BVY17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BVY17 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 503
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Claims by Applicants of fear of persecution in Peru due to former political activity in that country – Tribunal made adverse findings regarding the credibility of the Applicants which were open to it on the evidence – significant problems in the conduct of the Application by Applicants’ original lawyer – no grounds of review established – Application dismissed with costs.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(aa), 65

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth), s.50
Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth), Schedule 1 Part 3 Division 1

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Banque Commerciale SA (en liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224; (2004) 207 ALR 12

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1

Applicant: BVY17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: CAG 33 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Neville
Hearing date: 28 August 2017
Date of Last Submission: 30 August 2017
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 29 March 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicants: Hugh Ford & Associates
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz (Canberra)

ON A FINAL BASIS, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The Application filed by the Applicant on 1 May 2017 be dismissed.

  2. The Applicant is to pay the Respondent’s costs as per Schedule 1, Part 3 Division 1 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

  1. The solicitor for the Applicant is to file written submissions of no more than 6 pages in length within 14 days of the date of these Orders, being by close of business on 12 April 2018, as to why the Court should not:

    (a)Injunct him from appearing before Judge Neville in future;

    (b)Refer his conduct to the ACT Law Society; and

    (c)Refer his conduct to the ACT Bar Council.

  2. Should the Court decide to proceed to the referrals foreshadowed at Order 3 of these Orders, the Court may do so without further notice to the parties.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAG 33 of 2017

BVY17

First Applicant

BVZ17
Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. On 1st May 2017, the Applicants filed an Application seeking review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal” or “the AAT”), dated 7th April 2017.[1] The Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 503
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, BVY17, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The core of the dispute concerned the lawfulness of the decision-making process, specifically whether adverse credibility findings made by the delegate were legally unreasonable and thus constituted jurisdictional error. The matter came before Neville J of the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the delegate's adverse credibility findings were tainted by jurisdictional error, and if so, whether this error rendered the Minister's decision unlawful. This involved an examination of the principles governing legal unreasonableness in administrative decision-making, particularly in the context of credibility assessments. The court was required to determine if the delegate's reasoning process, leading to the rejection of the applicant's evidence, was arbitrary, capricious, or lacked an evident and intelligible justification.

Neville J referred to established Full Court authorities, including *Singh* and *DAO16*, which clarified the concept of legal unreasonableness. The court noted that legal unreasonableness can arise either from an underlying jurisdictional error or as an outcome-focused assessment where a decision lacks an evident and intelligible justification. In relation to credibility findings, the court emphasised that while such findings are generally for the decision-maker, they are not beyond scrutiny. Adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error if they lack a logical, rational, or probative basis, or are based on unwarranted assumptions or false factual premises. However, the court cautioned that a high degree of caution must be exercised to avoid impermissible merits review, requiring a demonstration of "extreme" illogicality in the reasoning process.

The decision does not specify the final orders made by Neville J, as the provided text focuses on the legal principles applied in assessing the application for review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

From the decisions cited, for the purposes of the disposition of the current Application for Review, it is sufficient to note the following from the Full Court’s decision in Singh, at [44] and [47] (Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ) (emphasis added):[44] In order to understand how the standard of legal unreasonableness is to be ascertained, it is important to see where the concept fits in terms of the Court’s supervisory powers over executive or administrative decision-making. In Li, the judgments identify two different contexts in which the concept is employed. Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process: 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [27]- [28] per French CJ, at [72] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [39] per Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J. However, legal unreasonableness can also be outcome focused, without necessarily identifying another underlying jurisdictional error. The latter occurs in what French CJ (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [28]) calls “an area of decisional freedom”: it has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious or without “common sense”. See also the plurality at [66] referring to an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. The plurality in Li described this as an inference to be drawn because the court cannot identify how the decision was arrived at. In those circumstances, the exercise of power is seen by the supervising court as lacking “an evident and intelligible justification”. Gageler J also uses language suggestive of review for legal unreasonableness being concerned with an examination by the supervising court of the outcome of the exercise of power (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [105] …[47] … the distinctions made between reasonableness review which concentrates on the outcome of the exercise of power, and reasonableness review which concentrates on an examination of the reasoning process by which the decision-maker arrived at the exercise of power. Although it is not necessary for the purposes of this appeal to resolve the question whether those should be seen as two different kinds of review and what might flow from that, we are inclined to the opinion that, where there are reasons for the exercise of a power, it is those reasons to which a supervising court should look in order to understand why the power was exercised as it was. The “intelligible justification” must lie within the reasons the decision-maker gave for the exercise of the power — at least, when a discretionary power is involved. That is because it is the decision-maker in whom Parliament has reposed the choice, and it is the explanation given by the decision-maker for why the choice was made as it was which should inform review by a supervising court… In DAO16 the Full Court provided the following [further] summary of principle, which (in my view) is directly relevant to the current claims by the Applicants, such as they may be discerned from the very poorly drawn and articulated Grounds of Review. In DAO16, the Full Court set out “relevant principles: legal unreasonableness”, thus (at [30]):[30] The relevant principles can be summarised as follows.(1) While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [37]-[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J).(2) Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) that:[135] ... A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.(Emphasis added)(3) By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), “[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 674 at [54].” Equally jurisdictional error may be established by “a process of reasoning which damns a man’s credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document”: SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1470; (2009) 181 FCR 113 at [37]. (4) Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that:[56] An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny...(citations omitted)(5) A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]-[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established