Commissioner of Taxation v Service

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Service [1999] FCA 1304

TAXATION – Income tax – Whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) applied correct test in determining whether the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction under s 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) for director’s fees paid to employer – Whether the AAT applied the correct test when determining whether the taxpayer obtained director’s fees subject to a constructive trust.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Whether any evidence to support findings of fact.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33(1)(c), 44(1).
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 51(1).

Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, discussed.

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, cited.

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, cited.

Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482, cited.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Payne (1999) 162 ALR 158, cited.

Ronpibon Tin NL v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 47, distinguished.

Lunney v Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478, cited.
Lodge v Commissioner of Taxation (1972) 128 CLR 171, followed.
Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177, followed.
Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 1, followed.
Ure v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 50 FLR 219, cited.
Robert G Nall Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1937) 57 CLR 695, cited.
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, cited.
Glennan v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 4467, cited.
Countess of Bective v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 47 CLR 417, cited.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Everett (1980) 143 CLR 440, cited.
Liedig v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 50 FCR 461, cited.
Zobory v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 64 FCR 86, cited.
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 73 ALJR 547, cited.
Northern NSW FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 26 FCR 39, followed.
Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 77 FCR 371, cited.
Schokker v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 162 ALR 677, cited.

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v JAMES GLEN SERVICE

N 213 OF 1999

SACKVILLE J
SYDNEY

16 SEPTEMBER 1999

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 213 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant

AND:

JAMES GLEN SERVICE
Respondent

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 SEPTEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) made on 19 February 1999, be set aside.

2.   The matter be remitted to the AAT, differently constituted, to be determined according to law and consistently with these reasons.

3.   The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1304
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Service involved the Commissioner of Taxation challenging a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that determined the tax implications of director's fees received by the taxpayer. The AAT had concluded that either the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction for the director's fees under the first limb of section 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA), or alternatively, that the fees were received on constructive trust for the company. The Commissioner argued that the AAT's findings were not supported by the evidence. The court needed to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the AAT's findings and whether the AAT's conclusions on the characterisation of the director's fees were correct.

The court examined the nature of the evidence presented to the AAT, considering whether it was sufficient to support the AAT's findings. The Commissioner had argued that the evidence did not support the inference that the taxpayer was contractually bound to account to the company for the director's fees. However, the court held that the AAT was entitled to consider the family arrangement and the written statements of the taxpayer and his wife, even if they did not strictly adhere to the rules of evidence. The court found that the AAT's findings were supported by the evidence and that it was not the role of the court to substitute its own findings for those of the AAT.

The court also addressed the characterisation of the director's fees under section 51(1) of the ITAA. The court referred to previous cases which established that the character of an outgoing is determined by considering the essential nature of the expenditure and the taxpayer's motive in incurring it. The court held that the AAT had correctly applied the principles of characterisation in determining that the director's fees were deductible either under the first limb of section 51(1) or on the basis of a constructive trust.

The court set aside the decision of the AAT and remitted the matter to the AAT, differently constituted, to be determined according to law and consistently with the court's reasons. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) made on 19 February 1999, be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the AAT, differently constituted, to be determined according to law and consistently with these reasons.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The AAT summarised the position as follows:“(a)if the [Taxpayer] derived the directors’ fees beneficially he was entitled to a matching deduction under the first limb of section 51(1) of the [ITAA]; and(b)in the alternative, and on reflection [the Taxpayer’s] contention as to a constructive trust is tenable, and the [Taxpayer] received the directors’ fees on constructive trust for the Company.”Was There Evidence to Support the AAT’s Findings? Mr Bloom QC, who appeared for the Commissioner, criticised the AAT’s findings on a number of grounds. It was said that the only proper inference from the evidence was that the Taxpayer and his family had entered into a family arrangement not intended to have contractual force; that there was no evidence to support the finding that the Taxpayer was contractually bound to account to the Company for the director’s fees; that there were no specific findings that the discussions were held with family members who were able to bind the Company; that insufficient attention was paid to the fact that the Taxpayer did not account to the Company for 50,000 options received by him from Advance Bank but had placed them in the family trust; and that some of the material on which the AAT relied, notably the statements of the Taxpayer and his wife, was couched in the form of legal conclusions rather than as evidence of primary facts. Some of the criticisms made by Mr Bloom of the findings may have some force. It is curious, for example, that the benefit of the options granted to the Taxpayer should have been permitted to accrue to the family trust rather than to the Company. It is not easy to reconcile the parties’ conduct in relation to the options with the claimed rationale for the arrangement whereby the Taxpayer, as a full-time employee of the Company, was permitted to take up a variety of directorships. Similarly, the discussions relating to the Taxpayer’s acceptance of directorial positions do not seem to have been confined to family members who were shareholders of the Company, perhaps lending support to the contention that the arrangement was not intended to have contractual force. But the question on an application for judicial review is not whether the Court would necessarily have made the same findings of fact as the AAT. It is whether there was an absence of any evidence to support a material finding of fact: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, at 358, per Mason CJ; Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, at 35-36, per Brennan J. In my view, there was evidence on which the AAT could make the findings it did. For example, both the Taxpayer and his wife gave evidence of discussions within the family amounting to an agreement substantially in the terms found by the AAT. They also gave evidence of their understanding that the arrangement operated as a term of the Taxpayer’s contract of employment. Furthermore, the AAT was entitled to take account of the written statements of the Taxpayer and his wife, even though they may not have been admissible in a court applying the rules of evidence. The AAT is not bound by those rules: AAT Act, s 33(1)(c). While s 33(1)(c) is not a licence to receive and act upon evidence devoid of rational probative force (Pochi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482, at 492, per Brennan J), the written statements in the present case could not be said to lack any probative value.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE J
In Lodge v Commissioner of Taxation (1972) 128 CLR 171, at 175, Mason J explained the decision in Lunney as follows:The rejection in Lunney’s case of the claim that the expenses of travelling between home and work was an allowable deduction was based on the proposition that it is not enough to show that the expenditure was an essential prerequisite to the derivation of assessable income. The decision denied the notion that an expense was incidental and relevant to the derivation of income merely because it was necessary in that sense. The decision turned rather upon a view of the character of the expenditure incurred.” (Emphasis added.) A similar point was made by Lockhart J in Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177, a case in which a majority of the Court denied a deduction to a professional footballer for additional food, over and above his normal meals, consumed on the instructions of his coach. Lockhart J said this (at 184):“The question whether the additional expenditure of the taxpayer is deductible under s 51(1) cannot be answered simply by a process of reasoning that, because expenditure of this kind is a prerequisite to the earning of the taxpayer’s assessable income (in the sense that it is necessary if assessable income is to be derived), it must be incidental and relevant to the derivation of income. It does not follow that such expenditure is incurred in or in the course of gaining or producing the income. The deductibility of the expenditure depends upon determining the essential character of the expenditure itself and not upon the fact that, unless it is incurred, the taxpayer will not be able to engage in the activity from which his income is derived.” (Emphasis added.) In Fletcher v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 1, the High Court considered the process of characterisation involved in determining whether an outgoing is wholly or partly “incurred in gaining or producing the assessable income” within the meaning of s 51(1) of the ITAA. After referring to Ronpibon, the Court said this (at 17) about the significance of a taxpayer’s motive:“So to say is not, however, to exclude the motive of the taxpayer in making the outgoing as a possibly relevant factor in characterization for the purposes of the first limb of s 51(1). At least in a case where the outgoing has been voluntarily incurred, the end which the taxpayer subjectively had in view in incurring it may, depending upon the circumstances of a particular case, constitute an element, and possibly the decisive element, in characterization of either the whole or part of the outgoing for the purposes of the sub-section.”The Court went on to say that it is commonly possible to characterise an outgoing as within the first limb of s 51(1) without any need to refer to the taxpayer’s subjective thought processes. This is ordinarily the case where the outgoing gives rise to the receipt of a larger amount of assessable income. But as the Court observed (at 18-19)“the position may... well be different in a case where no relevant assessable income can be identified or where the relevant assessable income is less than the amount of the outgoing. Even in a case where some assessable income is derived as a result of the outgoing, the disproportion between the detriment of the outgoing and the benefit of the income may give rise to a need to resolve the problem of characterization of the outgoing for the purposes of the sub-section by a weighing of the various aspects of the whole set of circumstances, including direct and indirect objects and advantages which the taxpayer sought in making the outgoing. Where that is so, it is a “commonsense” or “practical” weighing of all the factors which must provide the ultimate answer.”See also Ure v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 50 FLR 219, at 233, per Deane and Sheppard JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE J