DFW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DFW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 746

Appeal from: DFW16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2726
File number: NSD 2287 of 2017
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 25 May 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Safe Haven Enterprise visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the judge failed to consider significant judgments – whether the judge was biased in fixing costs – whether the judge failed to hold that the Authority acted unreasonably and denied procedural fairness – whether there was a failure to exercise or not consider whether to exercise power to invite the appellant to give new information – section 473DC(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where inconsistencies in appellant’s visa application and a prior invalid application were not put to him – where the Authority unreasonably failed to consider exercising its power to get information – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DC(3), 473DD, Pt 7AA Div 3

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) R 35.13(a) and R 35.14

Cases cited:

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958

CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576; [1994] FCA 293

DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 & Anor [2018] HCASL 102

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 [2018] FCAFC 32

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li and Another (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

Date of hearing: 24 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 85
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr BD Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

NSD 2287 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DFW16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

(1)The appeal be allowed.

(2)The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 8 December 2017 be set aside.

(3)The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 11 October 2016 not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa be set aside.

(4)The matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for consideration by another member in accordance with law.

(5)The appellant be entitled to his costs in the Federal Circuit Court, and on…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 746
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

DFW16 applied for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority, which had affirmed a delegate's refusal of his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application, leading DFW16 to appeal to the Federal Court. The appeal centred on whether the Federal Circuit Court judge failed to consider significant judgments, whether the judge was biased in fixing costs, and whether the judge failed to hold that the Authority acted unreasonably and denied procedural fairness. Additionally, DFW16 argued that the judge failed to consider whether to exercise the power to invite him to give new information.

The Federal Court found that the judge in the Circuit Court erred in not finding that, while the Authority could regard the 2013 application in its decision-making, the Authority acted unreasonably in failing to consider whether it should invite the appellant to comment on the question of the internal inconsistencies it had identified between the two applications before finally disposing of the SHEV application. The court held that the judge's failure to consider this issue was a legal error that warranted allowing the appeal. Regarding the other grounds of appeal, the court found that there was no error in the judge's consideration of other relevant judgments, and that the judge's impartiality was not called into question by the circumstances of the case.

The Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the matter to the Immigration Assessment Authority for reconsideration by another member. The appellant was also entitled to his costs in the Federal Circuit Court and on this appeal, if any, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) The appeal be allowed.

(2) The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 8 December 2017 be set aside.

(3) The decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 11 October 2016 not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa be set aside.

(4) The matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for consideration by another member in accordance with law.

(5) The appellant be entitled to his costs in the Federal Circuit Court, and on this appeal, if any, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa, which was ultimately refused by the delegate on 28 July 2016. The Minister referred this decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) for fast track review, as required by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The IAA affirmed the delegate's decision on 11 October 2016, finding the appellant was not owed protection obligations by Australia and did not meet the criteria for complementary protection. The IAA based this decision on significant inconsistencies between the appellant's 2013 protection application and his 2015 Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV) application, which undermined the appellant's credibility. The inconsistencies in question related to the appellant's membership in a youth club, his position with the youth group, the attack on his father, and other events. The IAA concluded there were not substantial grounds for believing the appellant faced a real risk of significant harm on return to Sri Lanka. The appellant applied for judicial review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed the application on 8 December 2017.

The appellant applied for judicial review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The matter was heard on 4 August 2017, 7 September 2017, and 8 December 2017. On 8 December 2017, Judge Smith dismissed the appellant's application and ordered the appellant to pay the Minister's costs. The appellant then appealed the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal was heard and determined on the basis of written submissions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate refused the appellant’s claims for complementary protection for the same reasons.AUTHORITY’S DECISION On 28 July 2016, as required by the Act, the Minister referred the delegate’s refusal decision to the Authority for fast track review under Pt 7AA of the Act. On 11 October 2016, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s refusal. The Authority, having regard (amongst other factors) to inconsistencies in the appellant’s claims in his 2013 protection application and his 2015 SHEV application, found he was not a person who was owed protection obligations by Australia for the purposes of s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The Authority considered that, in respect of a number of the appellant’s claims, the appellant’s information was “materially inconsistent and implausible”, which undermined his credibility. At [12]‑[23] of the Authority’s decision record, it dealt with inconsistencies in relation to a number of the appellant’s claims under the headings “Youth club, Karuna group/SLFP, Pillayan group/TMVP”, “His position with the youth group”, “Club membership”, “Attack on his father”, “Timing of attack on father and hiding in other village”, “Meeting on the beach”, “Detention by Karuna group”, “Snake bite”, and “Abduction due to father’s political affiliation and forced labour of brothers” where the statements made in the 2013 protection application were used to evaluate, unfavourably, the SHEV claims of the appellant. The inconsistencies identified were plainly significant to the Authority’s final disposition of the SHEV application. It also was not satisfied that the appellant had a profile that would bring him to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities by reason of having a suspected link to the LTTE. The Authority was not satisfied the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm due to being a failed asylum seeker or having departed Sri Lanka illegally. Finally, the Authority concluded that there were not substantial grounds for believing that the appellant faced a real risk of significant harm on return to Sri Lanka, meaning he did not meet the s 36(2)(aa) criteria for complementary protection. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT The appellant then applied for judicial review of the Authority’s decision on 28 October 2016. At the hearing of the application in the Circuit Court, a key issue was whether it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to have exercised or considered exercising its power to invite the appellant to comment on, and respond to, inconsistencies between versions of events. The judge noted that there were marked differences between the appellant’s 2013 protection claims and those made in 2015 on the SHEV application. At [12] of his reasons, the judge stated:For example, the relevant narrative in the SHEV application started in 2011 when the applicant became the president of the [Youth Club] and the reasons for the applicant leaving his home town in the first instance were different and given in greater detail than in the 2013 [protection application].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In those circumstances, I consider that the judge in the Circuit Court erred in not finding that, while the Authority could regard the 2013 application in its decision‑making, the Authority acted unreasonably in failing to consider whether it should invite the appellant to comment on the question of the internal inconsistencies it had identified between the two applications before finally disposing of the SHEV application; and so would uphold the appeal on this ground.Ground 2: Did the Circuit Court judge err in failing to take into consideration the decisions in BVZ16, BBS16 and CHF16? The appellant does not elaborate on this ground in his particulars. In his outline of submissions, the Minister argues this ground is new and, accordingly, the appellant requires leave in its respect. He contends this leave should be refused as the ground of appeal does not allege with any specificity any error of the Authority in considering the appellant’s material. In any event, the Minister contends, the Authority’s consideration of the material was sound as it turned its mind to the s 473DD criteria and concluded that it was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the consideration of the information contained in the appellant’s statutory declaration, written submissions and attachments which raised claims not before the delegate. I do not consider that the judge can be said to have erred in failing to take into consideration the decisions mentioned. There are many decisions of this Court that may bear upon aspects of the fast track decision‑making process that the Authority must engage in. It is for a relevant party to make submissions to a court about jurisdictional errors they say were made. It is not enough simply to refer to other decisions and say in some amorphous way that the Court failed in taking them into consideration. There is nothing to suggest that the judge below failed to consider any relevant allegation of error made to him. For that reason, this ground must fail. Ground 3: Did the Circuit Court judge’s “actual or lack of impartiality and prejudice” affect his Honour’s finding affirming the Authority’s decision and dismissing the appellant’s application “with higher cost”? The appellant contends, by his particulars of this ground, that:a)The appellant’s application came up for hearing on 4 August 2017 before Judge Smith and his counsel barrister Ben Zipser who requested to court to tender the amended application which was not objected by the respondent Minister’s lawyers. The judge Smith after several comments made on the counsel Ben Zipser accepted the amended application.b)The application SYG2109/2016 came up for hearing on 7 September 2017 where the counsel barrister Ben Zipser who apologised to court and submitted an affidavit and requested for an extension to tender his amended application. The amended application was accepted by Judge Smith with comments on the counsel barrister Ben Zipser. The said application was dismissed by Judge Smith who also ordered the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,206.c)The applicant’s matter SYG2981/2016 was dismissed by Judge Smith on 8 December 2017 who also ordered the applicant pay the first respondent’s cost fixed in the amount of $12,000 made criticism of counsel barrister Ben Zipser. This was done despite barrister Ben Zipser sent an Email on 8 December 2017 at 2:41 am to the Associate of Judge Smith and Katherine Hooper, Minister’s solicitor that he cannot appear for the applicant due to a commitment in another court at the same time at 9.30 am on 8 December 2017 for the hand down the judgement and the cost order should be less that claimed by the Minister for the following reasons:1)The Minister incurred solicitor costs of $1,422.80 for, inter alia, preparing an affidavit dated 1 August 2017. Although the Minister served the affidavit, the Minister did not read the affidavit at the hearing. The Minister should not get party/party costs for work in preparing an affidavit it did not read at the hearing.2)The Minister incurred solicitor costs of $3,272 in preparing for and attending the hearing on 4 August 2017 and reporting to the client. In circumstances where counsel was briefed to appear for the Minister, the amount recoverable on a party/party basis for a solicitor’s preparation for and attendance at the hearing should be lower.3)The Minister incurred solicitor costs of $1,636 for ‘reviewing the issues arising in the matter and providing a preliminary and subsequent advices to client’ and solicitor costs of $1,390 for ‘preparing ... [etc] the Court Book’. In circumstances where scale costs are about $7,600, incurring costs totalling about $3,000 for these two steps appears disproportionately high.4)There is an invoice from counsel dated 4 August 2017 totalling $4,046.78. The applicant has no objection to this invoice. There is then a second invoice from counsel dated 7 September 2017 totalling $485.95 for work done between 22 and 24 August, which was two weeks after the hearing on 4 August. It is not clear what this work was for. Prima facie, this work is not recoverable under party/party costs.5)However, taking into account the above matters, the order should be closer to the scale amount.