SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeals to a Single Judge: Civil)
LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS (NO 2)
[2018] SASC 70
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton
29 May 2018
PROCEDURE - COSTS - GENERAL RULE - COSTS FOLLOW THE EVENT - COSTS OF WHOLE ACTION - GENERALLY
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL
On 22 December 2017 a single Judge of this Court dismissed an appeal against the order of a Magistrate dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment entered in relation to a claim for unpaid legal fees: Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers [2017] SASC 197. The respondent applied for an award of costs of the appeal relying on the general rule that costs follow the event.
The appellant opposed that application. The matter was adjourned to allow the appellant time in which to file written submissions. In the intervening period the appellant filed two interlocutory applications seeking various orders including the setting aside of the judgment delivered on 22 December 2017 and a stay of the question of costs (FDNs 24 and 31).
In his written submissions the appellant also referred the Court to two other interlocutory applications, filed prior to the hearing of the appeal, which he submitted remained live and required determination (FDNs 7 and 17). These interlocutory applications sought various orders including a stay of the proceedings pursuant to s 41 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 and the institution of contempt proceedings against a solicitor employed by the respondent.
In addition the appellant sought an extension of time in which to comply with each of the obligations contained in rule 290 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 concerning an appeal to the Full Court instituted against the judgment of 22 December 2017.
Held:
1. The interlocutory applications FDNs 7, 24 and 31 are dismissed.
2. if it is necessary, and to the extent that it is necessary, the interlocutory application FDN 17 is dismissed.
3. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and occasioned by the appeal, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.
4. The appellant is granted an extension of time to 19 January 2018 in which to file a Notice of Appeal to the Full Court against the judgment in Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers [2017] SASC 197.
5. The appellant is granted an extension of time to apply for permission to appeal as required by rule 289(1)(b) SCR to within 21 days of the date of this judgment.
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), ss 40, 48, 50; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 40; Magistrates Court Civil Rules 2013, r 23, 87; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, rr 12, 13, 242, 282, 288, 289, 290, 300, 303; Legal Practitioners Act 1981, s 41, s 70O; Australian Consumer Law, s 101, referred to.
ERS Engines Pty Ltd v Wilson (1994)…
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- Case
- [2018] SASC 70
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As indicated on the hearing of the appeal counsel applied and was granted permission to amend the Notice of Appeal filed 7 October 2014 with the consequence to which I have already referred. At no time did counsel suggest that there were any outstanding interlocutory matters that the Court needed to resolve before the appeal could proceed.Consideration I commence by dealing with the application pursuant to rule 12(2)(b) SCR to set aside the judgment of 22 December 2017 as a nullity on the grounds that the respondent did not have standing to appear. In describing itself in its Magistrates Court claim as a firm it may be accepted that the respondent intentionally used the language of the Partnership Act 1891 (SA) to signify the fact that it was a partnership.[28] A partnership is not a legal entity. The proceedings against the appellant were as a matter of law instituted by each member of the then partnership. Under rule 23 MCR the respondent was permitted to institute proceedings against the appellant in the firm name. The rule is one of procedural convenience. A similar rule exists in this Court. Any dissolution of the old partnership and formation of a new partnership consequent upon the retirement or addition of partners since the proceedings were first instituted may be expected to be accompanied by arrangements for the transition of rights, including choses in action, and liabilities from one partnership to the next reflecting the change in personal and commercial arrangements. No reason arises to think that the chose in action subject of the claim instituted in the Magistrates Court does not continue in the possession of the firm now defending the appeal.[28] Partnership Act 1891 (SA), s 4. Nothing the appellant has raised causes me to think that the members of the partnership known as Minter Ellison do not have standing to defend these proceedings. That the Minter Ellison partnership in this State enjoys the benefits of affiliation with a similarly named partnership or corporate body interstate but operates wholly separately does not change this. That the respondent took no issue with being described as Minter Ellison Lawyers in the appeal papers as opposed to Minter Ellison or Minter Ellison a Firm, likewise does not cause me concern. In the Magistrates Court the appellant could have sought an order requiring a statement on oath or affirmation of the particulars of those who were partners of the firm at the relevant time. He did not do so. Why now should he, in effect, be able to seek further particulars of the parties suing him? In his defence to the claim filed in the Magistrates Court the appellant admitted that the plaintiff-cum-respondent was a firm carrying on business as a law firm at all material times. I am not persuaded that the respondent has committed a procedural irregularity within the meaning of rule 4 SCR in bringing the substantive proceedings. I add that I consider the application now made opportunistic and disingenuous. No reason arises why it could not have been pursued at the hearing of the appeal and no explanation has been provided as to why it was not agitated in the court below or on appeal. The revelation that Minter Ellison interstate is a related but separate entity to Minter Ellison Adelaide does not change matters. At all times the firm in Adelaide or its successor in Adelaide, assuming changes in the membership of partners to have occurred, has been the plaintiff-cum-respondent. The fact that in a retainer agreement the respondent is styled “Minter Ellison Group” and not “Minter Ellison a Firm” does not mean that they are not one and the same. As I said, in his defence in the substantive proceedings the appellant has admitted as much. I refuse the application to set aside the judgment delivered on 22 December 2017 on the grounds that the proceedings were a nullity.