State of Victoria v Villan

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2021 0079
STATE OF VICTORIA Applicant
v
JADE VILLAN Respondent

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JUDGES: KENNEDY and WALKER JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 20 May 2022 
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 7 June 2022
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2022] VSCA 106
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: Villan v State of Victoria (Supreme Court of Victoria, Keogh J, 29 June 2021)

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to appeal – Interlocutory costs order – Issue of principle regarding duty of solicitor to notify witness of consequences of giving evidence – Wide-ranging practical implications – Exceptional circumstances established – Leave to appeal granted.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeal – Costs – Civil jury trial – Respondent allegedly abused by school principal – Proceeding stayed pending criminal investigation – Where judge ordered State to pay respondent’s costs, in ex tempore ruling – Whether trial judge made error by requiring State to give principal legal advice – Limited interpretation of judge’s ruling preferred – No error demonstrated – House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, applied – Appeal dismissed.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to adduce new evidence on appeal –Where parties not on notice as to issues ultimately relied upon by trial judge – Interests of justice permit new evidence – Leave granted.

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Counsel

Applicant: Ms M Britbart QC with Mr B House
Respondent: Mr C Winneke QC with Mr M Hooper

Solicitors

Applicant: Thomson Geer Lawyers
Respondent: Maurice Blackburn

KENNEDY JA
WALKER JA:

  1. This application for leave to appeal concerns an interlocutory costs order. We emphasise at the outset that only in an exceptional case will this Court grant leave to appeal in relation to an order of that kind. Nonetheless, for the reasons set out below, we have concluded that this is an exceptional case. That is because it raises an issue of principle concerning the proper conduct of a solicitor in relation to a witness in a civil proceeding, where the witness may be the subject of future criminal prosecution in relation to the issue raised in the civil proceeding.

  2. The substantive proceeding in which the costs order was made is a proceeding in tort by the respondent, Mr Villan, against the applicant, the State of Victoria. Mr Villan alleges that, while he was a pupil in a school operated by the State, he was sexually assaulted by the school principal (identified by the pseudonym EFG). He alleges that the State is directly and vicariously liable for EFG’s acts. EFG is not a party to the civil proceeding. Mr Villan had not, at the times relevant to this application, made a complaint to police concerning EFG. 

  3. By its defence the State denies the allegations concerning EFG’s acts. It proposed to call EFG as a witness at trial and he had agreed to give evidence. The solicitors for the State told EFG that they did not act for him and advised him to obtain legal advice, but EFG did not do…

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Details
Case
[2022] VSCA 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of State of Victoria v Villan, the Supreme Court of Victoria was called upon to address several significant issues related to costs, leave to appeal, and the admissibility of new evidence in the context of a civil trial involving allegations of abuse by a school principal. The case centred on the trial judge's decision to stay a civil proceeding pending the outcome of a criminal investigation into the respondent's allegations, and the subsequent order for the State to pay the respondent's costs incurred due to the indefinite stay. The State challenged the trial judge's ruling, arguing that there was no error in his decision-making process.

The court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in his ruling by requiring the State to provide the principal with legal advice and whether the trial judge's decision to order the State to pay the respondent's costs was justified. The court also had to consider whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying an appeal from the trial judge's interlocutory costs order, and whether the interests of justice warranted the admission of new evidence on appeal. The reasoning of the court revolved around the discretionary nature of the trial judge's decision and the need to identify a specific error in the exercise of that discretion, as per the principles established in House v The King.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in his decision to stay the proceeding and order the State to pay the respondent's costs. The court held that the State had not demonstrated any error in the trial judge's decision and that the trial judge had appropriately exercised his discretion. The court also found that the interests of justice warranted the admission of new evidence on appeal, as the parties were not on notice as to the issues ultimately relied upon by the trial judge. Therefore, the court granted leave to adduce new evidence on appeal.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's decision to stay the proceeding and order the State to pay the respondent's costs. The court also granted leave to adduce new evidence on appeal, finding that it was in the interests of justice to permit the respondent to rely on the additional evidence. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to the principles established in House v The King when reviewing the exercise of discretionary powers by trial judges.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

We commence by observing that, as the parties accepted, the trial judge’s decision involved the exercise of a discretionary power and thus the standard of review on an appeal is the House v The King standard: The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so.[10] [10](1936) 55 CLR 499, 504–5 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ); [1936] HCA 40 (emphasis added). Thus it is not sufficient that we might have made a different costs order than that made by the trial judge. Rather, it is necessary that we identify an error of the kind described in House v The King. The State submitted that there was nothing which was done, or omitted to be done, by it which had led to the indefinite stay of the trial. Until the respondent gave evidence that he would be making a complaint to the police, it said, there was no basis on which a stay of the civil proceeding could be anticipated. It pointed out that EFG had been told by its solicitors on numerous occasions that they did not act for EFG and that he ought to obtain independent legal advice, and that they gave EFG the details of the Law Institute of Victoria. EFG chose not to do so. The State also submitted that EFG was asked on repeated occasions whether he had been contacted by the police in respect of the respondent’s allegations, and that, until Mr Villan’s statement of his intention to report the alleged conduct to the police, EFG had made an election not to obtain legal advice or representation. His Honour’s conclusion that EFG was not aware of the risk of exposure to criminal prosecution, the State submitted, was inconsistent with the affidavit evidence confirming that the State’s solicitors had asked EFG whether he had been contacted by Victoria Police. The State submitted that neither it nor its solicitors had any power to compel EFG to seek legal advice earlier. The State further submitted that its solicitors had acted in accordance with the Law Institute of Victoria’s Ethics Guidelines.[11] Those Guidelines deal with the interview of a prospective defendant as follows:A solicitor should act fairly and honestly in interviewing persons who are prospective defendants and, in particular, should:(a) inform the person on whose behalf he or she acts;(b) inform the person about the matter in which he or she is acting;(c) ensure the person is aware that the solicitor is not acting or giving advice on the person’s behalf;(d) advise the person he or she may decline to discuss the matter if he or she chooses to do so;(e) ensure that there is no attempt to manipulate the person’s evidence.[12]We observe that the LIV Guidelines do not make reference to a witness who may be subject to criminal proceedings. [11]Law Institute of Victoria, ‘Interviewing and Conferring with Witnesses Guidelines’ (10 February 2017) (‘LIV Guidelines’). [12]LIV Guidelines, [2].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 29 June 2021, the trial judge heard oral argument concerning the costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment. His Honour then held as follows, in an ex tempore judgment:The circumstances leading to indefinite adjournment of this proceeding are set out in my ruling Villan v State of Victoria [2021] VSC 354. I won’t repeat them here. The defendant sought to defend the case brought by the plaintiff by denial that the abuse alleged by the plaintiff occurred and communicated at least from February this year the intention to call EFG as the critical witness in support of that defence.The materials provided today, in particular the affidavit of the defendant’s solicitor Mr Roberts sworn 25 June 2021, show that there was contact between the defendant’s solicitors and EFG on at least May 2020 and that repeatedly in the course of that contact EFG was advised that he should get independent legal advice, and the defendant’s solicitors did not represent him. However, the correspondence does not indicate and Mr Roberts does not say in his affidavit that EFG was advised of the risk of exposure to criminal prosecution on the basis of the allegations made by the plaintiff or the impact giving evidence in the proceeding might have on such a prosecution.Inevitably, before he gave evidence EFG was, in my view, going to require independent legal advice as to those matters. In my view, in the process of obtaining that advice the issues which have ultimately led to the indefinite stay of the proceeding would’ve come to light. I accept the plaintiff’s submission that in the circumstances it is appropriate that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs thrown away by reason of adjournment of the trial. So I will make that order.[6][6]Emphasis added. Both the State and Mr Villan sought to rely on new evidence on the appeal. Each also opposed the other’s application. Mr Villan applied to rely on an affidavit from Mr Rule, a senior associate at Maurice Blackburn. That affidavit sought to respond to the State’s submission that Maurice Blackburn had been aware of the Respondent’s intention to go to the police since the firm had been instructed, and that Maurice Blackburn and Mr Villan had maintained a ‘plan’ to finalise the civil proceeding before Mr Villan made a complaint to police. We will address Mr Rule’s evidence in greater detail below. Although Mr Villan could have adduced Mr Rule’s new evidence before the trial judge, we accept that he was not on notice regarding the submissions that the State would make as to Maurice Blackburn’s knowledge of Mr Villan’s intention to make a complaint. That explains why Mr Rule’s evidence was not adduced below. Further, the serious nature of the State’s submission that Mr Villan and his solicitors had a ‘plan’ to finalise the civil proceeding and then for Mr Villan to make a complaint to police requires that Maurice Blackburn have an opportunity to put on evidence concerning its knowledge and the advice it gave to Mr Villan. Thus we consider that it is in the interests of justice to permit Mr Villan to rely on Mr Rule’s further affidavit.

Decision

Reasons for decision

He was then asked whether he had made a decision to make a complaint to police, in response to which he said: My decision was made – made at the – depending on how the redress scheme worked, I didn’t understand it, whether I could make one or not at that point, but since being told by Maurice Blackburn I can make one at any point my decision from then on is that I will make a complaint to the police. So – and I have taken this up with my lawyers throughout the last two years of this, whether – do I wait or do I go or ---[3][3]Emphasis added. The following morning an application was made by the State to discharge the jury. Senior counsel for the State told the Court that EFG had been told about Mr Villan’s evidence concerning his intention to go to the police, and that EFG had indicated that, in those circumstances, he wished to obtain legal advice as to whether to give evidence in the trial. In the course of discussion, the following exchange occurred:HIS HONOUR: It was my intention this morning to discuss with you that I intended to make a referral to the pro bono scheme - - -MS BRITBART: Yes.HIS HONOUR: To allow for the principal to receive some advice. Now, whether he needs advice by the pro bono scheme or whether he wants to do that privately is a matter for him.MS BRITBART: Yes.HIS HONOUR: But, subject to hearing from the parties, it’s clear to me that he can’t receive advice from the defendant.MS BRITBART: No.HIS HONOUR: Your interests are not entirely aligned with his.MS BRITBART: That’s right.HIS HONOUR: Particularly in respect of this issue of him giving evidence. So, he’ll need some advice.MS BRITBART: Yes.HIS HONOUR: And then he can adopt whatever course he chooses - - -MS BRITBART: Correct.HIS HONOUR: Subject to that advice.MS BRITBART: Yes.HIS HONOUR: Who knows what that will be in terms of whether or not he agrees to give evidence with an appropriate certificate.MS BRITBART: Yes. Also in the course of discussion, senior counsel for the State observed that the case had been commenced without any complaint to the police, or indication that that was on Mr Villan’s mind; and that the fact that he had now given evidence that he would be making a complaint was a ‘substantial change’. In response, senior counsel for Mr Villan sought to deflect any suggestion of fault on the part of his client, and then went on to observe that the very first thing that ought to occur, if the State’s representing someone who is accused of a very serious offence, is ‘You don’t have to even speak to us; before you do anything you should get some advice from a legal practitioner experienced in crime.’ Ultimately, on 22 April 2021, the trial judge discharged the jury and the proceeding was adjourned. The proceeding was listed on 3 May 2021 for argument on whether EFG would give evidence in the trial. Having by this time obtained legal advice and representation, EFG’s position was that he was unwilling to give evidence and that he opposed an order compelling him to do so.[4] As noted above, the trial judge held that it was not in the interests of justice that EFG be required to give evidence at a trial in the proceeding, when it was likely that the allegations made against him by Mr Villan would be the subject of a criminal investigation.[5] In consequence of that conclusion, the trial judge stayed the proceeding until the determination of any pending criminal investigation and/or criminal proceedings against EFG arising out of a complaint by Mr Villan.[4]Reasons, [10].[5]Reasons, [31].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established