Chapple v DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   CHAPPLE -v- DULUXGROUP (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD [2022] WADC 73

CORAM:   COMMISSIONER COLLINS

HEARD:   3 JUNE 2022 & WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FILED 11 MAY & 1 JUNE 2022

DELIVERED          :   12 AUGUST 2022

FILE NO/S:   APP 89 of 2021

BETWEEN:   STEPHEN CHAPPLE

Appellant

AND

DULUXGROUP (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   MAGISTRATE P G MALONE

File Number            :   FRE/MINOR/843/2020


Catchwords:

Magistrates Court appeal - Minor case claim - Whether denial of natural justice - Procedural fairness - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
District Court Rules 2005 (WA)
Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA)
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Appeal allowed in part

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr R V Graham
Respondent : Mr T J Langdon

Solicitors:

Appellant : Vogt Graham Lawyers
Respondent : HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Perth)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Defendi v Szigligeti [2019] WASCA 115

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Fazio v Bedford [2016] WADC 162

Gambaro v Mobycom Mobile Pty Ltd [2019] FCAFC 144

International Finance Trust Company Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49

Leeth v The Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 174 CLR 455

McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council [2008] NSWCA 209; (2008) 72 NSWLR 504

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

R v T, WA (2013) 118 SASR 382

Rankilor v Circuit Travel Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 148

Re Burton; Ex parte Lowe [2003] WASCA 306

Rowe v Stoltze [2013] WASCA 92; (2013) 45 WAR 116

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141

Strahan v Brennan [2014] WASC 190

Table of Contents

A.      Introduction

B.       Proceedings in the Magistrates Court

C.       Issues for determination

D.      Legal principles

E.     Appeal to be decided on material and evidence before the Magistrate unless leave is given to adduce additional evidence

F.     Ground 1: was Mr Chapple given the opportunity to be heard?

F.1      Overview

F.2      Mr Chapple's submissions

F.3      Dulux's submissions

F.4      Disposition

G.      Ground 2: was the Magistrate biased?

G.1      Mr Chapple's submissions

G.2      Dulux's submissions

G.3      Legal principles

G.4     Disposition

H.      Ground 3: did the Magistrate fail to give adequate reasons in relation to ordering the payment of some of Dulux's costs?

H.1      Overview

H.2      Dulux's submissions

H.3      Mr Chapple's submissions

H.4      Legal principles

H.5      Disposition

I.    Conclusion

COMMISSIONER COLLINS:

A.     Introduction

  1. On 16 November 2021, Magistrate Malone (Magistrate) heard a 'minor case' claim at the Fremantle Magistrates Court involving the appellant and the respondent.  The appellant, Mr Chapple, was the claimant in that matter.  At the end of the hearing, the Magistrate dismissed Mr Chapple's claim and ordered Mr Chapple to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $7,508 (Magistrate's Decision).

  2. Mr Chapple has appealed the Magistrate's Decision.  The appeal was filed on 6 December 2021.  In support of his appeal,…

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Details
Case
[2022] WADC 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chapple v DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd involved a dispute concerning whether a magistrate's conduct during a trial led to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The parties included the plaintiff, Mr Chapple, and the defendant, DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd, with the latter represented by an expert witness, Mr Booth. The primary issue was whether the magistrate's interactions with Mr Booth, particularly through direct questioning, created a bias that might affect the fairness of the trial. The court was tasked with determining whether these interactions were sufficient to suggest that the magistrate was not open to persuasion by the merits of the case.

The legal issues centred on the principles of procedural fairness and the concept of prejudgment. The court had to evaluate whether the magistrate's conduct indicated a failure to remain impartial, and if so, whether this failure could reasonably lead a fair-minded lay observer to doubt the magistrate's impartiality. The court also considered whether the magistrate's questioning of Mr Booth was justified under the circumstances, given the need to ensure a fair hearing for both parties.

The court concluded that the magistrate's interactions with Mr Booth did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The magistrate's questioning was deemed to be within the bounds of procedural fairness, aimed at verifying Mr Booth's qualifications and the validity of his evidence. The court found that the magistrate's actions were reasonable and necessary to ensure that both parties received a fair hearing. The directness of the questioning did not, in itself, imply bias, especially when considered in the context of the magistrate's duty to ensure a fair trial.

The final orders of the court upheld the magistrate's conduct as proper and did not find any bias that would necessitate a retrial. The court's decision was based on the magistrate's entitlement to question the expert witness to ascertain the validity of the evidence presented and to ensure a fair trial for both parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Magistrates are required to give reasons for their decisions. Section 31 of the Magistrates Court Act provides: 31Judgments, content of (1)The Court's reasons for a judgment in a case -(a)need only identify the facts that the Court has accepted in coming to its decision and give the reasons for doing so; and (b)need only identify the law that the Court has applied in coming to its decision and give the reasons for doing so; and (c)need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and (d)need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case. When considering a magistrate's reasons, it is necessary to keep in mind the work magistrates perform. In this regard, in Strahan v Brennan[2014] WASC 190 [88] - [92], Martin CJ observed that: 88It is necessary then to return to the first ground in each appeal which alleges that the magistrate's reasons were inadequate. Plainly, magistrates must give adequate reasons for their decision. However, the content of the obligation imposed upon magistrates and the question of whether that obligation has been satisfied in any particular case depends upon a number of considerations elucidated in the Magistrates Court Act and relevant case law.89The first is that Magistrates Courts are summary courts. The very nature of the word 'summary' requires and connotes that the magistrates are to conduct their business with expedition and with a degree of informality appropriate to the disposition of the large volume of cases which are brought before those courts every day. Consistently with that notion s 31(1) of the Magistrates Court Act expressly provides that: …90Having regard to that section and the context in which the magistrates of this state conduct their judicial business it is not appropriate to scrutinise the reasons for decision given by magistrates with a fine-tooth comb or with an eye keenly attuned to the identification of error. Nor is it appropriate for the court to infer from infelicity of language that error is thereby demonstrated. That is because, of necessity, magistrates are required to perform their important functions in a different time frame to that which applies in the superior courts and in that context it is to be expected that some infelicity of language is likely to occur from time to time.91Nevertheless it is clear that the reasons of a magistrate must disclose the underlying intellectual process which has given rise to the conclusions - Tran v Claydon [2003] WASCA 318; (2003) 40 MVR 506 [36] - [37] (McLure J, Steytler P & Johnson J agreeing). It is also clear that the adequacy of any magistrate's reasons is to be assessed by looking at the reasons as a whole and includes not only findings expressly made but findings to be inferred from the findings expressly made - Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASCA 131 [27] (Mazza JA, McLure P & Newnes JA agreeing). 92Further, the adequacy of the magistrate's reasons in any particular case must be assessed in the context of that particular case so that what might appear to be unacceptable economy of language might be justified by the manner in which the case was conducted or by the evidence that was adduced - Francis v Todd [2011] WASC 185 [18] (Edelman J). (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Prejudgment usually refers to the situation where the decision‑maker is not 'open to persuasion': Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 [71]; McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council [2008] NSWCA 209; (2008) 72 NSWLR 504 (McGovern) [15] - [23]. Applying the test of apprehended bias to an allegation of prejudgment, the question is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not be open to persuasion. Nevertheless, there may be cases in which it can be concluded that the denial of an opportunity to respond to a matter 'could have had no bearing on the outcome of the trial of an issue of fact': McGovern at [96] citing Stead at (145) - (146). In my view, Mr Chapple has not demonstrated that the Magistrate's interactions with Mr Booth gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are as follows. First, Mr Chapple has not identified what was said that might have led the Magistrate to decide the case other than on its legal or factual merits. Mr Chapple has not articulated the logical connection between that matter and the feared deviation from deciding the case on its merits: cf Ebner [8]. Although it may be accepted that the Magistrate's questioning of Mr Booth was at times direct, and Mr Chapple had limited opportunity to respond to the Magistrate's conclusions about Mr Booth's expertise and evidence, that is not, in and of itself, sufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. More is required. The Magistrate's questioning of Mr Booth must be placed in context. I have already referred to part of that context above at paragraph [82]. It is not necessary for me to repeat the relevant facts surrounding that context. In my view, the relevant context also included the following: (1) the Magistrate's questions were of short duration; (2) the Magistrate was entitled to know Mr Booth's expertise and experience as that served a legitimate forensic purpose; (3) the Magistrate was entitled to know Mr Booth's methodology and the assumptions which Mr Booth had made in forming his opinion; (4) the Magistrate had read Mr Booth's report and heard his evidence; and (5) the Magistrate gave Mr Booth an opportunity to explain how he had formed the opinion that he did. On one view, the Magistrate's questioning of Mr Booth was forensically focused toward ascertaining whether Mr Booth was appropriately qualified to give the evidence that he gave as a purported expert. The fair-minded lay observer may have concluded that having heard Mr Booth's evidence, having read Mr Booth's report (which the Magistrate had (ts 45)), but not being satisfied that Mr Booth was qualified to give the evidence that he gave, as a matter of procedural fairness, it was incumbent on the Magistrate to give Mr Booth an opportunity to demonstrate that he was in fact qualified to give the evidence that he had given. In my view, the Magistrate's questioning of Mr Booth was to ensure that he was affording Mr Booth and Mr Chapple a fair hearing. The Magistrate was entitled to state his reasons for rejecting Mr Booth's evidence. Although it would have been preferable if the Magistrate had raised Mr Booth's expertise with Mr Chapple at an earlier point in the proceedings, the timing of the Magistrate's questions and the directness of those questions did not, in my opinion, involve a reasonable apprehension of bias.