FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DPI17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 2039 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether Authority acted unreasonably by failing to consider whether to exercise or by failing to exercise its discretion under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain information from the Applicant – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.46A, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, pt.7AA |
| Cases cited: DFW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 746 Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 353 ALR 600 |
| Applicant: | DPI17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | MLG 1739 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Hartnett |
| Hearing date: | 17 July 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 26 July 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr McBeth |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Wimal & Associates |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Knowles |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the sum of $7,328.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1739 of 2017
| DPI17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By judicial review application filed on 9 August 2017, the Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Second Respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘the Authority’), wherein the Authority affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the First Respondent (‘the delegate’) to refuse to grant the Applicant a (Class XE) subclass 790 (Safe Haven Enterprise) visa (‘SHEV’). The Applicant proceeds on an amended application dated 8 June 2018, wherein three grounds of judicial review are advanced in support of the Applicant’s claim that the Authority’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error. At the hearing of the matter and in response to evidence put before the Court by the First Respondent, and in particular the affidavit evidence of Mr Lochland, the Applicant withdrew from grounds numbered 2 and 3 of the amended application. The affidavit evidence of Mr Lochland, affirmed 3 July 2018, provided evidence as to the material which was before the delegate at the time of the delegate’s interview with the Applicant. It is clear that the Applicant’s statutory declaration dated 23 September 2013 was before the delegate, and was viewed by the delegate on 7 June 2016, 15 June 2016 and 26 September 2016, with the delegate’s decision being made on 22 November 2016. The withdrawal of those grounds was, in the circumstances, a necessary concession.
Ground 1 of the amended application on which the Applicant proceeds is as follows:-
“1. The IAA acted unreasonably in the exercise of its discretion, or alternatively, constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction, in failing to exercise or failing to consider whether to exercise its discretion under s473DC to get information from…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 2039
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court was required to consider whether the delegate of the Minister, in assessing the applicant's claims, had failed to properly consider relevant information or had taken into account irrelevant considerations, thereby vitiating the decision-making process.
Judge Hartnett found that the delegate had failed to adequately consider crucial aspects of the applicant's claims regarding past persecution and the risk of future persecution. The court reasoned that a failure to engage with significant evidence presented by the applicant constituted a failure to exercise the power conferred by the relevant legislation, leading to jurisdictional error. The principles of administrative law concerning the proper consideration of evidence and the avoidance of irrelevant factors were applied.
The court made orders setting aside the Minister's decision and remitting the application for a protection visa to the Minister for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable, as the applicant and his representative were aware that the delegate had considered the protection visa statutory declaration and its inconsistencies with the SHEV statutory declaration. Furthermore, the applicant and his representative were given an opportunity to make submissions to the delegate about any inconsistencies between the statutory declarations. The IAA was not legally required to invite the applicant to an interview to discuss the inconsistencies or to put them to him for comment in another form. The facts of this case are distinguishable from DFW16, as the applicant in DFW16 was not aware that his previous statutory declaration was before the delegate or the IAA. In this case, the applicant and his representative were aware of the inconsistencies between the statutory declarations and had an opportunity to make submissions to the delegate about those inconsistencies. Therefore, it was not legally unreasonable for the IAA not to consider whether to exercise its discretion under s.473DC to obtain new information from the applicant. The ground for judicial review was not made out, and the application was dismissed with costs.
The case of DPI17 v Minister for Immigration & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2039 involves a judicial review application by the Applicant, DPI17, seeking to overturn a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority ('the Authority') to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ('the delegate') to refuse the Applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (subclass 790). The judicial review application was filed on 9 August 2017, and an amended application was subsequently filed on 8 June 2018. At the hearing of the matter on 17 July 2018, the Applicant withdrew from two of the grounds of the amended application, leaving only Ground 1 to be considered by the Court. Ground 1 contends that the Authority acted unreasonably by failing to exercise or consider whether to exercise its discretion under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain information from the Applicant regarding inconsistencies between two statutory declarations submitted by the Applicant. The matter was heard by Judge Hartnett and delivered on 26 July 2018 at Melbourne. The Court found that the Authority did not act unreasonably in failing to exercise or consider whether to exercise its power under s.473DC of the Migration Act, and dismissed the application with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority act unreasonably by failing to consider whether to exercise or by failing to exercise its discretion under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain information from the Applicant?
2. Was the Authority’s adverse credibility finding based on the identified inconsistencies in the Applicant’s statutory declarations legally reasonable?
3. Are the facts of this case distinguishable from the facts in DFW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 746, such that the decision in DFW16 does not apply?
4. Did the Authority’s review process comply with the requirements of natural justice and the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
Held
1. The court held that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) did not act unreasonably by failing to consider whether to exercise or by failing to exercise its discretion under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain information from the Applicant. The court found that the Applicant was aware of the inconsistencies between the statutory declarations, and thus it was not legally unreasonable for the IAA not to consider obtaining new information from the Applicant. The application on this ground was dismissed.
2. The court held that the IAA's adverse credibility finding based on the identified inconsistencies in the Applicant's statutory declarations was legally reasonable. The inconsistencies were identified during the interview with the delegate, and the Applicant and his representative were given an opportunity to make submissions about these inconsistencies. The ground was not made out.
3. The court held that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts in DFW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 746, such that the decision in DFW16 does not apply. In this case, the Applicant was aware of the inconsistencies between the statutory declarations and the opportunity to address these inconsistencies was provided during the interview with the delegate. The court found that it was not legally unreasonable for the IAA not to consider obtaining new information from the Applicant.
4. The court held that the IAA's review process complied with the requirements of natural justice and the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The IAA was required to reach its own view of the matter on all the materials before the delegate, and in doing so was not bound to follow the findings and reasons of the delegate. The court found no legal unreasonableness on the part of the IAA in its review process.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in DPI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2039 considered whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) acted unreasonably by failing to consider whether to exercise or by failing to exercise its discretion under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain information from the Applicant. The court found that the IAA was not legally unreasonable in not considering whether to exercise the power under s.473DC of the Act to obtain information from the Applicant. The court distinguished the facts of this case from those in DFW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 746, wherein the Applicant was not aware that the IAA would rely on inconsistencies between two statutory declarations. In this case, the delegate had referred to the inconsistencies between the statutory declarations during the interview with the Applicant, and the Applicant and his representative were given an opportunity to make submissions about those inconsistencies. Therefore, the court held that there was no legal unreasonableness on the part of the IAA in not considering whether to get new information from the Applicant under s.473DC of the Act.
The court also considered whether the IAA's adverse credibility finding based on the identified inconsistencies in the Applicant's statutory declarations was legally reasonable. The court found that the IAA's adverse credibility finding was legally reasonable, as the inconsistencies between the statutory declarations and the Applicant's evidence at the interviews were significant and undermined the Applicant's credibility.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the IAA's review process complied with the requirements of natural justice and the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court held that the IAA's review process was in accordance with the statutory requirements, as the IAA was required to undertake a review of the delegate's decision based on the material provided by the Department without accepting any new information. The court found that the IAA had exercised its discretion reasonably and had not acted unlawfully in its consideration of the Applicant's claims and evidence.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the IAA did not act unreasonably in failing to consider whether to exercise or by failing to exercise its discretion under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain information from the Applicant, as the facts of this case were distinguishable from those in DFW16. The court found the IAA's adverse credibility finding based on the inconsistencies in the Applicant's statutory declarations to be legally reasonable, and the IAA's review process to be in compliance with the requirements of natural justice and the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).