BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1367

Appeal from: BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 1481
File number: NSD 961 of 2019
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 24 September 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing claims that the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to exercise lawfully its review jurisdiction under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where the appellant was refused a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs – where Immigration Assessment Authority found the appellant’s protection claims to lack credibility – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Immigration Assessment Authority made a jurisdictional error by not exercising its discretion to get new information pursuant to s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to allow the appellant to address any credibility concerns – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision not to exercise its discretion to get new information was unreasonable – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Immigration Assessment Authority’s reasoning concerning a document was irrational or illogical – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5AA, 5, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A(2), 353, 420, 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DD, 473DF, 473FA, 473FA(1), 473FA(2), 473GA, 473GB
Cases cited:

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 35; [2018] FCAFC 114

CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551; [2018] FCAFC 12

DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 134; [2019] FCAFC 43

FGC17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 559

FND17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1369

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 (2018) 253 FCR 526; [2018] FCAFC 32

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577; [2010] FCAFC 159

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317

Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 81;[2017] FCAFC 200

SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 140 ALD 78; [2013] FCA 123

SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 135 ALD 276; [2013] FCA 566

SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451; [2015] FCA 1089

SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51

Date of hearing: 21 November 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number…
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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1367
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the appellant challenging the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed claims that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) failed to exercise its review jurisdiction lawfully under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant had been refused a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs, and the IAA found the appellant's protection claims to lack credibility. The primary legal issues were whether the Circuit Court erred in not finding that the IAA made a jurisdictional error by not exercising its discretion to obtain new information under section 473DC of the Act, and whether the IAA's decision not to exercise its discretion was unreasonable. Additionally, the appellant contended that the IAA's reasoning concerning a document was irrational or illogical.

The court considered that the statutory scheme in Part 7AA of the Act effectively compels the IAA to determine a review on the papers, and the mere fact that the IAA's findings may differ from those of the delegate is not necessarily an exceptional circumstance. To establish a jurisdictional error, the appellant needed to demonstrate more than the IAA making different factual findings and more than merely disagreeing with those findings. The court found that the Circuit Court did not err in concluding that the IAA was not legally required to "put to" the appellant that it was "minded to make different findings" to those made by the delegate. The court held that the IAA's decision not to exercise its discretion to get new information was not unreasonable, and the reasoning concerning the document was not irrational or illogical.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. This outcome confirms that the IAA's review process under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is to be conducted on the papers, and the appellant's claims of unreasonableness and irrational reasoning by the IAA were not substantiated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal essentially raises two issues. The first issue is whether the Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the Authority acted unreasonably, in a legal or jurisdictional sense, in failing to consider exercising, or failing to exercise, its discretion under s 473DC of the Act to get new information in relation to an aspect of the appellant’s case. The second issue is whether the Circuit Court erred in failing to find that a part of the Authority’s reasoning process concerning potentially corroborating documentary evidence was irrational or illogical.BACKGROUND The appellant entered Australia by sea in May 2013 in circumstances which made him an “unauthorised maritime arrival” as defined in s 5AA of the Act. He was interviewed by an officer of the then Department of Immigration and Citizenship in June 2013. A documentary record of that interview records that, when asked why he left his country of nationality, the appellant gave the following answer:I am not happy there, I was accused of something I did not do and in addition to that the situation in Iraq is the reasons for me to leave basically.What were you accused of?I was accused by a private informer that I am terrorist and I am innocent, when were you accused, 2004, (client clarified 2012 not 2004), by a secret informer, I think he maybe he belongs to one of the parties or belongs to the government.What terrorist act were you accused of?It happened to many people they accused you and the government taken to prison and he told the government something bad about me and they arrested me and then they freed me, I was at home and they came and took me to prison and investigated everything about me and then they let me go, I cannot remember how many days, it was only a short time, unsure of time frame, a prison in Al Bathaa area and then they moved me from Al Bathaa to Al Nasria and they let me go from Al Nasria to back home, between 35-40 days. In answer to a separate question concerning whether he had ever been arrested or detained by the police or security organisations, the appellant gave the following response:What were you accused of?I was accused by a private informer that I am terrorist and I am innocent, when were you accused, 2004 (client clarified 2012 not 2004), by a secret informer, I think he maybe he belongs to one of the parties or belongs to the government.What terrorist act were you accused of?It happened to many people they accused you and the government taken to prison and he told the government something bad about me and they arrested me and then they freed me, I was at home and they came and took me to prison and investigated everything about me and then they let me go, I cannot remember how many days, it was only a short time, unsure of time frame, a prison in Al Bathaa area and then they moved me from Al Baatha to Al Nasria and they let me go from Al Nasria to back home, between 35-40 days.When they came to arrest me in 2012, I do not know when they came and inform about me.Other than what you have already told me is there any other reason?No.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant made various other claims in support of his visa application, including: claims concerning the way he was treated by the local community after his release from prison; rumours about him which related to him fighting with Sunni Muslims which were allegedly circulated in the community; the alleged monitoring of his family residence by members of the militia; and the perception that he was a Sunni, or had an association with Sunni groups or with Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States. It is unnecessary to consider those claims as the findings that were in due course made about them did not feature significantly, or at all, in the appellant’s review application and are not directly relevant to this appeal.THE DELEGATE’S DECISION The appellant was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister in respect of his protection visa application on 2 June 2017. On 6 July 2017, the delegate refused the appellant’s application because the delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the central criteria for a protection visa in ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act. It is unnecessary to consider the delegate’s reasons in any great detail. It suffices to note that the delegate accepted as credible a number of the appellant’s claims, including: his claims about his arrest by the Iraqi police in April 2012, on suspicion of being involved in the terrorist attack in Batha in Iraq in January 2012; the fact that he was charged and remanded in police custody for 40 days; and the fact that he appeared before the Thi Qar Criminal Court and was acquitted of all charges on the basis that there was not enough evidence. The delegate was not, however, satisfied that, upon his release from prison, the appellant was blamed by members of his community for the January 2012 terrorist attack, or that he was discriminated against or mistreated by the community because he was thought to be a Sunni Muslim, or that he was of any adverse interest to the Iraqi government or militia groups. The delegate also rejected various other factual claims advanced by the appellant in support of his application.THE FAST TRACK REVIEW PROCESS UNDER PT 7AA OF THE ACT The appellant was a “fast track applicant” as defined in s 5 of the Act because: he was an unauthorised maritime arrival who had entered Australia on or after 13 August 2012, but before 1 January 2014, and was not taken to a regional processing country; was a person to whom the Minister had given a written notice under s 46A(2); and had made a valid application for a protection visa. The decision to refuse the appellant’s protection visa on the basis that he did not meet the criteria for such a visa was accordingly a “fast track decision” as defined in s 5 and a “fast track reviewable decision” as defined in s 473BB of the Act. It followed that the Minister was required by s 473CA of the Act to refer the decision to refuse the appellant’s protection visa application to the Authority. The Secretary of the Department was also required by s 473CB to provide certain material, referred to as the “review material”, to the Authority. The Authority was required to review the decision pursuant to s 473CC of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant’s argument that the Authority’s reasoning in relation to the corroborative value of the document from the Thi Qar Criminal Court was somewhat difficult to discern. It appeared to relate in some way to the Authority’s apparent unwillingness to accept the provenance or genuineness of the document. At various points, the appellant appeared to contend that, if the Authority found that the document was not genuine, that finding itself was irrational or illogical, though the basis of that contention was also somewhat unclear. Otherwise, the appellant’s argument appeared to be that if the document was genuine, it clearly corroborated some of his claims, even if it did lack some specificity. The Authority’s finding that it was of only limited corroborative value was therefore said to be irrational or illogical. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL GROUNDS The main complaint or grievance which appeared to lie behind both of the appellant’s grounds of review and the corresponding appeal grounds was that the Authority made adverse factual findings against him which differed from the findings made by the delegate. The appellant argued, in effect, that it was unreasonable in those circumstances for him not to have been given any opportunity to put additional evidence or submissions to the Authority in relation to those factual matters so as to assuage the Authority’s concerns about them. That appeared to be the main basis of his contention that the Authority’s failure to exercise its discretion to get new information about those matters was legally unreasonable. It also appeared to be the implicit or underlying basis of his argument that the Authority’s reasoning process in relation to those factual issues was irrational or illogical. It is perhaps understandable that, having persuaded the delegate about his central claims, the appellant felt aggrieved that the Authority in effect rejected those claims and did so “on the papers”; that is, without giving him a further hearing or giving him any direct opportunity to address the Authority about his claims. Unfortunately for the appellant, however, the statutory scheme in Pt 7AA of the Act effectively compels the Authority to determine a review on the papers other than in exceptional circumstances. The mere fact that the Authority’s findings may differ from those of the delegate is not necessarily an exceptional circumstance. To make out jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority, it was necessary for the appellant to demonstrate more than that the Authority made different factual findings to those made by the delegate and more than that he disagreed with those findings. Ground one – Did the Authority unreasonably fail to exercise its discretion to get new information? As noted earlier, the primary judge did not directly engage with or address the appellant’s contention that the Authority’s failure to consider exercising its discretion, or its failure to exercise its discretion in s 473DC of the Act to get new information, was legally unreasonable. Nor did his Honour give any, or any detailed consideration to the statutory scheme in Pt 7AA of the Act and the applicable principles in relation to the Authority’s discretion to get new information. Rather, his Honour approached the appellant’s arguments by considering whether it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to “put to” him that it was “minded to make different findings” to those made by the delegate: see Judgment at [23]. His Honour concluded that it was not.