Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWCA 431
Hearing dates:13 September 2012
Decision date: 18 December 2012
Before: Campbell JA at [1]
Bergin CJ in Eq at [114]
Sackville AJA at [115]
Decision:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

SUCCESSION - where person entitled to assert equitable defence in protection of disputed property has died intestate while under the protection of the NSW Trustee and Guardian - estate bona vacantia - administrator of deceased estate able to assert defence available to deceased in his lifetime - whether Crown entitled to bona vacantia property can enforce a defence belonging to intestate deceased - whether Crown takes title as successor or by statute - question not necessary to resolve where disputed property held at all relevant times by administrator of deceased estate

EVIDENCE - onus of proof - balance of probabilities - party bearing the onus must present enough evidence to enable the court to feel actual persuasion that a particular fact is so - where asserted fact is supported by only one piece of evidence - evidence sufficient on its own to support finding of relevant intention - whether a sufficient basis in surrounding circumstances to overcome evidence

WORDS AND PHRASES - "bona vacantia"
Legislation Cited: Administration of Estates Act 1925
Evidence Act 1995
Interpretation Act 1987
NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009
Probate and Administration Act 1898
Public Trustee Act 1913
Statute of Distributions 1670
Succession Act 2006
Cases Cited: Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145
Andrews v Hogan (1952) 86 CLR 223
Application des Gaz SA v Falks Veritas Ltd [1974] 1 Ch 381
Attorney General of Ontario v Mercer (1883) 8 AC 767
British General Insurance Co Ltd v AG [1945] LJCCR 113
Brown v The NSW Trustee & Guardian [2011] NSWSC 1203
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v ACCC [2007] FCAFC 132; (2007) 162 FCR 466
Delaforce v Simpson-Cook [2010] NSWCA 84
Dyke v Walford (1846) 5 Moore PC 434; 13 ER 557
Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101
Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691
Hunt v Barlow [2000] NSWSC 324
In re Barnett's Trusts [1902] 1 Ch 847
In re Mitchell deceased; Hatton v Jones [1954] Ch 525
In re Usines de Melle and Firmin Boinot's Patent (1954) 91 CLR 42
In the estate of Hanley [1942] P 33
In the Estate of Maldonado;…
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Details
Case
[2012] NSWCA 431
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute over property located in Mosman, New South Wales. The appellant, as executrix of Ian's estate, contended that John, the deceased registered proprietor of the Mosman land, held it on trust for Ian. The primary judge dismissed these proceedings, finding that John did not hold the land on express or resulting trust for Ian, and alternatively, that any such claim was defeated by confirmation or estoppel. The appellant appealed this decision.

The court was required to determine whether John held the Mosman land on trust for Ian, and if so, whether any such trust claim was defeated by confirmation or estoppel. Additionally, the court considered novel arguments concerning the effect of no grant of administration of John's estate at the time of the proceedings and the impact on equitable defences when the State of New South Wales was eventually entitled to John's net estate as bona vacantia.

The court found that at the time John acquired the Mosman land, he held it on trust for Ian. However, it also concluded that the primary judge was correct in holding that any claim that the property was held on trust was defeated by confirmation or estoppel. The court reasoned that the onus was on the appellant to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that John held the property on trust for Ian, requiring evidence sufficient to enable the court to feel actual persuasion of the asserted fact. While a note dated 5 December 2000, on its own, supported the conclusion that the money was transferred to John with the intention of purchasing a house for Ian, the surrounding circumstances, including written instructions signed by Ian, did not provide a sufficient basis to overcome the defence of confirmation or estoppel. The court also considered and rejected the arguments concerning the effect of the absence of a grant of administration and the State's entitlement to the estate.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The onus would be on the Appellant to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that John received the sale proceeds on the basis that he would hold the house purchased with those proceeds on trust for Ian. To satisfy an onus of proof on the balance of probabilities is not simply a matter of asking whether the evidence supporting that conclusion has greater weight than any opposing evidence. As well, both under the common law and also under s 140 Evidence Act 1995, the evidence must be enough to enable the court to feel actual persuasion that a particular fact is so: Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [136]; Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v ACCC [2007] FCAFC 132; (2007) 162 FCR 466 at [31]; R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504; (2001) 127 A Crim R 493 at [55]; Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246, McDougall J at [55], McColl and Bell JJA agreeing. I respectfully agree with the observation in Cross on Evidence, 8th Australian edition (2010) LexisNexis [9130] and footnote 184 that "according to ALRC 26 [998], the provision does not require actual belief; but that is not what the language says". What s 140(1) says is: However, in the present case the judge correctly recognised that, if one took the note of 5 December 2000 (extracted at [16] above) on its own it supported a conclusion that the money was transferred to John with an intention that a house in Australia would be purchased by John, in John's name, but beneficially for Ian. Every occasion on which "he" or "him" appears in that note is a reference to John. The judge went on to say, at [26]: It is uncontroversial that the evidence is such that this Court is in as good a position as the trial judge to reach factual conclusions. Mr Ash submits that here the judge has posed the wrong question, by presuming that a trust could be found only as a result of conversations between John and Ian. Mr Ash submits that, rather, it is communications, either direct or indirect, between Mr Murphy and Ian that should have been enquired into. I do not accept that the judge has overlooked relevant communications between Mr Murphy and Ian. He specifically referred to and took into account, the undated instructions in writing that Ian signed. The primary judge gave, at [26]-[28], the following reasons for not regarding the 5 December note as leading to the conclusion that the property was held on trust: I accept Mr Ash's submission that the matters to which the primary judge referred are not sufficient to displace the conclusion that would otherwise be drawn from the note of 5 December 2000. I will consider those matters seriatim. The undated letter of instructions concerning the proceeds, that Ian signed, is not inconsistent with the contemplated house in Australia being beneficially Ian's house. The obtaining of such written instructions was referred to in the 5 December 2000 note, in a context where those instructions were a means of enabling the house in Australia to be purchased, in John's name but for Ian. Mr Murphy was retained to act only concerning the Surrey conveyancing transaction, not concerning any proposed trust. It is a usual incident of a solicitor's task, when acting for a vendor in a conveyancing transaction, to arrange that the net purchase price is paid to the vendor or as the vendor directs. There was no occasion for Mr Murphy to record in the instruction letter the purpose for which Ian was authorising the money to be paid to John.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BERGIN CJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BERGIN CJ

The State of New South Wales was joined as second defendant in the court below, and has been joined as a Second Respondent in the appeal. It took no active part in either the hearing in the court below, or in the appeal. Its joinder might be explained by the fact that John left no next-of-kin who would become entitled to his estate pursuant to s 61B(1)-(6) Probate and Administration Act 1898 ("P & A Act"). Once administration of John's estate has been completed the State will be entitled to John's estate pursuant to s 61B(7) P & A Act. At the time of his death, John was the registered proprietor of Real Property Act 1900 land in Mosman, on which his home was erected. The Appellant brought proceedings in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the Respondents, contending (so far as is now relevant) that John had held the Mosman land on trust for Ian, and that the First Respondent held it on trust for the Appellant in her capacity as Ian's executrix. In the court below, Brereton J dismissed those proceedings: Brown v The NSW Trustee & Guardian [2011] NSWSC 1203. So far as now relevant, his Honour did so on the basis that he was not satisfied that John had held the land for Ian on either an express trust or a resulting trust. Alternatively, he held that any claim that there might have been that the Mosman house was held on trust was now defeated by confirmation, or estoppel. The Appellant appeals against both those aspects of the decision below. Mr D Ash appeared for the Appellant. Mr A Hill and Ms M Pringle appeared for the First Respondent. I have concluded that it should have been held that, at the time John acquired the Mosman land, he held it on trust for Ian. However, I have concluded that his Honour was correct in holding that any claim that there might have been that the Mosman house was held on trust was now defeated by confirmation or estoppel. On the way to that conclusion I have considered two novel arguments that Mr Ash raised. One concerns the effect of no grant of administration of John's estate having been obtained at the time of the proceedings in the court below. The other concerns the effect, on the availability of equitable defences, of the State eventually becoming entitled to John's net estate. There was no dispute about the relevant primary facts. At all relevant times, Ian lived in England. In 2000, Ian was aged 84. He owned a house called West Heath Cottage in Pirbright, Surrey, United Kingdom. His other substantial asset was a portfolio of shares that were held and managed for him by SG Banking. He was entitled to both a governmental pension, and an occupational pension. By September 2000, Ian had moved into sheltered accommodation. He had had several falls, and was no longer able to look after himself. His wife was still alive, but was in a nursing home suffering from dementia. John had lived in Australia since about 1981. He worked as a stockbroker. The Appellant is a niece of Ian. She and her brother Patrick Gammidge are the only children of Ian's only sibling. The Appellant has at all relevant times before this litigation began lived in England.