FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CJR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1627
ORDERS
WAD 631 of 2017 BETWEEN: CJR17
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1627
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Federal Circuit Court did not deny the appellant procedural fairness. The court reasoned that the appellant was on notice of the matter in issue and had not sought an adjournment to address the late filing of the affidavit. Furthermore, the court held that the error in the case was attributable to the appellant or his agent, rather than the Tribunal, and thus did not warrant a finding of procedural unfairness. Regarding the AAT's handling of the post-hearing correspondence, the court concluded that the AAT was not obligated to respond to the letter, especially given the ambiguity of its content and the lack of an extension of time sought by the appellant.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs, should they not be agreed upon. This decision underscores the importance of timely and proper submission of evidence and the limited obligations of tribunals to address post-hearing communications that do not meet formal submission requirements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the Minister submitted that there are many examples where the Tribunal might receive evidence or documents that do not meet their description but it is not incumbent on the Tribunal to inform a visa applicant of the veracity of the documents. For example, it was submitted, a purported medical certificate might not in fact provide sufficient details for it to be probative or might only be a receipt but that would not oblige the Tribunal to inform the applicant that it is inadequate prior to making a decision. A similar argument might apply to a range of evidence or submissions that might be provided to the Tribunal or that an applicant might indicate he or she wishes to submit but fails to provide to a Tribunal. Counsel for the Minister somewhat reluctantly described this as a 'floodgates' argument, but contends (in effect) that such examples indicate that procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to in effect take an interventionist supervisory role of the manner in which an applicant runs his or her case. The content of procedural fairness must be considered in the context of the Tribunal's statutory obligations and the circumstances of a particular case.Consideration Counsels' research did not reveal authorities that deal with the content of any obligation on the part of the Tribunal when it is given notice of a misapprehension such as in this case outside the extended time period for provision of submissions and where no extension of time has been sought. I would add to the factual matrix the ambiguity of the terms of the 28 April 2016 letter itself. There are examples where the court has made an internal error relating to communications or filing and so made orders on an artificial basis. One example is provided by Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 4) [2012] FCA 1170, where submissions were not properly filed but were provided by email to Collier J's associate. The submissions were not brought to the attention of her Honour before orders were made on the papers. Submissions form part of the formal court record of proceedings. Accordingly, her Honour, having been informed of the issue, vacated the orders under r 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), which permits in limited circumstances the varying or setting aside of orders after entry, including where there is an error arising from an accidental slip or omission. See also as to the exceptional circumstances in which such jurisdiction might be exercised: United Group Resources Pty Ltd v Calabro (No 6) [2012] FCA 431; Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) [1993] HCA 6; (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 303; De L v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (No 2) [1997] HCA 14; (1997) 190 CLR 207 at 215. To my mind, these authorities, concerned as they are with the finality of litigation and the particular circumstances that apply to applications to vary or set aside orders, are not sufficiently analogous to the circumstances of the Tribunal in this case. To the extent there was error, it was not on the part of the Tribunal. The error cannot fairly be described as mutual, and the circumstances cannot fairly be described as otherwise exceptional. The error was on the part of the Agent or the appellant, and there appears to have been an element of calculated risk in relying on information apparently from Mr F that suggested (at least to the Agent/appellant) that the UK decision may have been provided to the Tribunal directly by Mr F (not by the Agent or appellant). As already explained, there is simply no evidence the Tribunal ever received the UK decision.