Zollo v National Australia Bank Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 61 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

ZOLLO v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD & ANOR

[2009] SASC 38

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Kelly)

23 February 2009

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - JURISDICTION AND GENERALLY

Appeal from a decision of a judge of Supreme Court granting permanent stay of proceedings by way of Information in the Magistrates Court – appellant filed Information in Adelaide Magistrates Court charging respondents with conspiracy and other offences – respondents applied for permanent stay on basis that the Information an abuse of process attempting to impugn earlier decision of Full Court – jurisdiction of State Courts to stay proceedings for abuse of process – exercise of jurisdiction.

Held: Appeal dismissed – Court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay extends to all circumstances where processes and procedures of Court converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness – proceedings unjustifiably oppressive or vexatious where can be seen to be foredoomed to fail, court is inappropriate forum or case disposed of by earlier proceedings.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 60; Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA); Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) Part IV; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 9; Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) , referred to.
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; Smith v Linskills [1996] 2 All ER 353; James v Medical Board of South Australia and Keogh [2006] SASC 267; Arthur JS Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1; State Bank of NSW Ltd v Stenhouse Ltd (1997) Aust Torts Reports 81-423; Clayton v Ralphs (1987) 45 SASR 347; Fuller v Field and State of South Australia (1994) 62 SASR 112; National Australia Bank v MacFarlane [2003] VSC 19; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322; R v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; Attorney-General's (UK) Reference (No 1 of 1990) [1992] 1 QB 620 at 644, considered.

ZOLLO v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD & ANOR
[2009] SASC 38

Full Court:      Gray, White and Kelly JJ

GRAY J.

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Supreme Court granting a permanent stay of proceedings.[1]

    [1]National Australia Bank Ltd & Argus v Zollo (2008) 254 LSJS 253; [2008] SASC 93.

  2. On 17 April 2008 the Judge ordered:

    On or before Friday 18 April 2008, the defendant perform all actions necessary to effect a discontinuance of the charges brought…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Zollo v National Australia Bank Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] SASC 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Zollo v National Australia Bank Ltd, the appellant, Mr. Zollo, appealed against a decision of a judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia that granted a permanent stay of proceedings against him. Mr. Zollo, an unrepresented appellant, filed an Information in the Adelaide Magistrates Court charging the respondents with conspiracy and other offences. The respondents applied for a permanent stay on the basis that the Information was an abuse of process attempting to impugn an earlier decision of the Full Court. The appeal raises questions about the jurisdiction of State Courts to stay proceedings for abuse of process and the exercise of that jurisdiction.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the Supreme Court had the inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process, and if so, whether that jurisdiction had been exercised correctly. The Court considered whether the proceedings were unjustifiably oppressive or vexatious, and whether they were foredoomed to fail or were an inappropriate forum, or whether the case had already been disposed of by earlier proceedings.

The Court held that the appeal should be dismissed. It confirmed that the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings extends to all circumstances where the processes and procedures of the Court are converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness. The Court found that the proceedings in this case were unjustifiably oppressive or vexatious, as they could be seen to be foredoomed to fail, were an inappropriate forum, or had already been disposed of by earlier proceedings. The Court was satisfied that the Judge had exercised his discretion correctly in granting a permanent stay.

In summary, the appeal was dismissed, and the permanent stay of proceedings granted by the judge of the Supreme Court was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant appeals against that decision. In the proceedings at first instance and on appeal, the appellant has been unrepresented.Background Circumstances The appellant formerly worked as a builder in Port Lincoln. He was a customer of the first respondent (the Bank) and borrowed monies from it. On 4 June 1990 he suffered an injury to his back which caused some continuing incapacity and disability. Since that time he has been in dispute with the Bank about insurance which he considers should have provided an indemnity to him in respect of his liability to it. The second respondent was the Managing Director of the Bank between 1988 and 1999. The charges laid against the respondents by the appellant are:1Between the years 1987 and 2005 the defendants jointly and severally by false pretences obtained money from the informant for the procurement of an insurance policy for the informant and failed or refused to obtain any such insurance policy for the informant.Contrary to Section 195 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 – 1975 or ALTERNATIVELY:-Contrary to Sections 139 and 140 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act as amended to date. 2Between the years 1987 and 2005 jointly and severally deceived the informant as to the existence of an insurance policy for the protection of the informant.Contrary to Section 139 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as amended or to the Common Law.3Between the years 1987 and 2005 conspired between themselves and with other persons unknown to the informant to deceive and defraud the informant with intent to deprive the informant of his property and assets. Contrary to the Common Law.4The defendants did pervert the course of justice by agreeing between themselves and others unknown to the informant to give false evidence to the Supreme Court of South Australia relating to the existence or otherwise of an insurance policy to be obtained by them for the informant. Contrary to the Common Law. To date, the charges have not been particularised properly. However, the appellant did swear an affidavit, which was before the Judge, in which he deposed to the “basic elements” of the charges. Reference will be made to this affidavit later. An understanding of the charges laid and of the Judge’s decision requires consideration of the appellant’s claims which have been determined by previous decisions of this Court. In September 1987, the appellant had three kinds of borrowings from the Bank; an instalment loan of about $150,000 secured by a mortgage; an overdraft facility of about $50,000; and a bill finance facility of about $70,000. In September or October of 1987 he spoke to a Bank employee (Mr Daly) about insurance. The appellant claims that Mr Daly later communicated to him that he had arranged insurance in respect of his liability to the Bank on all three borrowings in the event of his suffering sickness, accident or death. However, after his back injury in June 1990, he found that he did not have such insurance. That gave rise to three actions against the Bank and others, described as “the Insurance Action”, “the Possession Action” and “the Damages Case”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
The assertion appears to have arisen from a misunderstanding by Mr Zollo of what occurred at the trial. Mr Zollo, in his submission, made reference to passages in the trial transcript which, with hindsight, contain some possible ambiguity in the description of an exhibit – in particular, the insurance policy in question. The trial took place more than a decade ago and it is apparent that Mr Zollo misunderstands what occurred. Counsel for the respondents undertook a careful analysis of the transcript and the exhibited document from which it is plain that the document tendered, the exhibit, included the alleged additional page. Nothing was added or inserted. There is no basis to conclude that there had been an additional page added to the exhibit following the trial and before the appeal hearing. Since preparing these reasons I have had the opportunity to read the reasons of White J. I agree with his more detailed observations with respect to this ground of appeal. There is no substance to the amended ground of appeal.Conclusion Having regard to the foregoing I would dismiss this appeal. WHITE J: By an information presented in the Magistrates Court on 13 November 2007, the appellant charged each of the respondents with four indictable offences, and caused a summons to be issued which required them to appear to answer the charges. The presentation of the information was a private prosecution. On the application of the respondents, a Judge of this Court found that the information and summons were an abuse of the process of the Magistrates Court because they amounted to a collateral attack on the conclusion of the Full Court of this Court in earlier proceedings between the appellant and the first respondent.[27] The Judge made orders requiring the appellant to discontinue the charges and staying them until he had done so. [27] National Australia Bank Ltd and Argus v Zollo [2008] SASC 93. The appellant appeals against that decision. In the proceedings at first instance and on appeal, the appellant has been unrepresented.Background Circumstances The appellant formerly worked as a builder in Port Lincoln. He was a customer of the first respondent (the Bank) and borrowed monies from it. On 4 June 1990 he suffered an injury to his back which caused some continuing incapacity and disability. Since that time he has been in dispute with the Bank about insurance which he considers should have provided an indemnity to him in respect of his liability to it. The second respondent was the Managing Director of the Bank between 1988 and 1999. The charges laid against the respondents by the appellant are:1Between the years 1987 and 2005 the defendants jointly and severally by false pretences obtained money from the informant for the procurement of an insurance policy for the informant and failed or refused to obtain any such insurance policy for the informant.Contrary to Section 195 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 – 1975 or ALTERNATIVELY:-Contrary to Sections 139 and 140 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act as amended to date. 2Between the years 1987 and 2005 jointly and severally deceived the informant as to the existence of an insurance policy for the protection of the informant.Contrary to Section 139 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 as amended or to the Common Law.3Between the years 1987 and 2005 conspired between themselves and with other persons unknown to the informant to deceive and defraud the informant with intent to deprive the informant of his property and assets. Contrary to the Common Law.4The defendants did pervert the course of justice by agreeing between themselves and others unknown to the informant to give false evidence to the Supreme Court of South Australia relating to the existence or otherwise of an insurance policy to be obtained by them for the informant. Contrary to the Common Law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

Finally, Mr Zollo made further complaint by an additional tenth ground of appeal:The court of Justice Anderson was deceived by the improper addition to exhibit D28 of what was deemed to be a policy of insurance in the appellant’s favour. No such document was ever before Bollen J. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in hearing the appeal by the respondents was also deceived by the same improperly added document, believing that that document was before Bollen J. This led to a wrong decision by The Honourable Justice Anderson.Consideration Of The Grounds Of Appeal A review of the Full Court decisions confirms that Mr Zollo’s claims against the National Australia Bank were rejected on the basis that there was no contract between the National Australia Bank and Mr Zollo, that there was no misrepresentation made to the National Australia Bank, no negligence on the part of the National Australia Bank and no misleading conduct by the National Australia Bank in breach of the Trade Practices Act or Fair Trading Act. Mr Zollo’s attempts to reopen those proceedings have been rejected. The Information laid in the Magistrates Court makes assertions of misconduct that have in substance been rejected by the Full Court. Mr Zollo again seeks to reopen the same matters on which the Full Court made findings in the earlier proceedings. The Judge, when granting a stay, concluded that it was apparent that Mr Zollo was raising or attempting to raise the very issues which were earlier disposed of. These findings of fact were open to the Judge. As the Judge observed, Mr Zollo’s affidavit, filed in opposition to the making of a stay order, confirmed these findings. It was open to the Judge to conclude that the purpose or at least the predominant purpose, of Mr Zollo in laying the Information was to collaterally attack the findings and decision of the Full Court. The discretion to grant a permanent stay was enlivened. No error in the exercise of that discretion has been identified. It was open to the Judge to exercise his discretion to grant a permanent stay and I add that in my view this was the appropriate order. Mr Zollo’s oral submissions to this Court confirmed that the criminal proceedings involved a challenge to the earlier Full Court decisions and attempted to pursue an enquiry into what Mr Zollo misguidedly perceived as improper conduct in the process of arriving at that decision. The further complaint made by the amended ground of appeal raises an assertion that both the Full Court and the Judge granting the permanent stay were induced to act on a false state of fact. This was said to have arisen through an additional page being added after the conclusion of the trial to an exhibit tendered at trial. This is a serious allegation and, it must be said immediately, is one made without any foundation. The assertion appears to have arisen from a misunderstanding by Mr Zollo of what occurred at the trial. Mr Zollo, in his submission, made reference to passages in the trial transcript which, with hindsight, contain some possible ambiguity in the description of an exhibit – in particular, the insurance policy in question. The trial took place more than a decade ago and it is apparent that Mr Zollo misunderstands what occurred. Counsel for the respondents undertook a careful analysis of the transcript and the exhibited document from which it is plain that the document tendered, the exhibit, included the alleged additional page. Nothing was added or inserted. There is no basis to conclude that there had been an additional page added to the exhibit following the trial and before the appeal hearing. Since preparing these reasons I have had the opportunity to read the reasons of White J. I agree with his more detailed observations with respect to this ground of appeal. There is no substance to the amended ground of appeal.Conclusion