Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers

Link copied
Case Copied 54 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON LAWYERS

[2019] SASC 139

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

12 August 2019

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL

PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS - TO STAY OR DISMISS ORDERS OR PROCEEDINGS GENERALLY

On 28 June 2013, the respondent sued Mr Lauro in the Magistrates Court for unpaid legal fees. The trial was listed to commence on 25 August 2014. Mr Lauro failed to attend on that date. The Registry advised him that the trial would not be adjourned if he failed to attend the next day but he again failed to attend. The Magistrate gave summary judgment and Mr Lauro’s later application to have the summary judgment set aside failed.

Mr Lauro appealed to a single Judge of this Court. Between the filing of his Notice of Appeal and the eventual hearing of the appeal, Mr Lauro filed numerous interlocutory applications. The appeal came on for hearing on 20 April 2017. On 22 December 2017, Hinton J dismissed Mr Lauro’s appeal.

On 19 January 2018, Mr Lauro instituted an appeal to the Full Court. He filed other interlocutory applications. On 29 May 2018, Hinton J dismissed all of the interlocutory applications.

On 18 June 2018, Mr Lauro filed an interlocutory application seeking inter alia permission to appeal from Hinton J’s two judgments and permission to amend his Notice of Appeal. On 28 June 2018, the Judge granted leave to file an amended second Notice of Appeal and permission on some of the grounds contained therein.

On 2 July 2018, Mr Lauro filed and served his Second Notice of Appeal. He did not set the appeal down for hearing and, on 27 March 2019, the respondent wrote to him stating that the appeal had been dismissed by dint of rule 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (SCR).

On 8 April 2019, Mr Lauro filed an interlocutory application seeking reinstatement of the appeal and an extension of time within which to set it down for hearing. The matter came on for contested hearing on 21 June 2019. Judgment was reserved.

Held, refusing to reinstate the appeal and refusing to grant a stay of execution:

1.  The discretion under SCR 296(2) should be exercised against Mr Lauro and in favour of the respondent for the following reasons:

(a)  Mr Lauro bears the onus of establishing the true facts concerning his knowledge about SCR 296. It is not possible to say where the truth lies as to when Mr Lauro first became aware of SCR 296 other than to find that it was certainly no later than 2 July 2018 when he raised the matter in correspondence with the respondent.

(b)  Following the institution of the Full Court appeal on 19 January 2018, Mr Lauro issued further proceedings in the Magistrates Court with the same subject matter as the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lauro v Minter Ellison Lawyers and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] SASC 139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Lauro has appealed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia which dismissed his appeal against a default judgment granted in favour of Minter Ellison Lawyers. The appeal was dismissed because Mr Lauro failed to set it down for hearing within six months of it being filed, as required by Supreme Court Rules. Mr Lauro argues that he was not aware of the requirement and seeks an extension of time to set down his appeal, for the appeal to be reinstated, and for any proceedings on the default judgment to be stayed. The court considered whether Mr Lauro was aware of the six-month set down rule and whether his failure to set down the appeal was intentional. The court found that Mr Lauro was aware of the rule but failed to set down the appeal due to his own neglect. The court dismissed Mr Lauro’s application for an extension of time, reinstatement of the appeal, and a stay on proceedings on the default judgment. The court held that Mr Lauro’s lack of legal knowledge was not a valid excuse for failing to comply with the set down rule. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Lauro now seeks the following orders:1. That this Application, and the Appellant’s supporting Affidavit filed contemporaneously with this Application be accepted for filing.2. That the within appellate proceedings (the Appeal) be reinstated.3. That the Appellant be granted a 3-month extension of time from the hearing of this Application, to set down the Appeal.4. That, to the extent that it may now be necessary, the execution of, or proceeding on, any judgment in favour of the Respondent against me be stayed pending the hearing and determination of the Appeal.5. Such further or other orders that the Honourable Court may deem fit.Background On 28 June 2013, over six years ago, the respondent, Minter Ellison Lawyers (the firm), instituted proceedings in the civil division of the Magistrates Court against Mr Lauro for unpaid legal fees. After numerous and lengthy interlocutory proceedings initiated by Mr Lauro, the trial of the action was listed to commence on Monday 25 August 2014. Mr Lauro’s failure to appear at the Magistrates Court trial On 21 August 2014 at 4.57 pm, Mr Lauro emailed the Supreme Court Civil Registry advising that he wished to appeal against various orders made by Magistrate Milazzo on 12 August 2014 concerning interlocutory applications. At 4.50 pm on 22 August 2014, Mr Lauro emailed the Magistrates Court Civil Registry and Mr Grant Mitchell, a firm partner (with a copy to Registrar of the Magistrates Court) indicating that he would appeal against the orders made by the Magistrate on 12 August 2014 and renewing his request that the trial scheduled to commence on 25 August 2014 be vacated. (It is to be noted that he made no mention of being ill). Mr Mitchell, having received the 4.50 pm email, then emailed Mr Lauro and inquired as to whether he would be attending at the trial. Mr Lauro then responded by email to Mr Mitchell in the following terms at 5.12 pm on 22 August 2014: Refer to previous correspondence, affidavits and submissions in court. I will not be present on Monday and your pretence of not knowing is an insult to your intelligence and unduly damaging to me. Any costs associated with this type of tactic your firm can bear. Forced communications after hours are also a nuisance that you have been repeatedly asked to stop. [Emphasis added] This communication is important for at least three reasons. First, Mr Lauro was here plainly taking the stance that he refused to attend at the trial because of matters referred to in “previous correspondence, affidavits and submissions in court” and that, according to Mr Lauro, such intention not to attend would have been self-evident to anyone familiar with that material. Secondly, again, he made no mention of being ill. Thirdly, the Court was not advised in any way prior to 25 August 2014 that Mr Lauro did not intend to attend at the trial. However, on the morning of Monday 25 August 2014, Mr Lauro sent a facsimile to the Magistrates Court in which he stated:I am writing to advise that, in addition to other proper reasons already known by both the Court and the Plaintiff law firm, I will also be unable to attend Court today due to the fact that I have been medically indisposed since 21 August 2014 and that, last night, I was medically examined at home and diagnosed with viral gastroenteritis that has plagued other family members of late.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On Tuesday 26 August 2014 at 10.00 am, the trial was called on again. Mr Lauro was again not in attendance. The respondent applied for judgment in default and the Magistrate granted that application. The Magistrate ordered, inter alia, that Mr Lauro’s defence be struck out; that there be judgment in default for the amount of the claim, namely $12,526.06; that costs be allowed in the sum of $4,117.00; and that the respondent be awarded interest in the sum of $625.00. Mr Lauro’s application to a Magistrate to set aside the default judgment On 2 September 2014, Mr Lauro applied to the Magistrates Court, inter alia, for an order setting aside the default judgment. Such an application is governed by rule 87 Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (MCCR) which provides as follows:(1)The Court may set aside or vary a judgment (not being a final judgment).[2](2)The Court must not set aside such a judgment unless the party seeking to set it aside establishes that he or she – (a) has an arguable case on the merits; and(b) has a reasonable excuse for not having complied with these Rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by these Rules or order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding.(3)When setting aside a judgment the Court may order –(a) payment to the other party of costs thrown away;(b) payment or security under Rule 81.[2] A final judgment is defined in rule 2(1) MCCR as meaning any judgment – It is to be emphasised that rule 87(2) contains a mandatory conjunctive. For example, it is not sufficient to establish that one has “an arguable case on the merits” – one has to also establish compliance with rule 87(2)(b).[3] [3] In Marmanidis v Germein [2017] SASC 103, [80] Hinton J observed: “… It is clear that the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Magistrates Court by rule 87(1) MCCR is conditioned by rule 87(2) MCCR. That is, the discretion vested by rule 87(1) cannot be exercised unless and until the party seeking to have the non-final judgment set aside establishes that it has both an arguable case on the merits, and, a reasonable excuse for not having complied with the rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by the rules or order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding. It may also be said that rule 87(2)(a) and (b) are in the nature of jurisdictional facts in that the discretion vested by rule 87(1) MCCR is not enlivened unless and until the Magistrate forms the opinion that the applicant has an arguable case and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the rules and orders of the Court and any time limits set by the Court. …” The application came on for hearing on 15 September 2014 before Magistrate Milazzo. During the course of the argument, the Magistrate gave Mr Lauro the opportunity to address his Honour’s concerns. Thus, as Hinton J was later to observe in his judgment:[4]27. Mr Mitchell then stated that he had the relevant communications of 22 August 2014 in his possession and was happy to provide them to the Court. The appellant opposed the tender of the documents on the grounds that they were not accompanied by an affidavit. During submissions the appellant time and again was concerned to argue that the Magistrate was biased. The Magistrate put to the appellant:Let me be frank with you, because this might help. Apart from an unfilled prescription and the brief medical reports, sorry medical certificates, do you have any evidence at all that you were in fact ill. You see, it is not difficult to go to the doctors and complain that you have symptoms. Two things that concern me. One is that you get a script, a prescription on the Thursday which is not filled and the second thing is that you apparently tell Minter Ellison on the Friday that you are not going to come to trial come what may. … Do you want to clarify exactly what was said because if you do, then you will need to allow Mr Mitchell to hand me the communication. My understanding is that you had assigned no reason for not coming on the Monday and it said that you weren’t going to come. Now, I don’t understand how you could be confident on the Friday that your symptoms wouldn’t clear up by the Monday. Those are my two concerns. 28. The Magistrate invited the appellant to address his concerns. In the course of doing so the Magistrate also offered the appellant the opportunity of a short adjournment in order that he might obtain affidavits from the treating doctors who attended upon him. The appellant did not request any adjournment but relied upon the content of the medical certificates, and, in particular, that of Dr Giordano. The Magistrate then proceeded to commence giving ex tempore reasons. He was interrupted by the appellant. The Magistrate returned to the communications between the appellant and Mr Mitchell on 22 August 2014. The appellant remained opposed to Mr Mitchell handing the documents to the Court. Consequently, Mr Mitchell entered the witness box, was sworn, and the documents were proved. They were then received as exhibit P1. …[4] [2017] SASC 197.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Secondly, Mr Lauro was put on notice, first by Hinton J and shortly thereafter by Mr Mitchell, that a failure to strictly abide by the time requirements would result in the respondent applying to have the appeal dismissed. Consideration of the present application The present application came before me in the Chamber List on 21 June 2019 (after Mr Lauro had objected to another Justice hearing the matter). On that day, I heard submissions from both sides. Counsel appearing for the respondent gave an undertaking that the respondent would not enforce the judgment against Mr Lauro at least until such time as I gave judgment on the application. I reserved judgment.Rule 296 – the set down rule Clearly, Mr Lauro failed to set down the appeal within six months from it being filed on 19 January 2018 and his Full Court appeal was automatically dismissed on about 19 July 2018 pursuant to SCR 296 (the set down rule). SCR 296 provides: (1)If the party having the carriage of an appellate proceeding fails to set the proceeding down for hearing with the time fixed by Supplementary Rules, another party may apply to the Court for permission to set the proceeding down for hearing or for an order dismissing the proceeding. (2)Unless an appellate proceeding is set down for hearing with 6 months after the proceeding is commenced or a longer time allowed by the Court, the proceeding is taken to have been discontinued and lapses. Despite the dismissal of an appellate proceeding under this rule, the Court may, for special reasons, reinstate the appellate proceeding. (3)If a proceeding lapses under subrule (2), all parties are to bear their own costs. (4)The power to allow a longer time under subrule (2) may be exercised before or after the period of 6 months has elapsed. [Emphasis added] The prima facie effect of SCR 296(2) is that an appeal is dismissed after the six month period expires and this is so whether the appellant knows of the rule or not. As McHugh J pithily observed in Gallo v Dawson, “[l]ack of legal knowledge is a misfortune, not a privilege”.[20] However, a positive finding that an unrepresented litigant was unaware of such a rule would be a factor to be taken into account in exercising a discretion under SCR 296(2). Obviously the onus is on Mr Lauro to establish such unawareness and an important question therefore arises as to the extent of his awareness of the set down rule at relevant times. [20] (1990) 93 ALR 479, 481.Mr Lauro’s written submissions dated 19 June 2019 In his written submissions dated 19 June 2019, upon which he relied at the hearing before me, Mr Lauro states:2.1. The Appellant was not aware of the existence and/or operation of Supreme Court Rule 296 (the “set down rule”).2.2. The failure to set down the Appeal was not intentional.2.3. Upon being advised by the Appeals Clerk of the setting of the index by email dated 7 February 2019, the Appellant requested:2.3.1. The opportunity to discuss the context of the index, and 2.3.2. That the index not be settled yet.2.4. By email dated 8 February 2019, the Appeals Clerk consented and thereby recalled the settled index. Refer to Exhibit “EL 14-2” of the Appellant’s Affidavit of 8 April 2019 (which is further supported by the email correspondence dated 3 April 2019 in Exhibit “EL 14-1” of the same Affidavit).…2.7. The 6-month period to set down imposed by Supreme Court Rule 296(2) appears to have expired as early as 18 July 2018.…2.9. The Appellant was not aware of the set down rule. He sets out in paragraph 14 of his Affidavit of 8 April 2019 the various events impacting upon his life. [Emphasis added]