Anders v NACS Nominees Pty Ltd (ACN 008 118 732)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

ANDERS AND ANOR v NACS NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 008 118 732)

[2013] SASC 152

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

10 October 2013

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

LANDLORD AND TENANT - RETAIL AND COMMERCIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION - JURISDICTION, POWERS AND APPEALS OF COURTS AND TRIBUNALS - JURISDICTION GENERALLY

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS

MAGISTRATES - GENERALLY - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND ABUSE OF PROCESS

The appellants and the respondent are the lessors and the lessee of the Snowtown Hotel, respectively. A dispute arose between the parties during 2012 over the application of an amount of $32,087 towards maintenance works. The lessee did not exercise its right of renewal under the lease during the renewal period. Two months after the expiration of that period the lessee sought renewal of the lease. The lessors refused that request and indicated that the lessee would be placed in holding over as a monthly tenant. The lessors subsequently sought payment by the lessee of a further sum of $65,477.50 in connection with maintenance works. When the lessee refused to pay that sum, the lessors commenced recovery proceedings in the District Court and later issued a Notice to Vacate to the lessee. The lessee subsequently filed an application pursuant to the Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 in the Magistrates Court seeking an interlocutory injunction restraining the lessors from enforcing the Notice to Vacate, as well as other final relief. The next day the lessee filed a Defence and Counterclaim in the District Court proceedings seeking identical final relief. The lessee's application was subsequently heard by a Magistrate who granted the application for an interlocutory injunction and ordered that the proceedings be transferred to the District Court for consolidation. The lessors appealed and asserted that the Magistrate erred in finding that the Magistrates Court was an appropriate forum for the grant of interlocutory relief pending trial in the District Court.

Held (Peek J, allowing the appeal):

The Magistrates Court was an inappropriate forum for the consideration of the application for the interlocutory injunction.

(1) The proceedings in the Magistrates Court were prima facie an abuse of process, being proceedings between the same parties, arising from the same substratum of fact, raising the same factual issues and questions of law, and seeking relief identical to that claimed in the proceedings pending in the District Court. [57]

(2)  The Magistrates Court proceedings were not reasonably justified. [29]-[34], [38]-[72]

(i) Instituting, or proceeding with, the Magistrates Court application was enirely unnecessary. Pursuant to s 22, Magistrates Act 1983 and s 5(1), Judicial Administration (Auxillary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988, the District Court has jurisdiction to make all of the orders sought by the lessee. [29]-[34], [58]

(ii) The jurisdiction vested in the Magistrates Court pursuant to s 68(2), Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 is not a specialist jurisdiction vested exclusively in that Court or which is…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASC 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Anders v NACS Nominees Pty Ltd (ACN 008 118 732) was a case in which the Supreme Court of South Australia considered whether the Magistrates Court was the appropriate forum for an application for an interlocutory injunction. The dispute arose between a lessor and a lessee of a hotel, where the lessee sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the lessor from enforcing a Notice to Vacate pending the resolution of the District Court action. The lessors appealed against the order for an injunction, arguing that the Magistrates Court was an inappropriate forum for the determination of the application.

The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the Magistrates Court had jurisdiction to determine the application for an interlocutory injunction and whether the proceedings in the Magistrates Court were an abuse of process. The court found that the Magistrates Court was an inappropriate forum for the determination of the application for an interlocutory injunction as the District Court had jurisdiction to make all of the orders sought by the lessee. The jurisdiction vested in the Magistrates Court was not a specialist jurisdiction, and the District Court exercised a review jurisdiction over orders made by Magistrates under s 68(2) of the Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995. The court also found that the Magistrates Court proceedings were an abuse of process, being proceedings between the same parties, arising from the same substratum of fact, raising the same factual issues and questions of law, and seeking relief identical to that claimed in the proceedings pending in the District Court. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings in the Magistrates Court were transferred to the District Court for consolidation.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court of South Australia found that the Magistrates Court was an inappropriate forum for the determination of the application for an interlocutory injunction, and the proceedings in the Magistrates Court were an abuse of process. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings were transferred to the District Court for consolidation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held (Peek J, allowing the appeal):

The Magistrates Court was an inappropriate forum for the consideration of the application for the interlocutory injunction.

(1) The proceedings in the Magistrates Court were prima facie an abuse of process, being proceedings between the same parties, arising from the same substratum of fact, raising the same factual issues and questions of law, and seeking relief identical to that claimed in the proceedings pending in the District Court. [57]

(2) The Magistrates Court proceedings were not reasonably justified. [29]-[34], [38]-[72]

(i) Instituting, or proceeding with, the Magistrates Court application was enirely unnecessary. Pursuant to s 22, Magistrates Act 1983 and s 5(1), Judicial Administration (Auxillary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988, the District Court has jurisdiction to make all of the orders sought by the lessee. [29]-[34], [58]

(ii) The jurisdiction vested in the Magistrates Court pursuant to s 68(2), Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 is not a specialist jurisdiction vested exclusively in that Court or which is unknown to the District Court. The District Court exercises a review jurisdiction over orders made by Magistrates under s 68(2) pursuant to s 38(6), Magistrates Court Act 1991. The Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 also provides for the transfer of proceedings to the District Court under s 69(1). The District Court also regularly deals with matters arising at common law and equity which overlap with s 68(2). [59]-[60]

(iii) The Magistrates Court is an inappropriate forum for the determination of the complex factual matters which are raised for determination in these proceedings. The lessors' action exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the Magistrates Court of $40,000 and consequently the matter was always one that was required to be determined by the District Court. The District Court is the correct forum for the determination of the parties' respective rights, the Court being familiar with these matters in its general experience and having the appropriate jurisdictional limit. [61]-[63]

(iv) The Magistrates Court proceedings constituted an unnecessary duplication of work and waste of scarce judicial resources given that it is only in the District Court proceedings that orders can be made which will dispose of all matters in dispute between the parties. Determination of the interlocutory application by the Magistrates Court potentially embarrasses the District Court, producing a judicial determination as to the prospects of success of the lessee in a District Court trial. This situation would be greatly exacerbated were the Supreme Court to deliver a judgment on appeal from the Magistrate's decision, making, as would be required, fairly definite findings about those prospects of success and thus producing the inappropriate outcome of there being two (partial) judicial determinations prior to the District Court having an opportunity to consider the matter. [64]-[71]

Background

Background to the litigation

On 13 May 2013, the lessee filed an application for an interlocutory injunction in the Magistrates Court pursuant to s 68(2), Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (the Act) restraining the appellant from enforcing the Notice to Vacate pending the resolution of the District Court action. The Magistrate subsequently on 10 July 2013 made the order sought. His Honour then transferred the proceedings to the District Court. The lessors now appeal against the order for an injunction. Background The Hotel was previously leased from 3 October 2007 to the entity Niley Pty Ltd (Niley). The lease to Niley (the lease) was to expire on 2 October 2012, subject to a right of renewal for five successive terms of five years. On 10 August 2009, the lessors entered into an agreement to take an assignment of the lease from Niley in consideration for a sum of $360,000. By a Memorandum of Transfer dated 23 October 2009 the lessors were assigned the lease with final settlement occurring on 20 November 2009. The first inspection of the Hotel The lease places certain obligations on the lessee to paint the Hotel and maintain the premises in a state of good repair.[2] On 12 October 2009 (two years into the lease period and while Niley was still in occupation of the Hotel), Mr Peter Hutchings prepared a report upon inspection of the Hotel (the First Inspection Report). That report indicated that repair and repainting works at an estimated cost of $32,087 (including GST and the inspection fee of Mr Hutchings) needed to be carried out. Niley paid that amount of $32,087 (the Niley Funds) to the lessors’ solicitors around the time of settlement between the lessee and Niley in October 2009. This payment had been expressly agreed upon between Niley and the lessee as a condition of the assignment transaction. [2] See clauses 2.12-2.14.The right of renewal The exercise of rights of renewal was conditional upon compliance with certain terms, including subclause 4.10.1(a) which provides:[t]he Lessee has made a written request to the Lessor not less than three (3) nor more than six (6) months (both inclusive and time being of the essence) before the expiration of the current term of this Lease … Accordingly, the right was exercisable by the lessee providing, during the period between 2 April 2012 and 2 July 2012, a written request to the lessor for the extension of the lease. However, the lessee did not exercise the right to renew within that renewal period and it was not until 4 September 2012 that the lessee, by letter of that date, requested renewal of the lease for five years. The lessors’ solicitors responded by letter of 6 September 2012 denying the request; they indicated that at the expiration of the lease on 2 October 2012 the lessee would be placed in holding over as a monthly tenant pursuant to clause 4.9. The second inspection of the Hotel In the intervening period, the Hotel was again inspected by Mr Hutchings and a report was issued on 8 October 2012 (the Second Inspection Report). Mr Hutchings found that repairs and repainting needed to be undertaken, this time at an estimated cost of $65,477.50 (including GST and the inspection fee of Mr Hutchings). The lessee did not pay this amount.The lessors’ District Court action and the lessee’s Magistrates Court application

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
A further issue raised by the peculiar circumstances of this case is that of embarrassment of the District Court. One effect of the interlocutory application being determined in the Magistrates Court is to produce a judicial determination as to the prospects of success of the lessee in a District Court trial, a matter of some potential embarrassment to the District Court Judge. Such embarrassment would be greatly exacerbated were this Court to deliver a judgment on appeal from the Magistrate’s decision, making, as would be required, fairly definite findings about those prospects of success. In such circumstances, there would exist on record two (partial) judicial determinations of the matter prior to the District Court having an opportunity to consider the matter. In my view, this is quite inappropriate. Conclusion For all of the above reasons, I consider that the Magistrates Court was an inappropriate forum for the determination of the lessee’s claim for an injunction. Both final remedies and interlocutory remedies (including orders for injunctions) are available to the lessee in the District Court and there are good reasons why the District Court should be the sole forum for the determination of all matters in dispute between the present parties. I find that the application for the injunction in the Magistrates Court action, in the face of extant District Court proceedings which raised for determination the same issues between the parties, was an abuse of process and should have been transferred to the District Court for consolidation. If there is to be an application for an interim injunction pending the District Court trial, that application should be heard and determined by a District Court Judge. I find that the appellant has made out ground 4 of appeal. I allow the appeal. I will hear the parties as to the precise form of the orders to be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

This was also alluded to in the extract above from the judgment of Gummow A-CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ in Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicolls,[40] the plurality there citing Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd.[41][40] (2011) 244 CLR 427, 452. See also the remarks of Gleeson CJ , Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256, 265 [9] extracted above, citing Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 and Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538.[41] (1990) 171 CLR 538.Consideration of the present case The District Court and Magistrates Court proceedings in this case arise from the same substratum of fact; involve the same parties; raise the same factual issues and questions of law; and similar relief is sought in each of the proceedings.[42] The Magistrates Court proceedings were therefore prima facie an abuse of process. I therefore proceed to consider whether there was any reasonable justification for the commencement and continuation of the Magistrates Court proceedings.[42] The only difference being that the interlocutory injunction was not sought in the District Court. Otherwise, the relief sought is identical.Was it necessary for the lessee to bring the proceedings in the Magistrates Court? I have concluded above that it was quite unnecessary to bring these proceedings in the Magistrates Court.Is the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court a specialist jurisdiction? The jurisdiction vested in the Magistrates Court pursuant to s 68(2), Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 and s 10(1a)(ab), Magistrates Court Act 1991 is not a specialist jurisdiction vested exclusively in that Court like the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court[43] or what was formerly the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court to determine claims under the Trade Practices Act 1974.[44] [43] See Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (1937) 56 CLR 277, 281 (Dixon J).[44] See Hughes Motor Service Pty Ltd v Wang Computer Pty Ltd (1978) 35 FLR 346, 354-355 (Bowen CJ). It is not unique or unknown to the District Court; indeed, the District Court in the ordinary course exercises a review jurisdiction over orders made by Magistrates under s 68(2) where those orders relate to a minor civil action.[45] Further, pursuant to s 69(1) of the Act, which provides for the transfer of Magistrates Court proceedings under s 68 to the District Court, the District Court itself commonly determines proceedings calling into question matters arising within the province of s 68(2) at the first instance level;[46] the lessee’s pending counterclaim in the District Court is testament to that fact. As well as this, the District Court regularly deals with various matters which arise at common law and equity and overlap with s 68(2).Is the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court suitable for the final resolution of the present matters? [45] Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 38(6).[46] See for example: Xclusive Pty Ltd v Christian Brothers Inc [2001] SASC 380; CP (Adelaide) Pty Ltd v Hartford Holdings Pty Ltd (No 7) [2002] SADC 81; Elaura Enterprises v Harnas & Harnas [2002] SADC 178; Jenkinson & Anor v Young [2004] SADC 30; Fresace P/L vBrian & Vivien Enterprises P/L; Brian & Vivien Enterprises P/L v Fresace P/L [2005] SADC 120; Paralawie Investments P/L v Maurice Srour P/L [2006] SADC 16.