SZVIA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVIA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1228

Appeal from: SZVIA & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1140
File number: NSD 788 of 2016
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 14 October 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider the appellants’ claims – whether the Tribunal erred in characterising claim through lack of understanding of the caste system – where ground of appeal raised shortly before the hearing that Federal Circuit Court judgment based on lack of preparation by the legal representative – whether inadequate preparation by legal representative warrants judicial intervention – whether arguable grounds for adjournment sought at the hearing to obtain legal representation
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 424AA
Cases cited:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Hanna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 282

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZLIX [2008] FCAFC 17

NABC of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1426

NADQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 483

Pannu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2013] FCA 1406

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189

SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 222 FCR 73

Date of hearing: 18 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S He
Solicitor for the Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order the Court may make in the proceeding, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 788 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZVIA

First Appellant

SZVIB

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellants appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in which an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was dismissed. 

    GROUNDS OF APPEAL

  2. The grounds of appeal as originally filed were:

    1.The Tribunal failed to properly consider the Claims;

    2.The Department failed to Accord Procedural fairness [sic]

  3. Subsequently, albeit under the heading of ‘Submissions’ the appellant raised the following purported grounds of appeal which are effectively to the following effect:

    (1)The Federal Court judgment (presumably the Federal Circuit Court judgment) was made on lack of preparation by the legal representative for the appellant;

    (2)The Tribunal failed to consider the claims;

    (3)The Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, a married couple who are citizens of India, appealed against a decision of the Tribunal which had dismissed their application for a protection visa. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider their claims and had erred in characterising their claims due to a lack of understanding of the caste system. The wife claimed she was a 'Jatt Sikh' and feared harm due to her marriage to a 'Hindu Sikh' from another caste. The couple applied for a review of the delegate's decision to refuse their application, but the Tribunal found that the appellant's evidence did not sufficiently clarify whether she had married a person from a different caste. The Tribunal found that the appellant was not a member of a particular social group consisting of 'Punjabi Sikh women in inter-caste marriages' as she had claimed.

The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant's claims and had not erred in characterising them. The court found that the Tribunal had understood that the appellant's characterisation of the two castes was by reference to religion and had addressed the overlapping concepts of caste and religion. The court found that the Tribunal's finding was open and that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in failing to characterise the appellant's claim by reference to an inter-religious marriage. The court also found that the appellant's references to marrying a person from a different religion appeared in the context of her explaining the point of difference between an aspect of the different castes, to which she claimed she and her husband belonged.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant's claims and had not erred in characterising them. The court also found that the appellant's references to marrying a person from a different religion appeared in the context of her explaining the point of difference between an aspect of the different castes, to which she claimed she and her husband belonged. The court found that the Tribunal had understood that the appellant's characterisation of the two castes was by reference to religion and had addressed the overlapping concepts of caste and religion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Helpfully the Minister has filed, at the request of the Court, supplementary submissions dealing with all matters.BACKGROUND The appellants are married citizens of India. The wife only has made claims for protection, her husband to whom I refer as the second appellant, applied as a member of the same family unit. The application for a protection visa was made on 22 March 2013. The appellant there claimed she was a ‘Jatt Sikh’. She claimed to fear harm in her village in India because she had married the second appellant who was a ‘Hindu Sikh’ from another caste. In addition she claimed she would suffer harm from her community because she had been previously married and divorced while in Australia. The appellant did not, however, attend an interview with the delegate of the Minister on 2 July 2013. The delegate subsequently refused the visa application on 12 July 2013. She applied for a review of the decision of the delegate on 5 August 2013 appearing with her husband before the Tribunal on 1 September 2014. As noted in the Tribunal’s decision (at [9]-[11]), in her protection visa application, the appellant claimed, in summary:(a)she was born in Sihan Daud, Punjab, India, in 1987 and lived at an address there up to March 2008. Her ethnicity is Sikh and her religion is 'Jatt Sikh'. She received a total of seventeen years of formal education in India, ending in April 2007. She first came to Australia on 31 March 2008 as the holder of a student visa. She married in New South Wales on 29 July 2010 and, besides her husband in Australia, lists her parents and a brother as living in India. She returned to India between 19 January and 19 March 2011 to visit her ill mother;(b)she fears physical, emotional and mental harm in her village because it will be discovered that she has married a Hindu from another caste. About 1500 of the 2000 inhabitants are Jatt Sikhs. She will be asked to appear before the Panchayat (village council). She says there are very old-fashioned and conservative people in the village who will punish her and her parents because she has broken with tradition. As she was studying abroad the community had high expectations that she would marry within her caste and bring pride to the village. Her parents have told her it is unsafe for her and her husband to live there;(c)a further difficulty is that she previously married another person, on 12 December 2008 in Melbourne. They were divorced on 11 March 2012. Not many people in the village know this but they will find out sooner or later. The community can prosecute her over it and make her life miserable. They may even try to assault her sexually;(d)the police will not protect her. They are corrupt and side with the Panchayat; and(e)she cannot relocate to another place in the Punjab because the Jatt Sikh community there would react in a similar way as the community in her village. The appellant had provided media articles downloaded from the internet relating to honour killings in Punjab and elsewhere in India.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 2 asserted a breach of s 424AA of the Act, but no obligation was held to arise under that provision as concerns about the appellant’s account (which were said to engage the obligation) was not ‘information’ for the purposes of s 424A of the Act and, therefore, s 424AA of the Act was not engaged. Ground 3 was not pressed. Ground 4 suggested that the Tribunal had taken into account an irrelevant consideration. That ground was also rejected at ([63]-[70]) as factually misplaced.CONSIDERATION As to the contention that the primary judge erred in finding the Tribunal made no error in its consideration of the appellant’s claims, the same argument is advanced as before the primary judge. In essence, the appellant claimed a fear by virtue of her marriage to her husband (the second appellant) who was from another caste. At [24], the Tribunal said:The [appellant] claims to fear harm from her local council (Panchayat) as well as other members of Sikh society in her village because she has married person from another caste. Although she does not suggest a Convention nexus I accept she can be taken to be claiming to fear harm arising from her membership of a particular social group which might be relevantly defined as “Punjabi Sikh women in inter-caste marriages” or “Punjabi women marrying against their family wishes”. I am prepared to accept that such groups can be said to exist in India as particular social groups, in the sense that they are sufficiently identifiable by characteristics or attributes common to all their members, other than a shared fear of persecution, which serve to distinguish them from society at large. From this it can be seen that the Tribunal assisted the appellant in her claim. I am unable to identify any error in characterising her claim in this way, and I agree with the conclusion of the primary judge in that respect. Her evidence provided in the course of her visa application and before the Tribunal was that she was a Punjabi woman of Sikh ethnicity who feared harm due to an inter-caste marriage. It is not apparent that there was any error on the part of the Tribunal in failing to characterise the appellant’s claim by reference to an inter-religious marriage. Her references to marrying a person from a different religion appeared in the context of her explaining the point of difference between an aspect of the different castes, to which she claimed she and her husband belonged. She explained at the hearing that ‘Jatt Sikh’ followed the Sikh religion while ‘Hindu Sikh’ follow both Sikhism and Hinduism. The Tribunal understood that her characterisation of the two castes was by reference to religion. Moreover, the Tribunal did address the overlapping concepts of caste and religion. The Tribunal (at [28]) accepted that ‘caste and religion are not necessarily separate concepts in Punjab, for Sikhs or for Hindus’. However, as the first appellant had framed her claim by reference to her inter-caste marriage, the Tribunal proceeded to test her claims on that basis. It found (at [28] and [32]) that, as country information did not support the existence of a ‘Hindu Sikh’ caste and that the appellant’s evidence did not sufficiently clarify whether she in fact married a person from a different caste, the first appellant was not a member of a particular social group consisting of ‘Punjabi Sikh women in inter-caste marriages’ as she had claimed. The primary judge was not in error in concluding (at [32]) that the Tribunal’s finding was open.