SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 4305 of 2004
| GUNNS FOREST PRODUCTS LTD | |
| Applicant | |
| v. | |
| NORTH INSURANCES PTY LTD and | First Respondent |
| INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD & ORS | Second to Twelfth Respondents |
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JUDGES: | CHERNOV and REDLICH, JJ.A. and MANDIE, A.J.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 3 April 2006 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 10 May 2006 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2006] VSCA 105 | |
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Arbitration – Award – Appeal from decision of judge refusing leave to appeal – Whether any manifest error of law on the face of the award – Commercial Arbitration Act 1984, ss.38(4)(b), 38(5)(b).
Insurance – Industrial special risks policy – Claim in respect of loss and damage to woodchips – Exclusion clause in respect of damage occasioned by or happening through contamination – Construction of exclusion clause – Whether contamination was cause of damage – Whether any manifest error of law on face of arbitrator’s award.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr G.G. McArthur, SC with Mr J.P.M. de Koning | Black (Peter) & Associates |
| For the 1st Respondent | Mr P.G. Cawthorn | Phillips Fox |
| For the 2nd to 12th Respondents | Mr C.M. Scerri, QC with Mr P.H. Solomon | Mallesons Stephen Jaques |
CHERNOV, J.A.:
I have had the benefit of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Mandie, A.J.A. and agree that, for the reasons given by his Honour, leave to appeal should be refused. The question before the arbitrator was whether the damage to the wood chips was “occasioned by or [happened] through contamination”. Put another way, the ultimate question was whether it could sensibly be said that the contamination was the real and proximate cause of the damage. The arbitrator was correct, I think, in answering that question in the affirmative. The contamination was constituted by rubber particles, the entry of which into the wood chips was relevantly caused by the malfunction of the conveyor belt. But the proximate cause of the damage was the contamination and, in my view, it would be inaccurate to say, as the appellant contended, that the real and proximate cause of the damage was the problem with the machinery. As Mandie, A.J.A. has explained, the mere fact that it might also be said that the damage was constituted by contamination does not detract from the above conclusions.
REDLICH, J.A:
I have had the benefit of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Mandie, A.J.A., and for those reasons I would dismiss the application for leave to appeal.
MANDIE, A.J.A.:
Introduction
The proceeding before the Court involves an application for leave to appeal[1] and (if leave is granted) an appeal from an interlocutory judgment of a Judge in the Trial Division dated 7 May 2004 by which the applicant was refused leave to appeal against the award of an arbitrator.
[1]On 18 June 2004 two judges of this Court ordered that such application for leave to appeal be referred to the Court before which the appeal was heard.
The applicant (“the insured”) was insured…
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- Case
- [2006] VSCA 105
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the arbitrator made any manifest error of law in his decision. The primary focus was on the construction of the exclusion clause and whether the arbitrator correctly found that contamination was the cause of the damage. The court noted that the exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous, and the arbitrator had correctly applied it to the facts of the case. The court found that the arbitrator's reasoning was sound and there was no manifest error of law in the award. The court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the arbitrator's decision.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles of contractual interpretation and the application of clear and unambiguous exclusion clauses. The court found that the exclusion clause was properly construed and applied to the facts of the case. The court also found that the arbitrator had correctly determined that contamination was the cause of the damage to the woodchips. The court held that the arbitrator's decision was not vitiated by any manifest error of law.
The final orders of the court were that Gunns' appeal be dismissed, and the arbitrator's decision be affirmed. The court also ordered that Gunns pay the costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal from the decision of a judge who had refused leave to appeal the arbitrator's award. The appellant, Gunns Forest Products Ltd, had applied for leave to appeal the arbitrator's decision, which was denied by the judge. The appellant then sought leave to appeal the judge's decision, which was also refused. The appellant then appealed the judge's decision to the court. The court was required to determine whether there was any manifest error of law on the face of the arbitrator's award.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether there was any manifest error of law on the face of the arbitrator's award.
2. Whether contamination was the cause of the damage to the woodchips, and if so, whether the exclusion clause in the insurance policy applied.
3. Whether the court should grant leave to appeal the judge's decision to refuse leave to appeal the arbitrator's award.
Held
1. The court held that there was no manifest error of law on the face of the arbitrator's award.
2. The court found that contamination was the cause of the damage to the woodchips and therefore the exclusion clause in the insurance policy applied.
3. The court refused to grant leave to appeal the judge's decision to refuse leave to appeal the arbitrator's award.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the issue of whether there was any manifest error of law on the face of the arbitrator's award. The court found that the arbitrator had correctly interpreted and applied the law in making the award, and there was no manifest error of law on the face of the award. The court relied on the provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984, which set out the grounds for appeal from an arbitration award, and found that none of those grounds were applicable in this case.
The court then turned to the issue of whether contamination was the cause of the damage to the woodchips, and if so, whether the exclusion clause in the insurance policy applied. The court found that contamination was indeed the cause of the damage, as evidenced by the expert reports and other evidence presented at the arbitration. The court then considered the wording of the exclusion clause in the insurance policy, and found that it was clear and unambiguous in excluding cover for damage caused by contamination. The court relied on established principles of contract interpretation and found that the exclusion clause applied to the facts of this case.
Finally, the court considered whether it should grant leave to appeal the judge's decision to refuse leave to appeal the arbitrator's award. The court found that there was no compelling reason to depart from the judge's decision, and that the appeal would not have a reasonable chance of success. The court relied on the principles set out in previous cases regarding the grant of leave to appeal, and found that they did not apply in this case.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that where an arbitrator has correctly interpreted and applied the law in making an award, there is no manifest error of law on the face of the award, and an appeal will not be allowed. Additionally, where an exclusion clause in an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, and the cause of the loss or damage falls within the scope of the exclusion, the exclusion will apply and the insurer will not be liable. Finally, where a judge has refused leave to appeal an arbitration award, and there is no compelling reason to depart from that decision, an appeal from that decision will also be refused.