D v Director-General Department of Community Services

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      D v. Director-General Department of Commuity Services & Ors. [2005]  NSWCA 474

FILE NUMBER(S):
40119/05

HEARING DATE(S):               7 December 2005

JUDGMENT DATE: 22/12/2005

PARTIES:
D - appellant
Director-General Department of Community Services - 1st respondent
F - Second respondents
Kathryn Renshall, Child Representative for E - Third respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Hodgson JA Ipp JA Hunt AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          EDA80080/04

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Palmer J

COUNSEL:
Mr. M.W. Anderson for appellant
Mr. G.W. Moore for 1st respondent
Ms. M. Falloon for 2nd respondents
Ms. M. Cleary for 3rd respondent

SOLICITORS:
Steve O'Connor, Legal Aid Commission of NSW, Parramatta for appellant
I.V. Knight, Crown Solicitor, Sydney for 1st respondent
Colquhoun & Colquhoun, Rozelle for 2nd respondents
Kathryn Renshall, Sydney for 3rd respondent

CATCHWORDS:
FAMILY LAW
CHILD WELFARE
ADOPTION - Whether errors were made by primary judge in failing to address alternatives, in failing to take into account factors required by ss.8 and 90 of the Adoption Act, or in dispensing with the mother's consent - Whether lack of capability referred to in s.67(1)(b) of the Act must be long-term - Whether "serious cause for concern" referred to in s.67(1)(c) of the Act must be closely linked to the available alternatives
PROCEDURE
ADJOURNMENT
APPEAL - Whether primary judge erred in refusing adjournment on the grounds of the mother's ill-health - Evidence of mother's recovery and changes of circumstances after hearing - Whether this evidence should be admitted on appeal - Whether further hearing of adoption application in best interests of child.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Adoption Act 2000 ss.8, 52, 54, 58, 67, 84, 90, 92 and 93

DECISION:
1. Appeal allowed. 2. Adoption order set aside, and the matter remitted to the Equity Division for a new hearing of the adoption application. 3. If any order as to costs is to be sought, that should be by written submissions by 16 January 2006, with any responding submissions provided by 30 January 2006.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40119/05
ED A80080/04

HODGSON JA
IPP JA
HUNT AJA

Thursday 22 December 2005

D  V.  DIRECTOR-GENERAL THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SERVICES & ORS.

Judgment

  1. HODGSON JA: On 20 December 2004, Palmer J gave judgment in proceedings in which the Director-General, Department of Community Services, sought an order for the adoption of a child E in favour of a married couple Mr. and Mrs. F, such application being opposed by the child’s natural mother D. On that day, the primary judge declared that a consent given by D to the adoption of E was ineffectual because D was not, at the time the instrument of consent was signed, in a fit condition to give the consent; made an order pursuant to s.67(1)(b) and (c) of the Adoption Act 2000 dispensing with the consent of D to the adoption of E; and made an order for the adoption of E in favour of…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWCA 474
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved an appeal by a mother, identified as D, against a decision of the primary judge concerning the adoption of her child, E. The central dispute revolved around whether the primary judge had erred in various aspects of the adoption proceedings, including failing to adequately consider alternatives, neglecting statutory requirements under sections 8 and 90 of the Adoption Act, and improperly dispensing with the mother's consent. The appeal was heard by a higher court, which was tasked with reviewing the primary judge's decision.

The legal issues before the appellate court included whether the primary judge had correctly interpreted and applied the provisions of the Adoption Act 2000, particularly concerning the paramount consideration of the child's best interests, the preservation of cultural and religious ties, and the assessment of parental capability. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether the primary judge erred in refusing an adjournment of the hearing due to the mother's ill-health and whether subsequent evidence of the mother's recovery and changed circumstances should be admitted on appeal, and if so, how it should be considered in light of the child's best interests and the principle of finality in litigation.

The court reasoned that while the primary judge had considered some aspects of the mother's wishes and the child's cultural ties, there was room for doubt regarding the thoroughness of this consideration, especially in relation to the potential beneficial consequences of preserving those ties. Crucially, the court found that significant further evidence, demonstrating the mother's recovery and the potential for positive family involvement in the child's upbringing, had emerged after the original hearing. Applying principles regarding the reception of fresh evidence on appeal, the court determined that to refuse this evidence would affront common sense and justice, as it falsified key assumptions upon which the primary judge had made decisions, including the refusal of the adjournment. The court concluded that admitting this evidence was necessary to ensure a correct assessment of the child's best interests.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the adoption order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Equity Division for a new hearing of the adoption application. The court also provided directions regarding any potential applications for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed. 2. Adoption order set aside, and the matter remitted to the Equity Division for a new hearing of the adoption application. 3. If any order as to costs is to be sought, that should be by written submissions by 16 January 2006, with any responding submissions provided by 30 January 2006.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my opinion, a fair reading of the whole judgment indicates that the primary judge did have regard to the wishes of the mother, as required by s.2(e); and in my opinion did give consideration to a proposed adoption plan having in mind provision for the child’s cultural and religious ties. As to whether the judge identified the child’s cultural ties and considered their preservation, and considered the interests of the child in later life, in the light of these matters, as required by s.8(1)(a) and (e), there is room for some doubt. D’s culture and community was referred to, but in the context of it being extremely hostile to a mother and child in the position of D and E, and the potentially adverse consequences of that. It does not appear that there was before the primary judge evidence of substantial beneficial consequences to the child through D’s culture and community, if an adoption order was refused. In those circumstances, it does not seem to me that there was material error in the judge not referring to these items. Of course, the further evidence, to which I will refer, puts the matter in a different light; but that was not before the primary judge, and cannot be relied on to show error by the primary judge.FURTHER EVIDENCE In my opinion, the question of reception and use of the further evidence, independently of error being shown in the judgment of the primary judge, should be considered in the light of principles discussed in Doherty v. Liverpool District Hospital (1991) 22 NSWLR 284. It is not necessary that “special grounds” be shown for the reception of evidence concerning matters occurring after the trial or hearing: see Supreme Court Act 1970, s.75A(8) and (9). The question whether such evidence should be admitted has to be approached as a matter of discretion and degree, having regard to the context in which it arises and also to the general public interest in finality of litigation. As stated by Lord Wilberforce in Mulholland v. Mitchell [1971] AC 666 at 679-680, such evidence may be admitted if basic assumptions, common to both sides at the trial, have clearly been falsified by subsequent events, or where to refuse to admit it would affront common sense or a sense of justice. On the other hand, it ought not to be admitted when it bears on matters falling within a field or area of uncertainty, in which a trial judge’s estimate has previously been made. Although the additional evidence indicates that one assumption on which the primary judge acted in refusing the adjournment, namely that the position of D could well be the same in two months’ time, was falsified, the further material does not in my opinion show that there was any procedural unfairness to D. I would add that, in any event, procedural fairness in cases such as this is not an overriding consideration, the predominant consideration being the best interests of E: cf. Re Andrew [2004] NSWSC 842, 61 NSWLR 283. The further evidence does show that D has recovered, in a way not anticipated; and shows a likelihood that there would be positive involvement of her family in the care and upbringing of E if the adoption was set aside. I think it is fair to say that this does amount to the falsification of assumptions, rather than merely being the realisation of a contingency taken into account by the primary judge. Had the primary judge not acted on the contrary assumptions but been in a position to make a correct assessment of these potentialities, a different outcome of the case would have been a substantial possibility; though I could not say that a different outcome would have been likely. In my opinion, to refuse to admit this evidence would affront common sense and a sense of justice.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Adoption Act 2000 provides in s.8 for principles to be applied by persons making decisions about the adoption of a child, as follows:8 What principles are to be applied by persons making decisions about the adoption of a child?(1)In making a decision about the adoption of a child, a decision maker is to have regard (as far as is practicable or appropriate) to the following principles: (a)the best interests of the child, both in childhood and in later life, must be the paramount consideration,(b)adoption is to be regarded as a service for the child, not for adults wishing to acquire the care of the child,(c)no adult has a right to adopt the child,(d)if the child is able to form his or her own views on a matter concerning his or her adoption, he or she must be given an opportunity to express those views freely and those views are to be given due weight in accordance with the developmental capacity of the child and the circumstances,(e)the child’s given name or names, identity, language and cultural and religious ties should, as far as possible, be identified and preserved,(f)if the child is Aboriginal - the Aboriginal child placement principles are to be applied,(g)if the child is a Torres Strait Islander - the Torres Strait Islander child placement principles are to be applied.(2)In determining the best interests of the child, the decision maker is to have regard to the following: (a)any wishes expressed by the child,(b)the child’s age, maturity, level of understanding, gender, background and family relationships and any other characteristics of the child that the decision maker thinks are relevant,(c)the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs, including the child’s sense of personal, family and cultural identity,(d)any disability that the child has,(e)any wishes expressed by either or both of the parents of the child,(f)the relationship that the child has with his or her parents and siblings (if any) and any significant other people (including relatives) in relation to whom the decision maker considers the question to be relevant,(g)the attitude of each proposed adoptive parent to the child and to the responsibilities of parenthood,(h)the nature of the relationship of the child with each proposed adoptive parent,(i)the suitability and capacity of each proposed adoptive parent, or any other person, to provide for the needs of the child, including the emotional and intellectual needs of the child,(j)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm caused, or that may be caused, by being subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour, or being present while a third person is subjected or exposed to abuse, ill-treatment, violence or other behaviour,(k)the alternatives to the making of an adoption order and the likely effect on the child in both the short and longer term of changes in the child’s circumstances caused by an adoption, so that adoption is determined among all alternative forms of care to best meet the needs of the child.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established