Thorner (Appellant) v Majors and others (Respondents)
Appellate Committee
Lord Hoffmann
Lord Scott of Foscote Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
Counsel
Appellants:
Respondents:
John McDonnell QC
Andrew Simmonds QC
Michael Jefferis
Penelope Reed
(Instructed by Stephen Gisby & Co)
(Instructed by Gould & Swayne)
Hearing date:
21 JANUARY 2009
ON WEDNESDAY 25 MARCH 2009
HOUSE OF LORDS
OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT
IN THE CAUSE
Thorner (Appellant) v Majors and others (Respondents)
[2009] UKHL 18
LORD HOFFMANN
My Lords,
1. The appellant David Thorner is a Somerset farmer who, for nearly 30 years, did substantial work without pay on the farm of his father’s cousin Peter Thorner. The judge found that from 1990 until his death in 2005 Peter encouraged David to believe that he would inherit the farm and that David acted in reliance upon this assurance. In the event, however, Peter left no will. In these proceedings, David claims that by reason of the assurance and reliance, Peter’s estate is estopped from denying that he has acquired the beneficial interest in the farm. The judge found the case proved but the Court of Appeal reversed him.
2. Such a claim, under the principle known as proprietary estoppel, requires the claimant to prove a promise or assurance that he will acquire a proprietary interest in specified property. A distinctive feature of this case, as Lloyd LJ remarked in the Court of Appeal (at paragraph 65), was that the representation was never made expressly but was “a matter of implication and inference from indirect statements and conduct.” It consisted of such matters as handing over to David in 1990 an insurance policy bonus notice with the words “that’s for my death duties” and other oblique remarks on subsequent occasions which indicated that Peter intended David to inherit the farm. As Lloyd LJ observed (at paragraph 67), such conduct and language might have been consistent with a current intention rather than a definite assurance. But the judge found as a fact that these words and acts were reasonably understood by David as an assurance that he would inherit the farm and that Peter intended them to be so understood.
3. The Court of Appeal said, correctly, that the fact that Peter had actually intended David to inherit the farm was irrelevant. The question was whether his words and acts would reasonably have conveyed to David an assurance that he would do so. But Lloyd LJ accepted (at paragraph 66) that the finding as to what Peter would reasonably have been understood to mean by his words and acts was a finding of fact which was not open to challenge. That must be right. The fact that he spoke in oblique and allusive terms does not matter if it was reasonable for David, given his knowledge…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18
Case
[2009] UKHL 18
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Thorner v Major, the House of Lords heard an appeal from David Thorner against the decision of the Court of Appeal. David Thorner, a farmer, had worked without pay on his cousin Peter's farm for nearly 30 years. David claimed that Peter had made assurances that David would inherit the farm, and that he had relied on these assurances to his detriment. The central issue was whether David had established a proprietary estoppel claim against Peter's estate. The Court of Appeal had overturned the trial judge's decision in favour of David, finding that Peter's assurances were not clear and unequivocal enough to establish a proprietary estoppel. The House of Lords allowed David's appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were sufficient to support his decision. The Lords found that Peter's assurances, although oblique, were reasonably understood by David as an assurance that he would inherit the farm and that it was reasonable for David to rely on them. The Lords also held that the fact that Peter had not explicitly intended for David to rely on his assurances did not preclude a proprietary estoppel claim. The House of Lords restored the trial judge's order that Peter's personal representatives hold the farm on trust for David.