Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS (NO 2)

[2018] SASC 70

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton

29 May 2018

PROCEDURE - COSTS - GENERAL RULE - COSTS FOLLOW THE EVENT - COSTS OF WHOLE ACTION - GENERALLY

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL

On 22 December 2017 a single Judge of this Court dismissed an appeal against the order of a Magistrate dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment entered in relation to a claim for unpaid legal fees: Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers [2017] SASC 197. The respondent applied for an award of costs of the appeal relying on the general rule that costs follow the event.

The appellant opposed that application. The matter was adjourned to allow the appellant time in which to file written submissions. In the intervening period the appellant filed two interlocutory applications seeking various orders including the setting aside of the judgment delivered on 22 December 2017 and a stay of the question of costs (FDNs 24 and 31).

In his written submissions the appellant also referred the Court to two other interlocutory applications, filed prior to the hearing of the appeal, which he submitted remained live and required determination (FDNs 7 and 17). These interlocutory applications sought various orders including a stay of the proceedings pursuant to s 41 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 and the institution of contempt proceedings against a solicitor employed by the respondent.

In addition the appellant sought an extension of time in which to comply with each of the obligations contained in rule 290 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 concerning an appeal to the Full Court instituted against the judgment of 22 December 2017.

Held:

1.       The interlocutory applications FDNs 7, 24 and 31 are dismissed.

2.       if it is necessary, and to the extent that it is necessary, the interlocutory application FDN 17 is dismissed.

3.       The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and occasioned by the appeal, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

4. The appellant is granted an extension of time to 19 January 2018 in which to file a Notice of Appeal to the Full Court against the judgment in Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers [2017] SASC 197.

5.       The appellant is granted an extension of time to apply for permission to appeal as required by rule 289(1)(b) SCR to within 21 days of the date of this judgment.

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), ss 40, 48, 50; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 40; Magistrates Court Civil Rules 2013, r 23, 87; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, rr 12, 13, 242, 282, 288, 289, 290, 300, 303; Legal Practitioners Act 1981, s 41, s 70O; Australian Consumer Law, s 101, referred to.
ERS Engines Pty Ltd v Wilson (1994)…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 70
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers (No 2), the appellant, Mr. Eric Lauro, appealed against a decision of the South Australian Supreme Court dismissing his appeal against a default judgment entered in the Magistrates Court. The respondent, Minter Ellison Lawyers, sought its costs of the appeal, and the appellant sought an extension of time to appeal to the Full Court and to file his written submissions in response to the respondent's costs application. The legal issues before the court included whether the respondent had standing to bring the proceedings, whether the court should grant the appellant an extension of time to appeal, and whether the respondent was entitled to its costs of the appeal. The court held that the respondent had standing to bring the proceedings and that the appellant's application to set aside the judgment as a nullity was without merit. The court also held that the appellant was entitled to an extension of time to file his written submissions in response to the respondent's costs application, but denied his application for an extension of time to appeal to the Full Court. Finally, the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision highlights the importance of following procedural rules and the consequences of failing to do so, as well as the court's discretion in granting extensions of time and awarding costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Consequently, the Court now has before it four interlocutory applications and the respondent’s application for its costs of the appeal. In addition the appellant seeks an extension of time in which to comply with each of the obligations contained in rule 290 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SCR) concerning an appeal to the Full Court that he has instituted against the judgment of 22 December 2017.Background The substantive proceedings subject of the appeal to this Court related to a claim for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $12,526.06 plus interest and the costs of filing the claim. That action, AMCCI-13-2765, was instituted in the Magistrates Court in June 2013. Default judgment was obtained on 26 August 2014. On 15 September 2014 a Magistrate refused to set aside the default judgment. On 7 October 2014 the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court (SCCIV-14-1393) against the order of 15 September 2014 and other orders made in the course of the substantive proceedings in the Magistrates Court. As mentioned, on 22 December 2017 the appeal against the order of the Magistrates Court refusing an application to set aside the default judgment was dismissed. As also mentioned the respondent applied for their costs of the appeal. In support of its application the respondent submitted that no reason existed to depart from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event. Counsel for the appellant, who was not counsel at the appeal, sought an adjournment. Consequently, the Court ordered that the appellant file and serve written submissions in response to the respondent’s application for costs by the close of business on Wednesday, 31 January 2018, and that the respondent file and serve any reply to those submissions by the close of business on Wednesday, 7 February 2018. Thereafter the application for costs would be dealt with “on the papers”. On 31 January 2018 the appellant filed an interlocutory application (FDN 22), the sixth interlocutory application, seeking an order varying the orders made on 22 December 2017 in relation to the application for costs to the extent that he be granted a further four weeks in which to provide written submissions. In an accompanying affidavit the appellant informed the Court that he no longer had legal representation.[2][2] Tenth affidavit of Eric Lauro, affirmed 31 January 2018 (FDN 23). The appellant has filed a total of eight interlocutory applications in the appeal proceedings SCCIV-14-1393. Initially the sixth interlocutory application was listed for hearing on 19 February 2018 but due to the parties not all being available that date was vacated and the matter relisted on 27 February 2018. By that time events had largely overtaken the need to hear and determine the sixth interlocutory application. On 16 February 2018 the appellant filed the seventh interlocutory application (FDN 24). In the seventh interlocutory application the appellant seeks the following relief: [3][3] FDN 24.1.An order staying consideration of the respondent’s application for the costs of the appeal in this matter (SCCIV-14-1393) and of the enforcement of the default judgment and costs orders in action no. AMCCI-13-2765 pending:a.compliance by the respondent with s 41(4) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (LPA); andb.investigation by the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner.2. In the alternative, that the hearing of the respondent’s application for the costs of the appeal and the enforcement of the default judgment and costs orders in action no. AMCCI-13-2765 be adjourned until:a.an appeal to the Full Court from the order made on 22 December 2017 dismissing the appellant’s appeal had been heard and determined;b.proceedings instituted in the Magistrates Court on 13 February 2018 and subject of action number AMCCI-18-444 had been heard and determined; and/orc.taxation of the respondent’s itemised bills associated with Magistrates Court proceedings subject of action number AMCCI-13-2765 had occurred.3.In the further alternative, that an order be made setting aside “all judgments and orders the subject of the within appeal in the justice of the case”.4.Time in which to appeal to the Full Court as required under rule 290 SCR be extended by six months or such other time as this Court should think fit.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At present rule 290 is not engaged and no need arises to consider any application for an extension of time in relation thereto. Conclusion and orders For these reasons the Court:1.dismisses the second, seventh and eighth interlocutory applications (FDNs 7, 24 and 31);2.if it is necessary, and to the extent that it is necessary, dismisses the fifth interlocutory application (FDN 17);3.orders that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and occasioned by the appeal (SCCIV-14-1393), such costs to be taxed if not agreed;4.orders that:a. the appellant is granted an extension of time to 19 January 2018 in which to file a Notice of Appeal to the Full Court in the matter SCCIV-14-1393.b. the appellant is granted an extension of time in which to make the application for permission required by rule 289(1)(b) SCR to within 21 days of the date of this judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As indicated on the hearing of the appeal counsel applied and was granted permission to amend the Notice of Appeal filed 7 October 2014 with the consequence to which I have already referred. At no time did counsel suggest that there were any outstanding interlocutory matters that the Court needed to resolve before the appeal could proceed.Consideration I commence by dealing with the application pursuant to rule 12(2)(b) SCR to set aside the judgment of 22 December 2017 as a nullity on the grounds that the respondent did not have standing to appear. In describing itself in its Magistrates Court claim as a firm it may be accepted that the respondent intentionally used the language of the Partnership Act 1891 (SA) to signify the fact that it was a partnership.[28] A partnership is not a legal entity. The proceedings against the appellant were as a matter of law instituted by each member of the then partnership. Under rule 23 MCR the respondent was permitted to institute proceedings against the appellant in the firm name. The rule is one of procedural convenience. A similar rule exists in this Court. Any dissolution of the old partnership and formation of a new partnership consequent upon the retirement or addition of partners since the proceedings were first instituted may be expected to be accompanied by arrangements for the transition of rights, including choses in action, and liabilities from one partnership to the next reflecting the change in personal and commercial arrangements. No reason arises to think that the chose in action subject of the claim instituted in the Magistrates Court does not continue in the possession of the firm now defending the appeal.[28] Partnership Act 1891 (SA), s 4. Nothing the appellant has raised causes me to think that the members of the partnership known as Minter Ellison do not have standing to defend these proceedings. That the Minter Ellison partnership in this State enjoys the benefits of affiliation with a similarly named partnership or corporate body interstate but operates wholly separately does not change this. That the respondent took no issue with being described as Minter Ellison Lawyers in the appeal papers as opposed to Minter Ellison or Minter Ellison a Firm, likewise does not cause me concern. In the Magistrates Court the appellant could have sought an order requiring a statement on oath or affirmation of the particulars of those who were partners of the firm at the relevant time. He did not do so. Why now should he, in effect, be able to seek further particulars of the parties suing him? In his defence to the claim filed in the Magistrates Court the appellant admitted that the plaintiff-cum-respondent was a firm carrying on business as a law firm at all material times. I am not persuaded that the respondent has committed a procedural irregularity within the meaning of rule 4 SCR in bringing the substantive proceedings. I add that I consider the application now made opportunistic and disingenuous. No reason arises why it could not have been pursued at the hearing of the appeal and no explanation has been provided as to why it was not agitated in the court below or on appeal. The revelation that Minter Ellison interstate is a related but separate entity to Minter Ellison Adelaide does not change matters. At all times the firm in Adelaide or its successor in Adelaide, assuming changes in the membership of partners to have occurred, has been the plaintiff-cum-respondent. The fact that in a retainer agreement the respondent is styled “Minter Ellison Group” and not “Minter Ellison a Firm” does not mean that they are not one and the same. As I said, in his defence in the substantive proceedings the appellant has admitted as much. I refuse the application to set aside the judgment delivered on 22 December 2017 on the grounds that the proceedings were a nullity.