FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
AMN18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1134
File number: MLG 269 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS Date of judgment: 6 November 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of the former Immigration Assessment Authority - where Authority rejected claim based on the failure of the applicant to raise the claim in a series of interviews, including a screening interview and an arrival interview – whether it was unreasonable for the Authority to have recorded adverse finding without first exercising the power under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to get information from the applicant – whether case can be distinguished from Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17- no jurisdictional error – application dismissed with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 473DC, 473DD
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Cases cited: BIL18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1367
Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17 (2019 165 ALD 64; [2019] FCA 591
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 58 Date of last submissions: 29 October 2024 Date of hearing: 29 October 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant Mr M Kenneally Solicitor for the Applicant MP Migration Law Counsel for the First Respondent Ms J Lucas Solicitor for the First Respondent Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Second Respondent Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 269 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: AMN18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SYMONS
DATE OF ORDER:
6 NOVEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The application for judicial review filed on 2 February 2018 and amended on 11 October 2024 be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SYMONS:
By an amended application filed on 11 October 2024, the applicant seeks review of a decision of the second respondent (Authority) made on 17 January 2018 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (visa).
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia by boat on 20 May 2013 (Court Book (CB)…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1134
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the IAA's approach was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The IAA had considered the applicant's claims in a comprehensive manner, taking into account the information provided during various interviews, including an arrival interview and a screening interview. The court noted that the IAA had rejected the applicant's claim regarding his interactions with the Karuna group, finding it inconsistent and fabricated. The court held that the IAA's reasoning was open on the material before it and that there was no jurisdictional error. The court distinguished this case from Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17, where the approach taken by the delegate was found to be perverse.
The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs. The court concluded that the IAA's decision was reasonable and based on a proper consideration of the evidence provided by the applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it was not unreasonable for the Authority not to have exercised its discretion pursuant to s 473DC of the Act.CONSIDERATION I do not consider that the failure of the Authority to exercise the discretionary power in s 473DC(1) of the Act to get information from the applicant in this case involved jurisdictional error. While an evaluation of the reasonableness of the approach taken by the Authority must be responsive to the individual circumstances of the case, where both parties made submissions that engaged closely with the decision of AYJ17, it is appropriate to treat this authority as a useful comparator in the resolution of the applicant’s judicial review application. Having now reviewed the decision of AYJ17, it strikes me that several matters that were significant in the disposition of the Minister’s unsuccessful appeal are absent in this case. To begin with, the approach taken by the delegate in AYJ17 to the claim about his brother’s death was diametrically opposed to that taken by the Authority. As the Minister observed in his submissions, the delegate found that AYJ17 had provided consistent details in his entry interview, written application and PV interview and had accepted AYJ17’s claim about his brother’s death on that basis. Indeed, the delegate accepted the claims made by AYJ17 “in their entirety”. By marked contrast, the Authority in AYJ17 zeroed in on the failure of AYJ17 to raise the claim about his brother in the arrival interview. The Authority found the omission “difficult to reconcile” with the later claim made by AYJ17 in the entry interview, TPV application and TPV interview. The view taken of the omission was instrumental in the rejection of this claim; while the Authority did have reservations about a death certificate provided by AYJ17, these reservations were secondary to its concern about the omission. It is evident from the manner in which the Authority approached its finding about the death of AYJ17’s brother that there was an informational gap around the circumstances of the arrival interview that, if filled, might have satisfied the Authority to take a different (more benign) view of the omission. In other words, the inability to reconcile the early omission might have been cured. In this case instead, the delegate did not make any express findings about the Karuna group claim and rejected, as a whole, the applicant’s claim to apprehend harm from para-military groups. The approach taken by the Authority was to view the applicant’s articulation of claims at interview as a whole. Where claims had been made consistently, the applicant obtained the benefit of a positive finding. Where claims had not been made consistently (including in the PV interview, which had occurred at a time close to the decision of the Authority) the Authority took the view that they were not genuine. In AYJ17, while directed at a different ground, Moshinsky J accepted the primary judge’s characterisation of the finding by the Authority about the brother’s death as “perverse”. In my view, the same criticism cannot be levelled at the approach taken by the Authority to the disposition of the Karuna group claim. Instead, I consider that the reasoning adopted by the Authority was open on the material before it. While this does not directly answer the question of whether the failure to exercise the statutory power in s 473DC was unreasonable, where grounds of review are often inextricably linked and responsive to the same fundamental error, it reinforces my conclusion that there was no error in terms of unreasonableness in this case.