Living Australia Pty Ltd v Rans Consulting Group Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

LIVING AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v RANS CONSULTING GROUP PTY LTD

[2019] SASC 86

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton

24 May 2019

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OR ORDER

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

The appellant failed to file and serve a defence to the respondent’s claim in the Magistrates Court within 21 days as required by r 60(1) of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) (MCCR). The respondent obtained judgment in default on 27 November 2018. When the appellant became aware of the judgment it filed an application seeking orders that the judgment be set aside. The appellant was late for the hearing of the application to set aside the default judgment with the consequence that the application was dismissed. The appellant proceeded to the Registry and immediately made a second application to set aside the default judgment.

On the hearing of the second application no issue was taken with the question of leave to proceed under r 63 MCCR. Rather, the parties joined issue on the question of whether the appellant could establish the preconditions necessary to enlivening the discretion to set aside the default judgment under r 87(2) MCCR. The Magistrate, in dismissing the appellant's application, held that whilst the appellant had a reasonable excuse for failing to file and serve a defence to the respondent’s claim, it did not have an arguable case on the merits within the meaning of r 87(2)(a). Amongst other things, the Magistrate considered that the appellant’s case was one of recent invention.

The appellant appealed to this Court. The appellant’s primary argument was that it was not open to the Magistrate to find that the appellant did not have an arguable case on the basis, in part, that such case was recently invented given that the appellant’s evidence on the application was not challenged. The respondent filed an Amended Notice of Cross-Contention challenging the Magistrate’s findings that the appellant had a reasonable excuse for its absence in Court for the first application and for not filing a defence within the prescribed time limit.

Held, allowing the appeal, the Magistrate erred in finding that the appellant did not have an arguable case on the merits. Exercising the discretion under r 87(2) afresh, the appellant’s second application is allowed and the default judgment dated 27 November 2018 is set aside.

Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 40(1); Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) rr 60, 61, 63, 64, 87; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 286(1), referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Marmanidis [2019] SASCFC 3; Cubelic v T & D Lock Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 397; Marmanidis v Germein [2017] SASC 103; Sandery v Kowalski [2016] SASC 175; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 86
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Living Australia Pty Ltd v Rans Consulting Group Pty Ltd is an appeal brought before the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appellant, Living Australia Pty Ltd, contests a decision made by the Magistrates Court that refused to set aside a default judgment awarded to the respondent, Rans Consulting Group Pty Ltd. The respondent had filed a claim against the appellant for unpaid consulting services rendered from August to October 2017, amounting to $23,318.92 plus costs and interest. The appellant argued that the Magistrates Court erred in its decision to deny the application to set aside the default judgment, and that the court should reconsider the application based on the criteria set out in rule 87 of the Magistrates Court Rules 2014.

The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Magistrates Court erred in its decision to deny the appellant's application to set aside the default judgment. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the appellant had satisfied the jurisdictional facts required by rule 87(2) of the Magistrates Court Rules 2014, which are having an arguable case on the merits and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the rules, orders of the Court, or any time limits set by the Court. Additionally, the court had to assess if the Magistrates Court exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment in a legally unreasonable manner.

In its decision, the Supreme Court found that the Magistrates Court did not adequately consider the appellant's application to set aside the default judgment. The court emphasised that rule 87(2) of the Magistrates Court Rules 2014 is in the nature of jurisdictional facts, which must be satisfied before the court can exercise its discretion to set aside a default judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrates Court failed to properly evaluate the jurisdictional facts, and thus exercised its discretion in a legally unreasonable manner. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Magistrates Court for reconsideration of the application to set aside the default judgment, in light of the correct application of rule 87 of the Magistrates Court Rules 2014.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow I would allow the appeal.Background On 25 October 2018 the respondent filed a claim against the appellant for $23,318.92 plus costs (total $24,845.42) and interest. The same day the respondent filed an amended claim, the amendment being the adjustment of the amount to be charged for effecting service of the amended claim. For reasons that will become apparent, it is necessary to go through the amended claim in some detail. The amended claim complied with the requirements of Form 2 MCCR. The opening paragraphs set out the amount claimed, the type of claim, the details of the plaintiff, the details of the defendant and the method by which the claim would be served. The amount claimed was $24,845.42 and the claim type was described as “debt”. The actual pleading in the amended claim commenced by identifying the plaintiff/respondent and defendant/appellant. The respondent, Rans Consulting Group Pty Ltd, is the trustee of the Rans Consulting Group Trust which, it was pleaded, provided consulting services in relation to business growth, advisory, strategic and business advice, profit improvement, and mentoring and coaching. The appellant, Living Australia Pty Ltd, is a company involved in property development, design and management. The amended claim pleaded that in or about August to September 2017 the respondent agreed to provide consulting services to the appellant in exchange for the payment of a fee. That agreement, it was pleaded, was partly oral, partly written and partly implicit. The oral component of the agreement was derived from conversations between Mr Ransome, a director of the respondent, and Mr Cakar, a director of the appellant, that occurred in the period August to September 2017. With respect to the written component, it was said to be comprised of an email from Mr Ransome to Mr Cakar dated 4 September 2017 in which there is contained the primary term of the consulting agreement, namely, that the respondent would provide 12 to 14 hours of consulting services per month to the appellant in return for payment in the amount of $3000 plus GST. As for the implied component, the claim pleaded that it was implicit in the consulting agreement that the appellant would pay the consulting fee within 14 days of the respondent issuing an invoice. It is unnecessary to summarise the asserted basis supporting the implied term. The amended claim pleaded the partial performance of the consulting agreement in the period August to October 2017 in that the respondent issued an invoice for services provided (Invoice No 1133) which was paid in full. The amended claim also pleaded variations to the consulting agreement that occurred in or about October 2017 when the respondent agreed to delay issuing an invoice for consulting services provided during October 2017 until late November 2017. The variation was agreed to because the appellant was experiencing cash flow issues. It was also pleaded that the respondent further agreed to provide the appellant with a monthly discount of 15% to 20% on the consulting fee chargeable in future in return for the appellant agreeing to the consulting agreement remaining in place long term. In addition the appellant agreed to provide the respondent with office space at the appellant’s premises at Unley for a rental of $400 per month with the rental to be deducted from any monthly invoice issued until such time as the office was vacated. The amended claim pleaded that Mr Ransome and Mr Cakar agreed to the variations in the course of one or more conversations in October 2017.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to r 286(3) SCCR it seems plain that, error being established, this Court may exercise the power contained in r 87 MCCR afresh. Bearing in mind that the second application was fought “on the papers”, this Court is in as good a position as the Magistrate to determine the application. The combined effect of the appellant’s attack on the Magistrate’s decision regarding r 87(2)(a) and the respondent’s attack on the Magistrate’s decision regarding r 87(2)(b) has had the consequence that the parties have made full submissions in this Court on the application of r 87 to the material before the Magistrate and this Court. In the circumstances I proceed to determine the second application afresh.Should the default judgment be set aside? Rule 87 MCCR provides:87.(1) The Court may set aside or vary a judgment (not being a final judgment).(2)The Court must not set aside such a judgment unless the party seeking to set it aside establishes that he or she – (a) has an arguable case on the merits; and(b)has a reasonable excuse for not having complied with these Rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by these Rules or order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding. In Marmanidis v Germein I said:[17][17] [2017] SASC 103 at [78]-[85].A default judgment within the meaning of rule 60 MCCR is not a final judgment within the meaning of rule 2(1) MCCR and is thus a judgment in relation to which the power contained in rule 87(1) MCCR may be exercised.… the first observation to make, is that rule 87 MCCR operates in a context of a judgment having been regularly obtained. A judgment irregularly obtained may be set aside ex debito justitiae. A judgment irregularly obtained would also be liable to an order in the nature of certiorari made by this Court.It is clear that the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Magistrates Court by rule 87(1) MCCR is conditioned by rule 87(2) MCCR. That is, the discretion vested by rule 87(1) cannot be exercised unless and until the party seeking to have the non-final judgment set aside establishes that it has both an arguable case on the merits, and, a reasonable excuse for not having complied with the rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by the rules or order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding. It may also be said that rule 87(2)(a) and (b) are in the nature of jurisdictional facts in that the discretion vested by rule 87(1) MCCR is not enlivened unless and until the Magistrate forms the opinion that the applicant has an arguable case and a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the rules and orders of the Court and any time limits set by the Court. In this connection, in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship French CJ said: The term “jurisdictional fact” applied to the exercise of a statutory power is often used to designate a factual criterion, satisfaction of which is necessary to enliven the power of a decision-maker to exercise a discretion. The criterion may be “a complex of elements”. When a criterion conditioning the exercise of statutory power involves assessment and value judgments on the part of the decision-maker, it is difficult to characterise the criterion as a jurisdictional fact, the existence or non-existence of which may be reviewed by a court. The decision-maker’s assessment or evaluation may be an element of the criterion or it may be the criterion itself. Where a power is expressly conditioned upon the formation of a state of mind by the decision-maker, be it an opinion, belief, state of satisfaction or suspicion, the existence of the state of mind itself will constitute a jurisdictional fact. If by necessary implication the power is conditioned upon the formation of an opinion or belief on the part of the decision-maker then the existence of that opinion or belief can also be viewed as a jurisdictional fact. ...(footnotes omitted).That an evaluative judgment needs [to] be made with respect to the criteria contained in rule 87(2)(a) and (b) does not alter the nature of those criteria as being in the nature of jurisdictional facts. As to rule 87(2)(a), in Saunders v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd Lander J said: It is not possible on an application of this kind, to resolve disputed questions of fact, primarily when those answers will depend upon the credibility of the parties (Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329 at 334).The appellant is not called upon to establish that his defence will be made out, but merely that he has an arguable case. To that end, the appellant must establish that upon the facts, as the appellant alleges them to be, the appellant has an arguable defence. The appellant must go further than assert that he has a defence, he must bring forward sufficient information and material to show that he is bona fide and intends to defend the action and that there “is some possibility of his doing so with success” (Grimshaw v Dunbar [1953] 1 QB 408 at 416).As to rule 87(2)(b), a reasonable excuse is one which in all circumstances the ordinary person would consider warrants forgiveness for non-compliance. Here it is necessarily the case that the ordinary person will appreciate the high premium that the community places upon compliance with rules of courts and orders of courts in order that justice be administered effectively and efficiently. That appreciation reflects an understanding of the importance to the functioning of the community of the effective and efficient exercise of judicial power to quell controversies arising in the community. With this understanding, the community, no less than the courts, expects litigants to discharge the obligations placed upon them by the law and the courts.If both of rule 87(2)(a) and (b) are satisfied the discretion vested by rule 87(1) is, as I have said, enlivened. As to the exercise of that discretion, in Saunders v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd Lander J said: In the circumstances where both of the matters referred to in the rule have been made out, and the delay in the application explained, and no real prejudice established, it would be appropriate to exercise the Court’s discretion in favour of the appellant.“The fundamental duty of the court is to do justice between the parties. It is, in turn, fundamental to that duty that the parties should each be allowed a proper opportunity to put their cases upon the merits of the matter. Any limitation upon that opportunity will generally be justified only by the necessity to avoid prejudice to the interests of some other party, occasioned by misconduct, in the case of the party upon whom the limitation is sought to be imposed.” (Davies v Pagett (1987) 70 ALR 793)The exercise of the power conferred by rule 87(1) MCCR, conditioned as it is by rule 87(2), is reviewable by this Court for legal unreasonableness in the sense explained below in relation to each of the jurisdictional facts and the exercise of the overall discretion exercised upon those facts being satisfied.[footnotes omitted]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established