The Adoption of Angelo (a pseudonym)

[2025] NSWSC 32

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

The Adoption of Angelo (a pseudonym) [2025] NSWSC 32

Hearing dates:

On the papers

Date of orders:

7 February 2025

Decision date:

07 February 2025

Jurisdiction:

Equity - Adoptions List

Before:

Nixon J

Decision:

Orders for adoption made; consent of father and mother dispensed with; change of name approved

Catchwords:

CHILD WELFARE – adoption – whether in child’s best interest that adoption order be made – whether adoption order clearly preferable – whether consent of mother should be dispensed with – whether consent of father should be dispensed with, in circumstances where father cannot, after reasonable inquiries, be found or identified – whether change of name should be approved

Legislation Cited:

Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), ss 8, 52, 67, 68, 72, 88, 90, 92, 101, 180

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), Dictionary to the Act

Cases Cited:

Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391

Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7

Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680

Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813

Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27

Adoption of Tiana (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 1561

Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056

Director General Department of Family and Community Services; Re Stephen [2011] NSWSC 1521

Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369

In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793

Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241

Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751

Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71

Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087

The Adoption of Ashleigh (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 763

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Principal Officer, Anglican Community Services (Trading as Anglicare) (Plaintiff)

Representation:

Solicitors:
Plaintiff (self-represented)

File Number(s):

2024/00403844

Publication restriction:

This judgment has been anonymised pursuant to s 180 of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW)

JUDGMENT

1. This proceeding concerns the proposed adoption of a child, whom I will call Angelo Max Kumara, who is aged six, by the proposed adoptive parents, whom I will call Natalie Sharma and Glenn Dinesh Sharma. For convenience, and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to each of the individuals involved in this matter by his or her first name.

2. By Summons filed 24 October 2024, the Principal Officer of Anglican Community Services (trading as Anglicare) seeks the following orders:

1. an order pursuant to section 88(4) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) (the Act) that the giving of notice of the application to Angelo’s birth father be dispensed with;

2. an order pursuant to section 67(1) of the Act that the consent of Angelo’s birth father be dispensed with;

3. an order pursuant to section 67(1) of the Act that the consent of Angelo’s birth mother be dispensed with;

4. an order for the adoption of Angelo in favour of the proposed adoptive parents; and

5. an order approving the name “Sharma” as the surname and “Angelo Dinesh Peter” as the given names of Angelo.

3. The Principal Officer of Anglicare also seeks a notation to the orders that the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in Angelo’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

The circumstances of the case

4. In September 2018, Angelo was born at X Hospital. In November 2018, he was placed into the care of short-term carers.

5. In March 2019, Angelo moved into the home of Natalie and Glenn and has lived with them continuously since that date.

6. On 11 April 2019, the Children’s Court of New South Wales made final orders pursuant to the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW), providing for Angelo to be placed under the Parental Responsibility of the Minister for Families and Communities until Angelo attains the age of 18 years. These orders remain in effect.

7. Angelo resides with Natalie, Glenn and their biological son, whom I will call Gabriel Sharma.

8. Angelo’s birth mother, as registered on his birth certificate, is Kim Kumara (not her real name), born in May 1995. She has not consented to Angelo’s adoption.

9. There is no birth father registered on Angelo’s birth certificate and his identity remains unknown.

10. Angelo has three maternal half-siblings, whom I will call Priyanka Kumara, Justin Kumara and Henry Kumara. Henry is the only one of these half-siblings who resides with Kim.

11. On 27 March 2024, the Minister's delegate consented to the adoption of Angelo.

12. On 7 November 2024, Kim was served with notice, pursuant to s 72(1) of the Act, of the Plaintiff’s application for an order dispensing with the requirement for her consent to Angelo’s adoption; and notice, pursuant to s 88(1)(a) of the Act, of the application for the adoption order.

13. Kim has not appeared in this proceeding to oppose the orders sought.

Adoption orders generally and the “best interests” principles under the Act

14. The principles regarding the making of an adoption order are well established. I have adopted the following summary of those principles from my recent decision in The Adoption of Ashleigh (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 763.

15. The determination of applications for adoption is arguably the most important work of the Equity Division of this Court: Secretary, New South Wales Department of Family and Community Services by his delegate, Principal Officer, Barnardos Australia v MB and JW [2017] NSWSC 1087 at [9] (Sackar J). An order for adoption is one of the most significant and far-reaching of all orders the Court has power to make: Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS [2019] NSWSC 71 at [157] (Hallen J).

16. In Re the Adoption of CCS and FLS at [150], Hallen J described the far-reaching nature of an adoption order as follows:

“An adoption order is status changing. It severs, in law, but not in fact, the existing relationship of blood, and creates an adoptive relationship in place of the natural relationship, which in fact, although not in law, continues, unchanged. New family ties are created which approximate blood ties. The child becomes part of his, or her, adoptive parents’ family, solely through operation of law, and there is no necessity for any actual blood relationship to exist between them. He, or she, thereafter, is regarded, in law, as the child of the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents are regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(c) of the Act. The adopted child also ceases to be regarded, in law, as the child of the birth parents and the birth parents cease to be regarded in law as the parents of the adopted child: s 95(2)(d) of the Act. The effect of an adoption order is to extinguish any parental responsibility of the birth parents. They no longer qualify as parents for the purpose of taking part in any future proceedings about the child. Thus, the adoption order directly affects three parties, namely the child, the birth parents and the adoptive parents.”

17. When making a decision about the adoption of a child, the paramount consideration to which I must have regard is the best interests of the child, both in childhood and later life: s 8(1)(a) of the Act. In Adoption of JLK and CRK [2017] NSWSC 7, Brereton J, at [12], described the key aspects of the paramountcy principle as follows:

"The 'paramountcy principle' contained in par (a) means that the inquiry is child and future focused: as the best interests of the children, both in childhood and later life, must be the paramount consideration, so it is necessary to evaluate the competing proposals (and any viable alternatives) so as to ascertain which will best serve the interests of these children now and in the future, given what has already happened, rather than revisiting the actual or perceived rights and wrongs of the past (save insofar as they may be indicative of the future)."

18. I must also have regard to the principles that adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child; that no adult has a right to adopt the child; that, if the child is able to form his own views on a matter concerning his adoption, he must be given an opportunity to express those views freely and such views are to be given due weight; and that the child’s given names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties should, as far as possible, be identified and preserved: subss 8(1)(b)-(e) of the Act.

19. I must not make an adoption order unless I am satisfied that the best interests of Angelo will be promoted by the adoption and that, as far as practicable and having regard to Angelo’s age and understanding, his wishes and feelings have been ascertained and due consideration given to them: subss 90(1)(a)-(b) of the Act.

20. The question of what is in a child’s best interests involves the making of a judicial evaluation and the balancing of many factors from which an overall conclusion must be reached which will be inherently imprecise: Director General Department of Human Services; Re M [2011] NSWSC 369 at [90] per Hallen J, citing Re B (A Minor) [2001] UKHL 70; [2002] 1 All ER 241 at [16] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).

21. In determining the best interests of Angelo, I must have regard to the matters set out in s 8(2) of the Act including, relevantly:

• any wishes expressed by Angelo;

• Angelo’s age, maturity and level of understanding;

• Angelo’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including his sense of personal, family and cultural identity;

• any wishes expressed by Kim;

• the nature of the relationship that Angelo has with Kim and any siblings or significant other people;

• the attitude of Natalie and Glenn to Angelo and to the responsibilities of parenthood;

• the nature of Angelo’s relationship with Natalie and Glenn;

• the suitability and capacity of Natalie, Glenn, or any other person, to provide for Angelo’s needs, including his emotional and intellectual needs; and

• the alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect on Angelo, in both the short and longer term, of changes in his circumstances caused by an adoption, so that adoption is determined among all alternative forms of care to best meet the needs of Angelo.

22. The Independent Assessor, Ms Ruth Wienburg, has reported that although Angelo does not have the capacity at his age to understand all of the implications of adoption, he sees himself as a member of the Sharma family and he wants to remain with them indefinitely.

23. The Independent Assessor has given evidence of Angelo’s loving relationship with Natalie, Glenn and Gabriel, observing “a great deal of warmth and affection between all members of the family”. In particular, the Independent Assessor has reported that:

“Angelo was comfortable asking Glenn and Natalie for assistance or to explain things to me, often just making eye contact with them or leaning into them, and he referred to them as mum and dad. His bond and attachment to them appeared strong and they are clearly his secure base, Glenn in particular. It was evident that Angelo sees himself as very much a part of the family in the same way Gabriel is, not surprisingly given that they are the only family he has ever known, and he was clearly very relaxed and secure in their presence. Likewise, Glenn and Natalie were very gentle and reassuring of Angelo … They behaved in the same calm, reassuring and affectionate way with both boys [that is, with Angelo and with their biological son, Gabriel], not making any distinction between them and clearly viewing them both as their much-loved sons.”

24. Natalie gave evidence that Angelo and Gabriel have a “very close and loving relationship” and are very affectionate towards each other. She also deposed that when Angelo draws a picture of his family, he always draws himself with Natalie, Glenn and Gabriel.

25. Gabriel refers to Angelo as “Kor Kor” (meaning older brother in Cantonese), a term of both endearment and respect.

26. The Independent Assessor concluded that Angelo is a “loved and valued member of both his immediate and extended families.”

27. Angelo attended preschool between 2021 and 2023, where he was described as having a strong group of friends as well as a growing sense of independence, with no additional support required. In 2024, Angelo attended kindergarten and achieved at the target level in all aspects of his learning. He is described in his school report as a “pleasure to teach” and “an eager participant in class discussions”, who “upholds the school values in all settings” and is “keen to learn” and “conscientious to do his best.”

28. Natalie and Glenn have facilitated Angelo’s attendance at general GP check-ups and specialist referrals, as well as undertaking recommended actions, including physiotherapy for plagiocephaly and surgery for insertion of grommets and an adenoidectomy. In addition, they have facilitated Angelo’s attendance, as required, at dental, optometry and hearing appointments, and have ensured that Angelo is up to date with his immunisations.

29. Natalie and Glenn are raising Angelo as Christian and attend Anglican church with him on Sunday mornings. Kim was raised as Catholic, converted to Islam when she married her former husband, and has now returned to the Catholic faith. She is aware that Angelo regularly attends Anglican church, and has stated that religion is something “Natalie and Glenn can have full reins with”, provided that Angelo is not raised in the Islamic faith, with which she no longer identifies.

30. Glenn identifies as Anglo Australian and Natalie as Chinese Australian. Kim is Anglo Australian, with Scandinavian and English descent. Glenn and Natalie have indicated their commitment to ensure that Angelo grows up with an understanding of his belonging to two families.

31. Having regard to the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that Angelo’s emotional, physical, educational and cultural needs are being met by Natalie and Glenn.

Is adoption clearly preferable in the best interests of Angelo?

32. I may not make an order for adoption unless I am satisfied that the making of such an order would be “clearly preferable” in the best interests of Angelo than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to his care: s 90(3) of the Act.

33. I must be satisfied that there is more than a slight preponderance of considerations in favour of adoption over other alternatives. The making of an adoption order must be obviously, plainly or manifestly preferable to any other action that could be taken by law: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [14] (Brereton J). I must feel a degree of conviction in favour of adoption which is commensurate with the gravity of the decision: Application of A - re D [2006] NSWSC 1056 at [53] (Palmer J); Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391 at [13] (Sackar J).

34. Consideration of whether adoption would promote the best interests of the child and whether it is clearly preferable to any other order involves the identification of the likely effects of adoption and examining the benefits and detriments of each alternative from the perspective of the best interests of the child: Adoption of NG (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 680 at [74] (Brereton J).

35. The alternatives to making an adoption order would appear to be as follows:

1. to make no order and to maintain the status quo (namely, that Angelo is in the parental responsibility of the Minister until he attains the age of 18);

2. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to Natalie and Glenn; or

3. to make an order under s 92 of the Act allocating parental responsibility to Kim.

36. As set out more fully below, Kim has previously indicated an intention to have Angelo returned to her care and has expressed a desire for the adoption not to proceed. However, she has not taken any active steps in this regard. She did not appear in this proceeding to oppose the orders sought, and has signed the proposed maternal adoption plan.

37. The Independent Assessor has expressed the view that restoration of Angelo to Kim is not realistic and is not in Angelo’s best interests. Angelo has never been in the care of Kim, and Kim has never formally sought the restoration of Angelo to her care. The Independent Assessor is of the opinion that although Kim has made changes in her life which have enabled her to take care of Angelo’s half-sibling, Henry, Kim would be placed under a high level of additional stress if she were to take on the care of another young child, which may impact the stability of her mental health. Further, Angelo has been in the care of Natalie and Glenn for most of his life and removing him from their care and their home would likely be distressing for Angelo and cause significant psychological harm to him. Having regard to those matters, I accept that restoration of Angelo to Kim would introduce uncertainty and risk factors which are not currently present and is not a realistic option.

38. If I were to make no order and were to maintain the status quo, Natalie and Glenn would be unable to make significant decisions concerning Angelo, as those decisions would require the approval of the Minister by his delegate. An order allocating parental responsibility for Natalie and Glenn to Angelo would alleviate some of the disadvantages of maintaining the status quo. However, this would remain a temporary order that would expire when Angelo attains 18 years of age. It therefore lacks the permanency of an adoption order and would result in Angelo losing his legal connection to his psychological family when he attains adulthood.

39. One of the principal benefits of adoption is to achieve a secure, stable, reliable, permanent, lifetime placement for the child in the adoptive family as the adoptive son or daughter of the adopters: In re W (A Child) (Adoption: Grandparents’ Competing Claim) [2017] 1 WLR 889; [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at [64] (McFarlane LJ; Jackson and Lindblom LJJ agreeing). Adoption serves the identity needs of the child in question, in circumstances where the child is emotionally, psychologically and residentially already a member of the proposed adoptive family, by bringing the child’s legal status into conformity with reality, and by perfecting the child’s sense of permanent belonging in the family with which he or she identifies, not only during childhood but for life: Adoption of Taylor-Clay [2019] NSWSC 27 at [58] (Brereton J).

40. In Re the Adoption of AJH [2017] NSWSC 1751 at [297], Hallen J said that:

“It is often referred to in the literature that a child placed with foster carers has an abiding need for a sense of security and identity and that she, or he, will feel most secure when she, or he, is assured that no one can take her, or him, away from the family of which she, or he, is a legal member. It is recognised that the sooner a child can feel this sense of security, the better for her, or his, development in the future: see Re Peter [2009] NSWSC 697, per Palmer J, at [35].”

41. The Independent Assessor has recommended that an adoption order be made, based on the fact that Angelo has clearly become a “loved and valued member of both his immediate and extended families” and the fact that Angelo has lived with Natalie and Glenn for over five years and regards them as his “secure attachment figures”. Angelo identifies the Sharma family as his family, and Natalie and Glenn have demonstrated an ongoing ability to meet Angelo’s needs. The Independent Assessor has concluded that adoption will provide Angelo with “stability, security and sense of belonging in his family that no other order can provide”.

42. Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that the making of an adoption order would serve the best interests of Angelo now, ensuring he is legally a part of his psychological family; and would also serve his best interests in the future, including after he has attained the age of 18.

41. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the making of the proposed adoption order would be clearly preferable in the best interests of Angelo than any other action that could be taken by law in relation to his care.

Requirements for dispensing with consent of birth parents under the Act

44. Section 52(a) of the Act relevantly provides that the Court must not make an adoption order in relation to a child who is less than 18 years of age unless consent has been given by each of the child’s parents.

45. Angelo’s birth mother has not consented to the adoption. Despite having made enquiries, the Plaintiff does not know the identity of Angelo’s birth father. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff seeks orders under s 67 of the Act dispensing with the requirement for consent by each of Angelo’s birth parents. The Plaintiff, as the Principal Officer of the accredited adoption service provider concerned with the adoption, has standing to apply for the making of such “consent dispense orders”: s 68(b) of the Act.

46. The relevant test for dispensing with consent is set out in s 67 of the Act, as follows:

(1) The Court may make a consent dispense order dispensing with the requirement for consent of a person to a child’s adoption (other than the child) if the Court is satisfied that—

(a) the person cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be found or identified, or

(b) the person is in such a physical or mental condition as not to be capable of properly considering the question of whether he or she should give consent, or

(c) if the person is a parent of, or person who has parental responsibility for, the child—there is serious cause for concern for the welfare of the child and it is in the best interests of the child to override the wishes of the parent or person who has parental responsibility, or

(d) if an application has been made to the Court for the adoption of the child by one or more persons who are authorised carers or the guardians for the child—

(i) the child has established a stable relationship with those carers or guardians, and

(ii) the adoption of the child by those carers or guardians will promote the child’s welfare, and

(iii) in the case of an Aboriginal child, alternatives to placement for adoption have been considered in accordance with section 36.

(2) The Court must not make such a consent dispense order unless satisfied that to do so is in the best interests of the child.

(3) In this section—

guardian has the same meaning as in section 79A (1) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998.

47. The proposed adoptive parents are "authorised carers" because they have care and responsibility for Angelo under out-of-home care arrangements made under the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act: Dictionary to the Act.

48. As Meek J noted in Adoption of Tiana (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWSC 1561 at [52], there is a difference in focus between, on the one hand, s 67(1)(a)-(c) and, on the other, s 67(1)(d) of the Act. The difference was explained by Slattery J in Director General Department of Family and Community Services; Re Stephen [2011] NSWSC 1521 at [58]-[59] as follows:

“Each of Adoption Act, s 67(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) is a gateway for the exercise of the s 67(1) discretion to make a consent dispense order. But there is a difference in focus between Adoption Act, s 67(1)(a), (b) and (c) and Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d). The difference is that s 67(1)(a), (b), (c) are each concerned with the situation of the birth parent or other person whose consent to an adoption order would otherwise be required under Adoption Act, s 52. These provisions deal with the inability of a person to provide consent, either because he or she cannot be found or because of incapacity or because issues concerning the welfare of the child displace the wishes of the parent or person with parental responsibility. All of these matters are concerned with the quality or the relative value of the consent of the parent or person with parental responsibility.

But Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d) has a different focal point. On its face it says nothing about the capacity or quality of the consent of the parent or person with parental responsibility. Rather, it looks to the child’s present situation. The threshold for the court’s exercise of Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d) discretion is that the authorised carers of the child have applied for the child’s adoption, that the child has established a stable relationship with those carers, and that the adoption of the child by those carers will promote the child’s welfare. Those matters are all well established here. Section 67(1)(d) does not expressly place a requirement on the exercise of the court’s s 67(1)(d) discretion that the court make a judgment about the quality or value of the consent of birth parent or other person with parental responsibility. But as Brereton J explained in Director General, Department of Community Services v D (2007) 37 Fam LR 595; [2007] NSWSC 762, parental consent is always a consideration; ‘Although the interest of the child are paramount, the Adoption Act does not entirely disregard the parental rights of the birth parents as is evident from the requirement for their consent’. Adoption Act, Chapter 4, Part 2, emphasizes the principle that an informed consent should be given by parents or persons with parental responsibility before an adoption order can be made. But when it applies, as has been stated, Adoption Act, s 67(1)(d) provides a different emphasis.”

Dispensing with the requirement for the consent of the birth mother

49. Kim has not consented to the adoption and has previously requested that Angelo be restored to her care.

50. Between October 2023 and October 2024, the Independent Assessor either met or spoke by telephone with Kim on around ten occasions.

51. On 25 October 2023, Kim stated that she had spent two years trying to have Angelo restored to her care and that she did not want the adoption to proceed. She further stated that she had sought advice from Legal Aid with regards to having more contact with Angelo. However, she told the Independent Assessor that she was not necessarily fighting the adoption.

52. On 13 November 2023, Kim stated to the Independent Assessor that her views had not changed and that she was still waiting to hear back from her lawyers and planned to follow up shortly. She made further statements to this effect to the Independent Assessor during their phone calls on 20 November 2023 and 12 December 2023.

53. On 9 April 2024, the Independent Assessor contacted Kim to advise her that Anglicare had commenced the adoption process. Kim stated that she was having difficulties getting in contact with Legal Aid and had made no progress in requesting that Angelo be restored to her care.

54. There were further telephone calls and meetings between Kim and the Independent Assessor on 29 January 2024, 15 August 2024, 3 September 2024, 12 September 2024 and 9 October 2024.

55. On 7 November 2024, Kim was served with notice, pursuant to s 72(1) of the Act, of the application for an order dispensing with the requirement for her consent to Angelo's adoption; and notice, pursuant to s 88(1)(a) of the Act, of the application for the adoption order.

56. Kim has not appeared in this proceeding to oppose the orders sought by the Plaintiff, and has signed the maternal adoption plan.

57. From her interactions with Kim, the Independent Assessor has formed the view that “Kim feels compelled to express her desire to have Angelo returned to her care but is ambivalent about this; she knows realistically this would be extremely challenging for her and would profoundly impact her mental health, which she has indicated is already fragile.”

58. The Principal Officer of Anglicare seeks an order, pursuant to s 67(1)(d) of the Act, to dispense with the requirement for Kim’s consent.

59. Dispensing with the consent of a parent is a grave step, not lightly to be taken: Adoption of RCC and RZA [2015] NSWSC 813 at [17] (Brereton J). In Adoption of BL [2018] NSWSC 391 at [20], Sacker J noted that the “severance of the legal relationship will of course never sever the biological relationship nor will it detract from the potential for developing a meaningful relationship through ongoing contact.”

60. I may not make a consent dispense order unless I am satisfied that, relevantly, Angelo has established a stable relationship with his authorised carers, Natalie and Glenn, and that the adoption of Angelo by Natalie and Glenn will promote his welfare: ss 67(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Before making such an order, I must also be satisfied that to do so will be in the best interests of Angelo: s 67(2) of the Act.

61. For the reasons given above when considering the proposed adoption order, I am comfortably satisfied about these matters. Having regard to the evidence of the proposed adoptive parents, the Independent Assessor and the Delegate, I am satisfied that Angelo has a stable and loving relationship with Natalie and Glenn and that they will continue to promote his welfare and continued development. Angelo’s relationship with Natalie, Glenn and Gabriel is the only close family relationship that he knows, having regard to the very young age at which he was placed in the care of his proposed adoptive parents. The making of a consent dispense order, so as to allow the making of the adoption order, is in the best interests of Angelo so as to allow his close bond with his psychological family to be reflected in his legal status.

Dispensing with the requirement for the consent of the birth father

62. The Court has the power to make a consent dispense order in circumstances where the person whose consent is required “cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be found or identified”: s 67(1)(a) of the Act.

63. Kim has consistently maintained that Angelo’s birth father is a man from Lebanon but has declined to provide any identifying information about the man. Kim has stated that her lawyers have indicated that she would need to take the matter to court and go through DNA testing to have the name of Angelo’s birth father recorded on his birth certificate.

64. Since Angelo’s birth, Anglicare and the Department of Communities and Justice and Anglicare have undertaken investigations in relation to several potential fathers of Angelo. Those investigations are set out in the affidavit of the Delegate. Those investigations have not revealed the identity of Angelo’s birth father. Kim has declined to provide any further information which would assist Anglicare in further pursuing this matter.

65. Generally, the Court “must not make a consent dispense order on the application of any person unless notice of the application has been given to the person whose consent is sought to be dispensed with at least 14 days before the order is made”: s 72(1) of the Act. However, the Court has the power to dispense with the giving of such notice: s 88(4) of the Act. The test for dispensing with the requirement to provide notice to a consent dispense order is set out in s 72(2) of the Act, which relevantly provides as follows:

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if —

(a) the person cannot, after reasonable inquiry, be found or identified …

66. Anglicare submits that it has made “reasonable inquiries” within the meaning of this provision and that, as a result of those inquiries, it has not been able to identify Angelo’s birth father. Having regard to the Delegate’s evidence, I accept this submission.

67. Further, for reasons already set out above, I am satisfied that the requirements of s 67(1)(d) are satisfied, namely, Angelo has established a stable relationship with Natalie and Glenn, and his adoption by them would promote his welfare.

68. Accordingly, I will make orders dispensing with the requirement for notice of a consent dispense order to be served on Angelo’s birth father and with the requirement for his birth father’s consent to the adoption.

The Adoption Plans

69. A maternal adoption plan has been served upon Kim, and has been signed by her.

70. The maternal adoption plan includes provision for face-to-face family time to occur between Kim and Angelo twelve times per year for a minimum duration of two hours. These visits may be replaced by WhatsApp video calls if requested by Kim. Visits will be jointly held with Angelo’s maternal half-sibling, Henry.

71. There is also provision for future telephone contact between Angelo, Kim and/or Henry if Angelo were to request this when he is older and there is provision for Natalie and Glenn to provide Kim with updates on Angelo’s progress, including photos, four times per year via email.

72. Natalie and Glenn are already facilitating and supervising family visits with Kim independently and do not need additional agency support to enact the maternal adoption plan following finalisation of the adoption.

73. I am satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in Angelo’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

74. A paternal adoption plan has also been signed by Natalie and Glenn in the event that Angelo’s birth father is identified which provides for contact between Angelo and his birth father should it be safe and in Angelo’s best interests.

Proposed name change

75. The Plaintiff seeks an order approving the name “Sharma” as the surname and “Angelo Dinesh Peter” as the given names of Angelo.

76. “Sharma” is the surname of Natalie and Glenn. The names that I have referred to as “Angelo Dinesh Peter” is comprised of part of Angelo’s existing name (Angelo), Glenn’s middle name (Dinesh), and a Chinese middle name which has been chosen by Natalie to match the sound of “Angelo” (Peter).

77. Before changing the name of Angelo, I must consider any wishes expressed by him and any factors relevant to the weight that should be given to those wishes: s 101(2) of the Act.

78. On 18 June 2024, the Independent Assessor placed separate strips of paper on the floor, with all of Angelo’s current and proposed names written on them. He immediately grabbed the strips that read “Angelo” and “Sharma” and identified with them. He also identified with the name “Dinesh” as Natalie had told him that he would be receiving that name. While he thought that his proposed full name, when arranged in front of him, looked “messy,” he understood that his middle names would only be on important papers.

79. Angelo also enthusiastically agreed to remove the names “Max” and “Kumara”.

80. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that Angelo has demonstrated an age-appropriate understanding, and signalled acceptance, of the proposed name change.

81. On 20 November 2023, the Independent Assessor asked Kim whether Angelo’s existing name had any particular significance. Kim said that “Angelo” and “Max” are the names of prophets in Islam and that she was “100%” comfortable with dropping the name “Max” upon finalisation of the adoption orders. Kim confirmed that Angelo had no connection to the surname “Kumara”, which was the surname of Kim’s ex-husband.

82. Kim expressed a preference for Angelo to take her father’s surname, being “Bailey” or “Bayley”. However, Kim has not herself adopted this surname, and it is unknown to Angelo.

83. Having regard to Angelo’s wishes, and in circumstances where maintaining Angelo’s first name maintains a connection to Kim, I am satisfied that the name “Sharma” should be adopted as Angelo’s surname.

84. I am also satisfied that the names “Dinesh” and “Peter” should be adopted as middle names for Angelo, given the significance of those names for Natalie and Glenn.

Conclusion

85. For the reasons given above, I make the following orders:

1. An order pursuant to section 88(4) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), that the giving of notice of the application to Angelo’s birth father be dispensed with.

2. An order pursuant to section 67(1) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), that the consent of Angelo’s birth father be dispensed with.

3. An order pursuant to section 67(1) of the Adoption Act 2000 (NSW), that the consent of Angelo’s birth mother be dispensed with.

4. An order for the adoption of Angelo in favour of the proposed adoptive parents.

5. An order approving the name “Sharma” as the surname and “Angelo Dinesh Peter” as the given names of Angelo.

Notation:

1. Note that the Court is satisfied that the arrangements proposed in the maternal adoption plan are in Angelo’s best interests and are proper in the circumstances.

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Decision last updated: 14 February 2025