BIJD and National Disability Insurance Agency

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BIJD and National Disability Insurance Agency [2018] AATA 2971 (10 August 2018)

Division:NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME DIVISION

File Number(s):      2016/6329

Re:BIJD

APPLICANT

AndNational Disability Insurance Agency

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President Gary Humphries

Date:10 August 2018

Place:Canberra

The reviewable decision is affirmed.

......................................................................

Deputy President Gary Humphries

Catchwords

NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME – funding for supports included in the statement of participant supports – whether two days of in-home care for a child is a reasonable and necessary support – whether support meets each of the requirements set out in s 34(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 – child suffering from severe, life-threatening, congenital heart disease – reviewable decision affirmed.

Legislation

National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 ss 3, 4, 31, 32, 33, 34, 100, 103

Cases

McGarrigle v NDIA [2017] FCA 308

Fear and NDIA [2015] AATA 706

JQJT and NDIA [2015’ AATA 478

Secondary Materials

Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Minister for Disability Reform, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013, 1 July 2013

National Disability Insurance Agency, Operational Guideline, National Disability Insurance Scheme < FOR DECISION

Deputy President Gary Humphries

10 August 2018

INTRODUCTION

  1. James is a three-year-old boy in Canberra with severe medical problems. Six days after he was born in June 2015 he suffered a stroke which resulted in him losing his left kidney and damaging his spleen, significantly impairing his ability to fight infections. His parents, including his mother BIJD, the applicant in these proceedings, were told that he would not live. He subsequently suffered two cardiac arrests in March 2016 as a result of stress on his heart. He remained in palliative care until November 2016.

  2. The Tribunal was told James suffers from severe, life-threatening, congenital heart disease.

  3. On 30 May 2016, James was accepted as a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (the NDIS or the Scheme), and a plan providing him with supports was approved by the National Disability Insurance Agency (the NDIA or the Agency) on 22 June 2016. On 8 July 2016, BIJD requested a review of the plan on the basis that it did not include two days of in-home support which she had requested. The decision was internally reviewed. The letter conveying that decision is undated, but was apparently made on or about 8 September 2016. In that decision it determined a plan for James which did not include two days of in-home care. BIJD has sought merits review by the Tribunal of this reviewable decision. The balance of the approved supports in the plan is not in dispute.

    APPLICABLE LEGISLATION, RULES AND GUIDELINES

  4. Section 32 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (the Act) requires that the CEO of the NDIA must facilitate the preparation of a plan when a person becomes a participant in the Scheme. The plan is facilitated in accordance with the Scheme’s rules (s 32(2)).

  5. A plan must include a statement of participant supports…

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Details
Case
[2018] AATA 2971
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by BIJD against a decision of the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) regarding funding for in-home care for her child, James. James suffers from severe, life-threatening congenital heart disease. The dispute centred on whether two days of in-home care per week constituted a reasonable and necessary support under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth). The decision was made by Deputy President Gary Humphries of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether the proposed in-home care support met each of the requirements set out in section 34(1) of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013. Specifically, the Tribunal considered whether the support was reasonable and necessary, taking into account factors such as the availability of alternative supports, the role of families and carers, and the potential for the support to be considered a substitute for childcare. The Tribunal also had regard to the interpretation of "reasonable and necessary supports" as outlined in case law, including the distinction between "reasonable" and "necessary" and the application of the criteria in section 34(1).

The Tribunal acknowledged the significant pressure on BIJD due to James's complex needs, noting that the in-home care would provide her with respite, including the ability to work. However, the Tribunal emphasised that the primary focus of the NDIS must remain on the needs of the participant with the disability. While the legislation requires consideration of the role of families and carers, the Tribunal found that the proposed support did not satisfy paragraphs (c) and (e) of section 34(1). Paragraph (c) relates to whether the support is most appropriately funded or provided by the scheme, and paragraph (e) concerns what it is reasonable to expect families, carers, and the community to provide. The Tribunal concluded that funding the support as requested could have significant precedential value and lead to an unwarranted expansion of the Scheme, particularly as it could be seen as a substitute for childcare.

Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the reviewable decision of the NDIA.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On balance, the Tribunal considers that s 34(1)(f) is satisfied. CONCLUSION The Tribunal has considerable sympathy for the challenging position in which BIJD and her family find themselves. James’s needs are such that it cannot be doubted that caring for him does place the mental, emotional and even physical health of BIJD, in particular, at some risk. The legislation, and more particularly the rules and guidelines made to aid its interpretation, require a decision maker to take into account the need to buttress the role of families and carers in relation to people with disabilities, most particularly children. There is some temptation to give that consideration such pre-eminence in the rollout of NDIS services that supports are funded as much for what they do for families as for what they do for the person with disabilities. But the focus of the NDIS must remain firmly on the needs of those with disabilities, such that the eligibility criteria for NDIS supports should be broadly consistent across communities and not calibrated so heavily to the ancillary needs of others that distortions in the Scheme are created. In the particular circumstances of James, the Tribunal is acutely conscious that a decision to fund a substitute for childcare, albeit one with some ameliorating impact on his disability, would have great precedential value, and could facilitate a significant and costly expansion of the Scheme. The Tribunal does not consider that the circumstances here warrant such an outcome. The support which BIJD seeks for James does not satisfy paragraphs (c) and (e) of s 34(1). Accordingly the reviewable decision made (apparently) on 8 September 2016 is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Emphasis was also placed on the lack of alternative programs or supports available in the community for a person with the problems encountered by James. There were, it was asserted, simply no other affordable alternatives available to in-home care.Consideration As a preliminary matter, I find that one outcome of the provision of in-home care to James is respite for BIJD. Notwithstanding her counsel’s characterisation, it is clear from her evidence cited at paragraph 24 above that, considering the pressure on her of addressing James’s many needs, the freedom to leave the family home and go to work is indeed a form of respite. For participant supports to be funded, each support must meet each of the criteria in s 34(1). That subsection does not, however, constitute a definition for the purposes of the Act of reasonable and necessary supports. Evidently, supports must meet other tests to be eligible for funding; for example, they must relate to a participant’s disability, a criterion not explicitly enumerated in s 34(1). In McGarrigle v NDIA [2017] FCA 308 the Federal Court considered the meaning of reasonable and necessary as used in the Act. Mortimer J indicated in this passage at [91]-[93] that the decision-maker’s enquiry is wider than simply determining whether each of the criteria in s 34(1) is met:Whether a support is “reasonable” requires a different assessment to whether a support is “necessary”. Again, it is not necessary in the context of this proceeding to be definitive about the nature and extent of the meaning of the phrase, or its components. It is enough to observe that using the concept of necessity would appear to tie one aspect of the CEO’s assessment to an evaluation of the kinds of factors set out in s 34(1)(a) and (b) and (d). The word “reasonable” would appear to be directed at factors such as those set out in s 34(1)(c) and (f). That is not to say the meaning of each word is exhausted by the factors set out in s 34(1): rather, it is to illustrate the different work that each concept does as an adjective in the phrase “reasonable and necessary supports”.Relevantly to this proceeding, the factor set out in s 34(1)(e) (“funding or provision of the support takes account of what it is reasonable to expect families, carers, informal networks and the community to provide”) goes to both whether a support is “reasonable” (in the sense of it being subject to provision or funding by the Agency) as well as whether it is “necessary” (in the sense of whether it is a support that cannot be provided by others).In my opinion, the text and context of s 33(5)(c), read with s 34(1) indicates that the CEO (or the delegate or Tribunal) must either be satisfied that a support has the character of being a reasonable and necessary support, or that it does not. Once a support is identified and described (to take an example away from this case, speech therapy lessons three times a week), then the question for the CEO (or the delegate or Tribunal) is whether she or he is satisfied that support, as identified, is reasonable and necessary for that particular participant. It may be open to the CEO to be satisfied that a differently identified support is reasonable and necessary: in this example, speech therapy lessons once a week. That determination can only be made on the basis of probative evidence.