Z v New South Wales Crime Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND CRENNAN JJ

Z  APPELLANT

AND

NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION  RESPONDENT

Z v New South Wales Crime Commission [2007] HCA 7
28 February 2007
S229/2006

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

D F Jackson QC with B A Arste for the appellant (instructed by Bolzan & Dimitri)

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with P F Singleton and M T England for the respondent (instructed by New South Wales Crime Commission)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ. This appeal was said to raise two issues concerning the operation of s 18B of the New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) ("the Act"). The facts, and the relevant legislation, appear from the reasons of Hayne and Crennan JJ. The first issue is whether a requirement that the appellant answer a certain question was one with which the appellant could refuse to comply on the ground that the answer would disclose a privileged communication passing between the appellant, a legal practitioner, in his capacity as a legal practitioner, and X, a client. The second issue is whether, even if the first issue were otherwise resolved in favour of the appellant, the appellant's claim to be entitled to refuse must fail because of the concluding words, or proviso, in s 18B(4).

  2. Grove J resolved both issues adversely to the appellant.  In the Court of Appeal, Mason P, with whom Wood CJ at CL agreed, considered it unnecessary and undesirable to decide the first issue because of "factual uncertainties", but held that the second issue should be resolved against the appellant.  I agree.

  3. As Grove J pointed out in his reasons, assuming the existence of a solicitor-client relationship between the appellant and X, most of what X communicated to the appellant was for the express purpose of being passed on by the appellant to third parties (the police).  To that extent, X's communications with the appellant were not privileged.  They were not confidential, and they were not made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice.

  4. The Commission, some years later, for the purposes of a certain investigation, asked the appellant to identify X.  The appellant claims that, in the special circumstances of this case, to answer that question would be to disclose a privileged communication.  In the ordinary case, as the appellant accepts, "a retainer is not a confidential communication"[1].  As a general rule, a requirement that a lawyer disclose the identity of a client will not necessitate disclosure of a confidential communication.  There are, however, exceptional circumstances in which there is such a connection between a confidential communication and a retainer that disclosure by a lawyer of the identity of a client will disclose that confidential communication.  As Mason P indicated, the problem about deciding whether the…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Z v New South Wales Crime Commission*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by a legal practitioner who had been summonsed to give evidence before the New South Wales Crime Commission. The practitioner had refused to disclose the name and address of a person who had provided him with information, asserting that the communications containing this information were protected by legal professional privilege. The Commission had directed the practitioner to answer the questions, ruling that the communications were not privileged.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the communication of a client's name or contact details to a legal practitioner constitutes a privileged communication, and whether section 18B(4) of the *New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985* (NSW) qualified a legal practitioner's entitlement to refuse to answer questions that would disclose a privileged communication by requiring them to furnish the name and address of the person involved in that communication.

The High Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. While not definitively determining whether the communication of a client's name and address is inherently privileged, the Court found that section 18B(4) of the Act, by its plain language, required a legal practitioner to disclose the name and address of the person to whom or by whom a communication was made, even if that communication was otherwise privileged. The Court considered that there was no textual basis to confine the operation of this provision in a way that would exclude its application in the present circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 18(2) provided:"A person appearing as a witness at a hearing before the Commission shall not, without reasonable excuse or except as provided by section 18A or 18B:(a)when required pursuant to section 16 either to take an oath or make an affirmation—refuse or fail to comply with the requirement,(b)refuse or fail to answer a question that the person is required to answer by the member presiding at the hearing, or(c)refuse or fail to produce a document or thing that the person was required to produce by a summons under this Act served as prescribed."Section 18B provided:"(1)A witness summoned to attend or appearing before the Commission at a hearing is not (except as provided by section 18A) excused from answering any question or producing any document or thing on the ground that the answer or production may incriminate or tend to incriminate the witness, or on any other ground of privilege, or on the ground of a duty of secrecy or other restriction on disclosure, or on any other ground....(4)If:(a)a legal practitioner or other person is required to answer a question or produce a document or thing at a hearing before the Commission, and(b)the answer to the question would disclose, or the document or thing contains, a privileged communication passing between a legal practitioner (in his or her capacity as a legal practitioner) and a person,the legal practitioner or other person is entitled to refuse to comply with the requirement, unless the privilege is waived by a person having authority to do so. However, the legal practitioner must, if so required by the member presiding at the hearing, furnish to the Commission the name and address of the person to whom or by whom the communication was made...."The facts In September 2003, the appellant was summonsed to attend the Commission and give evidence in relation to an investigation the Commission was conducting into an attempted murder. It is convenient to refer to the victim of that attempted murder as M. The appellant was asked by the Commission to disclose the name and address of a person, referred to in the present proceedings as X. X had twice given the appellant certain information about M and on each occasion the appellant had passed on that information to police. The attack on M was made in 2002, some years after X had consulted the appellant, and the appellant had passed on the information provided. When asked, in a hearing conducted by a member of the Commission, who it was who had provided the information he had passed on to police, and where that person could be contacted, the appellant declined to answer, on the ground that the communications conveying that information to the appellant were the subject of legal professional privilege. The member of the Commission who was conducting the hearing ruled that the communications were not privileged and directed the appellant to answer the questions. The appellant refused to do so and made application to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, under s 19(2) of the Act, for an order of review in respect of the decisions to direct him to answer the questions.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ
Nor is it necessary to consider in this Court the application to this case of the last sentence of s 18B(4) – "However, the legal practitioner must, if so required ... furnish to the Commission the name and address of the person ... by whom the communication was made". The appellant contended that if communication of the name and address of a client was privileged it would be incongruous to read s 18B(4) as requiring the disclosure of that privileged information. It is by no means evident that there is any textual foundation for the appellant's contention that the last sentence of s 18B(4) could and should be given the confined operation that would be required to exclude that provision's engagement in the present matter. It is not necessary, however, to decide that question.Conclusion and orders The orders made by the Court of Appeal should be upheld on the footing described in these reasons. The appeal to this Court should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ