District Court of South Australia
(Criminal)
R v FISCHER & ORS (No 2)
[2013] SADC 14
Reasons of His Honour Judge Slattery (ex tempore)
6 November 2012
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CHARACTER AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CHARACTER AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS - RELEVANCE - JOINT TRIAL
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - PROPENSITY, TENDENCY AND CO-INCIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY AND RELEVANCY
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - INFORMATION, INDICTMENT OR PRESENTMENT - JOINDER - JOINT OR SEPARATE TRIAL - EMBARRASSMENT OR PREJUDICE
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - EVIDENTIARY MATTERS RELATING TO WITNESSES AND ACCUSED PERSONS - CHARACTER AND PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS - ADMISSIBILITY IN CROSS-EXAMINATION - ACCUSED GIVING EVIDENCE AGAINST CO-ACCUSED
Notice of intention by defendants Fischer and Wilkey to adduce evidence of discreditable conduct filed against co-accused Hankins.
Defendants Fischer and Wilkey sought to adduce discreditable conduct evidence about Hankins of three types;
a. That the accused NEIL HANKINS was a dealer of methylamphetamine prior to and at the time of the offending the subject of the charge.
b. That the defendant purchased methylamphetamine from NEIL HANKINS for at least a year prior to his arrest.
c. That the accused NEIL HANKINS has convictions for manufacturing and trafficking in the drug methylamphetamine.
For the following purposes;
d. To establish that NEIL HANKINS had an interest in the drug methyl amphetamine, so as to rebut any suggestion of an innocent association with that drug when arrested on 23 July 2011.
e. To rebut the suggestion that the defendant was in fact in possession of the drugs.
f. To show that the relationship between the defendant and NEIL HANKINS was one of an ongoing purchaser and dealer of the drug methylamphetamine.
Application by co-accused Hankins for severance of the trial of the charges laid against him under section 34T of the Evidence Act because of the deleterious effect of the discreditable conduct evidence under s34P of the Evidence Act sought to be led against him by Fischer and Wilkey.
Held: Court refuses to allow the co-accused Fischer and Wilkey to lead evidence of prior convictions of Hankins because its prejudicial effect well exceeds the probative value of that evidence. However, the types of evidence sought to be led under a. and b. is admissible and probative evidence that may be led in the ordinary course, and the permissible use of that evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect on the co-accused. There was no real possibility that the co-accused would be prejudiced by that evidence.
Section 34T application by Hankins for severance refused. None of the bases in s 34T(d), (e) or (f) were made out.
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s18(1)(d)(iv), s34O, s34P, s34Q, s34R, s34T , referred to.
Lowery v R [1973] 3 All ER 662 [1974] AC 85 ; R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 , applied.
R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 ; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 ; R v Randall [2004] 1 All ER ; Gipp v The Queen (1998) 194…
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- AGLC
- R v Fischer (No 2) [2013] SADC 14
- Case
- [2013] SADC 14
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles governing the admissibility of character evidence in criminal trials, particularly in the context of joint trials. The primary concern was whether such evidence was relevant to the case and whether its admission could cause undue prejudice to the defendants. The court reviewed the relevant legislative provisions, including s 110 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which sets out the general rule against admissibility of prior criminal conduct to prove propensity, but allows exceptions for certain purposes such as attacking credibility. The court also considered the common law principles that have traditionally restricted the admissibility of character evidence in joint trials to prevent one defendant from being prejudiced by the criminal history of another.
The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence of the prior conviction. The evidence was relevant to the credibility of the defendant who was testifying against their co-accused, and its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court held that where a defendant chooses to give evidence and attack the credibility of a co-accused, the door is opened for the co-accused to introduce evidence relevant to credibility, including prior convictions. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction of both defendants.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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