BIJD and National Disability Insurance Agency [2018] AATA 2971 (10 August 2018)
Division:NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME DIVISION
File Number(s): 2016/6329
Re:BIJD
APPLICANT
AndNational Disability Insurance Agency
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President Gary Humphries
Date:10 August 2018
Place:Canberra
The reviewable decision is affirmed.
......................................................................
Deputy President Gary Humphries
Catchwords
NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME – funding for supports included in the statement of participant supports – whether two days of in-home care for a child is a reasonable and necessary support – whether support meets each of the requirements set out in s 34(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 – child suffering from severe, life-threatening, congenital heart disease – reviewable decision affirmed.
Legislation
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 ss 3, 4, 31, 32, 33, 34, 100, 103
Cases
McGarrigle v NDIA [2017] FCA 308
Fear and NDIA [2015] AATA 706
JQJT and NDIA [2015’ AATA 478
Secondary Materials
Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Minister for Disability Reform, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013, 1 July 2013
National Disability Insurance Agency, Operational Guideline, National Disability Insurance Scheme < FOR DECISION
Deputy President Gary Humphries
10 August 2018
INTRODUCTION
James is a three-year-old boy in Canberra with severe medical problems. Six days after he was born in June 2015 he suffered a stroke which resulted in him losing his left kidney and damaging his spleen, significantly impairing his ability to fight infections. His parents, including his mother BIJD, the applicant in these proceedings, were told that he would not live. He subsequently suffered two cardiac arrests in March 2016 as a result of stress on his heart. He remained in palliative care until November 2016.
The Tribunal was told James suffers from severe, life-threatening, congenital heart disease.
On 30 May 2016, James was accepted as a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (the NDIS or the Scheme), and a plan providing him with supports was approved by the National Disability Insurance Agency (the NDIA or the Agency) on 22 June 2016. On 8 July 2016, BIJD requested a review of the plan on the basis that it did not include two days of in-home support which she had requested. The decision was internally reviewed. The letter conveying that decision is undated, but was apparently made on or about 8 September 2016. In that decision it determined a plan for James which did not include two days of in-home care. BIJD has sought merits review by the Tribunal of this reviewable decision. The balance of the approved supports in the plan is not in dispute.
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION, RULES AND GUIDELINES
Section 32 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (the Act) requires that the CEO of the NDIA must facilitate the preparation of a plan when a person becomes a participant in the Scheme. The plan is facilitated in accordance with the Scheme’s rules (s 32(2)).
A plan must include a statement of participant supports…
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- Case
- [2018] AATA 2971
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine whether the proposed in-home care support met each of the requirements set out in section 34(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013. Specifically, the Tribunal considered whether the support was reasonable and necessary, taking into account factors such as the availability of alternative supports, the role of families and carers, and the potential for the support to be considered a substitute for childcare. The Tribunal also had regard to the interpretation of "reasonable and necessary supports" as outlined in case law, including the distinction between "reasonable" and "necessary" and the application of the criteria in section 34(1).
The Tribunal acknowledged the significant pressure on BIJD due to James's complex needs, noting that the in-home care would provide her with respite, including the ability to work. However, the Tribunal emphasised that the primary focus of the NDIS must remain on the needs of the participant with the disability. While the legislation requires consideration of the role of families and carers, the Tribunal found that the proposed support did not satisfy paragraphs (c) and (e) of section 34(1). Paragraph (c) relates to whether the support is most appropriately funded or provided by the scheme, and paragraph (e) concerns what it is reasonable to expect families, carers, and the community to provide. The Tribunal concluded that funding the support as requested could have significant precedential value and lead to an unwarranted expansion of the Scheme, particularly as it could be seen as a substitute for childcare.
Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the reviewable decision of the NDIA.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Emphasis was also placed on the lack of alternative programs or supports available in the community for a person with the problems encountered by James. There were, it was asserted, simply no other affordable alternatives available to in-home care.Consideration As a preliminary matter, I find that one outcome of the provision of in-home care to James is respite for BIJD. Notwithstanding her counsel’s characterisation, it is clear from her evidence cited at paragraph 24 above that, considering the pressure on her of addressing James’s many needs, the freedom to leave the family home and go to work is indeed a form of respite. For participant supports to be funded, each support must meet each of the criteria in s 34(1). That subsection does not, however, constitute a definition for the purposes of the Act of reasonable and necessary supports. Evidently, supports must meet other tests to be eligible for funding; for example, they must relate to a participant’s disability, a criterion not explicitly enumerated in s 34(1). In McGarrigle v NDIA [2017] FCA 308 the Federal Court considered the meaning of reasonable and necessary as used in the Act. Mortimer J indicated in this passage at [91]-[93] that the decision-maker’s enquiry is wider than simply determining whether each of the criteria in s 34(1) is met:Whether a support is “reasonable” requires a different assessment to whether a support is “necessary”. Again, it is not necessary in the context of this proceeding to be definitive about the nature and extent of the meaning of the phrase, or its components. It is enough to observe that using the concept of necessity would appear to tie one aspect of the CEO’s assessment to an evaluation of the kinds of factors set out in s 34(1)(a) and (b) and (d). The word “reasonable” would appear to be directed at factors such as those set out in s 34(1)(c) and (f). That is not to say the meaning of each word is exhausted by the factors set out in s 34(1): rather, it is to illustrate the different work that each concept does as an adjective in the phrase “reasonable and necessary supports”.Relevantly to this proceeding, the factor set out in s 34(1)(e) (“funding or provision of the support takes account of what it is reasonable to expect families, carers, informal networks and the community to provide”) goes to both whether a support is “reasonable” (in the sense of it being subject to provision or funding by the Agency) as well as whether it is “necessary” (in the sense of whether it is a support that cannot be provided by others).In my opinion, the text and context of s 33(5)(c), read with s 34(1) indicates that the CEO (or the delegate or Tribunal) must either be satisfied that a support has the character of being a reasonable and necessary support, or that it does not. Once a support is identified and described (to take an example away from this case, speech therapy lessons three times a week), then the question for the CEO (or the delegate or Tribunal) is whether she or he is satisfied that support, as identified, is reasonable and necessary for that particular participant. It may be open to the CEO to be satisfied that a differently identified support is reasonable and necessary: in this example, speech therapy lessons once a week. That determination can only be made on the basis of probative evidence.