Dalby Bio-Refinery Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dalby Bio-Refinery Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2019] FCAFC 85

Appeal from: Dalby Bio-Refinery Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 1806
File number: VID 1596 of 2018
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, BEACH AND ANASTASSIOU JJ
Date of judgment: 24 May 2019
Catchwords: INSURANCE – where damage found to stockpiles of dry distillers’ grain and solubles – construction of perils exclusion clause in industrial special risks insurance policy – whether “heating” in exclusion clause qualified by the word “spontaneous” – interpretation of the phrase “spontaneous heating” – whether explanation required for cause of spontaneous heating – appeal dismissed with costs   
Cases cited:

Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 82; 161 CLR 500

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; 251 CLR 640

Gunns Forest Products Ltd v North Insurances Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 105; 14 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-691

Johnson v American Home Assurance Company [1998] HCA 14; 192 CLR 266

McCann v Switzerland Insurance Australia Ltd [2000] HCA 65; 203 CLR 579

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37; 256 CLR 104

Selected Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 37; 242 CLR 336

Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2005] HCA 17; 221 CLR 522

Date of hearing: 14 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M D Wyles QC with Mr B J Murphy
Solicitor for the Appellant: McCullough Robertson
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G G McArthur QC with Ms K E Foley
Solicitor for the Respondents: Lander & Rogers

ORDERS

VID 1596 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DALBY BIO-REFINERY LTD

Appellant

AND:

ALLIANZ AUSTRALIA INSURANCE LIMITED

First Respondent

CHUBB INSURANCE AUSTRALIA LIMITED

Second Respondent

ZURICH AUSTRALIAN INSURANCE LIMITED

Third Respondent

JUDGES:

ALLSOP CJ, BEACH AND ANASTASSIOU JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 May 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of the Court in the Insurance List dismissing an application by an insured to enforce a claim for material damage under an Industrial Special Risks Policy issued by the respondent insurer.

  2. The appellant carries on business as a manufacturer and distributor of ethanol.  In carrying out that business it carries on a bio-refinery at Dalby in South East Queensland.

  3. In the early hours of 2 March 2016, fire and emergency services attended the premises at Dalby in respect of damage that had occurred and was occurring to stockpiles of dry distillers’ grain and solubles in four bays (numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4).  The primary judge summarised the matter at [3] of his reasons:

    At approximately 6.30 am on 2 March…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dalby Bio-Refinery Ltd (Dalby) appealed against a decision of the primary judge, who found that Allianz Australia Insurance Limited (Allianz) was not liable to indemnify Dalby for damage to stockpiles of dry distillers’ grain and solubles due to an exclusion in the industrial special risks insurance policy. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the perils exclusion clause in the policy, specifically whether the term "heating" in exclusion 6(c)(ii) was qualified by the word "spontaneous". Dalby argued that the damage to the grain and solubles was due to spontaneous heating, and thus within the policy coverage, while Allianz contended that the exclusion applied because "heating" was not qualified by "spontaneous".

The court was required to determine the proper construction of the exclusion clause, particularly whether "heating" was qualified by the word "spontaneous". Additionally, the court needed to interpret the phrase "spontaneous heating" to ascertain whether an explanation of the cause of the spontaneous heating was necessary. The court also had to consider whether the contra proferentem rule applied to resolve any ambiguity in the policy.

The court concluded that "heating" in exclusion 6(c)(ii) was not qualified by the word "spontaneous". The textual context of the exclusion and the differentiation between spontaneous combustion and any form of heating supported this interpretation. The court further held that "spontaneous" meant the occurrence of something without external cause, and thus the term "spontaneous heating" simply meant heating that occurred due to internal processes without external incitement. Given this interpretation, the damage to the grain and solubles due to heating was excluded from coverage under the policy. The court dismissed the appeal with costs.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge accepted the submission of the insurer that “heating” in exclusion 6(c)(ii) was not qualified by the word “spontaneous”. The reasons for this conclusion were set out at [32]–[37]:Conclusions32 It seems to me it is tolerably plain, from both the text of the exclusion and having regard to the relevant context, that the Insurers were not prepared to accept a risk of damage to the Product occasioned by or happening through heating of any type. I accept the submissions of the Insurers that there are a number of textual matters pointing against the constructions agitated by Dalby.33 The first and most obvious is that the word heating is not qualified or modified by the word “spontaneous” as is the case with “combustion” or “fermentation”. The notion that spontaneity qualifies all of the perils in cl 6(c)(ii) cannot be sustained in circumstances where one of the matters referred to in that clause involves what is clearly an external process (being the application of heat, and is itself qualified by the word “any”).34 Secondly, there is a difference between damage occasioned by spontaneous combustion and damage that would be occasioned by any form of heating (including self-heating); it follows that “heating” has work to do in the exclusion clause properly construed. Indeed the circumstances of this case make it clear that there could be damage to the Product occasioned by heating which fell short of any combustion and it seems to me that this is precisely the sort of eventuality to which perils exclusion 6(c)(ii) is directed.35 Thirdly, contrary to the submissions of Dalby, I do not believe that the proviso assists. The proviso refers to “property damage as a result of such spontaneous combustion, fermentation or heating or process involving the direct application of heat”.36 Plainly, given the comma between “combustion” and “fermentation” prior to the disjunctive appearing before the word “heating”, “spontaneous” is qualifying “combustion” and “fermentation”. What is also evident is that the insertion of the disjunctive before “heating” points to the fact that “heating” is embracing a broader causal concept as is “any other process involving the direct application of heat”. For these reasons, I do not consider there to be any ambiguity and the Insurers’ submissions as to the proper construction of the perils exclusion are to be preferred.37 It also follows that the argument of Dalby based on the application of the contra proferentem rule, such as it is, must be rejected. The primary judge then dealt with “spontaneous heating” should he be wrong about the word heating being unqualified by “spontaneous”. It is at this point that the referee’s second report becomes relevant: whether “self-heating” was a synonymous expression for “spontaneous heating”. At [39]–[41] of his reasons the primary judge said:39 In determining this issue, I was referred by the parties to various dictionary definitions. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, 5th ed, provides a definition of “spontaneous” and a definition of “spontaneous combustion” in the following terms:spontaneous / adj. 1. Proceeding from a natural personal impulse, without effort or premeditation; natural and unconstrained; a spontaneous action; a spontaneous remark. 2. (of impulses, motion, activity, natural processes, etc.) arising from internal forces or causes, or independent of external agencies. 3. growing naturally or without cultivation, as plants, fruits, etc. 4. produced by natural process.spontaneous combustion / n. the ignition of a substance or body from the rapid oxidation of its own constituents, without heat from any external source.40 The Oxford Encyclopaedic English Dictionary sets out definitions of the same terms as follows:spontaneous / adj. 1 acting or done or occurring without external cause. 2 voluntary, without external incitement (made a spontaneous offer of his services). 3 Biol. (of structural changes in plants and muscular activity esp. in young animals) instinctive, automatic, prompted by no motive. 4 (of bodily movement, literary style, etc.) gracefully natural and unconstrained. 5 (of sudden movement etc.) involuntary, not due to conscious volition. 6 growing naturally without cultivation.spontaneous combustion the ignition of a mineral or vegetable substance (e.g. a heap of rags soaked with oil, a mass of wet coal) from heat engendered within itself, usu. By rapid oxidation.41 The Supplementary Report provides the referee’s reasoning process for drawing some meaningful distinction between the concept of “self-heating” and “spontaneous heating”. The referee expresses his view that they are “not quite synonymous terms”. This is because, according to the referee, spontaneous suggests “an event or a suddenness” and self-heating can be a “very slow process” which can take months to reach “criticality”. It is for this reason that the referee described the process as self-heating rather than spontaneous heating. Both parties agreed that it was for the Court to determine the content to be given to the word “spontaneous” as used in the Policy to the extent that it was relevant. It seems to me that the ordinary, usual and relevant meaning of the word “spontaneous”, is that it describes the occurrence of something without external cause. Although spontaneous combustion is usually related to something that occurs with some rapidity, when talking about spontaneous in the sense of qualifying the causal concept of heating, it simply means that it occurs without external incitement or factors, rather it is something which occurs by reason of internal processes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established