DKT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DKT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 208

Appeal from: DKT16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 170
File number: VID 152 of 2019
Judges: DAVIES, MOSHINSKY AND SNADEN JJ
Date of judgment: 2 December 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – protection visa – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) – decision of the first respondent refusing an application for a protection visa – whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal failed to consider risks of harm cumulatively – whether the Tribunal misunderstood the definition of “degrading treatment or punishment” – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave ought to be granted to permit reliance upon additional ground not argued before the primary judge – whether additional ground has merit – leave refused

Legislation:

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Art 1A

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7, ss 5, 36, 65, 411, 414, 415, 474, 476

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

BLX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 176

CSZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 706

DKT16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 170

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780

Li Pei Ye v Crown Limited [2004] FCAFC 8

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 362 ALR 48

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 93 ALJR 252

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2018) 261 FCR 556

Summers v Repatriation Commission (2015) 230 FCR 179

SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 28 August 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms S Pathan
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Chaile
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 152 of 2019
BETWEEN:

DKT16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

DAVIES, MOSHINSKY AND SNADEN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

2 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

4.In the absence of any such agreement:

(a)within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 208
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DKT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Nepal who is HIV-positive, appealed against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which had found that she was not entitled to a protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissed the appeal, and the applicant now sought judicial review of that decision in the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, who had lived in Australia since 2014, claimed that she was unable to return to Nepal because of the social stigma attached to her HIV status and her status as a widow. The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claims on the basis that the applicant had not suffered discrimination or difficulties in obtaining treatment for her HIV in Nepal, and had not faced difficulties at work in relation to her HIV status. The Tribunal also found the applicant’s evidence to be embellished and exaggerated. The sole ground of judicial review was that the Tribunal had failed to consider the risks of harm cumulatively.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in failing to consider the risks of harm cumulatively. The Tribunal had considered the evidence of discrimination and adverse treatment in the context of the applicant’s overall circumstances, and had concluded that the applicant had not suffered serious or significant harm. The court also found that the Tribunal had not misunderstood the definition of “degrading treatment or punishment”. The Tribunal had correctly interpreted the definition to require treatment or punishment that was extreme or sustained, and had found that the applicant’s treatment had not reached that level. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the evidence of discrimination and adverse treatment in the context of the applicant’s overall circumstances, and had concluded that the applicant had not suffered serious or significant harm.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the evidence of discrimination and adverse treatment in the context of the applicant’s overall circumstances, and had concluded that the applicant had not suffered serious or significant harm. The court also found that the Tribunal had not misunderstood the definition of “degrading treatment or punishment”. The Tribunal had correctly interpreted the definition to require treatment or punishment that was extreme or sustained, and had found that the applicant’s treatment had not reached that level. The court noted that the applicant’s claims were not supported by the evidence, and that the Tribunal’s decision was not unreasonable. The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in failing to consider the risks of harm cumulatively, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

4. In the absence of any such agreement:

(a) within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);

(b) within a further 14 days, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN‑COSTS); and

(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The claims for protection advanced by means of the appellant’s Visa Application focused heavily upon the fact that she is an HIV-positive widow. She was diagnosed with HIV in 2005. Her late husband, who was also an HIV sufferer, died in 2007. By her Visa Application (and the submissions that she advanced in support of it, before both the Minister’s delegate and, later, the Tribunal), the appellant explained that:(1)prior to leaving Nepal, she had been receiving retroviral treatment in her home town of Pokhara (and, on occasion, in Kathmandu), and had been since approximately 2008;(2)prior to coming to Australia, she held a job as a social worker, working with HIV sufferers—a position that she had held since 2003;(3)she has family—including parents, siblings and two adult children—who remain in Nepal;(4)because of her HIV status, her family does not support her;(5)following an earthquake in April 2015, her parents’ home—at which her children lived at the time—was destroyed and they were forced to take up residence in a tent;(6)her late husband’s family blames her for his death;(7)her HIV status is widely known amongst her community, which reflected in her subjection in Nepal to various forms of differential treatment, including having things thrown at her when she went out;(8)HIV-positive women in Nepal are particularly vulnerable to various forms of violence—including physical and sexual violence—and are often subjected to comparatively poor treatment in Nepalese hospitals;(9)despite legislative intervention to the contrary (which has not been effective or enforced), Nepalese society does not “accept” HIV sufferers—they are subjected to widespread discriminatory practices on account of their condition, including social, physical and vocational exclusion;(10)Nepalese society looks unfavourably upon widows; and(11)in consequence of those realities, her relocation to another part of Nepal would not assist her in avoiding the social stigma that attaches to HIV sufferers and widows.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION At [13]-[16] of the FCCA Judgment, the FCCA summarised the Tribunal’s Decision as follows (references omitted):13. The Tribunal commenced by accepting that the [appellant] is a citizen of Nepal and HIV positive. The Tribunal found, in paragraph 39 of the [Tribunal’s Decision], that the [appellant] has not suffered discrimination or difficulties in obtaining treatment for her HIV in Nepal. The Tribunal found further, in paragraph 40 of the [Tribunal’s Decision], that in light of the [appellant]’s own evidence, she had faced no difficulties at work in relation to her HIV status. The Tribunal acknowledged:-“that those with HIV can suffer discrimination in work in Nepal, according to independent evidence. However, the nature of the [appellant]’s job, providing support services to those with HIV, results in this being an environment where discrimination is not faced by her.”14. The Tribunal then proceeded to make adverse credibility findings against the [appellant] stating, prior to the making of those findings, that it considered that the [appellant] had “embellished and exaggerated claims of discrimination, and of knowledge by others of her HIV status” and, in relation to one “tangential claim”, that the [appellant] had “been blatantly untruthful”. The adverse credit findings made by the Tribunal are set out in paragraphs 41 to 62 of the [Tribunal’s Decision]. It is not necessary here in these reasons to further set out those findings when having regard to the sole ground of judicial review raised by the [appellant]. Rather, it is [sufficient] to state here the conclusion as to the [appellant]’s evidence reached by the Tribunal as set out in paragraphs 63 and 64 of the [Tribunal’s Decision] which is as follows:-“63. The [appellant]’s evidence has been characterised by untruthfulness, inconsistency, confusion and vagueness. There is a deliberate untruth in relation to the [appellant]’s [parents’] home being damaged [sic] the earthquake. There is inconsistent evidence as to whether the [appellant]’s parents know of her HIV status and contradicting claims as to whether they support her, or have evicted her from the home. There is significant inconsistency, confusion and vagueness as to the extent the others know of the [appellant]’s HIV status.64. The credibility issues identified cause the Tribunal to consider that the [appellant] has embellished and exaggerated claims of family or other mistreatment and of knowledge by others of her HIV status.”15. Based on the credibility issues that arose for the Tribunal, the Tribunal stated in paragraphs 66 to 71 of the [Tribunal’s Decision] the following:-“66. The Tribunal is of the view that the [appellant]’s parents likely know of her HIV status but the Tribunal considers that they maintain their support for the [appellant]. The Tribunal does not consider it plausible that there could be suspicion or knowledge of the [appellant]’s HIV status in her small home village and that members of the [appellant]’s own family would not be aware of this.67. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the [appellant] has been rejected by her parents or evicted from the family home due to her HIV status.68. While the Tribunal has some doubts as to the extent that the [appellant]’s HIV status is widely known, the Tribunal is prepared to accept that there is some dissemination of this information, both in her home village, and in Pokhara.69. The Tribunal is prepared to accept that there has been some degree of discrimination and adverse treatment by some individuals towards the [appellant] as a result of knowledge or suspicion of her HIV status both in Pokhara [and] in her home village. However, the Tribunal considers that there has been embellishment and exaggeration by the [appellant] in relation to this, given the cumulative impact of the credibility concerns identified.70. The Tribunal does not consider that the [appellant] has been subject to physical attack. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the [appellant] is unable to buy goods as a result of her HIV status or that she is unable to rent property. The latter is inconsistent with the [appellant]’s evidence that she rented a property in Pokhara, and the Tribunal considers that she would be less of a focus and target in this larger city.71. The Tribunal does not accept that the [appellant] was forced out of her family home in her village or out of her home in Pokhara due to knowledge of her HIV status, given the inconsistencies in relation to these claims in the Tribunal hearing and the fact that these claims were not made as part of the original application.72. In relation to the [appellant]’s home village, the fact that the [appellant] has remained living in her home village, for at least half the time, from her diagnosis in 2007 until coming to Australia in 2014 is consistent with discriminatory treatment of a moderate level only and not to an extent that it has constituted serious or significant harm. If the [appellant] had been subject to sustained and extreme discriminatory treatment, the Tribunal considers that she would have moved permanently to Pokhara, where her employer was based. Pokhara is the second largest city in Nepal with a population of more than 340,000 people.73. While the Tribunal is prepared to accept that there [may be] some individuals who know of the [appellant]’s HIV status in Pokhara, and that there has been some discriminatory treatment, the Tribunal [sic] not satisfied that it has been extreme or sustained in Pokhara such that it has constituted serious or significant harm. In the bigger city of Pokhara, the Tribunal considers that the risk of discriminatory treatment is likely to be less than in the [appellant]’s home.”16. The Tribunal said further in paragraph 78 of the [Tribunal’s Decision] the following:-“While the Tribunal is prepared to accept that there may be some degree of discrimination, negative verbal comments, and a lack of understanding from individuals either in Pokhara or her home village, who know or suspect as to the [appellant]’s HIV status, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the [appellant] would be subject to physical mistreatment, or discriminatory treatment that would be extreme or sustained such that it would constitute serious harm for the purpose of the Refugees Convention criterion, or constitute extreme humiliation, for the purpose of the complementary protection criterion (in terms of whether the [appellant] would face degrading treatment or punishment as a defined category of significant harm). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the [appellant] would be at a real risk of significant harm on any other grounds.”We adopt that summary as a relevant and fair reflection of the Tribunal’s Decision.