Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17 [2019] FCA 591

Appeal from: AYJ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2227
File number: NSD 1697 of 2018
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 1 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – protection visa – fast-track review process – where the delegate accepted that the respondent’s car was fitted with a bomb that exploded, killing the respondent’s brother – where the delegate interviewed the respondent and found that the respondent’s evidence in relation to his brother’s death was consistent – where the Immigration Assessment Authority found that the respondent’s evidence in relation to his brother’s death had been inconsistent on the basis that he had not referred to his brother’s death in his arrival interview – where the primary judge found that the Authority’s use of the omission in the arrival interview was perverse – where the primary judge found that it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to exercise the power under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 36, 473CA, 473CB, 473DC
Cases cited:

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551

DYK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 222

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 239 FCR 436

Date of hearing: 12 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Graycar
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Zipser
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Stamford Law
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1697 of 2018
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Appellant

AND:

AYJ17

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3.Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

4.In the absence of any agreement:

(a)within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 591
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Minister for Home Affairs v AYJ17, the respondent, an unauthorised maritime arrival, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to dismiss his application for a protection visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) erred in rejecting the respondent's claims regarding the death of his brother in a car bomb explosion without exercising the power under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to give the respondent an opportunity to comment.

The court held that the IAA's failure to consider exercising the power under section 473DC was legally unreasonable. The court emphasised that the statutory power in section 473DC must be exercised reasonably, and the failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power lacked an evident and intelligible justification, especially when the IAA knew that it did not have, but the respondent was likely to have, information on his particular circumstances and the impact of relocation to Beirut. The court concluded that the review by the IAA under section 473CC miscarried for jurisdictional error.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The court directed that within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the respondent’s costs. If no agreement is reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the respondent’s costs will be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

4. In the absence of any agreement:

(a) within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);

(b) within a further 14 days, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and

(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal is to be dismissed. It is therefore unnecessary to determine the issue raised by the notice of contention.Background In September 2012, the respondent arrived in Australia by boat. He was an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 20 September 2012, the respondent attended the arrival interview. The materials before the Court include a form headed “Arrival Interview”. The form is a printed form of eight pages, with a series of typed questions, with spaces for responses to be written by hand. The first page of the form indicates that the interview lasted 50 minutes. It is apparent from the last page that the respondent was assisted by an interpreter. It may be inferred that the form was completed by an officer of the Department (rather than by the respondent personally). The form comprises two Parts: Part A is concerned with “Biodata”; Part B is concerned with “Travel”. On page 1 of the form, under the heading “Part A – Biodata”, there is a paragraph as follows:Introduction to clientThis is the first opportunity for you to provide information regarding your circumstances. We encourage you to be as honest and accurate with the information as you can be. Information provided by you will need to be re-confirmed at a later time. Please also consider what supporting documents or evidence you have (or have access to) that may support the information you provide. Question 21 on the form is: “Why did you leave your country of nationality (country of residence)?” The form provides a box with three lines for a response to this question to be inserted. The primary judge recorded at [89] of her reasons for judgment (the Reasons) that, at the hearing before her, counsel for the Minister confirmed that the box is not capable of expansion. The respondent’s response to the question, which occupied two of the three lines was as follows:I was an officer with Police in Iraq + I was threatened by religious groups. On 13 November 2012, the respondent attended the entry interview. The materials before the Court include a form headed “Irregular Maritime Arrival – Entry Interview”. The form has a series of questions with boxes or fields for answers to be typed in. The completed form is 18 pages in length. It appears from the first page that the interview went for about 1.5 hours. On the first page of the form the following information appears:Important InformationI need information about you and your arrival in Australia. This interview will be recorded. This interview is your opportunity to provide any reasons why you should not be removed from Australia. If you do not answer questions a decision may be made on the basis of the information we have.You are expected to give true and correct answers to the questions I ask. You should understand that if the information you give at any future interview is different from what you tell me now, this could raise doubts about the reliability of what you have said.The Department is careful to protect the privacy of all information given by you during this interview. This information will not be made available to authorities in the country of your habitual residence. The exception to this is if a determination is made that you have no lawful basis to remain in Australia. In this situation, personal information may be provided to authorities of a foreign government where disclosure is necessary for your removal from Australia.The information you provide at this and any future interview may be used or disclosed as the basis for checks with authorities in countries through which you have passed or in which you have resided since you left your country of origin.The information may also be used to carry out checks with international humanitarian agencies concerning any contact you may have had with them before coming to Australia.The information may also be disclosed to Australian Government agencies authorised to receive information, including that in relation to foreign affairs, border control, health, security and law enforcement matters.The recording for this or any future interview may be disclosed to language experts contracted by the Australian Government to assist in verifying your place of origin.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, I am not satisfied that, if the IAA had not made the finding that it did regarding the respondent’s claim in relation to his brother’s death, the outcome would have been the same. Ground 3 is therefore rejected.Conclusion In light of the above, it is unnecessary to consider the notice of contention. For the reasons set out above, the appeal is to be dismissed. There is no apparent reason why costs should not follow the event. I will therefore make an order that the Minister pay the respondent’s costs, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent has filed a notice of contention containing two grounds. The first ground is not pressed. By the second ground, the respondent contends that the judgment should be affirmed on the basis of the second ground of review before the primary judge.Consideration It will be convenient to consider each ground of appeal in turn.Ground 1 The first ground of appeal concerns the primary judge’s conclusion that it was legally unreasonable for the IAA to reject the respondent’s claims on the basis that they were not mentioned at the arrival interview without exercising the power under s 473DC to give the respondent an opportunity to comment. Section 473DC is set out in the Reasons at [25]. The principles concerning legal unreasonableness have been considered by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408 (SZVFW) and by the Full Court of this Court in cases including Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1. In SZVFW, Kiefel CJ stated at [10] that in the joint judgment in Li “it was explained that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power is unreasonable in a legal sense when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification”. This may be the case where a decision is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at. The Chief Justice emphasised, at [11], that “the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent”. (See also [51]-[60] per Gageler J; [78]-[87] per Nettle and Gordon JJ; and [131]-[135] per Edelman J.) CRY16 involved an application of the principles of legal unreasonableness in relation to the statutory power in s 473DC. In that case, an issue of relocation arose before the IAA. That issue had not been considered by the delegate. The Full Court stated, at [67], that, as explained by Gageler J in Li, reasonableness is closely linked to procedural fairness. The Full Court stated: “Nevertheless, in light of the terms of s 473DA it is important to consider the present issue through the lens of Div 3 and the principles of legal reasonableness rather than the principles of procedural fairness.” The Full Court also stated: “Further, in our opinion, that the outcome is unfair ‘in an ordinary sense’, as accepted by Senior Counsel for the Minister, is not irrelevant to whether or not there has been legal unreasonableness in the exercise or non-exercise of statutory powers.” The Full Court stated at [77] that the analysis of legal unreasonableness in respect of statutory powers and discretions must be founded in the terms in which both powers and discretions are conferred. The Full Court considered both the powers available to the Authority and the broader statutory context. The Full Court conclude at [82]:Our conclusion is that it was legally unreasonable, in the circumstances, not to consider getting documents or information from the respondent. The legislature is to be taken to intend that the Authority’s statutory power in s 473DC will be exercised reasonably. The failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power lacks an evident and intelligible justification in circumstances where the Authority knew that it did not have, but the respondent was likely to have, information on his particular circumstances and the impact upon him of relocation to Beirut. The Authority did not have that information because the question of relocation, either at all or to Beirut, was not explored, or the subject of findings, by the delegate. The Authority’s failure to consider the exercise of that discretionary power meant that it disabled itself from considering what was reasonable, in the sense of “practicable”, in terms of relocation. In our opinion, as a consequence, the review by the Authority under s 473CC miscarried for jurisdictional error.