Davies v Pagett

Case

[1986] FCA 186

5 Jan 1986

No judgment structure available for this case.

C A T C H W O R D S

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - immlgration - challenge to deportation orders - appllcation for short stay - no specific ground of challenge - crlterla for grant of stay.

Miqration Act, 1958 s.18

Phanq Yook Wah & Ors.

v. John Richard Mahoney & Anor.

QLD G39 of 1986

PINCUS J.

BRISBANE

1 May 1986

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

OWEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

QLD G39 of 1986

GENERAL DIVISION

1

BETWEEN

:

Applicants

AND :

JOHN RICHARD MAHONEY

First Respondent

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

MINUTES OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:

PINCUS J.

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MAY 1986

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appllcations be dismissed.

2 . The applicants pay to the respondents the costs of and incidental to the proceedings to be taxed.

NOTE:

Settlement and entry of orders is dealt wlth in Order 36

I .

of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

OUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

QLD G39 of 1986

DIVISION

GENERAL

1

BETWEEN: PHANG YOOK WAH

PHANG CHIA NGIT LAN

PHANG KENG CHUN PHANG YING YING

Applicants

AND:

JOHN RICHARD MAHONEY

First Respondent

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION

AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

PINCUS J.

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Thls

1 s an

application by Phang Yook

Wah,

Phanq Chia

Nqit Lan,

Phanq Kenq Chun, and Phanq Ylnq Yinq for an order of

review of decisions

that

they

be

deported

pursuant

to

the

provlsions of 5.18

of the Miqration Act

1958, as prohiblted

non-citizens. The dates of the

deportatlon

orders

are

not

certainly known as to all of them, but apparently are 23 April

1986 as to the first two applicants, and 30 April 1986 as to the

last two.

The applicants

are husband, wife, and two children who

came to Australia in

1982.

They received

a temporary entry

permit, over-stayed, and have since lived in this country,

and

2 .

the

parents have worked

here.

They have apparently

been

successful citizens, and the information before me suggests that

they are people

of desirable character.

On 16 April 1986, acting

on

what

is

described

as

community informatlon,

an

officer of the department detained the

flrst applicant, and he was interviewed on 17 Aprll 1986. A record of interview 1 s before me. On 18 April, on application by the department to a stipendiary magistrate, authority was glven to detain the first appllcant for 10 days.

On that

day, an application was made to Spender

J. to

set aside the magistrate’s order, and that application was heard

on 18 Aprll and 21 Aprll. On the latter

day, Spender J. made an

order

for

the

release

of the

first

appllcant.

Wlth

the

concurrence of

counsel for the applicants, I have looked at the

papers in relatlon to that first application and have noted that

counsel then actlng for the applicant sald that the famlly were

willing to leave Australia to

go to Hong Kong immedlately, and

informed Spender J. that the applicatlon was brought to

allow the

applicant a few days‘

breathing space to organlze

his affairs In

Australia.

Hls

Honour

emarked

urlng

the

course

of

the

application:

“It appears that

no appllcation is made in respect

of

the other three,

so that what

1 s

intended is

that they will voluntarily make arrangements to

go

to Hong Kong.

‘I

On 2 3 April, as

I have mentioned, a decislon was taken,

so

far as the information before

me

discloses, to deport the

second appllcant, and

an

order was apparently made In respect

of

3 .

her.

There is a copy tendered

of

the order of

deportatlon in

respect

of

the first appllcant. Thereafter, there were some

contacts between the department and the applicants and legal

advisers.

The

first appllcant apparently changed

his solicitor,

and on 30 Aprll, I am told - and the matter

has been conducted on

this basis - that deportation orders were made against the

thud

and fourth applicants.

The immediate purpose of the present

applications is to obtain

a short stay of the deportation orders

to

enable an

application to be brought

f o r an

interlocutory

inlunction on proper material.

The longer term purpose is to

give the first applicant, who,

of course, wishes his family to

remain with him

in the meantime, some months

delay, If necessary,

to enable him to sell his business as a going concern.

It 1 s a

restaurant business which

has been closed as

a result of the

events I have mentioned.

There was some debate before

me as to the proper test

to

be applied

with respect to the

first, and immedlate, questlon.

Counsel for the respondent urged upon me the

view

that, in

accordance with

the decision of the Full Court In Fainqold

v.

Zammit (1984) 1 F.C.R.

87 and the later declsion in Dalllkavak

v.

The Mlnister for Immlqratlon and Ethnic Affairs,

61 A.L.R. 471 at

p.478, the court

has to inquire whether there 1s

a serious

question

to be tried.

Counsel

for

the

applicants,

however,

relied upon cases such

as the decision of Toohey J. in Vldeto v.

The Mlnister for Immiqratlon and Ethnic Affalrs, unreported,

20

August 1985.

His Honour there remarked:

"Although reference is made

in the papers to

an

interlocutory injunction, the appropriate relief is

an order suspending the operation

of the decision

of

the Minister or

staying any proceedlngs under

4 .

that

decision, pursuant to s.15 of the Judicial

Review Act.

The

analogy of any interlocutory

injunction is not necessarily appropriate."

His Honour

then

referred

to

remarks

of Jenkinson J. in

Dallikavak's case:

"There wlll be occasions when the exerclse

of the

power 1s sought at

a time when the refusal

(or the

grant) of a stay wlll have grave consequences, but there is such a question to be tried. There will be cases in which the pre~udicial consequences for

it

1 s impossible

to form any view as

to whether

the applicant of refusal of

a stay (or for the

community of grant of a stay) are of a kind

or

degree outslde the contemplation

of those who frame

the criteria governing the grant

of interlocutory

in~unctive relief

In litigation

concerning

proprietary and contractual interests."

Toohey J .

agreed with the view of Jenkinson

J . , who adopted the

criterion suggested

by Xeely J. In Perkins v. Cuthlll (1981) 52

F . L . R .

236 at p.238.

" ... s.l5(l)(a) requlres an applicant to satlsfy the

court that reasons

or circumstances exist whlch

make It

just that the court should make the order

sought .

. .

I have also notlced

that In Falnqold

v. Zammit the Full Court

recorded without disapproval that Keely

J . had given a short stay

when refusing an lnterlocutory in~unction.

I agree with

the contention put forward here that quite

different considerations apply with respect to

a short stay, the

only purpose of

which 1 s to enable an lnterlocutory appllcation

to be brought on proper material. Here, the appllcants

have the

dlfficulty that their

new solicitor is not fully seized of the

matter, having been recently appointed, although

he as obvlously

been vlgorous in pursuit

of his clients' interests.

5.

Nevertheless,

the

circumstances

are such as

to make it

impossible, in my view, to grant a stay.

It is not a case where

there has

simply been no time to apply.

I

have mentioned that

the controversy, if I can

call it that for slmplicity, started

a

fortnight ago,

and during that time,

until yesterday, there was

no suggestlon that the applicants were unwilling to leave. Both in the interview on 17 April and before Spender J. on 23 April,

the first applicant

put forward a contrary case.

Mr. Morley

Q.C., who

appears for the applicants, says

that the case proposed to be mounted is on the basis of

a breach

of the

rules

of natural

justice,

and

refers

to

the

recent

decision of

the

High Court

in

v.

Minister f o r Immiqration

and Ethnic Affalrs

62 A.L.R.

321.

He made complalnts

of a

general character under this

headlng, observing, for example,

that It was

not

put

to the

applicants

preclsely

what

the

authorities had against

them.

He suggested that they had not an

opportunity to answer anything

of that sort.

I can see the

difficulty under which

the applicants labour and the possibility

that, if

reasons are given and the departmental papers are

examlned, some ground of challenge to the deportation orders may

emerge: experience suggests that that is not unlikely.

There must, however,

in my view, be some specific legal

basis for applying for a stay of a deportation order. The degree of cogency which the applicant must demonstrate in hls attack or

foreshadowed

attack

depends

on the

circumstances, but, in

general, it cannot be rlght to say that the mere possibility that

further examination of circumstances surrounding the

making of a

6.

deportation order will disclose some legal defect

1 s sufficient

ground for a stay.

That is, in essence, the position here.

It 1 s true that

there may

be matters which

have

been considered in making the

orders whlch

have not been put to the applicants, but there is

no

evidence of the existence of any such matters, and

I do not think

I am entitled

to

speculate

that

unanswered

allegations

of

significance underlie the basic case of the respondent,

whlch is

simply that there is

a power to deport prohibited non-citizens,

a

category into

which all the applicants admittedly fall.

Puttlng this more simply, in my view,

it cannot be the

law that a stay of a deportation order, valid on its face, is to be had simply for the asking, whether for a few days, or even a

lesser tune. It

may, to some, seem unfortunate that the course

has been taken of deportating these applicants precipitately but

I am far from thlnking that that course has been shown to have the slightest trace of illegality.

If, on simply suggestlng that

there may be

a breach of the rules of natural justlce, or some

other vitiating

factor, a stay may

be obtained, the practlcal

result is that the power of immediate deportatlon given by 5.18

of the Act

has been cut down by judicial decision.

2r

In my

view, therefore, the

applicatlons cannot succeed

and must

be dismissed.

4 certify

that this and the 5-

preceding

p q e s

a true copy of the reascm for

judgment hcreln

of HIS Honour

Mr. justice Pincus 9 s

L!'

Associate

Data 1 - 7 ,

/48G

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