SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS
[2017] SASC 197
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton
22 December 2017
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OR ORDER - WHERE JUDGMENT OR ORDER MADE IRREGULARLY, ILLEGALLY OR AGAINST GOOD FAITH
Appeal against the order of a Magistrate dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment.
On 25 August 2014 the appellant advised the Registry that he was unable to attend his trial due to commence that day. The matter was adjourned until 26 August 2014. The appellant failed to attend on that day. Consequently default judgment was awarded in favour of the respondent. The appellant applied for the default judgment to be set aside. On 15 September 2014 the Magistrate dismissed the application.
The appellant appeals that order. He contends that the default judgment should not have been awarded as he was unable to attend due to being incapacitated by illness and that he had an arguable defence.
Held: The appeal is dismissed. It was open to the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant did not have a reasonable excuse for his non-attendance. The discretion to set aside a default judgment contained in MCCR 87(1) has not been enlivened.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 281; Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) r 2, r 87, referred to.
Marmanidis v Germain [2017] SASC 103, applied.
Sandery v Kowalski [2016] SASC 175; Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 397; Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, considered.
LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS
[2017] SASC 197Magistrates Appeals: Civil
HINTON J.
Introduction
This is an appeal against the order of a Magistrate refusing an application to set aside a default judgment.
On 28 June 2013 the respondent, Minter Ellison Lawyers, instituted proceedings in the civil division of the Magistrates Court against Mr Eric Lauro, the appellant, for unpaid legal fees. Ultimately the action was listed for trial to commence on Monday 25 August 2014. That did not occur. Rather, the trial was adjourned to the following day, after the Court received a facsimile from the appellant on the morning of 25 August 2014 advising that he was unable to attend for medical reasons. By email dated 25 August 2014 the registry advised the appellant:
We have received your fax of 25 August 2014. His Honour has adjourned the matter to Tuesday 26 August 2014 to meet your convenience. Please note that His Honour has indicated that if you fail to attend on 26 August 2014 the matter will not be further adjourned on any basis.
The action was called on the following morning at 10.00am. The appellant was not in attendance. The respondent applied for judgment in…
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- Case
- [2017] SASC 197
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Magistrate correctly applied rule 87 MCCR when dismissing the appellant's application to set aside the default judgment. Rule 87(2) MCCR requires that a party seeking to set aside a non-final judgment must establish both an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with court rules or orders. The appellant argued that he had both an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for not attending court, which was his illness on the scheduled trial date. The respondent contended that the appellant's illness could not provide a reasonable excuse since he had no intention of attending court regardless of his health condition.
The court considered the Magistrate's reasoning in dismissing the application to set aside the default judgment. The Magistrate had doubts about the authenticity of the appellant's medical certificate and his reported symptoms of gastroenteritis. However, the Magistrate did not express a concluded view on whether the appellant genuinely suffered from the illness. The court noted that the Magistrate had managed the case for some time and was familiar with the appellant's conduct, which likely influenced his assessment of the application. The court found that the Magistrate's conclusions were open to challenge, as the evidence did not conclusively establish that the appellant's illness was feigned. The court also noted that the appellant's decision not to reveal his medical condition earlier could be seen as unreasonable, but it did not necessarily negate the possibility of a reasonable excuse.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted the appellant an extension of time to appeal against the Magistrate's decision. The court found that the Magistrate had not correctly applied rule 87 MCCR in dismissing the application to set aside the default judgment. The appellant had presented evidence of an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, which warranted a different outcome. The court's decision highlighted the importance of considering the totality of circumstances when assessing applications under rule 87 MCCR and the need for Magistrates to carefully evaluate the evidence presented by the parties.
The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, grant the appellant an extension of time to appeal, and remit the matter to the Magistrates Court for reconsideration of the application to set aside the default judgment in light of the Supreme Court's findings. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that justice is done between the parties and that each party has a proper opportunity to present their case on the merits.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HINTON J
The respondent submitted that the conclusions reached by the Magistrate were open. The appellant having no intention to attend, as is evidenced from his email exchange with Mr Mitchell, the happenstance of his illness could not provide a reasonable excuse. As to whether or not the appellant had an arguable defence, counsel for the respondent pointed to evidence suggesting that he had conducted himself in a manner consistent with acceptance of the retainer referred to in the letter of 16 November 2011. He argued that there was then evidence of a contract and evidence of performance or at least part-performance that could not be disputed. In those circumstances an argument to the contrary was untenable. Counsel submitted that the argument that the terms of the contract were unknown to the appellant was not raised by the defence. Consideration I commence, as the Magistrate did, with a consideration of the appellant’s excuse for not attending Court on 26 August 2014. In doing so I accept that what transpired must be seen through the prism of the appellant being unrepresented. What is also plain is that the Magistrate had managed the matter for some time and, in doing so, had become familiar with the appellant, as indeed had the appellant with the Magistrate. In this regard the Magistrate had a knowledge of the history of the matter that no doubt informed his approach to the application to set aside the default judgment. In paragraph [3] of his reasons the Magistrate accepts that the appellant did report symptoms of vomiting, diarrhoea and abdominal pain to the doctors he consulted. In the remainder of that paragraph and in the following paragraph the Magistrate appears to doubt that such report was genuine. He made as much plain in the course of hearing the application. That is not to doubt the doctors who provided the appellant with medical certificates. Rather, I understand the Magistrate to have considered the diagnosis as based on the appellant’s report of his symptoms. Hence the Magistrate’s interest in the fact that the appellant did not fill the script written for him on the Thursday – if the appellant was genuine in his report of suffering from gastroenteritis he would have done so. When the appellant then said that he resorted to what was left from a previous prescription, the Magistrate’s response was to again express doubt because it is commonly known that a course of antibiotics prescribed ordinarily comes with the instruction to complete the entire course. However, the Magistrate expresses no concluded view as to whether the appellant suffered from gastroenteritis at the material time. The 4.50pm email of 22 August 2014 sent to the Court and referred to in paragraph [5] of the Magistrate’s reasons forms the backdrop to the email sent a short time later to Mr Mitchell. In it the appellant requests that the trial be vacated ostensibly for the reasons he had advanced repeatedly since 9 May 2014[8] but now extending to include a professed intention to appeal the Magistrate’s refusal on 12 August 2014 to vacate the trial. The Magistrate notes that “it would have been in his interest at that time to indicate that he had a serious medical condition and might be unable to come to Court in any event”. With the benefit of hindsight that may be so, but equally, as counsel for the appellant submitted, it would not have been unreasonable to hope that his condition would settle in time to attend court on Monday.[8] I understand those reasons as including inadequate discovery, bias on the part of the Magistrate, non-availability of witnesses and work commitments.