AMN18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AMN18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1134

File number: MLG 269 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS
Date of judgment: 6 November 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of the former Immigration Assessment Authority - where Authority rejected claim based on the failure of the applicant to raise the claim in a series of interviews, including a screening interview and an arrival interview – whether it was unreasonable for the Authority to have recorded adverse finding without first exercising the power under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to get information from the applicant – whether case can be distinguished from Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17- no jurisdictional error  – application dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 473DC, 473DD

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1367

Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17 (2019 165 ALD 64; [2019] FCA 591

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 58
Date of last submissions: 29 October 2024
Date of hearing: 29 October 2024
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant Mr M Kenneally
Solicitor for the Applicant  MP Migration Law
Counsel for the First Respondent Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 269 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AMN18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SYMONS

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The application for judicial review filed on 2 February 2018 and amended on 11 October 2024 be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SYMONS:

  1. By an amended application filed on 11 October 2024, the applicant seeks review of a decision of the second respondent (Authority) made on 17 January 2018 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (visa). 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia by boat on 20 May 2013 (Court Book (CB)…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AMN18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Sri Lankan national, sought judicial review of a decision by the former Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to reject his application for a visa based on his claim of fear of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka. The primary legal issue before the court was whether it was unreasonable for the IAA to have made an adverse finding without first exercising the power under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain further information from the applicant.

The court found that the IAA's approach was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The IAA had considered the applicant's claims in a comprehensive manner, taking into account the information provided during various interviews, including an arrival interview and a screening interview. The court noted that the IAA had rejected the applicant's claim regarding his interactions with the Karuna group, finding it inconsistent and fabricated. The court held that the IAA's reasoning was open on the material before it and that there was no jurisdictional error. The court distinguished this case from Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17, where the approach taken by the delegate was found to be perverse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs. The court concluded that the IAA's decision was reasonable and based on a proper consideration of the evidence provided by the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 16 October 2017, the Department informed the Authority that there was “no PV recording for Part one” and only the transcript was available (CB 442).DECISION OF THE AUTHORITY On 17 January 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant the visa and provided a written statement of decision and reasons (Reasons) (CB 448-465). The Authority conducted its review on the basis of the material that had been provided by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act. Relevant to this application for judicial review, the Authority recorded the applicant’s claim that after Karuna and Pillayan split from the LTTE he had been approached by Karuna to work as a driver but had refused (Reasons, [11]). The Authority noted that on 6 July 2013 the applicant had participated in an “arrival entry” interview and recorded aspects of his evidence, including his response to being asked about his problems with the Karuna group in Batticaloa (Reasons, [16]). The Authority noted also that the applicant had participated in an enhanced screening interview on 21 June 2013 and noted that the information from that interview was largely consistent with that given in his arrival interview, PV application and PV interview. The Authority recorded the applicant as having stated during that interview that he had started having problems with the Karuna group while he was driving for the LTTE in Batticaloa between 2002 and 2006 (Reasons, [16]). The Authority noted again that the applicant had been consistent in the information he had provided to the Department at his advanced screening interview, arrival interview, PV application and interview. The Authority accepted that the applicant was a Tamil from Jaffna who had worked for the LTTE as a driver between 1999 and 2008, including in Batticaloa between 2002 and 2006 (Reasons, [19]). The Authority took a different view of the applicant’s evidence concerning his interactions with the Karuna group. At Reasons, [20] it said:In contrast to his evidence regarding his LTTE employment, I consider the applicant has provided inconsistent accounts as to why he left Batticaloa in 2006. The applicant claimed to have been approached before the split and that Karuna asked him to be his driver but he refused and said he was working for Vasanthan and because of this refusal he would be persecuted if captured. I am of the view the applicant has embellished his claims in this respect given he did not state so previously. In his arrival interview he simply stated after the Karuna group split and joined the armed forces it was threatening for him as he was working for the LTTE. At his advanced screening interview he stated after the split, the Pillayan and Karuna Groups chased them from Batticaloa; because of the Karuna Groups insistence/request they should leave Batticaloa, they returned to Vanni without taking any items. At his PV interview the applicant a number of times stated that because he had spent time in Batticaloa the Karuna and Pillayan group was known to him, the Karuna Group knew him well because he was working there. The applicant provided no details about being contracted specifically by Karuna himself, the circumstances in which he was allegedly asked to drive for him and that he refused to do so. I consider the applicant has fabricated this claim to enhance his profile and fear of persecution and that the real reason he fled Batticaloa was because as an LTTE worker he feared the Karuna Group and the fact that the Pillayan Group were committing atrocities. I am not satisfied on his return to Sri Lanka the applicant will be personally targeted by the Karuna Group or any other paramilitaries for refusing to drive for them over ten years ago given I have rejected this claim that he was asked directly by Karuna to drive for him and refused. Given the passage of time and his low level profile role as a driver for the LTTE, I am also not satisfied that the applicant would be targeted by the Karuna group or other paramilitaries because of his previous links to the LTTE.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not unreasonable for the Authority not to have exercised its discretion pursuant to s 473DC of the Act.CONSIDERATION I do not consider that the failure of the Authority to exercise the discretionary power in s 473DC(1) of the Act to get information from the applicant in this case involved jurisdictional error. While an evaluation of the reasonableness of the approach taken by the Authority must be responsive to the individual circumstances of the case, where both parties made submissions that engaged closely with the decision of AYJ17, it is appropriate to treat this authority as a useful comparator in the resolution of the applicant’s judicial review application. Having now reviewed the decision of AYJ17, it strikes me that several matters that were significant in the disposition of the Minister’s unsuccessful appeal are absent in this case. To begin with, the approach taken by the delegate in AYJ17 to the claim about his brother’s death was diametrically opposed to that taken by the Authority. As the Minister observed in his submissions, the delegate found that AYJ17 had provided consistent details in his entry interview, written application and PV interview and had accepted AYJ17’s claim about his brother’s death on that basis. Indeed, the delegate accepted the claims made by AYJ17 “in their entirety”. By marked contrast, the Authority in AYJ17 zeroed in on the failure of AYJ17 to raise the claim about his brother in the arrival interview. The Authority found the omission “difficult to reconcile” with the later claim made by AYJ17 in the entry interview, TPV application and TPV interview. The view taken of the omission was instrumental in the rejection of this claim; while the Authority did have reservations about a death certificate provided by AYJ17, these reservations were secondary to its concern about the omission. It is evident from the manner in which the Authority approached its finding about the death of AYJ17’s brother that there was an informational gap around the circumstances of the arrival interview that, if filled, might have satisfied the Authority to take a different (more benign) view of the omission. In other words, the inability to reconcile the early omission might have been cured. In this case instead, the delegate did not make any express findings about the Karuna group claim and rejected, as a whole, the applicant’s claim to apprehend harm from para-military groups. The approach taken by the Authority was to view the applicant’s articulation of claims at interview as a whole. Where claims had been made consistently, the applicant obtained the benefit of a positive finding. Where claims had not been made consistently (including in the PV interview, which had occurred at a time close to the decision of the Authority) the Authority took the view that they were not genuine. In AYJ17, while directed at a different ground, Moshinsky J accepted the primary judge’s characterisation of the finding by the Authority about the brother’s death as “perverse”. In my view, the same criticism cannot be levelled at the approach taken by the Authority to the disposition of the Karuna group claim. Instead, I consider that the reasoning adopted by the Authority was open on the material before it. While this does not directly answer the question of whether the failure to exercise the statutory power in s 473DC was unreasonable, where grounds of review are often inextricably linked and responsive to the same fundamental error, it reinforces my conclusion that there was no error in terms of unreasonableness in this case.