FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DEE16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2966 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – protection visa – whether the Authority erred in interpreting or applying the law, or failed to exercise its jurisdiction, or erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction – whether the Authority failed to have regard to relevant considerations – whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error in that it was unreasonable. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.473DC, 473DD |
| Applicant: | DEE16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File number: | MLG 2307 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Riley |
| Hearing date: | 20 June 2019 |
| Date of last submission: | 20 June 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 17 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the applicant: | Anthony Krohn |
| Solicitors for the applicant: | Ambi Associates |
| Counsel for the first respondent: | John Maloney |
| Counsel for the second respondent: | No appearance |
| Solicitors for the respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application filed on 25 October 2016 and amended on 27 May 2019 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,467.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 2307 of 2016
| DEE16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First respondent
And
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”). In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant’s claims
The applicant’s claims are summarised in paragraph 9 of his written submissions filed on 27 May 2019 as follows:
The applicant’s reasons for seeking protection including (sic) the following claims:
a)The Applicant is a man in his twenties, a non-citizen of Australia, and a national of Sri Lanka and of no other country. (CB 54)
b)He has no right to enter and to reside in any other country. (CB 54)
c)The Applicant is of Tamil ethnicity. (CB 56)
d)The applicant is a Hindu. (CB 56)
e)The core of the Applicant’s claims was that because of his race, his birth and growing up in an area formerly under LTTE control, and because of his brother who had been an LTTE fighter, detained, tortured, permanently injured, rehabilitated, but subject to continuing monitoring and reporting, he was at risk himself as [being] suspect[ed] of LTTE involvement.(CB 30, 102-105)
f)The Applicant claimed to have been questioned and beaten by the authorities about the LTTE, both during his time in a Sri Lankan Army camp at the end of the war, and also since then in…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read DEE16 v Minister for Immigration and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCCA 2966
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicant contended that the delegate failed to properly consider and assess the evidence relating to his alleged past membership of the LTTE and the potential consequences of his return to Sri Lanka, thereby failing to afford him procedural fairness. The applicant argued that this failure amounted to a jurisdictional error, vitiating the delegate's decision.
Judge Riley found that the delegate's assessment of the applicant's claims regarding his alleged LTTE membership and the associated risks in Sri Lanka was inadequate. The Court held that the delegate had not adequately grappled with the evidence presented, particularly concerning the applicant's stated reasons for fearing persecution. This failure to undertake a proper assessment of the evidence, in the context of the applicant's protection claims, constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court therefore quashed the delegate's decision.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority). The applicant, DEE16, sought to challenge the Authority's decision to refuse to grant him a protection visa. The Authority had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The application for review was initially filed on 25 October 2016 and subsequently amended on 27 May 2019. During the hearing before the court on 20 June 2019, the applicant conceded that there was support for the Minister's position regarding the delegate's acceptance that the applicant had been questioned after 2010. The court dismissed the application, finding that none of the applicant's grounds had been made out. Consequently, the application was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,467.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in interpreting or applying the law, and fail to exercise its jurisdiction, or err in the exercise of its jurisdiction by not exercising its power under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 to invite the applicant to an interview or otherwise get new information about his claims?
2. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in interpreting or applying the term “real chance” under section 5H of the Migration Act 1958, in finding that it was “not satisfied that there is a real chance the Sri Lankan authorities will take an adverse interest in the applicant on return to Sri Lanka for any reason”?
3. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority fail to have regard to relevant considerations, including relevant information, by excluding the applicant’s brother’s membership of the LTTE as a factor in its assessment of any risk of harm to the applicant?
4. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority fall into jurisdictional error in that it was unreasonable by:
a) Making findings which were illogical in the sense of being unsupported by any probative evidence or acting so unreasonably that no reasonable decision maker could so have acted?
b) Being contradictory in its findings about the applicant’s brother?
c) Excluding the applicant’s brother’s membership of the LTTE as a factor in any risk to the applicant?
Held
1. The court concluded that the Immigration Assessment Authority did not err in interpreting or applying the law, or fail to exercise its jurisdiction, or err in the exercise of its jurisdiction by not exercising its power under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 to invite the applicant to an interview or otherwise get new information about his claims. The first aspect of ground 1 is not made out.
2. The court concluded that the Immigration Assessment Authority did not err in interpreting or applying the term “real chance” under section 5H of the Migration Act 1958, in finding that it was “not satisfied that there is a real chance the Sri Lankan authorities will take an adverse interest in the applicant on return to Sri Lanka for any reason”. The second aspect of ground 1 is not made out.
3. The court concluded that the Immigration Assessment Authority did not fail to have regard to relevant considerations, including relevant information, by excluding the applicant’s brother’s membership of the LTTE as a factor in its assessment of any risk of harm to the applicant. Ground 2 is without substance.
4. The court concluded that the Immigration Assessment Authority did not fall into jurisdictional error in that it was unreasonable by:
a) Making findings which were illogical in the sense of being unsupported by any probative evidence or acting so unreasonably that no reasonable decision maker could so have acted. The error alleged in the first aspect of ground 3 is not made out.
b) Being contradictory in its findings about the applicant’s brother. The error alleged in the second aspect of ground 3 is not made out.
c) Excluding the applicant’s brother’s membership of the LTTE as a factor in any risk to the applicant. The error alleged in the third aspect of ground 3 is not made out.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in the case of DEE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 2966, delivered its judgment on October 17, 2019. The applicant, DEE16, a non-citizen and national of Sri Lanka, sought review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) that affirmed the Minister's delegate's decision to refuse his application for a protection visa. The Court considered several grounds of review, including whether the IAA erred in its interpretation or application of the law, failed to exercise its jurisdiction, erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction, failed to have regard to relevant considerations, and fell into jurisdictional error by being unreasonable. The ratio decidendi of this case can be distilled into several key points regarding the scope of the IAA's discretion under the Migration Act 1958, the interpretation of the term "real chance," and the standards of reasonableness in administrative decision-making.
Firstly, the Court addressed whether the IAA erred in not exercising its power under section 473DC of the Migration Act to invite the applicant to an interview or otherwise obtain new information about his claims. The Court noted that section 473DC does not impose a duty on the IAA to obtain new information, and the decision not to invite the applicant to an interview did not constitute an error in interpreting or applying the law, or a failure to exercise jurisdiction. The Court relied on previous cases such as DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2018] FCAFC 12, which established that the IAA is not required to obtain new information simply because an applicant's credibility is in issue. The Court found that the IAA's decision was within its lawful discretion and did not err in this regard.
Secondly, the Court examined whether the IAA erred in interpreting or applying the term "real chance" under section 5H of the Migration Act. The applicant argued that the IAA misunderstood the real chance test by failing to consider that a known, rehabilitated but gravely injured LTTE member might be subject to monitoring, while his brother might be harassed and physically harmed. The Court concluded that the IAA's reasoning on this issue was open to it and did not reflect a misapprehension of the real chance test. The IAA explained why the circumstances of the applicant's brother did not lead to a well-founded fear of persecution, and the Court found that this aspect of the ground amounted to a request for merits review, which is beyond the scope of judicial review.
Thirdly, the Court considered whether the IAA failed to have regard to relevant considerations, specifically the applicant's brother's membership of the LTTE. The Court held that the IAA had indeed considered the relevant information and rejected the applicant's interpretation of the facts. The IAA concluded that the applicant's brother had been apprehended, rehabilitated, and was complying with ongoing monitoring requirements, and there was no evidence that he had become involved in any pro-LTTE activities or attracted further adverse attention from the authorities. The Court found that this ground amounted to a request for merits review and was without substance.
Lastly, the Court addressed whether the IAA fell into jurisdictional error by being unreasonable. The Court considered three aspects of unreasonableness alleged by the applicant: making findings unsupported by probative evidence, being contradictory in its findings about the applicant's brother, and excluding the applicant's brother's membership of the LTTE as a factor in any risk to the applicant. The Court found that the IAA's reasoning was rational and based on the evidence before it, and there was no contradiction in the IAA's findings. The Court also found that the IAA was not unreasonable in excluding the applicant's brother's membership of the LTTE as a factor in any risk to the applicant, as the IAA had considered the relevant information and concluded that the circumstances did not give rise to a real chance of harm.
In conclusion, the Court found that none of the applicant's grounds for review were made out, and the application for judicial review was dismissed with costs. The ratio decidendi of this case reinforces the principles that the IAA has broad discretion in conducting its review under the Migration Act, the interpretation of the term "real chance" is fact-specific and open to reasonable differences of opinion, and the standard of reasonableness in administrative decision-making requires that decisions be based on probative evidence and logical reasoning.