Carter v Coroner's Court at Wellington

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2012-485-2186 [2015] NZHC 462

IN THE MATTER OF

the Coroners Act 2006, the Magna Carta

1297 c 29 and its various affirmations, the Statute of Westminster the First 1275 and an application for review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972

BETWEEN

JOHN HOWARD CARTER Applicant

AND

THE CORONER'S COURT AT WELLINGTON

First Respondent

THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Second Respondent

"A"

Third Respondent

Hearing: 24 February 2015

Counsel:

J H Carter in person

D J Perkins for Second Respondent No appearance for Third Respondent J B Orpin as amicus

Judgment:

13 March 2015

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J

[1]      Mr Carter has brought proceedings against the Coroner at Wellington and the Commissioner of Police.  The proceedings relate to challenges he mounts in relation to decisions made by the Coroner and the police over the cause of his son, Christopher’s death.   The Coroner and police consider it to have been a suicide.

Mr Carter considers it was a homicide.

CARTER v THE CORONER'S COURT AT WELLINGTON [2015] NZHC 462 [13 March 2015]

[2]      The proceeding has a lengthy – indeed tortuous history covering a period of some years.  This is due in part to the fact that Mr Carter is self-represented, and so struggled to bring the litigation to any focus.  A related but separate cause has been Mr Carter’s illness – both physical and mental.

[3]      I attach to this judgment a potted summary of the interlocutory history of this proceeding to give a flavour of the background to which I refer.

[4]      The Crown now applies for an award of interim costs and disbursements up to 8 September 2013, the day before the date upon which, through the intercession of amicus, the proceeding became focused on at least potentially justiciable issues. Costs are sought on an indemnity, increased, or party and party basis.  In addition, or in the alternative, the Commissioner seeks an order for security for prospective costs. Finally, the Commissioner seeks an order staying the proceeding until Mr Carter pays the costs awarded and/or gives the security required.

[5]      Mr  Orpin,  as  amicus,  submits  that  such  orders  are  not  appropriate.    He submits that the only order for costs that the Court may make is one in relation to the Commissioner’s withdrawn application to strike out Mr Carter’s claim, and he submits that the Court, in its discretion, should not make that order either.  He further submits that an order for security for costs is not appropriate as Mr Carter is able to pay, from his own assets, any costs award should his substantive claim fail.

Costs

[6]      For the Commissioner, Mr Perkins, argues that his client is entitled to an award for costs up to 8 September 2013 because up until that point, it was not clear that the focus of Mr Carter’s complaint against the Commissioner was that his decision not to prosecute “A” or any other person at the conclusion of the police investigation into Christopher Carter’s death.

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Details
Case
[2015] NZHC 462
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Carter v Coroner's Court at Wellington, the High Court of New Zealand considered an application for costs and security for costs by the Commissioner of Police against Mr. Carter. The applicant, Mr. Carter, had been self-represented in a proceeding concerning the cause of his son's death, which the Coroner and police determined to be a suicide, while Mr. Carter believed it to be a homicide. The Commissioner applied for costs incurred up until a certain point in the proceeding, arguing that the applicant's statements of claim had not reflected the focus of the proceeding until that point. The Commissioner also sought an order for security for costs, arguing that Mr. Carter would be unable to pay any costs award if his substantive claim failed.

The court held that it would be premature to award costs in respect of the applicant's re-pleadings and interlocutory steps. The court found that Rule 7.77(8) did not dictate when those costs should apply, and Rule 14.8, which requires costs to be paid early, should not apply in this case as it would pre-empt an analysis of the merits. The court also found that the Commissioner's application for security for costs was not appropriate as the threshold requirement was not met, as Mr. Carter owned a debt-free house which would be sufficient to meet any costs award if necessary.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the Commissioner's applications for costs, security for costs, and the consequential stay application. The court advised Mr. Carter to consider the risk of being saddled with a substantial costs award if he were unsuccessful in the proceeding.

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