BMW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BMW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1036

Appeal from: BMW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 369
File number(s): NSD 428 of 2017
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 1 September 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal affirmed decision not to grant appellant a protection visa – whether adverse credibility finding by Tribunal unreasonable or illogical – whether primary judge conflated test for legal unreasonableness with ‘no evidence’ rule – whether primary judge wrongly found that the evidence before the Tribunal did not compel acceptance of the appellant’s claims – appeal dismissed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65
Cases cited:

ARG15v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

SZDTZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1824

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Date of hearing: 17 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Anthony Silva
Counsel for the Defendants: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Defendants: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

NSD 428 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BMW16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 SEPTEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1......... INTRODUCTION

[1]

2......... BACKGROUND 

[4]

2.1...... The appellant’s claims

[4]

2.2...... The Tribunal’s decision

[10]

2.3...... The decision of the Court below

[17]

3......... CONSIDERATION

[20]

3.1...... Relevant principles:  legal unreasonableness

[20]

3.2...... Ground 2:  did the primary judge conflate the test for determining whether the Tribunal’s decision was legally unreasonable with the no-evidence rule?

[22]

3.3...... Ground 1:  did the primary judge err in determining that certain findings were open to the Tribunal and not legally unreasonable?

[24]

4......... CONCLUSION

[39]

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant appeals…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1036
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In BMW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision that dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The appellant, BMW16, sought a protection visa on the basis of fear of harm if returned to Sri Lanka, citing threats from a Buddhist monk and the destruction of a Hindu temple. The AAT affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant a protection visa, finding that BMW16's claims of being singled out for threats were not credible. BMW16 appealed to the Federal Circuit Court, contending that the AAT's adverse credibility finding was unreasonable and that the primary judge had conflated the test for legal unreasonableness with the 'no evidence' rule. The appeal was ultimately dismissed by the High Court.

The legal issues before the court included whether the AAT's adverse credibility finding was legally unreasonable and whether the primary judge correctly applied the test for legal unreasonableness. The court noted that the question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is case-specific, and adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error if they are legally unreasonable or reached without a logical, rational, or probative basis. The court emphasised that even emphatic disagreement with the AAT's reasoning would not suffice to demonstrate illogicality. Furthermore, the court highlighted the importance of distinguishing between legal unreasonableness and a disagreement with the merits of the decision.

The High Court found that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable. The court held that the AAT was entitled to find that BMW16 was not credible, given the lack of evidence supporting his claims of being specifically targeted by the Buddhist monk. The court also noted that the primary judge did not conflate the test for legal unreasonableness with the 'no evidence' rule, but rather considered the close analogy between the two. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable and that the primary judge correctly applied the relevant legal principles.

The appeal was dismissed, and BMW16 was ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. The court's decision underscores the limited scope of judicial review in such cases and the deference afforded to the AAT's findings of fact and credibility.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, it is important to emphasise the last point made in the passage at [56] in SZUXN as to the relationship between legal unreasonableness on the one hand, and the need to observe the proper boundaries of judicial review, on the other hand. The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court was limited to deciding whether the Tribunal’s decision was made lawfully under the Act, that is, whether the Tribunal’s decision is invalid by reason of a jurisdictional error. This Court in turn must decide whether the Federal Circuit Court wrongly decided that there was no jurisdictional error. The Tribunal would make a jurisdictional error if, for example, it misunderstood the criteria by which the appellant’s visa application must be assessed under the Migration Act, or if it failed to hear and determine his application in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 (the Court). However, neither this Court nor the Federal Circuit Court has jurisdiction to grant the appellant a visa, to consider whether the appellant satisfies the criteria for the grant of protection visa, or to correct mistaken findings of fact by the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [65] (Sackville J), [146] (Kenny J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 at [114] (Kirby J). The question of whether or not this Court or the Court below agrees with the Tribunal’s decision is not, therefore, a basis for finding that decision invalid, even if another decision-maker might have taken a different view of the evidence and reached a different decision. 3.2 Ground 2: did the primary judge conflate the test for determining whether the Tribunal’s decision was legally unreasonable with the no-evidence rule? It is convenient to begin with a consideration of ground 2 as this raises the issue of whether or not the primary judge applied the correct test in determining the ground of legal unreasonableness. The parties were agreed that the primary judge did not expressly limit his consideration of the unreasonableness ground to the question of whether there was no evidence at all that might sustain the Tribunal’s finding rejecting the appellant’s claim that he was singled out for threats by the Buddhist monk. However, his Honour considered that there was “a close analogy” between the type of unreasonableness alleged below, on the one hand, and judicial review on the “no evidence ground”, on the other hand (reasons below at [22]). With respect to the latter, his Honour said that:22. …it is necessary to show that there was not a skerrick of evidence to support the relevant finding or decision. That is no easy task. To establish unreasonableness in the manner asserted by the applicant is no easier.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant claimed to fear that he would be harmed, abducted, tortured, or killed if he returned to Sri Lanka like other people who had been involved in the temple issue, and there was nowhere safe to which he could relocate. 2.2 The Tribunal’s decision The appellant attended a hearing conducted by the Tribunal on 23 February 2016 with his legal representative. On 26 May 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal accepted a number of the appellant’s claims, relevantly that:(1)the temple had been destroyed and that a Buddhist temple in his village had been built in its place (Tribunal’s reasons at [56]);(2)the appellant wrote letters to a number of people requesting that they be allowed to rebuild a Hindu temple at the same location and continue their religious practices there (Tribunal’s reasons at [57]); and(3)the community attempted to conduct a ceremony at the destroyed temple site in late 2010, were told to leave by a Buddhist monk, and conducted the ceremony outside the grounds of the destroyed temple (Tribunal’s reasons at [58]) The Tribunal also appears to have accepted that in 2010 the community constructed a small makeshift temple in front of the land where the original temple was located (Tribunal’s reasons at [39]). However, the Tribunal did not accept other critical aspects of the appellant’s claims. Specifically, the Tribunal found that:59. The Tribunal does not find the applicant’s evidence credible that he was personally singled out by the Buddhist monk and threatened when no other members of the temple committee were targeted or threatened. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is a member of the temple administrative committee, there is no reason to think that that [sic] the monk would know who the applicant was, and why he was any more troublesome than any other member of the committee, particularly as his brother-in-law was the person speaking in Sinhalese. The temple is his wife’s family temple and his wife’s [family] have all been involved in seeking its reconstruction. His wife’s older brother is the President of the temple committee and has not been threatened. The applicant was one of many signatories to the letters of protest and not identified as the author. The Tribunal does accept that it is possible that the monk made a general threat to the people wanting to conduct the [ceremony] “wanting to get rid of them”. Despite the applicant’s claims of being threatened he stated that he remained living in his house for a further 18 months without any specific threats being made to him until someone who was in Army Intelligence warned him that the Army was watching him and he was at risk. He didn’t leave until two months after the army rounded up and detained … other people in the temple area [in early 2012]. Having regard to the country evidence, the Tribunal accepted that there are continuing disputes about the “Sinhalisation” of Hindu temples in the eastern provinces but found that there was no evidence before it that any Tamil individuals have been harmed in disputes about Hindu temples in the eastern provinces since 2013 (Tribunal’s reasons at [63]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge also rejected the second ground of judicial review based upon an alleged failure to comply with s 425 of the Act. That finding is not challenged on appeal.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles: legal unreasonableness The parties were agreed that the relevant legal principles for determining whether findings made by, or the reasoning employed by, an administrative decision-maker were legally unreasonable were recently explained in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [36]-[44] (the Court) and ARG15v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 (ARG15) at [83] (the Court). These may be summarised relevantly as follows.(1)The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 at [83](b)).(2)Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). (3)To establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [148]; CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61].(4)Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ).(5)With respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (SZUXN) at [55] explained (in a passage approved by the Full Court in CQG15 at [60]):55. … Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result… Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out….(citations omitted)(6)More specifically, with respect to adverse credibility findings, Wigney J explained in SZUXN (in a passage also approved in CQG15 at [60]) that: 56 An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny… Considerable caution must, however, be exercised before too readily acceding to a proposition that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error … That is because assertions of illogicality and irrationality can all too readily be used to conceal what is in truth simply an attack on the merits of the Tribunal’s findings and decision. (citations omitted)