selling his shares--is absent in Christie's case, but the general nature of the reasons for making the gift was the same in both cases.
I am of opinion, for the reasons which I have given in the case of Hayes, that the receipt of the shares by Christie was not a receipt of income by him. It is necessary, I think, to add only a very few words.
Like the dissentient member of the board, I have felt slightly more difficulty over this case than over the case of Hayes. This is because it may be said that the "services" rendered by Christie were incidental to, and rendered in the ordinary course of carrying on, an occupation undertaken for the purpose of gain, viz. the ordinary business of a real estate agent. This is not, I think, true in the same sense in the case of Hayes. But the slight difference in this respect between the two cases is not sufficient, in my opinion, to lead to a different result.
I do not think it can be held on the evidence that the connexion necessary to make the receipt income subsisted between what was given by the donor and anything done by the donee. It is not enough, as I have said in the case of Hayes 1, that a gift should be motivated, in part or even in whole, by gratitude for services rendered. That mere fact does not supply the necessary connexion, and, in my opinion, there was here no other relation between "gift" and "services" than is supplied by the fact that one of several motives inspiring the gift was gratitude for general help freely given in the past, in the course of many informal discussions, and believed by the donor to have been a factor in the amassing by him of a considerable fortune. One feels that the truth and sub- stance of the whole matter is not stated by saying that what was given was remuneration for work and labour done. And, unless that can be truly said, what was received was not "income" of the recipient.
This appeal also should, in my opinion, be allowed.
Appeal allowed with costs. Order that assessment
be reduced by excluding from appellant's asses- sable income of the year ended 30th June 1951 the sum of £3,000 representing the value of shares in Richardson's Meat Industries Ltd. received by appellant in that year. Solicitors for the appellant, Finlay, Watchorn, Baker &Solomon. Solicitor for the respondent H. E. Renfree, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth of Australia.
1(1956) 96 C.L.R., at pp. 55, 56.