Brown v Commissioner of Taxation

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Brown v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCAFC 75  

Brown v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 318  

NOTE: CHANGES TO THE MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION (MNC)

The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002.  Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.

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  • All Full Court judgments delivered prior to 1 January 2002 will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brown v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 318  

INCOME TAX – Assessable income – whether benefits received by the Taxpayer were income or were received as a mere gift.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Whether administrative decision void where decision maker made use of material provided in the course of without prejudice negotiations – whether any material provided by applicant in negotiations claimed to be without prejudice was taken into account by the Commissioner in remitting penalty.

EVIDENCE – common law privilege protecting without prejudice communications – whether the factual foundation of the privilege was made out.

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), ss 223(1), 227(3)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 131, 189

Hayes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 96 CLR 47, distinguished
Christie v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 96 CLR 59, distinguished
White v Overland [2001] FCA 1835, discussed
Rush and Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] 1 AC 1280, considered
Ex parte Hamilton; Re Fagan [1966] 2 NSWR 732, cited
Harris v Minister for Public Works (New South Wales) (1912) 14 CLR 721, cited
Cornelius v The King (1936) 55 CLR 235, cited
Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542, cited
Ex parte Whitelock; Re Mackenzie [1971] 2 NSWLR 534, at 540, cited
Casley-Smith the FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332, cited
Field v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1957) 99 CLR 285, cited
Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290, cited
Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 117 CLR 514, discussed
Squatting Investment Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 86 CLR 570, discussed
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dixon (1952) 85 CLR 540, cited
Seymour v Reed [1927] AC 554, referred to
Midland Railways Co v Sharpe [1904] AC 349 cited
Herbert v McQuade [1902] 2KB 631, cited

Halsbury’s Laws of Australia
S Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (4th ed., 2000)

Parsons, Income Taxation in Australia (1985)

BROWN V COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
N 946 OF 2001

HILL, SACKVILLE AND FINN JJ
21 MARCH 2002
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 946 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

JOHN…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 318
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Brown v Commissioner of Taxation, the taxpayer, Mr Brown, appealed against the disallowance of his objection to an amended assessment issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. The amended assessment included additional income tax of $475,111.02 and additional tax of $343,696.15, which was assessed on the basis that Mr Brown made a false and misleading statement resulting in the avoidance of tax. The primary Judge had previously ruled on the admissibility of certain communications under section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, and Mr Brown argued that these communications were privileged under the common law. The Commissioner argued that the voir dire evidence never became evidence at the trial and that the ruling made in reliance on section 131(1) of the Evidence Act was irrelevant to any question arising in relation to the common law privilege.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the primary Judge's ruling on the admissibility of certain communications under section 131(1) of the Evidence Act necessitated a finding that those communications were privileged at common law. The court needed to determine whether the evidence admitted on the voir dire provided a sufficient foundation for such a finding. Additionally, the court had to consider whether an issue estoppel had arisen in respect of the primary Judge's factual findings made in his rulings on evidence.

The court found that there was no evidence at the trial upon which a finding could be made that the communications were privileged under the common law, as the only evidence relating to the circumstances in which the communications were made had been given on the voir dire. The court also found that the primary Judge's factual findings on the voir dire, resulting in the inadmissibility of the relevant communications under section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, did not necessitate a finding that those communications were privileged at common law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed with costs, and no further appeal would lie in relation to the primary Judge's ruling on the admissibility of certain communications under section 131(1) of the Evidence Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

An amended assessment which included these three amounts was issued by the Commissioner on 28 March 1996. The respective value of each was $920,000, $34,725 and $30,000, with the consequence that further income tax was assessed to him amounting to $475,111.02. Also included in the amended assessment was an amount of additional tax of $343,696.15 assessed on the basis that Mr Brown had made a statement that was false and misleading and which statement had resulted in the avoidance of tax by him. Mr Brown objected against the amended assessment. The objection was disallowed by the Commissioner. It was against that objection decision that Mr Brown appealed.The Facts Save as to one matter to which reference will later be made, the facts are no longer in issue between the parties. The following statement of facts is therefore taken substantially from the judgment of the learned primary Judge: Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) ATC 4,294 For some time prior to his retirement from Parliament in March 1990 Mr Brown was a Minister in the then government with the portfolio of Minister for Tourism. It was, apparently in that capacity that he met Mr Ray in 1988 on a visit to Queensland, during which he visited a property that Mr Ray and a business associate were developing at Kirra. After that first encounter Mr Brown and Mr Ray became friends and saw each other on a number of occasions, but infrequently. On more than one of those occasions Mr Brown assisted Mr Ray with various charity matters in which Mr Ray was involved. At relevant times a Mr Hambley, who had for some time been a friend of Mr Brown, was the Regional Director of the Australian Tourism Commission in Tokyo. Mr Brown’s son, Christopher, and Mr Brown’s wife were respectively an employee and consultant of JMA Public Relations Pty Ltd (“JMA”). Among the clients of JMA was the owner of Goodnight Island, an island situated off the south Coast of New South Wales. In late 1989 Mr Hambley contacted Christopher Brown by telephone and told him that representatives of a Japanese company Narui Norin Co Ltd (“Narui Norin”), who were friends of Mr Hambley’s father-in-law, were coming to Australia and suggested to him that it could be in his interests to run by the Japanese representatives a copy of the island brochure. In January or February 1990 Mr Brown, his wife and son met the Japanese representatives and went with them to Goodnight Island. While the representatives of Narui Norin were still in New South Wales Mr Brown telephoned Mr Ray at his office on the Gold Coast in Queensland and told him that there were some Japanese visitors who wished to invest in Australian property. He told Mr Ray that the Japanese visitors were loggers who, in Japan, owned forest land, knocked down trees and then used the timber to construct log cabins and built golf courses on the land. He said that they were looking for similar opportunities in Australia. An arrangement was made for Mr Ray to meet the Japanese visitors.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The ruling in substance reaffirmed a ruling that the primary Judge had given in an interlocutory judgment delivered on 13 March 2001: Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 46 ATR 393. In that judgment, his Honour rejected an earlier tender by the Commissioner of communications made at the meeting and thereafter. His Honour found on the basis of evidence admitted on the voir dire, as he did in the later ruling, that the Taxpayer and the Commissioner had been “in dispute” at the date of the meeting.Use of Evidence Admitted on the Voir Dire In the course of argument on the appeal, it was pointed out to Mr Christie that not only had his Honour made no finding that the communications at the October meeting and in subsequent correspondence were privileged under the common law, but it seemed that there was no evidence at the trial upon which such a finding could be made. This seemed to follow because the only evidence relating to the circumstances in which the communications were made had been given on the voir dire. In other words, it seemed that the evidentiary foundation for the argument based on the existence of the common law “without prejudice” privilege communications was lacking. Counsel were invited to make further written submissions on this issue and on the scope of the privilege. It must be said that the Taxpayer’s supplementary written submissions did not address the evidentiary difficulty, except in the most general terms. The submissions simply invited the Court to conclude that the primary Judge’s factual findings on the voir dire, resulting in the inadmissibility of the relevant communications under s 131(1) of the Evidence Act, necessitated a finding that those communications were privileged at common law. This assertion was not developed by argument and no authorities were cited. It was also said, in the alternative, that an issue estoppel had arisen in respect of the factual findings made by the primary Judge in his rulings on evidence. Again this submission was not developed. For his part, the Commissioner argued in his supplementary submissions that the voir dire evidence never became evidence at the trial and that no finding had been or could be made that the communications the Commissioner was said to have taken into account in relation to penalty were subject to the common law privilege. In any event, so the Commissioner argued, the ruling made in reliance on s 131(1) of the Evidence Act was irrelevant to any question arising in relation to the common law privilege. The Commissioner also submitted that he was bound to use information disclosed to him when discharging the statutory responsibility, imposed on him by s 166 of the ITAA, to make an assessment “[f]rom the returns, and from any other information in his possession”; that to the extent the Commissioner took into account the October 1995 communications he did not err in law; and that White v Overland was distinguishable from the present case since there was a clear use of information given on a without prejudice basis which was determinative of the decision in question.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL, SACKVILLE AND FINN JJ
The case put on behalf of Mr Brown as and from the time he objected to the amended assessment was that the transfer of the unit was a “mere” gift, not made in discharge of any obligation; a gift “out of the blue” inspired by goodwill. Although that goodwill could be traceable to gratitude engendered by the assistance which Mr Brown had given to Monacorp (or Mr Ray) the transfer was not, Mr Brown argued, remuneration for any personal services which Mr Brown had provided.The Judgment appealed from. After setting out the facts the learned primary Judge turned to consider the legal principles as stated in the well-known authorities, viz, Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 117 CLR 514, Hayes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 96 CLR 47 and Squatting Investment Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 86 CLR 570. There was little criticism directed at his Honour’s statement of principle, and indeed, it must be said that it was unexceptionable. At the outset, his Honour noted the distinction, which the authorities draw between a simple (or as it is sometimes called, a “mere”) gift, on the one hand and the case where, although a payment or transfer is made without legal obligation, something more is to be found. His Honour said at 4,312, paraphrasing what was said by Fullagar J in Hayes at 54:“On the other hand, further facts may appear which show that, although the payment or transfer was a “gift” in the sense that it was made without legal obligation, it was nevertheless so related to an employment of B by A, or to services rendered by B to A, or to a business carried on by B, that it is, in substance and in reality, not a mere gift but the product of an income earning activity on the part of B, and therefore to be regarded as income from B’s personal exertion.” His Honour acknowledged that it might be difficult to characterise the relationship between Mr Ray and Mr Brown at the start of 1990 as a business relationship. But, in his view, the relevant relationship was between Monacorp and Mr Brown. Monacorp intended, as his Honour said, to reward Mr Brown for his role in introducing Narui Norin, an introduction which had resulted in the sale of the Kings Forest land. His Honour noted further that Mr Brown had provided assistance to Monacorp in introducing Mr Ray to Mr Hambley and lent his name to the FIRB application. He had not been remunerated for any service he had rendered. Indeed, he had actually incurred expenditure in travelling at his own expense to Japan. The benefits he had received were, his Honour repeated at par 113 (at 4,313), “provided, at the expense and cost of Monacorp, as a reward for the introduction of Narui Norin to Monacorp, an introduction that led to a very beneficial transaction for Monacorp”. His Honour then continued in a passage at pars 114-115 (at 4,313–4,314), to which attention was directed in argument:“There can be [no] doubt that the provision of the Benefits was related directly to the introduction of Narui Norin to Monacorp. There is no evidence of any specific statement that it also related to any further services provided by the Taxpayer. …It is an easy inference to draw that the Taxpayer gave the assistance that he did in connection with the transaction in order to ensure its consummation and, therefore, the receipt of the Benefits.It could not be said that the giving of the Benefits, or the payment of $1 million by Monacorp, was a personal gift to the Taxpayer on personal grounds, irrespective of and without regard to the question of whether services had been rendered or not … The Benefits came to be provided by reason of the introduction of Narui Norin to Monacorp. They would not have been provided if the transaction had not been consummated. The Taxpayer assisted in that consummation by his introduction of Mr Ray to Mr Hambley and his intervention in relation to the FIRB application. The actions of the Taxpayer were causative of the provision of the Benefits. Those actions consisted of the introduction of the representatives of Narui Norin to Mr Ray, the introduction of Mr Ray to Mr Hambley and the intervention with the FIRB.”(Emphasis in original)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL, SACKVILLE AND FINN JJ