O'Connor v R
[2014] NZCA 328
•12 September 2014 at 3.00 pm
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND |
| CA182/2014 [2014] NZCA 328 |
| BETWEEN | FRANK POU O'CONNOR |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| CA183/2014 | |
| AND BETWEEN | DILLON WAYNE KELSEN |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| CA194/2014 | |
| AND BETWEEN | ROSS WILLIAM CARKEEK |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| Hearing: | 13 August 2014 |
Court: | Stevens, Simon France and Mallon JJ |
Counsel: | G A Boot for Appellant O'Connor |
Judgment: | 12 September 2014 at 3.00 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe appeals against the length of sentences are dismissed.
BThe appeal by each appellant against the imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment is allowed. All orders that the appellants serve a minimum period of imprisonment are quashed.
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REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Simon France J)
Introduction
The appellants were involved in a joint retributory attack on a man who had stolen methamphetamine. The course of the retribution was excessive and encompassed two home invasions, theft from one of those premises, and moving the victim from address to address, all the while having initially beaten the victim at his house and continuing the assaults thereafter.
The appellants appeal final sentences of:[1]
(a)for Mr Carkeek, seven years’ imprisonment with a 50 per cent minimum period of imprisonment (MPI);
(b)for Mr O’Connor, six years, nine months’ imprisonment with a 50 per cent MPI; and
(c)for Mr Kelsen, six years, three months’ imprisonment with a 40 per cent MPI.
[1]R v Kelsen, Carkeek and O’Connor DC Hamilton CRI‑2012‑019‑4770, 2 April 2014.
Many challenges are advanced. The starting points are challenged on a disparity basis when assessed against the starting point taken for a co‑defendant. Each appellant challenges an uplift given for past offending, and the lack of any credit for mitigating factors such as remorse and a commitment to change. There is a challenge based on an arithmetical error (Mr Kelsen), and all appellants challenge the imposition of an MPI.
The Crown in its written submissions did not engage with the individual points. Instead it contended that for all appellants the starting points taken were significantly lower than the circumstances of the offending and related authorities required. That being so, it was submitted all appellants must inevitably fail to show their final sentences are manifestly excessive, regardless of any deficits that might exist in the actual process of sentencing adopted.
Facts and offending
The sentencing proceeded on the basis of an agreed summary of facts.
Mr Carkeek was visited by the victim, a Mr Robert Burke. Mr Burke went to purchase methamphetamine from Mr Carkeek, but rather than paying for it, he held a knife to Mr Carkeek’s throat and robbed him of the drugs. Mr Carkeek initiated a violent response.
Mr Carkeek was at the time living with a Ms Rachel Fraser‑Jones. Mr Carkeek directed Ms Fraser‑Jones to go and collect Messrs Kelsen and O’Connor and take them to collect Mr Burke. Ms Fraser‑Jones did this and on the way also collected a man called Dusty Tango.
Mr Burke saw the defendants arriving and ran inside. The three men, Messrs Tango, O’Connor and Kelsen, approached the front door and Mr Tango kicked it in. The others followed. Mr Tango was carrying a bat which he used to assault Mr Burke. At some point he passed the bat to Mr Kelsen, who thereafter held it. Mr Tango had acquired a knife from within the property and he proceeded to stab Mr Burke in and around the leg.
Inside the house Mr Burke was then dragged to different rooms and further beaten by Messrs Tango and O’Connor. It seems that throughout the entire episode Mr Kelsen was a presence, and a near observer, but did not physically assault the victim. At one point Ms Fraser‑Jones came in to see what was happening but apparently quickly left and went outside.
At some point in the process Mr Burke blacked out as a result of the continued beating. He was dragged to the car and placed in the back seat, bleeding from the stab wounds. Two of the men sat on him, and he was driven by Ms Fraser‑Jones back to the address she shared with Mr Carkeek.
Once there, Mr Burke was dragged from the car, and Mr Carkeek proceeded to assault Mr Burke by two blows to the head. He then told the group to take Mr Burke to a further address where associates of Mr Burke lived. Upon arrival at that address, the three men entered with Mr Burke. Mr Tango was still armed with the knife. Various electronic goods, not of great value, were taken. It seems the purpose of this was to obtain goods equal to the value of the drugs stolen.
By this time Ms Fraser‑Jones had left to walk back to her house. The stolen property was taken in the car by the three men to Mr Carkeek’s house, and then Messrs O’Connor, Kelsen and Carkeek cleaned the car.
Mr Burke’s main injuries were from the knife attack. He suffered nerve damage as a result of a severed nerve, and also tendons in his right thumb were cut when he received a defensive wound in that area.
As all defendants ultimately pleaded guilty, it is appropriate to focus on the final charging outcome:
(a)Mr Tango alone was charged with wounding with intent to injure.
(b)The four defendants who initially travelled to collect Mr Burke were charged with aggravated burglary. Mr Carkeek was not ultimately charged with this count of aggravated burglary.
(c)All assaults on Mr Burke, other than Mr Tango’s knife attack, were covered by a single charge of injuring with intent to injure. This applied to all three appellants in this case and Ms Fraser-Jones.
(d)The detention of Mr Burke which started at the house, carried on when he was taken to Mr Carkeek, and then concluded when taken to his associates’ house was caught by a single kidnapping charge which applied to all five defendants.
(e)The theft from the second house was charged as a second incident of aggravated burglary, and applied to all five defendants.
The first matter of significance is that Mr Tango alone faced the wounding charge. He was tried and sentenced separately to the appellants before us. That means that for analysis purposes as regards the other defendants, the first phase has to be taken as involving an armed aggravated burglary in which Mr Burke was beaten. An aggravating feature of that beating is that some of it occurred after he had, to the defendants’ knowledge, been stabbed and was bleeding heavily.
The second matter is that Mr Carkeek was not charged at all with this aggravated burglary. Despite this, the summary of facts still indicates he instigated the episode by instructing that Mr Burke be collected. For analysis purposes, it has to be taken that Mr Carkeek, although having instructed Mr Burke to be collected and it being likely that force would be involved, is not to be visited with the way his instructions were carried out. His liability commences from the time a beaten and bleeding Mr Burke was presented to him.
An appropriate starting point?
We first address the Crown proposition that the starting points were too low. This Court recently reviewed sentencing for aggravated burglary in Namana v R.[2] Fifteen cases are reviewed in an Appendix to that judgment. The cases suggest a starting point range of eight to 11 and a half years, and the issue is whether this case properly falls amongst them.
[2]Namana v R [2013] NZCA 640.
The aggravating features here are, first, that both burglaries involved forced entry, at night, of a private dwelling by a group of men, one of whom was armed. On the first occasion the weapon was a bat and on the second, a knife. Next there is a sustained physical assault, which continued after the man was stabbed, and which led to him briefly passing out. Allied with this is a prolonged detention of the victim who was forcefully taken in an injured state from the first address to two more. Finally, there is the background context of vigilante retaliation stemming from a drug deal.
Turning to the cases referenced in Namana, the case of Frank v R is an obvious comparator.[3] In that case it was believed the victim had been involved in the theft of a car. Three men, including Mr Frank, travelled to the victim’s house. When the victim opened the door they forced their way in, wearing balaclavas. The victim (who had a walking disability due to polio) was repeatedly punched and threatened with a knife. He was then dragged outside and forced into a car. The house was burgled and ransacked. The offenders then drove off with the victim, forcing him into the back of a hatchback car, and punching him. He was marched into another house and there were discussions about what to do with him. He was allowed to sleep on the couch. During the night, in circumstances not involving Mr Frank, the victim was sexually abused. He was released in the morning. A starting point of eight years was upheld on appeal.
[3]Frank v R [2013] NZCA 447.
Tiori v R also involved a retaliatory attack.[4] Four men planned to rob a tinny house at night time to retaliate for an earlier assault by the owners of that house. One of the group entered the house on the pretext of buying cannabis. He told the rest when to enter, which they did wearing balaclavas and carrying a slug gun, a hammer, and possibly a third weapon. One occupant was hit on the head and some property was taken. Children were present in the house at the time. On appeal this Court lowered the starting point from 10 years to eight years.
[4]Tiori v R [2011] NZCA 355.
These starting points of around eight years are by no means the top of the range. In R v Fenton, four or five men entered a residential home armed with a softball bat and machete.[5] The object was to take cannabis and cash. The male adult in the house was hit in the head with the bat. His teenage daughter was tied to a bed and his wife also threatened. Electronic items and the family car were taken. A starting point of 10 to 11 years was upheld.
[5]R v Fenton [2008] NZCA 379.
The Court in Frank also reviewed many authorities.[6] That review illustrates that cases primarily involving kidnapping and extortion of money (for example, by taking the victim to an ATM) have attracted lower starting points than those identified in Namana.[7] The key distinguishing features of such cases, from the cases reviewed in Namana, are the absence of home invasion and the level of violence.
[6]Frank v R, above n 3, at [20]–[38].
[7]For example Eketone-Mahara v R [2011] NZCA 71; R v Wharton HC Blenheim CRI-2007-006-1815, 9 October 2007; Joblin v R [2011] NZCA 585; and R v Liang CA448/04, 2 June 2005.
When comparing the present case to the more serious home invasions we have discussed, we accept the Crown proposition that a starting point less than eight years was not to be expected. Here there is prolonged violence, albeit not itself causing long term consequences (recalling the wounding must be put to one side). There is a prolonged kidnapping with an intermediate phase where the victim is presented to Mr Carkeek almost like a trophy for further beating. This aspect merits particular denunciation. Moreover, there is then a second armed burglary of a private dwelling, a feature not present in the other cases, albeit we accept that standing alone it is at the lower end of such activity.
We view the case as at least as serious as Frank (there, a more vulnerable victim and more prolonged kidnapping, but here, equally serious violence and two aggravated burglaries) and Tiori (here, more serious violence and two aggravated burglaries). In Namana itself this Court described the eight year starting point as stern.[8] That was a robbery at night by a group with gang associations who were armed with a firearm. The violence was moderate. In the present case the violence appears at least as serious, and the second aggravated burglary again provides a point of difference.
[8]Namana v R, above n 2, at [36].
Overall we are satisfied that the existing starting points for the appellants Mr Kelsen and Mr O’Connor of seven years’ imprisonment and six and a half years respectively were too low and below the available range.[9]
[9]In the Namana appendix, there are two cases with starting points lower than eight years: Pani v R [2011] NZCA 45 and R v Crawford [2009] NZCA 479. We have considered them but they do not alter our assessment.
Mr Carkeek requires separate analysis since he is not to be visited with the first phase of the offending. However, the injuring with intent charge commencing his culpability merits a starting point for him towards the maximum penalty of five years. It is to be recalled that he initiated Mr Burke’s detention. The charging suggests he did not anticipate the violence inflicted in achieving this but he plainly knew it had happened when Mr Burke was presented to him. Mr Burke was clearly in a bad way, and far from seeing it as enough, Mr Carkeek, reflecting his controlling role, himself further seriously assaulted the victim. Thereafter he again directed all the further offending.
The overall starting point for Mr Carkeek was six and a half years. We reject that this was too high. We consider a combined starting point for the injuring, kidnapping and aggravated burglary of seven to seven and a half years was available given his dominant role in the matter, but we do not say that six and a half years was below the available range.
Against those assessments we turn to the individual appellants. Whilst our conclusion on the starting points significantly undermines the effect any individual challenges can achieve, we consider it appropriate to address them.
Disparity
The sense of grievance underlying these appeals primarily stems from the sentencing of Ms Fraser‑Jones, who pleaded guilty to the same charges as Messrs Kelsen and O’Connor, and to more charges than Mr Carkeek. She received a starting point of five years.
There was an unusual background to Ms Fraser‑Jones’ sentencing. Ms Fraser‑Jones was the first of the offenders to seek a sentence indication. Judge Marshall gave her a sentence indication which she accepted. She was then briefed by the Crown to give evidence at the trial of the others. It seems the availability of her evidence prompted the other defendants to seek sentence indications.
For reasons that are not known to us, on the same day that Judge Marshall sentenced Ms Fraser‑Jones consistent with his sentencing indication, the present appellants had a sentence indication hearing before a different Judge, Judge Burnett. Her Honour indicated she was not willing to take the same starting point as had been taken for Ms Fraser‑Jones. Our earlier discussion indicates that we agree with Judge Burnett’s assessment.
The appellants did not accept Judge Burnett’s sentencing indication but decided to plead guilty anyway. It was then suggested by all counsel that as the sentence indication had not been accepted, there was no need for Judge Burnett to sentence the appellants. Instead, applying normal principles, the same Judge that had sentenced their co‑defendant should sentence them. The Court did not agree, considering this had the flavour of Judge-shopping.
We consider that the situation should not have arisen. Two Judges in the same court should not have been dealing with co‑defendants on the same day. However, once the situation had happened, we agree with what occurred. Judge Burnett should, as she did, have completed the sentencing and if the defendants she sentenced were unhappy with the outcome, they can appeal, as they have.
We do not accept the disparity claim. Ms Fraser‑Jones was the driver. She briefly went inside on the first aggravated burglary, and not at all on the second. We do not accept that her situation is indistinguishable from the situation of Mr Kelsen. He was present throughout all the events, held the bat and no doubt added a level of intimidation by his presence.
There was accordingly a basis to distinguish between Ms Fraser‑Jones and Messrs Kelsen, O’Connor and Carkeek. We accept that the authorities suggest a driver can be regarded as equally culpable, but it is not an invariable rule, and some distinction is possible. Whether the size of the difference that has arisen here is too great is open to debate but there is nothing in the circumstances that would have supported lowering these appellants’ sentences because of Ms Fraser‑Jones’ situation. The fact of different starting points is not itself unprincipled or unreasonable, and the possibility that Ms Fraser‑Jones has had too great a reduction does not assist these appellants. The disparity is not “gross”.[10] Nor would a failure to adjust the sentence of these appellants bring the administration of justice into disrepute.[11]
[10]R v Rameka [1973] 2 NZLR 592 (CA) at 594.
[11]R v Lawson [1982] 2 NZLR 219 (CA) at 223.
It appears that a further aspect of complaint is that it was Ms Fraser‑Jones who introduced Mr Tango into the picture. He was apparently unknown to the appellants (at least Messrs Kelsen and O’Connor) and was of course the main source of the violence. This was not a feature of the case that was reflected in the summary of facts and so could not feature in the sentencing. This aspect makes it understandable why the present appellants feel a level of grievance but they have not been harshly treated, and in fact the opposite is true. At most, this further reinforces that Ms Fraser‑Jones has probably been fortunate.
Uplifts for previous offending
We address this as a general topic because we consider that all three appellants are correct in their complaint against the imposition of an uplift. Mr Downs, for the Crown, does not contest this.
Mr Kelsen received a three month uplift.[12] His most recent sentence of imprisonment prior to the present case was in November 2005, and was a six week sentence. Prior to that there were a series of similarly short sentences. In the time between his last jail term and the present offending there was a persistent pattern of lower level offending, generally met with a fine or community work. He had no previous offending of the present type. There was an “other aggravated robbery” conviction, but it was visited with a sentence of community work and $400 reparation, suggesting it was of a wholly different nature from the present offending.
[12]R v Carkeek, above n 1, at [26].
Mr O’Connor received a six month uplift.[13] The same observations apply. His previous jail term was a three month sentence in October 2006. Prior to that there were other such short jail sentences, although in early 2005 he received 21 months’ imprisonment for a number of burglaries. Since 2006 the primary offending had been breach of bail conditions or failure to answer bail.
[13]At [16].
Mr Carkeek received a four month uplift.[14] He had been sentenced to jail three times previously – one month (2012), one month (2011) (after review of community sentence) and six months in 2009 (driving). He has no offending of the type involved in this case.
[14]At [20].
We do not consider that an uplift was justified in any of these cases. We also have concerns about the size of the uplift relative to the sentences imposed at the time for each appellant’s past offending. It is important that uplifts not be imposed as a matter of course but rather are a considered response to specific aspects of an offender’s previous criminal history. It is also important with multiple defendants to have regard to parity. Mr Tango also received a six month uplift, yet he presented with a much more significant criminal history involving numerous recent jail terms. He was a classic case for an uplift based on deterrence and protection principles. It is not supportable that Mr O’Connor should have received the same uplift as him.
Mr O’Connor’s appeal
Mr O’Connor appeals his sentence on the basis of disparity with Ms Fraser‑Jones and Mr Kelsen, a challenge to the uplift, a challenge to the lack of credit for time spent on electronic bail and his genuine remorse, and a challenge to the imposition of an MPI. We have already addressed the first two, and will deal with all MPIs at the end.
Concerning electronic bail, Mr O’Connor spent 10 months on electronic bail. He was subject for most of that period to a 24 hour curfew, although we understand it was varied in the latter stages to allow one hour a week out for shopping. The grant of electronic bail ended with a breach. Mr O’Connor, who was at the time dealing with significant family issues, removed his bracelet. However, he promptly rang the authorities to say he had done this and waited at the address for them to arrive. Following this, bail was revoked. The Judge declined credit because Mr O’Connor was fortunate to be on bail, and because the bail conditions were appropriate.
We do not consider either reason is sustainable as a basis for declining credit. Neither negates the reality that Mr O’Connor spent this time on bail under the conditions that were imposed. We, therefore, consider the matter afresh.
A review of authorities does not disclose any particular pattern in the amount of credit given for restrictive terms bail. It is plain that the circumstances of the detention and the defendant’s compliance during that period are relevant to the assessment. The cases we have reviewed have allowed two months credit for slightly over three months on bail;[15] three months for nine months on electronic bail;[16] six months for eight months spent on 24 hour electronic curfew;[17] and none where repeated breaches occurred.[18]
[15]Molia v R [2013] NZCA 512.
[16]R vTamou [2008] NZCA 88.
[17]Beckham v R [2012] NZCA 603, [2013] 1 NZLR 613.
[18]R v Bidois [2009] NZCA 426; R v Bishop [2009] NZCA 265.
There are no particular features concerning Mr O’Connor’s ten months on bail of which we are aware. It does not seem to have involved hardship outside the norm, nor was it affected by repeated breaches. Therefore some credit might legitimately have been expected. We assess this as four months, reflecting that it is not a direct correlation and is not to be viewed as being time on custodial remand.
Finally, we note Mr O’Connor queried the different starting points between him and Mr Kelsen. The reality is that more direct violence is attributable to Mr O’Connor, and that provides a rational basis for distinguishing.
Mr Kelsen’s appeal
Mr Kelsen raised the same disparity, uplift, and MPI issues as Mr O’Connor. He also submits that more credit was due for his remorse, a positive pre‑sentence report and the fact that he had since taken positive steps that emphasise his acceptance of responsibility and insight. We accept there was material to support this submission but do not consider the Judge can be said to have erred in declining to give discrete credit. It is, however, a matter we will have regard to when considering the MPI.
Finally, it is accepted that there was an arithmetical error meaning the sentence, as the Judge constructed it, should have been six years, one month imprisonment rather than the six years, three months’ imprisonment that was imposed.
Mr Carkeek’s appeal
Other than the MPI issue, we have addressed all matters relating to the core offending. However, Mr Carkeek also pleaded guilty to a single charge of offering to supply methamphetamine. This related to the triggering incident in which Mr Burke robbed Mr Carkeek of the methamphetamine Mr Carkeek was trying to sell to him. Mr Carkeek has previous drug offence convictions but they are for personal use or possession. There are no convictions for drug dealing.
The Judge took a two year starting point for the methamphetamine offending and discounted it by 12 per cent for the guilty plea.[19] This left a sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment but her Honour considered that since it was to be imposed cumulatively, totality required a reduction to 11 months. On the core offending Mr Carkeek had been sentenced, after the uplift for previous convictions and discount for the guilty plea, to six years one, month imprisonment. The drug sentence resulted in a final term of seven years.
[19]At [21].
The first challenge is to the fact that the sentence was made cumulative. Mr Chisnall, for Mr Carkeek, contends that the methamphetamine offending was part of the same transaction as the core offending. We do not agree. Whilst it was undoubtedly the background to why Mr Burke was subsequently offended against, it was rightly seen as separate offending.
The second challenge, to the starting point, requires more consideration. A starting point of two years is at the bottom of band one of R vFatu, which provides that low level supply (less than 5 grams) should attract starting points of two to four years’ imprisonment.[20] A review of some comparable High Court sentencings suggest a starting point of 15–18 months was perhaps more expected, but two years was, for example, taken in R v Duncan.[21] Whether two years was too stern here a starting point or not, it is apparent that Mr Carkeek can have no complaint with the final sentence of 11 months.
Conclusion on sentences
[20]R v Fatu [2006] 2 NZLR 72 (CA) at [34].
[21]R v Duncan [2012] NZHC 1208; R v Paul HC Auckland CRI‑2006‑057‑1, 20 June 2006; R v Fournier HC New Plymouth CRI‑2011‑443‑14, 25 October 2011; R v Gibbons HC Auckland CRI‑2009‑090‑9224, 27 July 2010; and R v Morrissey HC Rotorua CRI‑2008‑070‑8612, 25 March 2009.
As regards Messrs Kelsen and O’Connor, we have identified errors. Mr Kelsen wrongly had an uplift for previous convictions applied, and there was a two month arithmetical error. Mr O’Connor also wrongly had an uplift applied and was denied credit for time on electronic bail for reasons that do not support the decision.
We conclude, however, that neither sentence should be adjusted to reflect these factors. If the minimum correct starting point were taken, and then the sentences adjusted in accordance with the conclusions reached in this judgment (no uplift, credit for electronic bail, guilty plea credit and no further credit for mitigating factors) both appellants would be subject to sentences longer than their present terms.[22] Accordingly, neither sentence has been shown to be manifestly excessive.[23]
[22]We have assessed this question for Mr Kelsen, taking into account specifically the fact the Judge took a six month lower starting point for him at sentencing.
[23]In Purua v R [2011] NZCA 489 at [11] and [17] the Court declined to give credit that should otherwise be given for electronic bail because the existing sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Concerning Mr Carkeek, we have concluded his starting point was within range but could have been higher. Removing the incorrectly applied four month uplift results in only a small adjustment and we are not satisfied that it can be said the current sentence is manifestly excessive. His appeal against the length of his sentence is also dismissed.
Minimum period of imprisonment
An MPI was imposed in relation to each appellant. For Messrs O’Connor and Carkeek, the figure was 50 per cent and for Mr Kelsen the figure was 40 per cent. The previous history of each offender has already been considered in relation to an uplift. Given that we considered the individual circumstances did not support even small uplifts, it follows that neither do they support the imposition of an MPI.[24]
[24]With reference to the factors set out in the Sentencing Act 2002, s 86(2)(a)–(d).
Nor was there otherwise anything about the offenders that required an MPI. Each appellant communicated with the Court in a way which, if genuine, showed a degree of insight into their offending and a desire and commitment to prioritise other things such as family for the future. Mr Kelsen had, following the offending, complied with bail conditions and moved to another city. He has a supportive partner. Mr Carkeek likewise wrote a letter of apology and provided support from friends who attest to his new perspective. Mr O’Connor is unable to write but through counsel expressed his remorse. His pre‑sentence report noted some evidence of him taking responsibility.
We recognise that all these positive expressions need ultimately to be backed up by real conduct. However, in our view they were sufficient, when taken with what could be termed neutral past offending records, to tell against an extended period of actual imprisonment.
As regards the offending itself, of these appellants only Mr Carkeek presents as a possible case for an MPI. Messrs O’Connor and Kelsen, particularly Mr Kelsen, played a secondary role to Mr Carkeek in the overall offending and a secondary role to Mr Tango in relation to the violence. There is no basis on which to consider an extended period was needed to reflect their culpability. The situation for Mr Carkeek is more marginal as he instigated all this offending and may be thought to have done quite well out of it. However, it would not be correct to circumvent the charging decisions by means of an MPI, and so we decline to do so.
In seeking to uphold the imposition of MPIs, Mr Downs noted that they are not uncommon when the offending is more serious and the underlying terms are at the longer end of finite sentences. He also reminded the Court that it is an appeal from the exercise of discretion. As regards the latter point we observe that we are not satisfied that the Judge at sentencing sufficiently addressed the various factors arising under s 86(2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 in the manner required. We do not intend by this to be overly critical, but see it as justifying the Court looking at the matter afresh.
That having been done, we quash all MPIs imposed in respect of the appellants.
Conclusion
The appeals against the length of sentence are dismissed.
The appeal by each appellant against the imposition of a MPI is allowed. All orders that the appellants serve a MPI are quashed.
Solicitors:
Public Defence Service, Wellington for Appellant Carkeek
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent
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