C A T C H W O R D S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - immlgration - challenge to deportation orders - appllcation for short stay - no specific ground of challenge - crlterla for grant of stay.
Miqration Act, 1958 s.18
Phanq Yook Wah & Ors.
v. John Richard Mahoney & Anor.
QLD G39 of 1986
PINCUS J.
BRISBANE
1 May 1986
| IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | ) | ||
| OWEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY |
| ||
| GENERAL DIVISION | 1 |
| BETWEEN | : |
Applicants
| AND : | JOHN RICHARD MAHONEY |
First Respondent
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
MINUTES OF ORDER
| JUDGE MAKING ORDER: | PINCUS J. |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 1 MAY 1986 |
| WHERE MADE: | BRISBANE |
| THE COURT ORDERS THAT: |
1. The appllcations be dismissed.
2 . The applicants pay to the respondents the costs of and incidental to the proceedings to be taxed.
| NOTE: | Settlement and entry of orders is dealt wlth in Order 36 |
I .
of the Federal Court Rules.
| IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | ) | ||
| OUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY |
|
| DIVISION | GENERAL | 1 |
BETWEEN: PHANG YOOK WAH
PHANG CHIA NGIT LAN
PHANG KENG CHUN PHANG YING YING
Applicants
| AND: | JOHN RICHARD MAHONEY |
First Respondent
| THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS |
Second Respondent
PINCUS J.
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
| Thls | 1 s an | application by Phang Yook | Wah, | Phanq Chia |
| Nqit Lan, | Phanq Kenq Chun, and Phanq Ylnq Yinq for an order of |
| review of decisions | that | they | be | deported | pursuant | to | the |
| provlsions of 5.18 | of the Miqration Act | 1958, as prohiblted |
| non-citizens. The dates of the | deportatlon | orders | are | not |
certainly known as to all of them, but apparently are 23 April
1986 as to the first two applicants, and 30 April 1986 as to the
last two.
| The applicants | are husband, wife, and two children who |
| came to Australia in | 1982. | They received | a temporary entry |
| permit, over-stayed, and have since lived in this country, | and |
2 .
| the | parents have worked | here. | They have apparently | been |
successful citizens, and the information before me suggests that
| they are people | of desirable character. |
| On 16 April 1986, acting | on | what | is | described | as |
| community informatlon, | an | officer of the department detained the |
flrst applicant, and he was interviewed on 17 Aprll 1986. A record of interview 1 s before me. On 18 April, on application by the department to a stipendiary magistrate, authority was glven to detain the first appllcant for 10 days.
| On that | day, an application was made to Spender | J. to |
set aside the magistrate’s order, and that application was heard
| on 18 Aprll and 21 Aprll. On the latter | day, Spender J. made an |
| order | for | the | release | of the | first | appllcant. | Wlth | the |
| concurrence of | counsel for the applicants, I have looked at the |
papers in relatlon to that first application and have noted that
counsel then actlng for the applicant sald that the famlly were
| willing to leave Australia to | go to Hong Kong immedlately, and |
| informed Spender J. that the applicatlon was brought to | allow the |
| applicant a few days‘ | breathing space to organlze | his affairs In |
| Australia. | Hls | Honour | emarked | urlng | the | course | of | the |
| application: |
| “It appears that | no appllcation is made in respect |
| of | the other three, | so that what | 1 s | intended is |
| that they will voluntarily make arrangements to | go |
| to Hong Kong. | ‘I |
| On 2 3 April, as | I have mentioned, a decislon was taken, |
| so | far as the information before | me | discloses, to deport the |
| second appllcant, and | an | order was apparently made In respect | of |
3 .
| her. | There is a copy tendered | of | the order of | deportatlon in |
| respect | of | the first appllcant. Thereafter, there were some |
contacts between the department and the applicants and legal
| advisers. | The | first appllcant apparently changed | his solicitor, |
| and on 30 Aprll, I am told - and the matter | has been conducted on |
| this basis - that deportation orders were made against the | thud |
| and fourth applicants. | The immediate purpose of the present |
| applications is to obtain | a short stay of the deportation orders |
| to | enable an | application to be brought | f o r an | interlocutory |
| inlunction on proper material. | The longer term purpose is to |
| give the first applicant, who, | of course, wishes his family to |
| remain with him | in the meantime, some months | delay, If necessary, |
| to enable him to sell his business as a going concern. | It 1 s a |
| restaurant business which | has been closed as | a result of the |
| events I have mentioned. |
| There was some debate before | me as to the proper test | to |
| be applied | with respect to the | first, and immedlate, questlon. |
| Counsel for the respondent urged upon me the | view | that, in |
| accordance with | the decision of the Full Court In Fainqold | v. |
| Zammit (1984) 1 F.C.R. | 87 and the later declsion in Dalllkavak | v. |
| The Mlnister for Immlqratlon and Ethnic Affairs, | 61 A.L.R. 471 at |
| p.478, the court | has to inquire whether there 1s | a serious |
| question | to be tried. | Counsel | for | the | applicants, | however, |
| relied upon cases such | as the decision of Toohey J. in Vldeto v. |
| The Mlnister for Immiqratlon and Ethnic Affalrs, unreported, | 20 |
| August 1985. | His Honour there remarked: |
| "Although reference is made | in the papers to | an |
interlocutory injunction, the appropriate relief is
| an order suspending the operation | of the decision |
| of | the Minister or | staying any proceedlngs under |
4 .
| that | decision, pursuant to s.15 of the Judicial |
| Review Act. | The | analogy of any interlocutory |
injunction is not necessarily appropriate."
| His Honour | then | referred | to | remarks | of Jenkinson J. in |
Dallikavak's case:
| "There wlll be occasions when the exerclse | of the |
| power 1s sought at | a time when the refusal | (or the |
| grant) of a stay wlll have grave consequences, but there is such a question to be tried. There will be cases in which the pre~udicial consequences for | it | 1 s impossible | to form any view as | to whether |
| the applicant of refusal of | a stay (or for the |
| community of grant of a stay) are of a kind | or |
| degree outslde the contemplation | of those who frame |
| the criteria governing the grant | of interlocutory |
| in~unctive relief | In litigation | concerning |
proprietary and contractual interests."
| Toohey J . | agreed with the view of Jenkinson | J . , who adopted the |
| criterion suggested | by Xeely J. In Perkins v. Cuthlll (1981) 52 |
| F . L . R . | 236 at p.238. |
| " ... s.l5(l)(a) requlres an applicant to satlsfy the | court that reasons | or circumstances exist whlch |
| make It | just that the court should make the order |
| sought . | . . |
| I have also notlced | that In Falnqold | v. Zammit the Full Court |
| recorded without disapproval that Keely | J . had given a short stay |
when refusing an lnterlocutory in~unction.
| I agree with | the contention put forward here that quite |
| different considerations apply with respect to | a short stay, the |
| only purpose of | which 1 s to enable an lnterlocutory appllcation |
| to be brought on proper material. Here, the appllcants | have the |
| dlfficulty that their | new solicitor is not fully seized of the |
| matter, having been recently appointed, although | he as obvlously |
| been vlgorous in pursuit | of his clients' interests. |
5.
| Nevertheless, | the | circumstances | are such as | to make it |
| impossible, in my view, to grant a stay. | It is not a case where |
| there has | simply been no time to apply. | I | have mentioned that |
| the controversy, if I can | call it that for slmplicity, started | a |
| fortnight ago, | and during that time, | until yesterday, there was |
no suggestlon that the applicants were unwilling to leave. Both in the interview on 17 April and before Spender J. on 23 April,
| the first applicant | put forward a contrary case. |
| Mr. Morley | Q.C., who | appears for the applicants, says |
| that the case proposed to be mounted is on the basis of | a breach |
| of the | rules | of natural | justice, | and | refers | to | the | recent |
| decision of | the | High Court | in | v. | Minister f o r Immiqration |
| and Ethnic Affalrs | 62 A.L.R. | 321. | He made complalnts | of a |
| general character under this | headlng, observing, for example, |
| that It was | not | put | to the | applicants | preclsely | what | the |
| authorities had against | them. | He suggested that they had not an |
| opportunity to answer anything | of that sort. | I can see the |
| difficulty under which | the applicants labour and the possibility |
| that, if | reasons are given and the departmental papers are |
examlned, some ground of challenge to the deportation orders may
emerge: experience suggests that that is not unlikely.
| There must, however, | in my view, be some specific legal |
basis for applying for a stay of a deportation order. The degree of cogency which the applicant must demonstrate in hls attack or
| foreshadowed | attack | depends | on the | circumstances, but, in |
general, it cannot be rlght to say that the mere possibility that
| further examination of circumstances surrounding the | making of a |
6.
| deportation order will disclose some legal defect | 1 s sufficient |
| ground for a stay. |
| That is, in essence, the position here. | It 1 s true that |
| there may | be matters which | have | been considered in making the |
| orders whlch | have not been put to the applicants, but there is | no |
| evidence of the existence of any such matters, and | I do not think |
| I am entitled | to | speculate | that | unanswered | allegations | of |
| significance underlie the basic case of the respondent, | whlch is |
| simply that there is | a power to deport prohibited non-citizens, | a |
| category into | which all the applicants admittedly fall. |
| Puttlng this more simply, in my view, | it cannot be the |
law that a stay of a deportation order, valid on its face, is to be had simply for the asking, whether for a few days, or even a
| lesser tune. It | may, to some, seem unfortunate that the course |
has been taken of deportating these applicants precipitately but
| I am far from thlnking that that course has been shown to have the slightest trace of illegality. | If, on simply suggestlng that |
| there may be | a breach of the rules of natural justlce, or some |
| other vitiating | factor, a stay may | be obtained, the practlcal |
result is that the power of immediate deportatlon given by 5.18
| of the Act | has been cut down by judicial decision. |
2r
| In my | view, therefore, the | applicatlons cannot succeed |
| and must | be dismissed. |
| 4 certify | that this and the 5- | preceding |
| p q e s | a true copy of the reascm for |
| judgment hcreln | of HIS Honour |
| Mr. justice Pincus 9 s | L!' |
Associate
| Data 1 - 7 , | /48G | . |
- AGLC
- Davies v Pagett [1986] FCA 186
- Case
- [1986] FCA 186
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue before the court was the criteria for granting a short stay of a deportation order when there is no specific ground of challenge provided. The applicants argued that the mere possibility of a legal defect in the making of the orders was sufficient to warrant a stay, while the respondents contended that a serious question to be tried must be demonstrated. The court had to balance the applicants' right to a fair hearing with the government's power to deport prohibited non-citizens.
The court held that while the possibility of a legal defect might warrant a stay in some cases, it was not sufficient on its own to grant a stay. The applicants needed to provide a specific legal basis for their request, such as a clear indication that a breach of natural justice had occurred. The court emphasised that a valid deportation order could not be easily stayed simply because the applicants suggested that there might be an issue with the process that led to the order. The court dismissed the applications for a stay, finding that the applicants had not met the required threshold.
The final orders of the court were that the applications for a stay of the deportation orders be dismissed, and that the applicants pay the costs of the proceedings to be taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.