HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND CRENNAN JJZ APPELLANT
AND
NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION RESPONDENT
Z v New South Wales Crime Commission [2007] HCA 7
28 February 2007
S229/2006ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
D F Jackson QC with B A Arste for the appellant (instructed by Bolzan & Dimitri)
M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with P F Singleton and M T England for the respondent (instructed by New South Wales Crime Commission)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ. This appeal was said to raise two issues concerning the operation of s 18B of the New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) ("the Act"). The facts, and the relevant legislation, appear from the reasons of Hayne and Crennan JJ. The first issue is whether a requirement that the appellant answer a certain question was one with which the appellant could refuse to comply on the ground that the answer would disclose a privileged communication passing between the appellant, a legal practitioner, in his capacity as a legal practitioner, and X, a client. The second issue is whether, even if the first issue were otherwise resolved in favour of the appellant, the appellant's claim to be entitled to refuse must fail because of the concluding words, or proviso, in s 18B(4).
Grove J resolved both issues adversely to the appellant. In the Court of Appeal, Mason P, with whom Wood CJ at CL agreed, considered it unnecessary and undesirable to decide the first issue because of "factual uncertainties", but held that the second issue should be resolved against the appellant. I agree.
As Grove J pointed out in his reasons, assuming the existence of a solicitor-client relationship between the appellant and X, most of what X communicated to the appellant was for the express purpose of being passed on by the appellant to third parties (the police). To that extent, X's communications with the appellant were not privileged. They were not confidential, and they were not made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice.
The Commission, some years later, for the purposes of a certain investigation, asked the appellant to identify X. The appellant claims that, in the special circumstances of this case, to answer that question would be to disclose a privileged communication. In the ordinary case, as the appellant accepts, "a retainer is not a confidential communication"[1]. As a general rule, a requirement that a lawyer disclose the identity of a client will not necessitate disclosure of a confidential communication. There are, however, exceptional circumstances in which there is such a connection between a confidential communication and a retainer that disclosure by a lawyer of the identity of a client will disclose that confidential communication. As Mason P indicated, the problem about deciding whether the…
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- Case
- [2007] HCA 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the communication of a client's name or contact details to a legal practitioner constitutes a privileged communication, and whether section 18B(4) of the *New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985* (NSW) qualified a legal practitioner's entitlement to refuse to answer questions that would disclose a privileged communication by requiring them to furnish the name and address of the person involved in that communication.
The High Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. While not definitively determining whether the communication of a client's name and address is inherently privileged, the Court found that section 18B(4) of the Act, by its plain language, required a legal practitioner to disclose the name and address of the person to whom or by whom a communication was made, even if that communication was otherwise privileged. The Court considered that there was no textual basis to confine the operation of this provision in a way that would exclude its application in the present circumstances.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ