| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2024 0018 |
| JOHN RAYMOND ANDERSON AND DEMITRA ANDERSON | Applicants |
| v | |
| CITY OF STONNINGTON | First Respondent |
| VICTORIAN RAIL TRACK | Second Respondent |
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| JUDGE: | BEACH JA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | On the papers |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 9 April 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 68 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2023] VSC 685 (Keogh J) |
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COSTS – Appeal – Application for leave to appeal against order refusing leave to appeal against costs orders – Whether associate judge erred in concluding that applicants not induced by any representation of second respondent to commence or maintain proceeding – Whether associate judge erred in not ordering party that disclosed document late to pay costs of proceeding – Associate judge’s orders plainly correct – Judge’s order refusing leave to appeal from associate judge’s orders plainly correct – Application for leave to appeal having no prospects of success – Application for leave to appeal totally without merit – Application for leave to appeal refused.
Supreme Court Act 1986, s 14D.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicants: | In person | ||
| First Respondent: | No appearance | ||
| Second Respondent: | Mr S Hopper SC | ||
| Solicitors | |||
| Applicants: | |||
| First Respondent: | |||
| Second Respondent | Norton Rose Fulbright | ||
BEACH JA:
This is an application for leave to appeal from an order refusing leave to appeal from orders in relation to costs. For the reasons given below, the application has no prospects of success. Indeed, the application is totally without merit.[1] Leave to appeal must be refused.
[1]As to the consequence of the application being determined to be totally without merit, see s 14D(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1986.
Background
At all relevant times, John and Dimitra Anderson (‘the Andersons’ or ‘the plaintiffs’), who are the applicants for leave to appeal in this proceeding, owned a residential property in Stonnington (‘the property’). On one border of the property, there was a lane (‘the lane’). The Andersons claimed that public use of the lane resulted in numerous acts of nuisance that adversely affected their enjoyment of the property. They sought to prevent public access by erecting a fence across the lane.
On 18 September 2014, after the fence had been erected, the Andersons commenced a proceeding in the Trial Division against the City of Stonnington (‘Stonnington’), seeking an injunction, including an interlocutory injunction, to restrain Stonnington from removing the fence. On 29 September 2014, the Andersons’ application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.[2]
On 17 February 2015,[3] the Andersons joined the registered owner of the lane, Victorian Rail Track (‘VicTrack’), to the proceeding as a second defendant.
[3]Pursuant to a consent order made on 9 February 2015.
In the proceeding, the Andersons made claims in nuisance and sought damages from Stonnington and VicTrack. They also sought declarations concerning the legal status of the lane. Specifically, they sought declarations to the effect that the lane was not a ‘road’ within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1989; was not…
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- Case
- [2025] VSCA 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the associate judge erred in concluding that the applicants were not induced by any representation of the second respondent to commence or maintain the proceeding, and whether the associate judge erred in not ordering the party that disclosed a document late to pay the costs of the proceeding. The applicants also sought leave to appeal the order refusing leave to appeal the associate judge’s orders.
The court found that the associate judge’s orders were plainly correct, and that the judge’s order refusing leave to appeal from the associate judge’s orders was also plainly correct. The court held that the application for leave to appeal had no prospects of success and was totally without merit. The court therefore refused the application for leave to appeal. The court considered that the applicants had not demonstrated any error on the part of the associate judge, and that there was no basis for the court to interfere with the associate judge’s orders.
There were no final orders made by the court in this case, as the application for leave to appeal was refused. However, the court’s decision is significant in that it reinforces the principle that leave to appeal is not a matter of right, and that an application for leave to appeal must have prospects of success and be otherwise meritorious. The court’s decision also highlights the importance of ensuring that parties comply with the rules of court, including the timely disclosure of documents.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi