CZAY v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CZAY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2012] FMCA 50
MIGRATION – Jurisdictional error – principles in relation to ‘relocation’ – relevance of domestic violence – extension of time.
Migration Act 1958, ss.417, 477(1) & (2)

Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCATrans 35
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Applicant S v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387
Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS & ors (2010) 243 CLR 164; (2011) 85 ALJR 306; (2011) 273 ALR 122
Plaintiff M13/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 277 ALR 667
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18
SZFDV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 51
SZJTW v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2009] FMCA 508
SZNOR v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2009] FMCA 639
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 59

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

M. Crock & L. Berg, Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, Policy and Practice in Australia, (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2011)

Applicant: CZAY
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: CAG 66 of 2010
Judgment of: Neville FM
Hearing date: 10 May 2011
Date of Last Submission: 21 July 2011
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 31 January 2012

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor/Advocate for the Applicant: Mr J Davey
Solicitors for the Applicant: Herm Legal & Migration Services
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms A Mitchelmore
Solicitors for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The Application for an extension of time be allowed.

  2. A writ of certiorari issue to bring the record - including the decision - of the Tribunal into this Court, and the decision of the Tribunal then be quashed.

  3. A writ of mandamus issue to require the Tribunal to determine the matter according to law.

  4. Pursuant to orders made on 10 May 2011, in the absence of any written submissions opposing costs within 14 days, the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs in accordance with the Rules of this Court in the sum of $6240.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAG 66 of 2010

CZAY

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS…

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Details
Case
[2012] FMCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Czay v Minister for Immigration, the High Court was asked to review the decision of the Tribunal regarding the applicant's claim for refugee status. The applicant alleged that she had a well-founded fear of persecution if she returned to India due to her husband's family's actions against her. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the law in assessing the applicant's claim, particularly in relation to the 'relocation principle' and the need for close consideration of the individual circumstances of the applicant.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and found that it had not adequately considered the applicant's specific circumstances, including the capacity of her husband and his family to continue persecuting her in other parts of India. The court emphasised the importance of individual and fact-specific inquiries, as highlighted in previous High Court decisions. The Tribunal's focus on the applicant's husband and his family, without proper consideration of their ability to persecute her elsewhere in India, led to an error in the decision-making process. This failure to properly consider the applicant's circumstances amounted to an error of law.

The High Court allowed the application for an extension of time and quashed the Tribunal's decision. It issued a writ of mandamus to require the Tribunal to reassess the applicant's claim according to law. Additionally, the court ordered the Minister for Immigration to pay the applicant's costs as per the Rules of the Court. The applicant's claim was to be reconsidered with a proper focus on her individual circumstances and the specific risks she faced upon returning to India.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The Application for an extension of time be allowed.

2.

A writ of certiorari issue to bring the record - including the decision - of the Tribunal into this Court, and the decision of the Tribunal then be quashed.

3.

A writ of mandamus issue to require the Tribunal to determine the matter according to law.

4.

Pursuant to orders made on 10 May 2011, in the absence of any written submissions opposing costs within 14 days, the First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs in accordance with the Rules of this Court in the sum of $6240.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In SZJSS, the High Court further observed, at [34] and [36] (internal citations omitted; emphasis added):[34] It has been recognised that to describe reasoning as irrational or unreasonable may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with it.[36] The conclusion that the Tribunal erred in giving "no weight" to the letters, with the implication that it should have given different, presumably determinative, weight to them, depended on the Federal Court reviewing the factual findings of the Tribunal rather than the process by which it arrived at its conclusions. In the joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, at [73] and [78], their Honours said (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original text):[29][73] The objective element [of the Convention definition of “refugee”] requires the decision-maker to decide what may happen if the applicant returns to the country of nationality. That is an inquiry which requires close consideration of the situation of the particular applicant.[78] The central question in any particular case is whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution. That requires examination of how this applicant may be treated if he or she returns to the country of nationality. Processes of classification may obscure the essentially individual and fact-specific inquiry which must be made.[29] Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473. I simply emphasise their Honours’ comments about the requirement for “close consideration of the situation of the particular applicant”, and later, the importance their Honours placed on “the essentially individual and fact-specific inquiry which must be made.” And in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003,[30] McHugh J noted, at [75], the important point that the Convention “does not refer to persecutors. It refers to persecution, not persecutors.” I record his Honour’s comment because, among other things, in the present case the Tribunal seems to have focussed – to a degree understandably – on the Applicant’s husband and his family. However, in doing so, there was little or no consideration of the capacity of those protagonists to continue or to orchestrate persecution of the Applicant in other parts of India. Put another way, the “close consideration” of the circumstances of this particular Applicant stipulated by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Applicant S395/2002 did not occur. This failure to consider, or to consider properly, the actual circumstances of the Applicant included the capacity of the Applicant’s husband and family to continue the persecution of her elsewhere in India.[30] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1. In SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the plurality judgment of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ (Kirby J and Callinan J agreeing in separate judgments), at [9] – [18] reviewed High Court authorities in relation to ‘the relocation principle.’[31] Then their Honours said, at [19]…it will be seen that the matter of "relocation" finds its place in the Convention definition by the process of reasoning adopted by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department.[32] His Lordship said:[33] "The [Convention] does not expressly address the situation at issue in these appeals where, within the country of his nationality, a person has a well-founded fear of persecution at place A, where he lived, but not at place B, where (it is said) he could reasonably be expected to relocate. But the situation may fairly be said to be covered by the causative condition to which reference has been made: for if a person is outside the country of his nationality because he has chosen to leave that country and seek asylum in a foreign country, rather than move to a place of relocation within his own country where he could have no well-founded fear of persecution, where the protection of his country would be available to him and where he could reasonably be expected to relocate, it can properly be said that he is not outside the country of his nationality owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason." [31] SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18.[32] [2006] 2 AC 426.[33] [2006] 2 AC 426 at 440.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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