81. Ruth and Dean have also been noted to have been independently facilitating family time visits since 2020, and as early as 2017. They have consistently supported family time visits, more informal family time arrangements and contact such as Grace’s siblings visiting her at her home and Grace staying overnight with Isabelle and Ben. Ruth and Dean are already facilitating and supervising family visits independently and do not need additional agency support to enact the maternal adoption plan or the paternal adoption plan following finalisation of the adoption.

82. The Independent Assessor specifically noted that a strength of her assessment was Ruth and Dean’s willingness to provide an environment where Grace is able to spend time with her family in her own home, and that a natural and open relationship is being fostered between Grace’s two families that allow her opportunities to develop a deeper understanding of her identity and sense of self.

83. I am satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan and the paternal adoption plan are in Grace’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

Proposed name change

84. The Plaintiff seeks an order approving the name “Higgins” as the surname and “Grace Charlie Sloane” as the given names of Grace.

85. “Higgins” is the surname of Ruth and Dean. “Grace Charlie Sloane Higgins” is comprised of part of Grace’s existing name (Grace), a middle name that had been chosen by Kathryn and has been given to all her other children (Charlie), and the surname of Jordan (Sloane).

86. The Independent Assessor reported that Kathryn feels supportive of Grace’s surname being changed to Higgins, “so long as she keeps the name Sloane as well”.

87. Ruth and Dean have indicated their desire to change Grace’s name to Grace Charlie Sloane Higgins to support Grace’s identity and connection with her birth family and her adoptive family. Ruth has given evidence that she supports Grace’s proposed name change to “reflect her permanent position within our family whilst maintaining ‘Sloane’ as her connection to her birth family”. In school enrolment and in her community, Grace is currently known by the name “Grace Charlie Sloane Higgins”. Grace has also expressed the importance of retaining the name “Sloane” to preserve her connection to her biological family.

88. The proposed name maintains the full name that Grace was given at birth and includes the adoptive parents’ surname as her new surname to honour the parent-child relationship if an adoption order is made.

89. Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that the proposed name change for Grace will establish a sense of belonging and connection to Grace’s adoptive family, while maintaining a connection to her birth family. I will accordingly make the order that is sought in respect of her name.

Conclusion

90. For the reasons given above, I make the following orders:

1. an order pursuant to section 67(1)(d) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (the Act), that the consent of the child’s birth mother be dispensed with;

2. an order pursuant to section 67(1)(d) of the Act, that the consent of the child’s birth father be dispensed with;

3. an order pursuant to section 23 of the Act for the adoption of Grace Charlie Sloane, in favour of the adopting parents, Ruth Anna Higgins and Dean Robert Higgins; and

4. an order pursuant to section 101(1) of the Act approving the name “Higgins” as the surname and “Grace Charlie Sloane” as the given names of Grace.

91. I will also make the following notations:

1. the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

2. the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the paternal adoption plan are in the child’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

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Decision last updated: 24 October 2025