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ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON THE INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE DATABASE UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION OF RETRIAL. PUBLICATION IN LAW REPORT OR LAW DIGEST IS PERMITTED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 50/2008 [2009] NZSC 18
SHANE HUIA MATENGA
v
THE QUEEN
Hearing: 10 February 2009
Court: Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Wilson JJ Counsel: W C Pyke for Appellant
J C Pike and M D Downs for Crown
Judgment: 13 March 2009
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is allowed.
B The convictions are quashed and a new trial ordered.
MATENGA v R SC 50/2008 [13 March 2009]
REASONS
(Given by Blanchard J)
Introduction
[1] Section 385(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 contains directions to an appellate court about the determination of an appeal against conviction at a trial before Judge and jury. The meaning and application of the subsection, and of equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions, has long been a matter of some uncertainty, especially in relation to the proviso. The subsection reads:
385 Determination of appeals in ordinary cases
(1) On any appeal [against conviction] the Court of Appeal or the
Supreme Court must allow the appeal if it is of opinion—
(a)That the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; or
(b)That the judgment of the Court before which the appellant was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on any question of law; or
(c) That on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice; or
(d) That the trial was a nullity—
and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal:
Provided that the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court may, notwithstanding that it is of opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.
[2] The particular difficulty with which the Court is faced in the present case concerns the direction in subs (1)(c) that the appeal must be allowed if “on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice”, contrasted with the power given to the Court nevertheless to dismiss the appeal “if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred”. In this context, what is the distinction between a miscarriage and a substantial miscarriage; and how should the Court proceed if it finds that there has been a miscarriage?
[3] The facts of the present case provide an illustration of the problem. The appellant, Mr Matenga, who was undoubtedly affected at the time by alcohol, went to visit a male friend at about 8.30 one morning. He was unable to gain entry to his friend’s residence. He then encountered a female neighbour, the complainant, outside her home. The two had…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Matenga v R [2009] NZSC 18
Case
[2009] NZSC 18
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Matenga v R, the Supreme Court of New Zealand was called upon to review the conviction and sentence of Shane Huia Matenga, who was found guilty of sexual violation by a jury. Matenga appealed the decision, arguing that the admission of inadmissible medical evidence led to a miscarriage of justice. The Court of Appeal had dismissed the appeal, but Matenga further appealed to the Supreme Court. The central legal issue was the interpretation and application of section 385(1) of the Crimes Act 1961, which governs appeals against conviction at a trial before a Judge and jury. Specifically, the Court had to determine the meaning and application of the proviso to subsection (1)(c), which allows the Court to dismiss an appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred.
The Supreme Court concluded that the approach taken by the High Court of Australia in Weiss v R should be followed in New Zealand, with some qualifications. The Court held that a miscarriage of justice is anything that is a departure from applicable rules of evidence or procedure, but only those departures that are capable of affecting the result of the trial should be considered. The Court of Appeal must then determine whether the guilty verdict was inevitable, in the sense of being the only reasonably possible verdict, on the admissible evidence. The Court emphasised that the proviso should be applied with caution, particularly when the ultimate issues depend on the assessment of witnesses. In Matenga's case, the Supreme Court found that the inadmissible medical evidence played a significant role in the jury's decision, and the Crown had not established that the guilty verdict was inevitable without the inadmissible evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.