Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers

Link copied
Case Copied 34 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS

[2017] SASC 197

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton

22 December 2017

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OR ORDER  - WHERE JUDGMENT OR ORDER MADE IRREGULARLY, ILLEGALLY OR AGAINST GOOD FAITH

Appeal against the order of a Magistrate dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment.

On 25 August 2014 the appellant advised the Registry that he was unable to attend his trial due to commence that day.  The matter was adjourned until 26 August 2014. The appellant failed to attend on that day.  Consequently default judgment was awarded in favour of the respondent. The appellant applied for the default judgment to be set aside. On 15 September 2014 the Magistrate dismissed the application. 

The appellant appeals that order. He contends that the default judgment should not have been awarded as he was unable to attend due to being incapacitated by illness and that he had an arguable defence.

Held: The appeal is dismissed. It was open to the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant did not have a reasonable excuse for his non-attendance. The discretion to set aside a default judgment contained in MCCR 87(1) has not been enlivened. 

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 281; Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) r 2, r 87, referred to.
Marmanidis v Germain [2017] SASC 103, applied.
Sandery v Kowalski [2016] SASC 175; Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 397; Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, considered.

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS
[2017] SASC 197

Magistrates Appeals:   Civil

HINTON J.

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against the order of a Magistrate refusing an application to set aside a default judgment.

  2. On 28 June 2013 the respondent, Minter Ellison Lawyers, instituted proceedings in the civil division of the Magistrates Court against Mr Eric Lauro, the appellant, for unpaid legal fees. Ultimately the action was listed for trial to commence on Monday 25 August 2014. That did not occur. Rather, the trial was adjourned to the following day, after the Court received a facsimile from the appellant on the morning of 25 August 2014 advising that he was unable to attend for medical reasons. By email dated 25 August 2014 the registry advised the appellant:

    We have received your fax of 25 August 2014. His Honour has adjourned the matter to Tuesday 26 August 2014 to meet your convenience. Please note that His Honour has indicated that if you fail to attend on 26 August 2014 the matter will not be further adjourned on any basis.

  3. The action was called on the following morning at 10.00am. The appellant was not in attendance. The respondent applied for judgment in…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] SASC 197
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, Eric Lauro, sought an extension of time to appeal against a decision made by the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The respondent, Minter Ellison Lawyers, a law firm, had obtained a default judgment against Mr. Lauro due to his failure to attend court on the scheduled trial date. The appellant subsequently applied to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the Magistrate. The appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia focused on the Magistrate's application of rule 87 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (MCCR) in dismissing the application to set aside the default judgment.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Magistrate correctly applied rule 87 MCCR when dismissing the appellant's application to set aside the default judgment. Rule 87(2) MCCR requires that a party seeking to set aside a non-final judgment must establish both an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with court rules or orders. The appellant argued that he had both an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for not attending court, which was his illness on the scheduled trial date. The respondent contended that the appellant's illness could not provide a reasonable excuse since he had no intention of attending court regardless of his health condition.

The court considered the Magistrate's reasoning in dismissing the application to set aside the default judgment. The Magistrate had doubts about the authenticity of the appellant's medical certificate and his reported symptoms of gastroenteritis. However, the Magistrate did not express a concluded view on whether the appellant genuinely suffered from the illness. The court noted that the Magistrate had managed the case for some time and was familiar with the appellant's conduct, which likely influenced his assessment of the application. The court found that the Magistrate's conclusions were open to challenge, as the evidence did not conclusively establish that the appellant's illness was feigned. The court also noted that the appellant's decision not to reveal his medical condition earlier could be seen as unreasonable, but it did not necessarily negate the possibility of a reasonable excuse.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted the appellant an extension of time to appeal against the Magistrate's decision. The court found that the Magistrate had not correctly applied rule 87 MCCR in dismissing the application to set aside the default judgment. The appellant had presented evidence of an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, which warranted a different outcome. The court's decision highlighted the importance of considering the totality of circumstances when assessing applications under rule 87 MCCR and the need for Magistrates to carefully evaluate the evidence presented by the parties.

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, grant the appellant an extension of time to appeal, and remit the matter to the Magistrates Court for reconsideration of the application to set aside the default judgment in light of the Supreme Court's findings. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that justice is done between the parties and that each party has a proper opportunity to present their case on the merits.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

I would grant the appellant an extension of time in which to appeal and dismiss the appeal. My reasons follow.The background to the obtaining of the default judgment and the refusal to set aside such judgment It is necessary to an understanding of the parties’ arguments and the Magistrates’ reasons that greater detail be provided as to the circumstances surrounding the adjournment of the trial, the obtaining of the default judgment, and the unsuccessful application to set that default judgment aside. The respondent’s claim is in short form. It includes the following:1.The plaintiff, Minter Ellison a firm (‘Minter Ellison’) is and was at all material times carrying on business as a law firm.2.On or around 31 May 2011, Natale Lauro and Silvana Lauro agreed to Minter Ellison’s ‘Terms of Engagement’, contained in the letter dated 31 May 2011, which recorded the terms of the retainer between Minter Ellison and the Lauros.3.Pursuant to the Terms of Engagement Minter Ellison agreed to act on behalf of Natale Lauro, Silvana Lauro and the defendant [Eric Lauro] in a dispute against Vincenzo Battista (‘Battista’).4.By way of email dated 16 November 2011, the defendant agreed to accept responsibility for invoices in relation to Battista from 16 November 2011. Thereafter the claim identified invoices issued by the respondent for work done in the period November 2011 to December 2012 that remained unpaid and alleged that in refusing to pay the listed invoices the appellant had breach the terms of engagement with the consequence that the appellant had suffered loss in the sum of $12,526.06. In his defence the appellant admitted paragraphs one and three of the claim. As to paragraph two, he pleaded that the only person who agreed to the respondent’s terms of engagement was his father, Mr Natale Lauro. The appellant pleaded that he did not know and could not admit or otherwise plead to the alleged non-payment of invoices since all invoice payments were made by his father and various invoices were disputed. The defence made plain in paragraph five that the appellant denied each and every allegation made in the claim not otherwise mentioned in the defence. Importantly, this meant the appellant denied paragraph four of the claim, thus refuting the allegation that he had accepted responsibility for invoices in relation to the Battista matter from 16 November 2011. As mentioned the trial was listed to commence on Monday 25 August 2014 but was adjourned after the Court received the facsimile from the appellant already mentioned. That facsimile stated:I am writing to advise that, in addition to other proper reasons already known by both the Court and the Plaintiff law firm, I will also be unable to attend Court today due to the fact that I have been medically indisposed since 21 August 2014 and that, last night, I was medically examined at home and diagnosed with viral gastroenteritis that has plagued other family members of late. Accompanying the facsimile was a medical certificate signed by a Dr Lau dated 24 August 2014. The certificate indicated that Dr Lau had examined the appellant on 24 August 2014, considered that the appellant was suffering from a “medical condition”, and formed the opinion that the appellant would be unfit for work on 24 and 25 August 2014, but able to resume his duties on 26 August 2014.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HINTON J
Having been copied into the 4.50pm email Mr Mitchell then emailed the appellant asking him, “can you please let me know whether you intend to attend at court on Monday?” He added that if the appellant was going to attend, he would prepare the matter for hearing, but if his intention was not to do so then Mr Mitchell would not set about preparation. At 5.12pm the appellant responded. He wrote:Refer to previous correspondence, affidavits and submissions in court. I will not be present on Monday and your pretence of not knowing is an insult to your intelligence and unduly damaging to me. Any costs associated with this type of tactic your firm can bear. Forced communications after hours are also a nuisance that you have been repeatedly asked to stop. Regards E LauroSetting aside a default judgment The grounds of appeal target the application by the Magistrate of rule 87 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (MCCR). It is convenient to deal with the legal principles applicable to rule 87 before turning to consider the arguments advanced in support of the grounds of appeal. Rule 87 MCCR provides:(1)The Court may set aside or vary a judgment (not being a final judgment). [4](2)The Court must not set aside such a judgment unless the party seeking to set it aside establishes that he or she – (a) has an arguable case on the merits; and(b) has a reasonable excuse for not having complied with these Rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by these Rules or order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding.(3)When setting aside a judgment the Court may order –(a) payment to the other party of costs thrown away;(b) payment or security under Rule 81.[4] A final judgment is defined in rule 2(1) MCCR as meaning any judgment – In Marmanidis v Germein I said:[5][5] [2017] SASC 103 at [80]-[84].It is clear that the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Magistrates Court by rule 87(1) MCCR is conditioned by rule 87(2) MCCR. That is, the discretion vested by rule 87(1) cannot be exercised unless and until the party seeking to have the non-final judgment set aside establishes that it has both an arguable case on the merits, and, a reasonable excuse for not having complied with the rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by the rules or order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding. It may also be said that rule 87(2)(a) and (b) are in the nature of jurisdictional facts in that the discretion vested by rule 87(1) MCCR is not enlivened unless and until the Magistrate forms the opinion that the applicant has an arguable case and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the rules and orders of the Court and any time limits set by the Court. … …That an evaluative judgment needs be made with respect to the criteria contained in rule 87(2)(a) and (b) does not alter the nature of those criteria as being in the nature of jurisdictional facts. As to rule 87(2)(a), in Saunders v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd Lander J said: It is not possible on an application of this kind, to resolve disputed questions of fact, primarily when those answers will depend upon the credibility of the parties (Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329 at 334).The appellant is not called upon to establish that his defence will be made out, but merely that he has an arguable case. To that end, the appellant must establish that upon the facts, as the appellant alleges them to be, the appellant has an arguable defence. The appellant must go further than assert that he has a defence, he must bring forward sufficient information and material to show that he is bona fide and intends to defend the action and that there “is some possibility of his doing so with success” (Grimshaw v Dunbar [1953] 1 QB 408 at 416).As to rule 87(2)(b), a reasonable excuse is one which in all circumstances the ordinary person would consider warrants forgiveness for non-compliance. Here it is necessarily the case that the ordinary person will appreciate the high premium that the community places upon compliance with rules of courts and orders of courts in order that justice be administered effectively and efficiently. That appreciation reflects an understanding of the importance to the functioning of the community of the effective and efficient exercise of judicial power to quell controversies arising in the community. With this understanding, the community, no less than the courts, expects litigants to discharge the obligations placed upon them by the law and the courts.If both of rule 87(2)(a) and (b) are satisfied the discretion vested by rule 87(1) is, as I have said, enlivened. As to the exercise of that discretion, in Saunders v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd Lander J said: In the circumstances where both of the matters referred to in the rule have been made out, and the delay in the application explained, and no real prejudice established, it would be appropriate to exercise the Court's discretion in favour of the appellant.“The fundamental duty of the court is to do justice between the parties. It is, in turn, fundamental to that duty that the parties should each be allowed a proper opportunity to put their cases upon the merits of the matter. Any limitation upon that opportunity will generally be justified only by the necessity to avoid prejudice to the interests of some other party, occasioned by misconduct, in the case of the party upon whom the limitation is sought to be imposed.” (Davies v Pagett [1986] FCA 106; (1987) 70 ALR 793)[(footnotes omitted)]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HINTON J

The respondent submitted that the conclusions reached by the Magistrate were open. The appellant having no intention to attend, as is evidenced from his email exchange with Mr Mitchell, the happenstance of his illness could not provide a reasonable excuse. As to whether or not the appellant had an arguable defence, counsel for the respondent pointed to evidence suggesting that he had conducted himself in a manner consistent with acceptance of the retainer referred to in the letter of 16 November 2011. He argued that there was then evidence of a contract and evidence of performance or at least part-performance that could not be disputed. In those circumstances an argument to the contrary was untenable. Counsel submitted that the argument that the terms of the contract were unknown to the appellant was not raised by the defence. Consideration I commence, as the Magistrate did, with a consideration of the appellant’s excuse for not attending Court on 26 August 2014. In doing so I accept that what transpired must be seen through the prism of the appellant being unrepresented. What is also plain is that the Magistrate had managed the matter for some time and, in doing so, had become familiar with the appellant, as indeed had the appellant with the Magistrate. In this regard the Magistrate had a knowledge of the history of the matter that no doubt informed his approach to the application to set aside the default judgment. In paragraph [3] of his reasons the Magistrate accepts that the appellant did report symptoms of vomiting, diarrhoea and abdominal pain to the doctors he consulted. In the remainder of that paragraph and in the following paragraph the Magistrate appears to doubt that such report was genuine. He made as much plain in the course of hearing the application. That is not to doubt the doctors who provided the appellant with medical certificates. Rather, I understand the Magistrate to have considered the diagnosis as based on the appellant’s report of his symptoms. Hence the Magistrate’s interest in the fact that the appellant did not fill the script written for him on the Thursday – if the appellant was genuine in his report of suffering from gastroenteritis he would have done so. When the appellant then said that he resorted to what was left from a previous prescription, the Magistrate’s response was to again express doubt because it is commonly known that a course of antibiotics prescribed ordinarily comes with the instruction to complete the entire course. However, the Magistrate expresses no concluded view as to whether the appellant suffered from gastroenteritis at the material time. The 4.50pm email of 22 August 2014 sent to the Court and referred to in paragraph [5] of the Magistrate’s reasons forms the backdrop to the email sent a short time later to Mr Mitchell. In it the appellant requests that the trial be vacated ostensibly for the reasons he had advanced repeatedly since 9 May 2014[8] but now extending to include a professed intention to appeal the Magistrate’s refusal on 12 August 2014 to vacate the trial. The Magistrate notes that “it would have been in his interest at that time to indicate that he had a serious medical condition and might be unable to come to Court in any event”. With the benefit of hindsight that may be so, but equally, as counsel for the appellant submitted, it would not have been unreasonable to hope that his condition would settle in time to attend court on Monday.[8] I understand those reasons as including inadequate discovery, bias on the part of the Magistrate, non-availability of witnesses and work commitments.