Houghton v Saunders
[2021] NZSC 98
•12 August 2021
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 6/2021 [2021] NZSC 98 |
| BETWEEN | ERIC MESERVE HOUGHTON |
| AND | TIMOTHY ERNEST CORBETT SAUNDERS, SAMUEL JOHN MAGILL, JOHN MICHAEL FEENEY, CRAIG EDGEWORTH HORROCKS, PETER DAVID HUNTER, PETER THOMAS AND JOAN WITHERS |
| Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan and Williams JJ |
Counsel: | A J Gavigan as Applicant |
Judgment: | 12 August 2021 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Mr Gavigan must pay the respondents collectively
costs of $2,500.
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REASONS
In our judgment dismissing Mr Gavigan’s application to recall our judgment dismissing his leave application, we reserved costs.[1] We gave the respondents leave to file a memorandum if they sought costs. They have now done so and Mr Gavigan has replied.
[1]Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZSC 76 [Recall judgment] at [9]. An application to recall the recall judgment was dismissed: Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZSC 92.
The applicants seek costs of $2,500 for the first respondents collectively and $2,500 for the second and third respondents. Mr Gavigan opposes any award.
Mr Gavigan not only filed submissions, but also other material relating to the allegations of fraud referred to in the recall judgment.[2] This material was filed without first obtaining leave and, in any event, has no relevance to the present application for costs. If leave had been sought to admit this material, we would have declined it. We have not taken the material into account in determining the present application for costs.
[2]At [4].
We consider an award of costs is appropriate given the application for recall lacked merit and was irregular in a number of respects. The respondents were required to respond to it. But we see a single award to all respondents as better reflecting the effort required from the respondents collectively to respond to the application. In the circumstances we award costs of $2,500 to the respondents collectively. In the absence of agreement to the contrary among the respondents, this should be divided equally between the first respondents on the one hand and the second and third respondents on the other.
Solicitors:
Gilbert Walker, Auckland for First Respondents
Russell McVeagh, Wellington for Second and Third Respondents
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