FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CSZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 706
Appeal from: CSZ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 144 File number: VID 114 of 2017 Judge: DAVIES J Date of judgment: 23 June 2017 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review – application for leave to amend the notice of appeal to raise new grounds not before the primary judge – whether the proposed grounds lacked “clear merit” Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v WuShan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; (2016) 243 FCR 220
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 4 May 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Appellant: S C Churches Solicitor for the Appellant: Craig McKay Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: M Hosking Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 114 of 2017 BETWEEN: CSZ15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DAVIES J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JUNE 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to amend the notice of appeal be refused.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DAVIES J:
BACKGROUND
The appellant has appealed the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCC”) dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the Minister”) not to grant the appellant a protection class (XA) visa.
The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan from Parachinar in the Kurram Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (“FATA”). He is of the Pashtun/Bangash ethnicity and a Shia Muslim. The appellant claimed to have a well‑founded fear of persecution from the Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (“TTP”) and/or from other extremist Sunni groups in Pakistan by reason of his religion, ethnicity, political opinion…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 706
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether leave should be granted to raise new grounds of appeal that were not considered by the FCC, and if so, whether such grounds have clear merit. The court had to determine if the proposed new grounds had sufficient merit to justify the grant of leave, and if there was an adequate explanation for why these grounds were not raised below. The court also considered whether granting leave would prejudice the respondent.
The court found that leave to argue the new ground should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice, and if the proposed ground has clear merit. The court concluded that the proposed new ground did not have sufficient merit to justify the grant of leave, as it was not an adequate explanation that a change in counsel was the reason for the proposed new ground not being raised below. Additionally, the proposed new ground did not align with the statutory scheme that vests jurisdiction to hear applications for judicial review in the FCC. Consequently, the court refused leave to amend the notice of appeal and dismissed the appeal.
In light of the above, the court made the following orders: (1) leave to amend the notice of appeal be refused, (2) the appeal be dismissed, and (3) the appellant pay the First Respondent's costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to amend the notice of appeal be refused.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As the authorities show, the guiding principle is that leave to argue a new ground should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 (“VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs”) at [46]; Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; (2016) 243 FCR 220 at [90]. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated.Generally, leave should be refused in the absence of an adequate explanation for the failure to raise the proposed appeal grounds below and where the proposed new grounds are of doubtful merit. If a proposed ground has no merit there is no justification for permitting it to be raised for the first time on appeal: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs at [48]. The Minister has opposed the grant of leave to add the proposed new ground of appeal on the basis that it has no merit and an adequate explanation was not given as to why this ground was not raised below. For the reasons that follow, leave to amend the notice of appeal to raise the new ground should be refused. In response to a question from the Bench, the explanation given for the proposed new ground was a change in counsel. As the cases show, that is not an adequate reason. The Court is, in effect, requested to consider for the first time an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision based on new grounds. This undermines the Court’s role as an intermediate appellate court in migration matters. It also undermines the statutory scheme in relation to judicial review of decisions of the Tribunal under which jurisdiction to hear applications for judicial review is vested in the FCC to the exclusion of this Court: SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51 at [31] and [38]. Apart from the lack of adequate reason, the proposed new ground does not have sufficient merit to justify the grant of leave. The ground particularised three jurisdictional errors as follows: (a)the failure to refer to relevant evidence (“Proposed Ground 1.1”);(b)a failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the appellant’s case (“Proposed Ground 1.2”); and(c)rejection of the utility of evidence on the basis of speculation unsupported by any logically probative evidence (“Proposed Ground 1.3”).Proposed Ground 1.1 In relation to Proposed Ground 1.1, it was argued that the Tribunal failed to have regard to relevant material, namely the US State Department 2013 Report on Religious Freedom published 28 July 2014 (“US State Department Report”), in finding there had been a significant improvement in the security situation in the Kurram Agency and that this was a “durable improvement” and the failure constituted jurisdictional error. The appellant referred to the proposition that jurisdictional error may include “ignoring relevant material in a way that affects the exercise of a power”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323, at 351–352 [82]–[84]; referred to in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164 (“Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS”) at [27]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431 (“Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS”), at [68].