JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: CASSERLY -v- INGERSOLL-RAND (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED & ANOR [2009] WADC 28
CORAM: SCHOOMBEE DCJ
HEARD: 26 FEBRUARY 2009
DELIVERED : 5 MARCH 2009
FILE NO/S: CIV 1275 of 2004
BETWEEN: DANIEL PETER CASSERLY
Plaintiff
AND
INGERSOLL-RAND (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED
Second DefendantATLAS COPCO AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to strike out pleading - Lack of particulars - Whether pleading frivolous or vexatious- Application for summary judgment on basis of plaintiff's failure to provide an expert report - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971, O20 r 19(1); O 16(1)
Result:
Application to strike out statement of claim granted in respect of par 10; remainder of application dismissed
Application for summary judgment dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr S Walker
Second Defendant : Mr G Macnish
Third Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Chapmans
Second Defendant : Cocks Macnish
Third Defendant : Not applicable
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Agar v Hyde (2001) 201 CLR 552
Anderson v City of Enfield Corporation (1983) 34 SASR 472
Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd v Dampier Port Authority and Anor [2006] 33 WAR 82
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540
Cuckow v Polyester Reinforced Products Pty Ltd (1970) 19 FLR 122
Henderson v Curtis [2008] WASC 283
Hismelt Corporation Pty Ltd v Pratt [2007] WASCA 192
McPherson's Ltd v Eaton [2005] NSWCA 435
Smith v Littlemore (1996) 15 WAR 289
Thompson v Johnston and Johnson Pty Ltd [1991] 2 VR 449
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40
Youlden Enterprises v Health Solutions (WA) Pty Ltd and Ors [2006] WASC 161
SCHOOMBEE DCJ: Ingersoll‑Rand (Australia) Limited ("the second defendant") has brought an application to strike out the further amended statement of claim on the basis that certain paragraphs are frivolous or vexatious because of the lack of particulars supplied with regard thereto. The second defendant has also brought an application for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff's action is frivolous or vexatious because the plaintiff did not comply with an order to file non‑medical expert reports prior to 23 December 2008, is now precluded from adducing non‑medical expert evidence and cannot succeed in its claim without such evidence.
The plaintiff claims that during the period September 1998 to September 2002, and in the course of his employment with Alcoa of Australia Limited ("the first defendant"), he used jack hammers and rattle guns to knock out mill liners for not less than eight hours per 12 hour shift. The plaintiff says that in carrying out this work he was exposed to vibration emanating from the jack hammers and rattle guns on a "frequent basis and/or over prolonged periods". In ignorance of the dangers thereof he performed this work and thereby suffered injury to both shoulders, elbows, forearms, wrists and hands.
The plaintiff says in the further amended statement of claim that the jack hammers and rattle guns…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Casserly v Ingersoll-Rand (Australia) Limited and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] WADC 28
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's claim could proceed without a non-medical expert report, particularly concerning the causation of the plaintiff's injuries. The court considered whether the plaintiff could rely on lay evidence and medical expert evidence to establish causation. The court examined the authority of Hismelt Corporation Pty Ltd v Pratt [2007] WASCA 192, where the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could prove causation without non-medical expert evidence by relying on specific instances of observed effects and expert medical opinion. The court also assessed whether the plaintiff had a reasonable prospect of success in proving their case.
In reaching its decision, the court referred to the principles outlined in Hismelt Corporation Pty Ltd v Pratt, where Buss JA held that the plaintiff could prove the tendency or capacity of the grinders to produce vibrations and thus causation through lay evidence and medical expert evidence. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or vexatious and that there was a serious question to be tried. The application to strike out the pleading was dismissed, and the application for summary judgment was also dismissed. The court found that the plaintiff had a reasonable prospect of success in proving their case based on the available evidence.
The court ordered that the application to strike out the pleading and the application for summary judgment be dismissed, allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed. The case highlights the importance of lay and medical expert evidence in establishing causation in workplace injury claims, particularly where non-medical expert evidence is not available.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Hismelt Corporation Pty Ltd v Pratt [2007] WASCA 192 at [21] ‑ [22] the issue under consideration was also whether there was a serious question to be tried in light of the fact that the plaintiff was precluded from filing and serving any non‑medical expert report. In that case the plaintiff's claim was based on an injury sustained by reason of the prolonged use of grinders which generated vibration. The Court of Appeal only considered the plaintiff's claim against the employer. The plaintiff's claim against the manufacturer had been dismissed by Registrar Wallace in the District Court because of the plaintiff's failure to produce the relevant non-medical expert evidence, which decision was upheld on appeal by Wager DCJ. Buss JA considered whether the plaintiff would be able to prove causation without non‑medical expert evidence, particularly whether the vibrations produced by the grinders in the circumstances in which they were used by the plaintiff, including the duration and frequency of use, materially contributed to his alleged injuries. Buss JA held that a subsidiary question was whether the relevant grinders had the tendency or capacity, if used in the relevant circumstances, to cause or materially contribute to the injuries of the kind which the plaintiff suffered. Buss JA referred to Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn revision), Vol 2, 1979 at 523 – 534, [441] where the learned author explains that where the tendency or capacity of an inanimate object has to be proven, an inference of that tendency or capacity may be made from "specific instances of observed effects, exhibitions or illustrations, to the supposed tendency, capacity or quality of producing them". Buss JA came to the conclusion that the tendency or capacity of the grinders could therefore be proven by the plaintiff giving evidence of his own personal experience of the grinders producing vibrations, the specified nature and extent thereof and the physical effects it had on him. The plaintiff would also be able to call co‑workers or others to give similar evidence. Further, it was open to the plaintiff to call a suitably qualified medical practitioner, for example, an occupational physician, as to his or her opinions and as to findings and opinions recorded in medical literature of the effects on workers who operated the grinders in question or comparable equipment. Buss JA held that in light of the fact that the plaintiff could rely on lay evidence or medical expert evidence to prove the tendency of the grinders to produce vibrations and thus causation, it could not be concluded that the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of success in proving its case. The same observations that Buss JA made clearly also apply in the present case with regard to proof of causation. It may not be necessary to establish the exact level of vibration of the jackhammers and rattle guns if there is lay evidence that they produce a high level of vibration and if a medical expert can say that the levels of vibration as described by the lay witnesses would have been likely to have caused the relevant injuries.