Ressels v Southern Response Earthquake Services Limited

Case [2025] NZCA 116


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA561/2024
 [2025] NZCA 116

BETWEEN

TREVOR STUART RESSELS
Applicant

AND

SOUTHERN RESPONSE EARTHQUAKE SERVICES LIMITED
Respondent

Court:

Thomas and Palmer JJ

Counsel:

G D R Shand for Applicant
T C Weston KC and K M Paterson for Respondent

Judgment:
(On the papers)

14 April 2025 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is declined.

BThe applicant must pay costs for a standard application on a band A basis together with usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Palmer J)

What happened?

  1. Mr Trevor Ressels’ property suffered damage in the Canterbury earthquakes.  He accepted a cash settlement offer of $16,875.68 from his insurance company, now Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd (Southern Response).  The claim was for items not covered by the Earthquake Commission, including paths and driveways.[1]  He brought legal proceedings to challenge the offer, primarily on the basis of misrepresentation and breach of the Fair Trading Act 1986, because it did not include allowances for preliminary and general costs, contingency, and professional design fees (the allowances).  Mr Ressels alleges there are between 7,500 and 9,500 policyholders in a similar position to him.  He sought leave to sue as a representative plaintiff on behalf of those with the same interest in the claim, under r 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules). 

    [1]The Earthquake Commission does not repair damage to driveways, fences, patios, pavings and swimming pools.  Claims relating to damage to these items are known as “Out of Scope” claims that must instead be managed by insurers.

  2. Southern Response acknowledges its liability for the preliminary and general work and contingency.  It is offering a compensation package to policyholders in a similar position to Mr Ressels.  It accepts that professional fees would be payable in cases where they were required.  It has waived a limitation defence in respect of contingency, professional fees and interest but raised a limitation defence regarding preliminary and general costs. 

Decision proposed to be appealed

  1. On 23 November 2023, Associate Judge Lester in the High Court declined Mr Ressels’ application for leave to sue as a representative plaintiff.[2]  Mr Shand, for Mr Ressels, submitted that the allowances are an essential part of a true remedial costing.[3]  The Judge held, among other things, that this was not a tenable common issue as each policyholder’s entitlement in respect of those items turns on its own facts.[4]  Mr Ressels had not identified a common issue of fact or law for each member of the representative class.[5]  He is not a suitable representative plaintiff.[6]

    [3]At [33].

    [4]At [35].

    [5]At [50].

    [6]At [42] and [61].

  2. Mr Ressels had previously sought leave to be joined as a further plaintiff and to sue as a representative in relation to a similar earlier proceeding by a Mr Sneesby about claims against Southern Response for the allowances.  Mr Sneesby’s application to sue in a representative capacity was declined because his claim was meritless.[7]  Mr Ressels’ application was declined in the High Court on 21 February 2023, on the basis that none of Mr Ressels’ legal rights would be determined by Mr Sneesby’s proceedings because the outcomes would turn on their respective particular facts.[8]

  3. On 2 August 2024, the High Court declined Mr Ressels leave to appeal the High Court’s interlocutory decision here.[9]  Mr Ressels now applies to this Court for that leave.  Southern Response opposes the application.

Should leave to appeal be granted?

  1. Mr Ressels submits the common issues for a representative suit and limitation issues in group litigation are sufficiently particularised and are reasonably arguable errors of fact and law.  Otherwise, the rights of thousands of people are adversely affected, so the delay of an appeal is warranted and the issues are of general public importance.

  2. There is a high threshold for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision.[10]  Here, Mr Ressels has not identified any reasonably arguable error of law or fact.  He did not particularise a common issue as required under r 4.24 of the Rules,[11] failed to explain the legal basis for the alleged obligation to pay the allowances irrespective of personal circumstances, and was not a suitable representative plaintiff.  There is no apparent error in the Judge’s conclusion that there were no issues sufficiently common to warrant leave being granted.  If there were an error, it would not be of such general or public importance to outweigh the lack of precedential value and the further delay involved in hearing an appeal.  Southern Response’s compensation package suggests the issue is of diminishing public importance.[12]  It is not in the interests of justice for leave to be granted.

Result

[11]Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431, (2019) 25 PRNZ 33 at [51], citing Cridge v Studorp Ltd [2017] NZCA 376, (2017) 23 PRNZ 582 at [11].

[12]Southern Response indicate that, as at 11 September 2024, 6,473 policyholders have received payment or have an offer awaiting acceptance under the compensation package for Out of Scope claims. 

  1. The application for leave to appeal is declined.

  2. The applicant must pay costs for a standard application on a band A basis together with usual disbursements.

Solicitors:
Grant Shand Barristers & Solicitors, Auckland for Applicant
Buddle Findlay, Christchurch for Respondent


Details
AGLC
Ressels v Southern Response Earthquake Services Limited [2025] NZCA 116
Case
[2025] NZCA 116
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Trevor Stuart Ressels sought to appeal against the High Court's decision declining his application to sue as a representative plaintiff against Southern Response Earthquake Services Limited in a claim regarding earthquake damage to his property. The primary issue was whether the High Court correctly refused Ressels leave to sue as a representative plaintiff on behalf of policyholders who received settlements for earthquake damage that did not include allowances for preliminary and general costs, contingency, and professional design fees. Ressels argued that the absence of these allowances was a common issue that warranted a representative action, while Southern Response contended that each policyholder's entitlement to the allowances depended on individual circumstances and thus, there was no common issue suitable for a representative claim.

The Court of Appeal held that Ressels had not demonstrated a reasonably arguable error of law or fact that warranted leave to appeal. The High Court's reasoning was sound, as Ressels failed to identify a common issue of fact or law that applied to all policyholders, a requirement under the High Court Rules 2016. The Court further found that the allowance claims were dependent on individual circumstances, and thus, not suitable for a representative action. Moreover, the Court considered that even if there were errors, they did not reach the threshold of general or public importance necessary to justify an appeal. The Court of Appeal concluded that the High Court's decision was correct, and Southern Response's compensation package indicated that the issue was of diminishing public importance.

The Court of Appeal declined the application for leave to appeal, and Ressels was ordered to pay costs for a standard application on a band A basis together with usual disbursements. The Court did not find any substantial legal or factual errors in the High Court's decision, reinforcing the importance of establishing a clear and common issue for a representative plaintiff in such proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.