Sneesby v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd

[2022] NZHC 262

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2021-009-1694

[2022] NZHC 262

BETWEEN

JOHN ARTHUR SNEESBY

Plaintiff

AND

SOUTHERN RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE SERVICES LIMITED

Defendant

Hearing:

14 February 2022 (by VMR)

Appearances:

G D R Shand for Plaintiff (by VMR)

T C Weston QC and K M Paterson for Defendant (by VMR)

Judgment:

23 February 2022

Reissued:

3 March 2022

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER

Addendum

This Judgment has been changed and re-issued under the Slip-Rule to correct paras [16], [19] and [60].

SNEESBY v SOUTHERN RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE SERVICES LIMITED [2022] NZHC 262

[23 February 2022]

[1]    Mr Sneesby commenced this proceeding against the defendant, Southern Response Earthquake Services Limited (Southern Response), in the District Court and it was transferred to this Court as Mr Sneesby seeks leave under r 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016 to bring his proceeding, as the representative category of up to 9,500 people who he says are in the same position as him.

Background

[2]    There is little, if any, material dispute between parties as to the general background to Mr Sneesby’s claim.

[3]    Mr Sneesby is the owner of a property in Christchurch damaged by the Canterbury Earthquake  Sequence,  in  particular  the  February  2011  earthquake. Mr Sneesby was insured with AMI Insurance Limited (AMI) now named Southern Response. To all intents and purposes, AMI was taken over by the Crown upon it being clear that, because of AMI’s exposure to the Canterbury market, it had insufficient reserves and re-insurance to cover all earthquake claims.

[4]    Mr Sneesby’s insurance was under a policy called “Premier Rental House Cover”. The cover is described as “top-up insurance” as it covers the cost to repair over and above the amount of cover provided pursuant to the Earthquake Commission Act 1993 (the EQC Act) which, at the time of the 2011 Earthquake Sequence, was

$100,000 plus GST.

[5]    The items listed in Schedule 2 to the EQC Act including fences, driveways, pavings and swimming pools, are excluded from EQC cover. While those items are not covered by EQC, they are nonetheless covered under the Southern Response Policy because of the extended definition of “house” in its Policy.

[6]    Damaged driveways, fences, paving et cetera have become known as “Out Of Scope” items (OOS). Many AMI policyholders had damage to their dwelling which did not exceed the cap under the EQC Act. That meant repair of damage to their dwelling remained with EQC but they had a claim with AMI for OOS items.

[7]    Damage to Mr Sneesby’s property fell into this category. Mr Sneesby lodged a claim with AMI for damage arising from the February 2011 earthquake and his claim was accepted.  There  was  a  delay  in  AMI  being  able  to  assess  the  value  of  Mr Sneesby’s OOS claim because of the sheer volume of claims received.

[8]    By email of 24 March 2014, Southern Response advised Mr Sneesby it would visit his house to assess OOS items. Arrow International, acting on behalf of Southern Response, visited the property on 2 April 2014 to carry out that assessment. Arrow prepared a written Scope of Works dated 20 June 2014 describing and costing the work it said would remediate the OOS items. The Scope of Works quantified the cost to remediate OOS items at $29,588.70. The $29,588.70 is said in the Scope of Works  to “… represent the proportion of costs payable by Southern Response to the contractor”.

[9]    Mr Sneesby accepted a cash settlement at the figure contained in the Scope of Works and completed a Settlement and Discharge Agreement dated 25 June 2014 (the 2014 Settlement Agreement). The 2014 Settlement Agreement records the payment as:

full and final settlement and discharge of any claims under the [p]olicy for damage (known and unknown) to the [i]nsured [p]roperty and in respect of any complaint, claim or right of action, the policyholder has or may have against Southern Response which arises directly or indirectly out of any earthquake.

[10]   Mr Sneesby’s claim is based on the proposition that the covering letter accompanying the Scope of Works and the 2014 Settlement Agreement represented to him that $29,588.70 was his maximum entitlement under the policy for OOS items, that is, the total cost to remediate those items.

The essence of Mr Sneesby’s complaint

[11]   Mr Sneesby says the 20 June 2014 written Scope of Works made no express allowance for:

(1)[Preliminary and General Allowance] P&G;

(2)Margin;

(3)Contingency;

(4)        Professional/design fees. (the omitted items)

[12]   During the hearing, Mr Shand, counsel for Mr Sneesby, advised that no claim was made for margin.

[13]   Mr Sneesby relies on Avonside Holdings Ltd v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd,1 and the Supreme Court decision of Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Avonside Holdings Ltd,2 in which he says allowances for margin, professional fees and contingency were set at 10 per cent each. Avonside concerned damage to a dwelling – not OOS items only. Mr Sneesby submits the rates are of general application.

[14]   In Dodds v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd,3 it was held that Southern Response was liable to pay professional fees and contingency where such were omitted from claim settlement documents on a house claim pre-1 October 2014. Southern Response  disclosed  to  policyholders  with  a  house  requiring  a  rebuild a Detailed Repair/Rebuild Analysis (DRA) that did not contain contingency and professional fees while Southern Response held an internal version of the same document that did show these allowances. This internal DRA was not provided to its customers, leading customers to believe the figure they were presented with represented the cost of rebuilding their home when Southern Response knew it did not, given the omitted items.

[15]   Here, Mr Sneesby draws a parallel with Dodds saying the costing presented to him made no express provision for the omitted items thus the figure understated the true copy of the remedial work.

[16]   Mr Sneesby says on the basis a 10 per cent allowance was available for each of professional fees along with (P&G), he was short paid $9,793.86 in 2014. He also claims interest. If only contingency and professional fees at 10 per cent should have been added, then Mr Sneesby says the shortfall was $6,213.63.

1      Avonside Holdings Ltd v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2014] NZCA 483.

2      Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Avonside Holdings Ltd [2015] NZSC 110, [2017] 1 NZLR 141.

3      Dodds v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZHC 2016 [2019] 3 NZLR 826 upheld on appeal in part in Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Dodds [2020] NZCA 395, [2000] 3 NZLR 383.

[17]   Southern Response has investigated whether there are other policyholders in the same position as Mr Sneesby (that is OOS claimants only who were cash settled) and their research shows the group size is between 7,500 and 9,500 insured.

[18]   Mr Sneesby seeks leave to bring a representative claim on behalf of a class defined in his application. The day prior to the hearing, which took place on a Monday, Mr Shand circulated an amended class which he amended again during the hearing.

Southern Response’s position

[19]   In summary, Southern Response says payments to homeowners for repairs or rebuilds cannot be equated with straightforward repairs to driveways and fences     et cetera. While Southern Response accepts repairs to swimming pools or engineered block walls/fences may have required an engineer or other professional input, the same is not true for the bulk of OOS claims which were straightforward repairs. Southern Response says P&G was included in the price provided by its contractor who costed the repairs (this is disputed by Mr Sneesby). Southern Response accepts the issue of what its costings in fact included cannot be resolved on this application.

[20]   Southern Response distinguishes the Dodds decision on the basis that the DRA’s prepared in Dodds, referred to at [14] above, were not prepared for OOS repairs, save in perhaps one per cent of claims. Accordingly, Southern Response says it did not withhold information from homeowners as was held in the Dodds litigation based on it retaining an internal DRA. It says OOS insureds were not misled.

[21]   As a  result  of  the  Dodds  litigation,  Southern Response  has  put  in  place a settlement “Package” for insureds who are in a similar position to Dodds, which is being extended to insureds who settled OOS claims only where there was no DRA. For OOS insureds, 10 per cent will be offered as a contingency allowance. Professional fees will be paid for those who can demonstrate their repairs called for the involvement of a professional. No offer for P&G will be made as Southern Response says its figure already includes a P&G allowance. Southern Response relies heavily on this offer to say no class action is necessary to see OOS claimants compensated.

[22]   Much of Southern Response’s submissions were aimed at critiquing the merits of  Mr Sneesby’s  claims.  In  particular,  limitation  is   relied  on  in  relation  to   Mr Sneesby’s Fair Trading Act claim along with it being said Southern Response made no representation that could support a Fair Trading Act claim. The claim of an implied term that Southern Response would disclose all material information is criticised on the law and it is submitted in any event no information was withheld.

[23]   As to the relevance of the merits, Mr Weston QC, counsel for Southern Response, referred to Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group, where the Court of Appeal said:4

… that must be so, as the Court cannot grant leave to the bringing of plainly meritless claims, and so allow those propounding the claim to invite others to join the group represented. But it is highly undesirable that this criterion be seen as creating the need or opportunity for a mini trial at the leave stage, at which the Court receives and reviews evidence on contested fact. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the objectives of the High Court Rules, and would substantially undermine the effectiveness of the r 4.24 procedure.

The elephant in the room

[24]   Given this application is not to be turned into a mini trial on the merits, I do not intend to address all of Southern Response’s criticisms of Mr Sneesby’s claim. However, one defence raised by Southern Response is compelling.

[25]   This proceeding is not the first brought by Mr Sneesby against Southern Response. In 2016, under CIV-2016-409-1009, Mr Sneesby sued EQC as first defendant and Southern Response as second defendant. Mr Sneesby and Southern Response settled the dispute as between them by an agreement signed in June 2017 (the 2017 Agreement).

[26]   Southern Response pleads the 2017 Agreement is a bar to Mr Sneesby’s present claim.5

4      Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group

[2017] NZCA 489 [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [16].

5      Southern Response also pleads the 2014 Settlement Agreement as also being a bar to the present claim. I only address the 2017 Settlement Agreement, given it contains more robust terms.

Details of the settlement agreement

[27]   The 2017 Settlement Agreement is called a “Settlement and Discharge Agreement”. The “Background” contains a number of defined terms which are important for understanding the operative terms.

[28]   The “Insured Property” is Mr Sneesby’s property in Christchurch. “Events” are the Canterbury earthquakes for 4 September 2010 to 5 April 2012. “Dispute” is defined as follows:

A dispute arose between the Plaintiff and Southern Response regarding the extent to which the Plaintiff is entitled to be indemnified under the Policies for damage to the Insured Property as a result of the Events.

[29]   The background refers to the plaintiff lodging a claim for the Insured Property under claim number D3473938. There then appears (“…….”). From the context, the blank was intended to be the Claim – Claim is not defined anywhere else and was meant to be a defined term. It is not suggested the term “Claim” would mean anything other than Mr Sneesby’s claim for earthquake damage to his property.

[30]   “Proceeding” is defined as CIV-2016-409-1009. The final paragraph of the “Background” recorded:

The Parties have agreed to resolve all issues arising directly or indirectly out of the Events, the Claim, the Dispute and the Proceeding on the terms set  out in this Agreement.

[31]Paragraph J to the “Background” records:

The Parties record that Southern Response and the Plaintiff have previously settled the Policyholder’s claims for items outside the scope of EQ Cover under Schedule 2 of the Earthquake Commission Act 1993.

[32]The operative terms of the Agreement that are relevant are as follows:

1.The terms of this Agreement are in full and final settlement of all    issues between them arising directly or indirectly from the Events, the Claim, The Dispute and the Proceeding.

…

7. The Discontinuance and Costs Settlement are accepted by Southern Response in full and final settlement and discharge of any claims the

Plaintiff and Southern Response have or might have against the other arising directly or indirectly out of, or in connection with the Events, Discontinuance, Proceeding and/or the Policies and/or the loss or damage to the Insured Property, whether such claims arise under contract, statute, common law, or equity; are in existence now or may arise sometime in the future; are known or unknown; and/or are in the contemplation of the Parties or otherwise; and/or arise following     a subsequent Court decision that states the law in a way different to the understanding of one or more parties to this Agreement.

…

9. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Agreement is intended as settlement of the claims lodged with the Earthquake Commission, or the Proceeding as it relates to the Earthquake Commission as First Defendant.

…

14. Except on the basis that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are breached, this Agreement may be pleaded by Southern Response as an absolute bar to any further or other claim arising directly or indirectly out of the Events, the Claim, the Dispute or the Proceeding.

The 2016 proceeding

[33]   Mr Sneesby’s 2016 statement of claim pleaded the damage to his property including misaligned fences and unevenness and cracks to concrete paths – being OOS damage. Whether relief was sought against Southern Response for OOS damage is not entirely clear as the claim pleads the “… plaintiffs suffered unforeseen and sudden physical loss or damage …”, referring to the listed damage including the OOS items. The pleading then refers to the repair strategy to repair the damage requiring work set out in a different paragraph which does not refer to fences or paths.

[34]   The statement of claim refers to Southern Response paying Mr Sneesby’s OOS claim in 2014 and to the 2014 Settlement Agreement being either an election by Southern Response to cash settle all of Mr Sneesby’s claims, including over-cap claims, or meaning that Southern Response had waived the right to reinstate itself. The 2014 Settlement Agreement is also the subject of a standalone cause of action which sought that it be set aside under s 7 of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1997 so the 2014 Settlement Agreement would not be a bar to Mr Sneesby pursuing his over-cap claim against Southern Response.

Principles of full and final settlement agreements

[35]   What would the 2017 Settlement Agreement convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties in the situation they were in at the time of the settlement?6

[36]Gendall J in Dodds v Southern Response said:7

In interpreting settlement agreements and release clauses, the court’s role is to ascertain the parties’ presumed intention and to give effect to it. The Court of Appeal in Prattley Enterprises Limited v Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd, noted the importance of finality and said that releases are routinely written in a general way, covering all claims known or unknown.

The Court of Appeal stated that where a release of all claims as the parties’ objectively ascertained intention courts “readily give effect to it”, recognising that finality facilitates settlement.

[37]   Dodds and Prattley are therefore authority for the proposition a party can surrender rights and claims of which they are unaware and could not have been aware if the language is sufficiently clear.

[38]   Ultimately the question is whether the settlement agreement uses language that is sufficiently clear to bar the claim in question. Any ambiguity or lack of clarity will be resolved against the party relying on the settlement agreement:8

… Even a very widely drawn clause, such as a clause that purports to be in “full and final settlement of all or any claims whether under statute, common law or in equity of whatsoever nature that may exist or not exist”, may be construed in a restrictive fashion if a claim later arises that would not have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of settlement.

[39]   It is not suggested that the 2017 Settlement Agreement was induced by misrepresentation. Accordingly, the sole issue is whether as a matter of construction, the 2017 Settlement Agreement bars the present claim. That issue is not subject to any factual or contextual dispute.

6      Firm PI Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2014] NZSC 147, [2015] 1 NZLR 432 at [60].

7      Dodds v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd, above n 3. (footnotes omitted).

8      Dodds v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd, above n 3 at [176], referring to Prattley Enterprises Ltd v Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd [2016] NZCA 67, [2016] 2 NZLR 750 at [65].

The construction of the 2017 Settlement Agreement

[40]   The parties to the 2017 Settlement Agreement had been involved in High Court litigation. That the 2017 Settlement Agreement was intended to be in absolute settlement between the parties is emphasised by cl 14 which permits Southern Response to plead the 2017 Settlement Agreement as an absolute bar to any further or other claim arising directly or indirectly out of the earthquakes (the Events), the Claim, the Dispute and/or the Proceeding.

[41]   Clauses 1 and 8 of the 2017 Settlement Agreement have been drawn widely. Both are intended to settle any claim of any sort, whether known or unknown, and whether presently in existence or otherwise, that Mr Sneesby might have.

[42] Mr Shand submitted that Background paragraph J (set out at [31] above) was intended to exclude OOS items from the settlement. I cannot accept that is a tenable construction of the 2017 Settlement Agreement as a whole. The parties in the 2017 Settlement Agreement intended to exclude Mr Sneesby’s claim against EQC and so by cl 9 expressly recorded that nothing in the Agreement was intended to be a settlement of those claims, had the parties intended the settlement would not include OOS claims they would have said so.

[43]   Given the 2016 proceeding referred to damage covered by the OOS claim the 2014 Settlement Agreement and sought relief in relation to that Agreement, it is untenable to say the parties intended to settle all claims known or unknown, present or future, arising directly or indirectly from the insurance claim referred to in the 2017 Settlement Agreement save for those issues connected to the OOS claim. Such would have required careful drafting.

[44]   Under the 2017 Settlement Agreement, Mr Sneesby’s then litigation funder paid a costs contribution to AMI as part of the settlement. That conveys that AMI saw Mr Sneesby’s claim as untenable. The idea the 2017 Settlement Agreement was intended to leave open a further claim relating directly or indirectly to the 2014 Settlement Agreement makes no sense. The 2017 Settlement Agreement was intended to mark an end to all and any claims Mr Sneesby had or might have. The wording could not be plainer.

[45]   It follows that, in my view, Mr Sneesby is not a suitable representative plaintiff as his claim is, to use the language of the Court of Appeal, “plainly meritless”. There is no point in granting leave to Mr Sneesby to bring a representative claim where his claim is subject to such a fundamental weakness, having signed a robust and comprehensive full and final settlement agreement.

[46]   I conclude Mr Sneesby’s claim will be barred by the 2017 Settlement Agreement.

Alternative plaintiff

[47]   Mr Shand, by memorandum dated 1 February 2022, proposed an alternative homeowner who it is said is in a similar position to Mr Sneesby, but who has not signed any settlement agreement with Southern Response. It is said the amount paid to the alternative plaintiff also made no express allowance for the omitted items. While Mr Shand does not accept the 2017 Settlement Agreement affects Mr Sneesby’s ability to be a representative plaintiff, that issue does not apply to the alternative plaintiff.

[48]   Unsurprisingly, Southern Response opposed the late attempt to introduce an alternative representative plaintiff. I agree that a formal application, accompanied by evidence, is required for that step to be taken. Southern Response would need an opportunity to review its file and prepare any reply evidence. That an alternative plaintiff has been put forward, notwithstanding Mr Shand’s protestations, is some recognition of the effect of the 2017 Settlement Agreement.

[49]   Mr Shand says Southern Response could have applied for summary judgment or to strike out Mr Sneesby’s claim but it has not done so, the implication being that Southern Response does not think the 2017 Settlement Agreement (with or without the 2014 Settlement Agreement) would found such applications. I disagree. In this context limitation, in particular, in relation to the Fair Trading Act cause of action, is relevant. In blunt terms, delay assists Southern Response in relation to limitation. It gains little in striking out Mr Sneesby’s claim only to have an alternative plaintiff take his place when it can leave time running.

[50]   At the end of the day, the issue is whether the 2017 Settlement Agreement is  a bar to bringing proceedings. In my view, this is a case where the merits are so against Mr Sneesby’s claim as a result of the 2017 Settlement Agreement that his application should be declined. It is no answer, as submitted by Mr Shand, that leave should be granted and if Mr Sneesby’s claim is then challenged by Southern Response, an alternative plaintiff could be found at that stage. That would be tie a large class of insureds to a doubtful proceeding where the suitability of a replacement plaintiff could have to be considered afresh.

[51]   Accordingly, the application by Mr Sneesby to sue as a representative plaintiff is declined.

Observations

[52]   With Mr Sneesby’s application having been declined, I make only limited comments about the remaining matters addressed by counsel but do so given the extensive submissions filed.

Is there a common issue of law or fact?

[53]   This is a critical issue in the context of a leave application. Mr Weston was highly critical of the fact that neither the application nor counsel’s submissions articulated precisely what the common issues of law or fact were. I agree. The Court of Appeal has described the identification of a common issue as “essential to the decision as to the practicability of a representative order and identification of whether, and if so what, res judicata arises”.9

[54]   Mr Shand, in oral reply, referred to the common issues identified in the Court of Appeal judgment in Ross v Southern Response.10 He submitted the common issues in this case could be arrived at by, in effect, substituting the facts of this case into the description of “common issues” set out in the Ross judgment with some consequential changes. This was too little too late. It is not for the defendant or the Court to carry

9      Credit Suisse Private Equity v Houghton [2014] 1 NZLR 541 at [53].

10     Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431, (2019) 25 PRNZ 33 at [31].

out the exercise suggested by Mr Shand.  It seemed to me the core proposition in   Mr Sneesby’s case is that insureds settling OOS claims were entitled to treat the figure provided by Southern Response as representing their insurer’s assessment of the full Policy entitlement. On Mr Sneesby’s case, as I understand it, whether the figure was communicated by way of a Scope of Works, a DRA, an email or otherwise, did not matter. That the figure was advanced by Southern Response as representing the cost to repair the earthquake damage meant the figure was a representation by Southern Response of the insured’s full entitlement.

[55]   Issues such as reliance, Mr Weston noting that a number of insured did not take the Southern Response figure at face value and some obtained legal advice; whether settlement agreements entered at the time are binding; whether P&G was built into the rates actually paid; and, indeed, whether a policyholder has suffered a loss, would all be for subsequent stages.

[56]   I would have considered the lack of precision around the statement of the common issue to stand against the granting of the application.

Access to justice

[57]   Representative actions make affordable otherwise unaffordable claims that would be beyond the means of any individual claimant. Here, Southern Response says that a representative action is unnecessary to compensate insureds who settled their OOS claims because Southern Response has confirmed its settlement Package will offer all insureds who cash settled their OOS claims, a 10 per cent payment for contingency plus interest and an allowance for professional fees if an insured can demonstrate their repair called for such input. While Mr Shand submitted there was no such extant Package, Southern Response has committed to the Court, via its sworn evidence and confirmed by counsel, that by mid-2022 a Package to settle OOS claims will be published.

[58]   As it stands, while progress on settling claims under the Package has been slower than hoped, Southern Response expects its pace of settlements to improve. Mr Shand submitted Mr Sneesby’s claim could progress more quickly than settlements under the Package. While whether the figure advanced by Southern

Response as representing the cost to repair OOS damage was an actionable representation may be an issue common to many OOS insureds who have cash settled, there are a multitude of issues that would have to be considered at subsequent stages. Finality would not be swift.

[59]   Mr Weston was also critical of there being no detail of how Mr Sneesby’s representative claim would be funded. Mr Shand said while it was not necessary for funding to be settled at this stage, it was intended to get a Funder involved. That inevitably means the recovery to class members would be subject to a deduction for the Funder costs.

[60]   Mr Weston’s point was, while the Package offer was at face value less than the amount payable if Mr Sneesby’s claim was fully successful, nonetheless the package payment would be made without a costs deduction. Any delay by Southern Response in processing claims under the OOS package would be compensated through interest.

[61]   The availability of the Package is an unusual factor in this case. To enable an “apples with apples” comparison of the benefits available under the class action and the Package, some idea of the deduction from potential recoveries under the class action would be helpful.

[62]   The Package also has the benefit of being a “quick and clean” settlement compared to a class action which will, at stage two (and subsequent stages), see the class broken into representative plaintiffs and again, take time to finalise.

Definition of “class”

[63]   As noted earlier, the original definition of the class to be represented  by     Mr Sneesby was amended the day before the hearing and amended further during the course of the hearing. Not surprisingly, counsel for Southern Response, given the first revision was received by email on the Sunday afternoon before the hearing, had not had a chance to fully consider the amended class but some preliminary concerns were raised. That, coupled with the fact that the common issues of fact and law were not defined, gives a distinct impression that the application is “under done”. Mr Weston went so far as to describe the application as “amateurish”.

[64]   Had I not dismissed the application on the grounds of the 2017 Settlement Agreement, I would have given Southern Response’s counsel further time to address the late amendments to the class and request Mr Shand to properly articulate the common issues relied on.

Costs

[65]   There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I did not hear counsel on costs.

[66]   Unless either counsel files a memorandum within five working days, the order of the Court shall be that Mr Sneesby will pay Southern Response costs on a 2B basis, together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.

Associate Judge Lester

Solicitors:

Grant Shand, Auckland (for Plaintiff)

Buddle Findlay, Christchurch (for Defendant)

Copy to counsel:
T Weston QC, Barrister, Christchurch