FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17 [2019] FCA 591
Appeal from: AYJ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2227 File number: NSD 1697 of 2018 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 1 May 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – protection visa – fast-track review process – where the delegate accepted that the respondent’s car was fitted with a bomb that exploded, killing the respondent’s brother – where the delegate interviewed the respondent and found that the respondent’s evidence in relation to his brother’s death was consistent – where the Immigration Assessment Authority found that the respondent’s evidence in relation to his brother’s death had been inconsistent on the basis that he had not referred to his brother’s death in his arrival interview – where the primary judge found that the Authority’s use of the omission in the arrival interview was perverse – where the primary judge found that it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to exercise the power under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 36, 473CA, 473CB, 473DC Cases cited: DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551
DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 222
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 239 FCR 436
Date of hearing: 12 February 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 54 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Graycar Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Zipser Solicitor for the First Respondent: Stamford Law Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1697 of 2018 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Appellant
AND: AYJ17
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
4.In the absence of any agreement:
(a)within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 591
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the IAA's failure to consider exercising the power under section 473DC was legally unreasonable. The court emphasised that the statutory power in section 473DC must be exercised reasonably, and the failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power lacked an evident and intelligible justification, especially when the IAA knew that it did not have, but the respondent was likely to have, information on his particular circumstances and the impact of relocation to Beirut. The court concluded that the review by the IAA under section 473CC miscarried for jurisdictional error.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The court directed that within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the respondent’s costs. If no agreement is reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the respondent’s costs will be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
3. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
4. In the absence of any agreement:
(a) within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);
(b) within a further 14 days, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and
(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent has filed a notice of contention containing two grounds. The first ground is not pressed. By the second ground, the respondent contends that the judgment should be affirmed on the basis of the second ground of review before the primary judge.Consideration It will be convenient to consider each ground of appeal in turn.Ground 1 The first ground of appeal concerns the primary judge’s conclusion that it was legally unreasonable for the IAA to reject the respondent’s claims on the basis that they were not mentioned at the arrival interview without exercising the power under s 473DC to give the respondent an opportunity to comment. Section 473DC is set out in the Reasons at [25]. The principles concerning legal unreasonableness have been considered by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408 (SZVFW) and by the Full Court of this Court in cases including Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1. In SZVFW, Kiefel CJ stated at [10] that in the joint judgment in Li “it was explained that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power is unreasonable in a legal sense when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification”. This may be the case where a decision is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at. The Chief Justice emphasised, at [11], that “the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent”. (See also [51]-[60] per Gageler J; [78]-[87] per Nettle and Gordon JJ; and [131]-[135] per Edelman J.) CRY16 involved an application of the principles of legal unreasonableness in relation to the statutory power in s 473DC. In that case, an issue of relocation arose before the IAA. That issue had not been considered by the delegate. The Full Court stated, at [67], that, as explained by Gageler J in Li, reasonableness is closely linked to procedural fairness. The Full Court stated: “Nevertheless, in light of the terms of s 473DA it is important to consider the present issue through the lens of Div 3 and the principles of legal reasonableness rather than the principles of procedural fairness.” The Full Court also stated: “Further, in our opinion, that the outcome is unfair ‘in an ordinary sense’, as accepted by Senior Counsel for the Minister, is not irrelevant to whether or not there has been legal unreasonableness in the exercise or non-exercise of statutory powers.” The Full Court stated at [77] that the analysis of legal unreasonableness in respect of statutory powers and discretions must be founded in the terms in which both powers and discretions are conferred. The Full Court considered both the powers available to the Authority and the broader statutory context. The Full Court conclude at [82]:Our conclusion is that it was legally unreasonable, in the circumstances, not to consider getting documents or information from the respondent. The legislature is to be taken to intend that the Authority’s statutory power in s 473DC will be exercised reasonably. The failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power lacks an evident and intelligible justification in circumstances where the Authority knew that it did not have, but the respondent was likely to have, information on his particular circumstances and the impact upon him of relocation to Beirut. The Authority did not have that information because the question of relocation, either at all or to Beirut, was not explored, or the subject of findings, by the delegate. The Authority’s failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power meant that it disabled itself from considering what was reasonable, in the sense of “practicable”, in terms of relocation. In our opinion, as a consequence, the review by the Authority under s 473CC miscarried for jurisdictional error.