Carter v Coroner's Court at Wellington

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2012-485-2186 [2015] NZHC 1467

IN THE MATTER OF

the Coroners Act 2006, the Magna Carta

1297 c 29 and its various affirmations, the Statute of Westminster the First 1275 and an application for review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972

BETWEEN

JOHN HOWARD CARTER Applicant

AND

THE CORONER'S COURT AT WELLINGTON

First Respondent

THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Second Respondent

"A"

Third Respondent

Hearing: 13 and 17 March 2015

Counsel:

J H Carter in person

D J Perkins for Second Respondent No appearance for Third Respondent J B Orpin as amicus

Judgment:

26 June 2015

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J

Introduction

[1]      Mr  Carter  has  brought  proceedings  against  the  Coroner’s  Court  and  the

Commissioner of Police in relation to the death of his son Christopher on 25 May

CARTER v THE CORONER'S COURT AT WELLINGTON [2015] NZHC 1467 [26 June 2015]

2010.  The matter has already generated a series of interlocutory decisions of this

Court.1

[2]      On 6 December 2013, I fixed the issues for substantive consideration in this proceeding in lieu of comprehensible pleadings from Mr Carter.  I did this with the able assistance of amicus and Mr Perkins for the Crown.  The focus of these issues was the police decision not to prosecute “A” in relation to the death of Christopher.

[3]      At issue now is the discoverability of a legal opinion relating to that decision

not to prosecute “A”.

[4]      Mr  Carter  represents  himself  in  this  proceeding  and  provided  written submissions in advance of this matter being heard.   He made some limited oral submissions at the hearing, but conceded that as the arguments are of an inherently technical nature, the argument was primarily between Mr Perkins for the police and the amicus Mr Orpin.

Factual and procedural background

[5]      Mr Carter commenced his proceeding on 24 October 2012.   The timing of this coincides with the Coroner’s inquest into the death of Christopher.  The inquest had  a  first  day  of  hearing  on  15  August,  and  a  further  two  days  on  25  and

26 October.  The focus of Mr Carter’s proceeding at that stage was on preventing the Coroner’s   inquest   from   continuing.     Mr Carter’s   view  was   that   the  police investigation had not been properly completed.

[6]      Following its completion, the investigation had been subject to a number of reviews.2    A first review of evidence had been undertaken by Detective Sergeant Patea in  October 2010.   Two  years later,  the  impending commencement  of the coronial inquest into Christopher’s death on 15 August triggered further reviews. Inspector Shane Cotter (who was to give evidence at the inquest) commissioned a

review of the evidence and a legal opinion about its sufficiency.

1      Carter v The Coroner’s Court at Wellington & Ors [2015] NZHC 42; Carter v The Coroner’s Court at Wellington & Ors [2015] NZHC 462, see appendix attached to that judgment for the full procedural history of interlocutory action in this proceeding.

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Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 1467
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Carter v Coroner’s Court at Wellington and Others involved a judicial review brought by Mr Carter in relation to the death of his son Christopher, focusing on the police decision not to prosecute a third party, referred to as “A”. The primary issue was whether the privilege attached to a legal opinion prepared by an in-house police lawyer, Sarah Kennedy (the Kennedy opinion), had been waived. Mr Carter sought the disclosure of the Kennedy opinion, arguing that any legal advice privilege had been waived in accordance with s 65 of the Evidence Act 2006. The Commissioner of Police claimed the retention of the privilege under s 54 of the Act.

The court examined three key questions to determine if the privilege was waived. Firstly, whether a significant part of the Kennedy opinion was disclosed, the court found that the disclosure of the opinion’s conclusion on the central issue of causation represented a significant part of the opinion, both in terms of the opinion itself and its relevance to the litigation. Secondly, whether the disclosure was made in circumstances inconsistent with maintaining its confidentiality, the court concluded that the disclosure was not inconsistent with maintaining the confidentiality of the Kennedy opinion, as it was an understandable response to a difficult situation. Lastly, whether the disclosure was made with the authority and/or consent of the privileged holder, the court found that Detective Superintendent Kench had the authority to waive the privilege in the circumstances of the case.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Commissioner of Police had not waived the privilege in respect of the Kennedy opinion. The opinion remained privileged in terms of s 54 of the Evidence Act 2006.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established