Beckham v R

Case [2012] NZCA 603


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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA608/2011
[2012] NZCA 603

BETWEEN  MAX JOHN BECKHAM
Appellant

AND  THE QUEEN
Respondent

CA460/2012

AND BETWEEN             THE QUEEN
Appellant

AND  MAX JOHN BECKHAM
Respondent

Hearing:         11 October 2012

Court:             Stevens, Venning and Dobson JJ

Counsel:         S J Bonnar and S J Mount for Appellant in CA608/2011 and Respondent in CA460/2012
D J Boldt for Respondent in CA608/2011 and Appellant in CA460/2012

Judgment:      20 December 2012 at 2.00 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal against conviction (CA608/2011) is dismissed.

BLeave is granted to the Solicitor-General to appeal out of time against sentence (CA460/2012).

CThe appeal against sentence is allowed.

DThe sentence of 13 years and six months’ imprisonment, together with a minimum period of imprisonment of seven years, is quashed.  In its place a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment is imposed, together with a minimum period of imprisonment of nine years.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Stevens J)

Table of Contents

Para No

A major drug investigation  [1]
Factual background – abuse of process  [8]
High Court judgments   [22]

First stay judgment  [22]
Submissions on whether the calls were listened to  [24]
High Court findings  [25]
Release of information from calls  [28]
Judge’s conclusions on abuse of process  [29]
Crown application to destroy disks containing call data  [30]
Further evidence judgment  [34]
Second stay judgment  [38]

Abuse of process – legal principles  [43]
Issues on first part of appeal  [48]
First issue – error of law?  [54]

Appellant’s submissions  [54]
Legal test – our views  [60]

Second issue – errors of fact?  [73]

Appellant’s contentions  [73]
Preliminary issue – further evidence  [76]
Second ground – our evaluation  [82]

Third issue – a reduction in sentence?  [93]

Appellant’s submissions  [93]
Our evaluation  [94]

Challenge to the interception warrants  [95]

Factual background – chronology  [95]
Admissibility of interception evidence  [96]
Pre-trail steps leading to the admissibility challenge  [100]
Submissions of parties  [108]
Relevant statutory provisions  [113]

Interception warrant evidence – our evaluation  [116]
Sentence appeal  [126]

Factual background  [130]
Sentencing decision  [132]
Discussion  [134]

Result  [139]

A major drug investigation

  1. In 2007 the police launched a major drug investigation referred to as “Operation Jivaro”.  Following termination of the investigation in December 2008 Mr Beckham and four co-accused were arrested and charged with serious drug dealing offences.  Following trial in the Auckland High Court on an indictment containing 57 counts of drugs and money-laundering charges the appellant was found guilty and was convicted on 24 counts.

  2. The Crown alleged, and the jury accepted, that the appellant had been a methamphetamine manufacturer and dealer on a significant scale over a period of at least 18 months.  His convictions included two charges of manufacturing methamphetamine;  two charges of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine;  two counts of possession of methamphetamine for supply;  eight counts of supplying methamphetamine;  one count of conspiring to supply methamphetamine;  one count each of supplying cocaine, supplying MDMA, possession of MDMA for…

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Details
AGLC
Beckham v R [2012] NZCA 603
Case
[2012] NZCA 603
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Beckham v R, the appellant, Beckham, challenged the admissibility of intercepted communications obtained during a police investigation. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the evidence obtained in breach of the statutory requirements for interception warrants should be admitted under specific conditions. The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained from an interception warrant that did not comply with certain statutory requirements.

The court examined the statutory framework provided by the MDAA, specifically sections 14 and 25. Section 14 outlines the conditions under which an interception warrant must be obtained, while section 25 allows for the admissibility of unlawfully intercepted communications under certain circumstances. The court had to determine whether the procedural errors in the application for the interception warrant were substantive and whether they were the result of bad faith. The appellant argued that the failure to mention the Operation Bend interception warrant applications in the “Other Investigative Procedures Tried But Failed” section of the warrant applications was a significant omission.

The Court held that the statutory provisions did not explicitly exclude the Operation Bend interception warrant applications from the scope of “other investigative procedures and techniques” as required by section 14(2)(e)(i) of the MDAA. The Court found that there was no substantive defect or bad faith in the omission of the Operation Bend information. The evidence obtained from the interception warrants was deemed relevant and admissible under section 25(2) of the MDAA because the procedural errors were not substantive and did not result from bad faith. The Court concluded that the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence.

The High Court of Australia upheld the decision of the lower court, affirming the admissibility of the intercepted communications obtained from the interception warrants. The Court's decision highlights the importance of compliance with statutory requirements for interception warrants and the conditions under which evidence obtained in breach of these requirements may still be admitted in court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If an interception warrant is obtained in breach of s 14 of the MDAA, the intercepted communications are inadmissible. Nevertheless the Court may admit that evidence if the conditions in s 25(2)(a) to (d) are satisfied. Section 25 relevantly provides:25Inadmissibility of evidence of private communications unlawfully intercepted(1)Subject to subsections (2) to (4), where a private communication intercepted by means of an interception device otherwise than in pursuance of an interception warrant or emergency permit issued under this Act or of any authority conferred by or under any other enactment has come to the knowledge of a person as a direct or indirect result of that interception or its disclosure, no evidence so acquired of that communication, or of its substance, meaning, or purport, and no other evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of the interception or disclosure of that communication, shall be given against any person, except in proceedings relating to the unlawful interception of a private communication by means of an interception device or the unlawful disclosure of a private communication unlawfully intercepted in that manner.(2)Even though certain evidence is inadmissible in criminal proceedings by virtue of subsection (1), a court may admit that evidence if the following conditions are satisfied:(a) the proceedings are for—(i) a drug dealing offence; or(ii) a prescribed cannabis offence; and(b) the evidence is relevant; and(c)the evidence is inadmissible by virtue of subsection (1) merely because of a defect in form, or an irregularity in procedure, in—(i)the application for or the granting of the interception warrant or emergency permit; or(ii) the manner in which the evidence was obtained; and(d) the defect in form or irregularity in procedure—(i) was not substantive; and(ii) was not the result of bad faith. Central to our evaluation are the contents of the applications for the interception warrants. Mr Bonnar’s main submission focussed on the omission of any reference to the Operation Bend interception warrant applications and the information obtained arising from these warrants under the heading: “Other Investigative Procedures Tried But Failed”. This part of the application was no doubt included by the police officer concerned as a response to the requirements of s 14(2)(e)(i) and s 15(1)(c). Both of these provisions emphasise the requirement that the relevant procedure or technique has been tried but failed. It is true that the Operation Bend information was not mentioned either in the application dated 13 October 2008 or in the two later applications. Other investigative procedures said to have been tried but failed to facilitate the successful conclusion of the investigation were: evidence of informants, surveillance of suspects, telephone enquiries and search warrants. As already noted, Andrews J held in the interception warrant judgment that the words “other investigative procedures and techniques” in s 14(2)(e)(i) of the MDAA were a reference to investigative procedures and techniques other than the interpretation of private communications by way of interception warrant.[65] We have considerable reservations about that view. We consider it is arguable, despite the wording of s 14(2)(e)(iii), that the term as used at least in subpara (i) might be broad enough to include an early investigative procedure involving interception of private communications.[65] At [37], quoted at [104] above.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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