FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1367
Appeal from: BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 1481 File number: NSD 961 of 2019 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 24 September 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing claims that the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to exercise lawfully its review jurisdiction under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where the appellant was refused a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs – where Immigration Assessment Authority found the appellant’s protection claims to lack credibility – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Immigration Assessment Authority made a jurisdictional error by not exercising its discretion to get new information pursuant to s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to allow the appellant to address any credibility concerns – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision not to exercise its discretion to get new information was unreasonable – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Immigration Assessment Authority’s reasoning concerning a document was irrational or illogical – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5AA, 5, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A(2), 353, 420, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DD, 473DF, 473FA, 473FA(1), 473FA(2), 473GA, 473GB Cases cited: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 35; [2018] FCAFC 114
CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641
DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551; [2018] FCAFC 12
DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 134; [2019] FCAFC 43
FGC17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 559
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 (2018) 253 FCR 526; [2018] FCAFC 32
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577; [2010] FCAFC 159
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317
Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 81;[2017] FCAFC 200
SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 140 ALD 78; [2013] FCA 123
SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 135 ALD 276; [2013] FCA 566
SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451; [2015] FCA 1089
SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51
Date of hearing: 21 November 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1367
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered that the statutory scheme in Part 7AA of the Act effectively compels the IAA to determine a review on the papers, and the mere fact that the IAA's findings may differ from those of the delegate is not necessarily an exceptional circumstance. To establish a jurisdictional error, the appellant needed to demonstrate more than the IAA making different factual findings and more than merely disagreeing with those findings. The court found that the Circuit Court did not err in concluding that the IAA was not legally required to "put to" the appellant that it was "minded to make different findings" to those made by the delegate. The court held that the IAA's decision not to exercise its discretion to get new information was not unreasonable, and the reasoning concerning the document was not irrational or illogical.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. This outcome confirms that the IAA's review process under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is to be conducted on the papers, and the appellant's claims of unreasonableness and irrational reasoning by the IAA were not substantiated.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant’s argument that the Authority’s reasoning in relation to the corroborative value of the document from the Thi Qar Criminal Court was somewhat difficult to discern. It appeared to relate in some way to the Authority’s apparent unwillingness to accept the provenance or genuineness of the document. At various points, the appellant appeared to contend that, if the Authority found that the document was not genuine, that finding itself was irrational or illogical, though the basis of that contention was also somewhat unclear. Otherwise, the appellant’s argument appeared to be that if the document was genuine, it clearly corroborated some of his claims, even if it did lack some specificity. The Authority’s finding that it was of only limited corroborative value was therefore said to be irrational or illogical. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL GROUNDS The main complaint or grievance which appeared to lie behind both of the appellant’s grounds of review and the corresponding appeal grounds was that the Authority made adverse factual findings against him which differed from the findings made by the delegate. The appellant argued, in effect, that it was unreasonable in those circumstances for him not to have been given any opportunity to put additional evidence or submissions to the Authority in relation to those factual matters so as to assuage the Authority’s concerns about them. That appeared to be the main basis of his contention that the Authority’s failure to exercise its discretion to get new information about those matters was legally unreasonable. It also appeared to be the implicit or underlying basis of his argument that the Authority’s reasoning process in relation to those factual issues was irrational or illogical. It is perhaps understandable that, having persuaded the delegate about his central claims, the appellant felt aggrieved that the Authority in effect rejected those claims and did so “on the papers”; that is, without giving him a further hearing or giving him any direct opportunity to address the Authority about his claims. Unfortunately for the appellant, however, the statutory scheme in Pt 7AA of the Act effectively compels the Authority to determine a review on the papers other than in exceptional circumstances. The mere fact that the Authority’s findings may differ from those of the delegate is not necessarily an exceptional circumstance. To make out jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority, it was necessary for the appellant to demonstrate more than that the Authority made different factual findings to those made by the delegate and more than that he disagreed with those findings. Ground one – Did the Authority unreasonably fail to exercise its discretion to get new information? As noted earlier, the primary judge did not directly engage with or address the appellant’s contention that the Authority’s failure to consider exercising its discretion, or its failure to exercise its discretion in s 473DC of the Act to get new information, was legally unreasonable. Nor did his Honour give any, or any detailed consideration to the statutory scheme in Pt 7AA of the Act and the applicable principles in relation to the Authority’s discretion to get new information. Rather, his Honour approached the appellant’s arguments by considering whether it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to “put to” him that it was “minded to make different findings” to those made by the delegate: see Judgment at [23]. His Honour concluded that it was not.