CCGF Holdings Pty Ltd v Coegi Group Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCGF Holdings Pty Ltd v Coegi Group Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1402  

File number: QUD 870 of 2018
Judgment of: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 1 October 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to set aside default judgment under r 39.05(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – cross-examination of applicant permitted – whether fifth respondent was aware of existence of proceedings prior to default judgment being entered – whether fifth respondent has prima-facie defence – whether setting aside default judgment is in the interests of justice
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 236 and 237

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) s 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05

Cases cited:

3D Funtimes Limited v Intellec Development Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 407

Adams v Kennick Trading (International) Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 503

Amirbeaggi as trustee of the bankrupt estate of John Mamdouh Hanna v Kamel (No 3) [2020] FCA 1202

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318

Davies v Pagett (1986) 10 FCR 226

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Berhad (No 2) (2010) 81 ATR 40; [2010] FCA 1296

Lal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2014] FCA 892

Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543

Wu v Avin Operations Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 132

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 86
Date of hearing: 6 May 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Handran
Solicitor for the Applicant: DSA Law
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent:  Ms N Papaleo
Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent:  Lander & Rogers
Counsel for the First to Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Respondents: The First to Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Respondents did not appear

ORDERS

QUD 870 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CCGF HOLDING PTY LTD ACN 604 129 802

Applicant

AND:

COEGI GROUP PTY LTD ACN 622 199 357

First Respondent

COEGI CONNECT PTY LTD ACN 622 200 337

Second Respondent

CONSOL GROUP APAC PTY LTD ACN 612 813 484 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 OCTOBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.By 4.30 pm on 8 October 2020, the fifth respondent file and serve written submissions (not exceeding six pages) and any affidavits dealing with the costs of her application to set aside the orders made on 19 July 2019.

2.By 4.30 pm on 15 October 2020, the applicant file and serve written submissions (not exceeding six pages) and any affidavits in response.

3.By 4.30 pm on 19 October 2020, the fifth respondent file and serve any written submissions in reply (not exceeding two pages).

4.The questions of costs and the final disposition of the fifth respondent’s application will be decided on the papers.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1402
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CCGF Holdings Pty Ltd filed an application against Coegi Group Pty Ltd in the Federal Court, seeking to set aside a default judgment entered against the latter. The key issue before the court was whether the applicant, Ms Gordon, had a bona fide defence to the claim and whether setting aside the default judgment would be in the interests of justice. The court considered the principles established in previous cases, which emphasized the importance of a prima facie defence and an adequate explanation for the failure to defend. The court also noted the need to balance the requirements of individual justice with the overarching purpose of facilitating the just resolution of disputes efficiently.

The court allowed cross-examination of both Ms Gordon and her husband, Mr Gordon, over the objection of their counsel. This decision was based on the importance of verifying the veracity of the evidence presented in the application. Ms Gordon's application to set aside the judgment relied heavily on her evidence that she was unaware of the existence of the proceedings until about 10 October 2019. The court found that it would be unjust to refuse the applicant the opportunity to challenge their evidence through cross-examination.

The court concluded that the application would be decided on the basis of written submissions and affidavits. The court ordered the parties to file and serve written submissions and affidavits within specified timeframes. The final disposition of the application, including the questions of costs, would be decided on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. By 4.30 pm on 8 October 2020, the fifth respondent file and serve written submissions (not exceeding six pages) and any affidavits dealing with the costs of her application to set aside the orders made on 19 July 2019.

2. By 4.30 pm on 15 October 2020, the applicant file and serve written submissions (not exceeding six pages) and any affidavits in response.

3. By 4.30 pm on 19 October 2020, the fifth respondent file and serve any written submissions in reply (not exceeding two pages).

4. The questions of costs and the final disposition of the fifth respondent’s application will be decided on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is also an affidavit of Francesco Starvaggi, a solicitor, annexing other affidavits of Mr Costello deposing that he left court documents in the letterbox at the address on 29 April and 3 May 2019. Evidence of Ms Gordon Ms Gordon has affirmed two affidavits. In the first, she deposes that she had no knowledge about the proceedings until she was informed of them by her husband on about 10 October 2019. Ms Gordon says that Mr Gordon told her he had been contacted by the liquidator of the Coegi Group, and had made enquiries and found out that judgment had been obtained against both of them and that bankruptcy proceedings were being taken against them. Ms Gordon deposes that she does not recall being served with any documents in the proceeding. She states that if she was served with any court documents, she would probably have thought that they were for Mr Gordon’s attention and would have either handed them to him or placed them on the desk in his office. She deposes that if she was aware of the proceeding, she would have dealt with them immediately by obtaining legal advice and instructing her solicitors to prepare a defence, as she has now done. Ms Gordon refers to the affidavits of service sworn by Mr Costello. She deposes that she does not recall Mr Costello serving documents on her on 25 January 2019. She states that although she was at home at certain times on that date, she was working with members from “my team”, but, as Mr Costello does not say when the documents were served, she cannot say with certainty where she was at that time. Ms Gordon deposes that she does not recall being served with court documents on 24 May 2019. She does not recall being served with court documents on 1 April 2019 and 12 July 2019. Ms Gordon deposes that because of her lack of involvement with Coegi Group, and the fact that she was unaware of “a large portion of the dispute”, she did not expect to be served with any court documents. She says that if she had been served with court documents, she would have handed them to her husband without reading them. Ms Gordon notes that Mr Costello swore an affidavit of service of a Bankruptcy Notice on 19 August 2019 in which he stated that on 26 July 2019, when he knocked on the door of the dwelling it was answered “by a female who identified herself as Eloise Gordon”. Ms Gordon states that she does not have any children, and Mr Gordon does not have any children named Eloise, but that she and Mr Gordon have a friend called Eloise Hendrix, who looks after their dog at home at times. Ms Hendrix has sworn an affidavit stating that she was house-sitting for the Gordons on 26 July 2019 when she accepted service of documents. Ms Hendrix left the documents on Mr Gordon’s desk and sent a message to him. She did not tell Ms Gordon about the documents being served. An issue that Ms Gordon seems to be raising is that, as Mr Costello made a mistake about Ms Hendrix’ relationship with the Gordons, he may be mistaken about service on other occasions. However, the issue does not appear to go anywhere since Mr Costello was not required for cross-examination, and therefore his evidence concerning service of court documents for the primary proceeding is not challenged. Ms Gordon also affirmed a second affidavit suggesting that Mr Costello may have mistakenly left the court documents with guests staying at an apartment at the front of her property. Again, that does not go anywhere.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In re-examination, he was asked why he had not told his wife about the court proceeding until October 2019. He responded to the effect that, in the context of his poor psychiatric state, he wanted to protect her.The law concerning setting aside default judgment Rule 39.05(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) provides that the Court, “may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if…it was made in the absence of a party”. The Rules do not prescribe any matters to which the Court is to have regard in the exercise of its discretion. In Adams v Kennick Trading (International) Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 503, Hope JA (with whom Glass JA agreed) held at 506:The existence of a bona fide ground of defence and an adequate explanation for the failure to defend and any delay are the most relevant matters to consider, but there may be other matters. A refusal of relief to an applicant is not automatically justified because he has failed to establish one relevant matter, such as an adequate explanation for the failure to defend or for delay; such a failure must be considered in the light of all the circumstances. The absence of an adequate explanation, particularly if it is coupled with prejudice, may justify the denial of relief, but only when considered with the other relevant circumstances of the case, bearing in mind what Lord Wright said in Evans v Bartlam:… if merits are shown the Court will not prima facie desire to let a judgment pass on which there has been no proper adjudication.(Citations omitted.) In Davies v Pagett (1986) 10 FCR 226, the Full Court held at 231:Since the decision of the House of Lords in Evans v Bartlam, the settled course of authority in England and in this country has emphasised, as fundamental to the exercise of the judicial discretion to set aside a default judgment, the need for a defendant to show a prima facie defence on the merits. In the language of Lord Wright, in the passage cited by the learned judge, this is “the primary consideration”.It is true, as Lord Atkin said in Evans v Bartlam, that it is inappropriate to lay down rigid rules to govern the exercise of the discretion. On the other hand, speaking generally, the cases show that a defendant who has an apparently good defence should not be refused the opportunity of defending, even though a lengthy interval of time has elapsed, provided that no irreparable prejudice is thereby done to the plaintiff.(Citations omitted.) Accordingly, the Court must have regard to the whole of the relevant circumstances and decide whether or not sufficient cause has been shown to justify the relief, but ordinarily the most relevant matters will be: (a)the explanation given by the absent party for its absence; and (b)whether the evidence discloses a defence of sufficient merit to warrant setting aside the order and permitting the matter to go to trial. (See also 3D Funtimes Limited v Intellec Development Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 407; at [6]; Lal v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2014] FCA 892 at [9]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Amirbeaggi as trustee of the bankrupt estate of John Mamdouh Hanna v Kamel(No 3) [2020] FCA 1202, Yates J held:12The second question is whether the party seeking to set aside the default judgment has demonstrated an arguable defence to the claim in respect of which the judgment has been given. In this context, “arguable” means a defence of such merit that, in the interests of justice, the default judgment should not be allowed to stand: Dunwoodie v Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd [2014] NSWCA 24 at [43]. The obvious rationale for this inquiry is to ascertain whether any useful purpose would be served by setting aside the judgment that has been given: Vacuum Oil Pty Co Ltd v Stockdale (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 239 at 243. This inquiry does not involve the Court embarking on a hearing of the full merits of the defence that is raised. However, the defence, as then advanced, must be supported by evidence that is appropriate to persuade the Court that it is sufficiently meritorious and is raised bona fide.13In exercising the discretion, the Court must be mindful of the requirements of s 37M(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which provides that the civil practice and procedure provisions (which include the FCR) must be applied, and any power conferred by those provisions must be exercised, in a way that promotes the overarching purpose of facilitating the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Provisions such as s 37M(3) have brought about “a new statutory balance among the various factors in litigation including court and party efficiency and the delivery of individual justice”: Hans Pet Constructions Pty Limited v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 at [36].Consideration At the hearing, I allowed cross-examination of both Mr and Ms Gordon over the objection of their counsel. I will give my reasons for that ruling. In Wu v Avin Operations Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1321, Kenny J observed at [18]:The Court has a discretion to permit or refuse an application made in an interlocutory proceeding to cross-examine a deponent on an affidavit that he or she has made, although the discretion to permit such cross-examination is exercised cautiously and, as Nicholson J said in Scanlon v American Cigarette Co (Overseas) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1987] VR 261 at 272, “normally” “somewhat sparingly”. Branson J cited this statement of his Honour with approval in Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment (No 1) (1996) 69 FCR 1 at 17. Ms Gordon’s application to set aside the judgment was based substantially upon her evidence that she was unaware of the existence of the proceedings until about 10 October 2019. The only explanation given in her affidavit for this was that she did not recall being served and, if she was served, she would have passed the documents on to Mr Gordon without reading them. Mr Gordon’s affidavit merely asserted that he had not told his wife about the proceedings, without providing any explanation for that unusual course. The veracity of the evidence of Mr and Ms Gordon’s evidence was fundamental to the application. I considered that it would be unjust to refuse the applicant the opportunity to challenge their evidence through cross-examination.