Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Levi (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Levi (No 3) [2008]
FCA 1586

CONTEMPT – breach of Court orders restraining respondent from offering businesses for sale without first satisfying certain conditions – belated guilty plea – substantial criminal record – previous imprisonment for offences of similar nature to that constituting the contempt - principles relevant to imposing penalty – appropriate penalty where respondent bankrupt – whether sentence of imprisonment appropriate – whether sentence should be suspended – no prior contempt – held repeated and flagrant breach of Court orders – substantial damage to the public – limited, if any, remorse

Held:  Ten months’ imprisonment ordered with six months suspended subject to compliance for five years with conditions.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31(1)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 24
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51AD, 52

Ambrose (trustee), Re; Athanasas (bankrupt) (No 2) [2008] FCA 1016
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Australian Taxation Information Services Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1607
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v INFO4PC.com Pty Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 24
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 279
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bon Levi [2008] FCA 68
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Contract Plus Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 364
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dynacast (Int) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 429
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Globex Systems Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 550
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Goldstar Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 585
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hercules Iron Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1182
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes (t/as Crowded Planet) (2004) 207 ALR 116
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes [2004] FCA 519
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Ltd (No 3) (2002) 196 ALR 576
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 11) [2007] FCA 1815
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 3)(2006) 230 ALR 528
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 8) [2007] FCA 1612
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Siminton (No 10) [2007] FCA 1814
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Eagle Inter-Link Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1524
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Michalik (2004) 52 ACSR 115
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Matthews (1992) 32 ACSR 404
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Reid (No 2) [2006] FCA 700
Australian Securities Commission v Macleod (No 3) (1993) 40 FCR 475
Capel v CaramFinance Australia Ltd (formerly known as Marac Finance Australia Ltd) [2000] 2 Qd R 126
Capel v Caram Finance Australia Ltd [1998] QSC 110
City Hall Albury Wodonga Pty Ltd v Chicago Investments Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 31
Commissioner for Fair Trading v Oliver [2004] NSWSC 722
Commissioner of Fair Trading, Department of Commerce v Jenness [2007] NSWSC 439
Dietrich v The…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1586
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) initiated proceedings against Mr Bon Levi for alleged breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The proceedings related to the sale of distributorships, primarily involving a business called 'Little Joe Snax'. The alleged breaches occurred between 1 August 2003 and 20 July 2004. The court found that Mr Levi was a franchisor and the agreements he offered were franchise agreements. It was determined that Mr Levi failed to comply with the Franchising Code of Conduct and engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 52 of the TPA.

The primary legal issues addressed by the court were whether the conduct of Mr Levi warranted a suspended sentence of imprisonment, the admissibility of previous criminal history in determining the penalty, and the appropriate length of the term of imprisonment. The court concluded that the contempts were serious and deliberate, with Mr Levi gaining substantial financial benefits. The complainants suffered loss, frustration, and wasted time due to Mr Levi’s conduct. The court considered factors such as Mr Levi’s age, health, and previous similar conduct when determining the penalty.

The court found that a suspended sentence of imprisonment would not be appropriate given the seriousness of the contempts. It held that previous criminal history could be taken into account in determining the penalty, and in this case, Mr Levi's previous conduct should be considered. The court also noted that factors such as Mr Levi's late guilty pleas, age, health issues, and lack of remorse were relevant in mitigation. The court ultimately decided on a term of imprisonment of 10 months, with the first 4 months to be served immediately and the remaining 6 months suspended subject to compliance with certain conditions for 5 years. Additionally, Mr Levi was ordered to pay the ACCC's costs on an indemnity basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent be imprisoned for a period of 10 months commencing from today, with the first 4 months being served in any event.

2. The balance of the sentence of 10 months will be suspended from execution upon the basis that if the first respondent within a period of 5 years from today, breaches the following conditions, the provision for suspension shall operate so that the first respondent must there upon be imprisoned for at least the remainder of the 10 month period not served, namely, the residual period of 6 months, the conditions being:

(a) the first respondent not, without leave of this Court first being obtained:

· sell; or

· advertise or promote for sale; or

· accept any payment or part payment for;

any business opportunity whatsoever.

(b) the first respondent not, without leave of this Court first being obtained knowingly participate in any other person or entity:

· selling; or

· advertising or promoting for sale; or

· accepting any payment or part payment for;

any business opportunity whatsoever.

The expression ‘business opportunity’ includes, but is not limited to, any franchise, training business, distributorship, manufacturing licence, partnership, import or export licence, purchasing or operating licence, marketing agreement or other business opportunity howsoever described.

3. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to this application on an indemnity basis. That is to say, all of the applicant’s costs in these proceedings be paid in full by the first respondent except to the extent that those costs are shown to have been unreasonably incurred.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons which appear below, I cannot accept that the series of contempts, as serious as they were, would warrant simply a suspended sentence of imprisonment. I also consider that as a matter of law, previous criminal history pertaining to conduct very similar to that constituting the contempts may and in this instance, should, be taken into account in determining the appropriate penalty. Equally, I do believe that there are considerations which would mitigate against a term of imprisonment as lengthy as that for which the ACCC contends.BACKGROUND On 4 August 2004, the ACCC issued proceedings against Mr Bon Levi alleging contraventions of s 51AD and s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA). These proceedings related to the sale by him of distributorships, mostly involving a business called ‘Little Joe Snax’. The distributorships purportedly sold involved the distribution of snack food products. The conduct which those proceedings addressed took place between 1 August 2003 and 20 July 2004. By consent, declarations and orders were made on 28 February 2005 by Kiefel J. Her Honour declared that:(a)Mr Levi, in offering and entering into the various distribution agreements, was a franchisor and the agreements offered by him were franchise agreements;(b)Mr Levi had failed to comply with the Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code) in multiple respects in relation to each of the 65 franchise agreements in the schedule to the order, and on each such occasion contravened s 51AD of the TPA;(c)Mr Levi engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 52 of the TPA by representing that:(i)he would secure a minimum of 75 retail outlets for each distributorship;(ii)he would pay each purchaser of a distributorship the amounts set out in their agreements;(iii)he would conduct a national advertising campaign to establish Little Joe Snax as a substantial competitor to major snack food brands in Australia;(iv)he was successfully operating a business of the type of the relevant distributorship which manufactured or acquired the product in question;(v)he was able to generate orders for the products in question which would ensure that for the term of each distribution agreement the distributor would have a minimum number of retail outlets to which to deliver the product;(vi)he would ensure that each distributor would receive a minimum weekly payment from him for the term of each agreement;(vii)he had reasonable grounds to believe that he had the means to make good his representations;(viii)he had exercised reasonable care and skill in making any forecasts;(ix)he had provided potential purchasers with all such information as to his personal history and business experience as required by law;(x)he had informed all potential purchasers of all matters known to him that might substantially limit, qualify or restrict his ability or capacity to perform his obligations under the agreements; and(xi)in the case of master distributorships for the distribution of beverages, he was able to source and contract for the supply of such beverages, including alcoholic beverages.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
The ACCC also seek an award of costs on an indemnity basis. It is relatively common in cases of contempt where proceedings have had to be brought to vindicate the authority of the Court and to uphold the public interest in the administration of justice to order costs on an indemnity basis particularly where the proceedings are brought by the ACCC in prosecution of its charter to act in the public interest (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dynacast (Int) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 429 at [89]).CONCLUSION The terms of her Honour’s injunction, while detailed, were clear and unambiguous. No suggestion is made to the contrary by way of any submission for Mr Levi. Clearly Mr Levi had proper notice of the terms of the injunction and warnings. The breaches of the injunction are admitted. Mr Levi’s acts were deliberate. The acts and omissions were not accidental. The conduct concerned was repeated, serious and flagrant and Mr Levi gained substantial financial benefits as a result of the repeated contempts. In addition to this, the complainants who were the subject of the behaviour constituting the contempts have suffered loss of funds, loss of assets, frustration and wasted time as a result of Mr Levi’s contemptuous conduct. He has shown little remorse for his contempt. His late pleas of guilty came only when it was clear that the ACCC was pressing for a substantial period of imprisonment. Mr Levi has a significant record for similar conduct in the past for which he has also been punished. In summary, the ACCC has contended for a sentence of imprisonment of 2-3 years with a suggestion that there be a discount subject to conditions (broadly similar to those imposed by Kiefel J) applying for a period of some 5 years. Dr McMillan has stressed reasons why it would be appropriate for the Court to impose a suspended sentence in this instance. All matters considered, I would have thought that the lower end of the scale advanced by the ACCC might be a starting point in light of the conclusions reached. From there one would need to consider factors in mitigation and the question of suspension of a sentence or the imposition of a fine. As previously observed, the latter course is pointless as there is no capacity to meet the fine. There is no reported contempt case in the Federal Court where the term of imprisonment imposed has reached the length suggested by the ACCC. On the other hand, it is true that when Mr Levi was known as Mr Farrow, he served the best part of 3 years in prison for failure to pay fines which he was ordered to pay in respect of conduct very similar to that which constituted these contempts. Taking as a starting the point the lower of the ACCC’s suggested period of sentence, (two years) as against that I would take the following matters into account in mitigation and reduction. First, notwithstanding that it was late, I would certainly take into account the guilty pleas. I would then take into account a variety of factors including his age and health difficulties. In relation to each of the contempt convictions, I would reduce the head sentence to 10 months but subject also to a condition that after serving 4 months of that sentence, the balance of the sentence be suspended subject to compliance for 5 years with conditions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

Although there has been a passing suggestion to the contrary, it appears to be established that there is no power in the Federal Court to impose a community service order (a creature of statute) for the reasons expressed by Gray J in Pattison (Trustee), in the matter of Bell (Bankrupt) v Bell [2007] FCA 137 at 46-48. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN CONTEMPT CASES In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 279 Spender J said at [16]: Considerations which are relevant in deciding what is the appropriate penalty include:(a)The relative seriousness of the contempt, which is determined by the extent to which the contemnor appreciated that a contempt was being committed: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 24 at [144].(b)Whether the contemnor subjectively intended to disobey the order: Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191 at 218; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes [2001] ATPR 41-807 at [20]; and Info4PCCom.(c)The importance of bringing home to the contemnor the seriousness of the contempt: Hughes at [24]; Info4PCCom at [139].(d)Whether the contemnor has offered any explanation or apology for his conduct: Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238, per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ at 245.(e)An acknowledgment by the contemnor that a contempt was committed may be a mitigating factor: Matthews at [25] and [29]. In a similar vein, in the context of breach of the terms of a mareva order, Palmer J in Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Michalik (2004) 52 ACSR 115 said at [29]:29For present purposes the relevant factors to be considered may be summarised thus: i)the seriousness of the contempt proved;ii)whether the contemnor was aware of the consequences to himself of what he proposed to do;iii)the actual or potential consequences of the contempt on the proceedings in which the contempt was committed;iv)whether the contempt was committed in the context of a proceeding alleging crime or conduct seriously prejudicial to the public interest: see, for example, Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 166;v)the reason or motive for the contempt;vi)whether the contemnor has received, or sought to receive, a benefit or gain from the contempt;vii)whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor;viii)the character and antecedents of the contemnor;ix)what punishment is required to deter the contemnor and others of like mind from similar disobedience to the orders of the Court;x)what punishment is required to express the Court's denunciation of the contempt. It is clear from the observations of Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ in Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 that the underlying rationale for the exercise of the contempt power is the necessity to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice. Their Honour’s said at 107:Although the primary purpose in committing a defendant who disobeys an injunction is to enforce the injunction for the benefit of the plaintiff, another purpose is to protect the effective administration of justice by demonstrating that the court's orders will be enforced. As the authors of Borrie and Lowe's Law of Contempt, 2nd ed (1983) say, at 3: "If a court lacked the means to enforce its orders, if its orders could be disobeyed with impunity, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute."