Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan [2005] FCAFC 113

MIGRATION – appeal – notice to give information – unlawful non-citizen released from detention pursuant to court order – telephone number confidentially communicated to legal adviser – intention to avoid detention – notice properly resisted on ground communication attracts legal professional privilege

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – appeal – client confidentially advising solicitor of telephone number – client subsequently failing to attend hearing in accordance with court order – whether communication had purpose of frustrating court order requiring attendance at hearing – whether communication, in the circumstances that the client intended to evade mandatory detention pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), had the purpose of frustrating the process of the law – no error in finding that privilege not defeated

Evidence Act1995 (Cth) s 59, s 140
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 18(1), s 21, s 189(1)

Federal Court Rules O 52 r 14AA, r 36

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124 referred to
Attorney‑General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 distinguished
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Limited (1997) 188 CLR 501 considered
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54 referred to
O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 cited
R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 cited
Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25 cited
SHMB v Godwin (No 2) [2003] FCA 1171 referred to
The Queen v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 distinguished

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS v ABBY HAMDAN

SAD 223 of 2004

BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ
9 JUNE 2005
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 223 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

ABBY HAMDAN
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2005

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 223 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANT

AND:

ABBY HAMDAN
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ

DATE:

9 JUNE 2005

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This appeal calls for consideration of the circumstances in which legal professional privilege will attach to the communication to a legal practitioner by a client of an objective fact. The particular communication with which this appeal is concerned is a communication by which a client of the respondent (‘the Client’) disclosed to the respondent (‘the Solicitor’) his mobile…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan was brought by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs against the decision of Finn J, which upheld a claim of legal professional privilege made by a solicitor on behalf of an applicant for a protection visa. The applicant had been detained as an unlawful non-citizen and sought a declaration that his detention was unlawful and an order for his release. Following a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, the primary judge found that there was no real prospect of the applicant being removed from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future, and ordered his release from detention. The applicant subsequently failed to attend a hearing of his application in the Federal Court, and the Minister sought to compel the disclosure of the applicant's mobile telephone number to the solicitor, which the solicitor had promised to keep confidential. The solicitor claimed legal professional privilege in respect of the communication, which the primary judge upheld. The Minister appealed the primary judge's decision, contending that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was to avoid detention and therefore to frustrate the processes of the law or, more specifically, the Court Attendance Order.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the purpose of the applicant in seeking to maintain the confidentiality of his mobile telephone number was a purpose incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. The court held that the Minister had not satisfied the evidentiary onus of demonstrating that the applicant's purpose was incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. The court found that nothing before the primary judge gave 'colour to the charge' that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was to frustrate the processes of the law or the Court Attendance Order. The court further held that it was not illegal for the applicant to seek by lawful means to evade detention and that he was under no legal obligation to facilitate his detention. The court also found that the applicant's failure to comply with the Court Attendance Order constituted a contempt, but the evidence did not establish that the applicant sought to frustrate the processes of the Court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and ordered the Minister to pay the respondent's costs.

The court's reasoning in this case highlights the importance of the evidentiary onus in determining whether a communication is protected by legal professional privilege. The court found that the Minister had not satisfied the evidentiary onus of demonstrating that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was a purpose incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. The court further found that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was not illegal and did not amount to a frustration of the processes of the law or the Court Attendance Order. The court's decision in this case therefore reinforces the principle that legal professional privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of incompatibility with the purpose of the privilege. The court's decision also highlights the importance of respecting the rights of clients to seek legal advice and to maintain the confidentiality of their communications with their lawyers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.BACKGROUND FACTS The Client applied unsuccessfully for a protection visa under the Act. For some time he was held in immigration detention as an unlawful non‑citizen. He eventually brought an application in the Federal Court seeking a declaration that he was being unlawfully detained and an order for his release from detention. The Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54 had held that the power to detain under the Act did not authorise the continuing detention of a person in respect of whom there was no real prospect of removal from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future. On 3 October 2003 Mansfield J concluded that there was a serious question to be tried that there was no real prospect of the Client being removed from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future. On the same day his Honour made certain interlocutory orders including an order that the Minister cause the Client to be released from detention forthwith (SHMB v Goodwin (No 2) [2003] FCA 1171). The other orders made by his Honour on 3 October 2003 included an order requiring the Client to keep his solicitor and a solicitor employed at the office of the Australian Government Solicitor in Adelaide informed of his address and contact details and an order that the Client attend in person any hearing in the Federal Court of Australia of which he was given reasonable notice in writing by the Australian Government Solicitor. The order last referred to is hereafter referred to as the Court Attendance Order. The Client’s application to the Federal Court had not been heard and determined on a final basis when on 6 August 2004 the High Court published its judgment in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124. The publication of this judgment meant that the Client’s application to the Federal Court was bound to fail. That application was listed for hearing by Mansfield J on 6 September 2004. It is accepted that the Australian Government Solicitor gave the Client reasonable notice in writing of this hearing. Consequently the Court Attendance Order required the Client to attend the hearing of his application. On or about 2 September 2004 the Solicitor made a number of attempts to contact the Client using a mobile telephone number that she understood to be his. The number was not operational. On 3 September 2004 the Client contacted the Solicitor, whose first language is Arabic, and spoke to her in Arabic. He said words to the following effect:‘I will provide you with my phone number … to enable you to provide me with legal advice, however, before I do so I want you to give me an undertaking that you will not disclose this number to anyone else.’The respondent gave the undertaking sought by the Client and subsequently provided the Client with legal advice by telephoning the mobile telephone number given to her by him.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ
To resist the claim of legal professional privilege advanced by the Solicitor the Minister was required to place evidence before the primary judge sufficient to meet an evidentiary onus with respect to disentitlement. That is, the Minister bore the onus of raising for determination the question of whether the purpose of the Client in seeking to maintain the confidentiality of the communication was a purpose incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. In our view, the Minister did not satisfy that evidentiary onus. Nothing before the primary judge gave ‘colour to the charge’ that the relevant communication was made by the client for the purpose either of frustrating the processes of the law generally or of frustrating the Court Attendance Order. The primary judge rightly determined that the Solicitor was entitled to the relief claimed in her application to the Court.CONCLUSION The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ

The present appeal is brought from the orders made by Finn J on 1 October 2004.MIGRATION ACT 1958 Section 18(1) of the Act relevantly provides:‘If the Minister has reason to believe that a person (in this subsection called the first person) is capable of giving information which the Minister has reason to believe is … relevant to ascertaining the identity or whereabouts of another person whom the Minister has reason to believe is an unlawful non-citizen, the Minister may, by notice in writing served on the first person, require the first person: (a)to give to the Minister, within the period and in the manner specified in the notice, any such information;….’ Section 21 of the Act relevantly provides:‘(1)A person must not refuse or fail to comply with a notice under subsection 18(1).(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply: (a)to the extent that the person is not capable of complying with the notice; or(b)if the person has a reasonable excuse.’ The Minister accepted for the purpose of the hearing before the primary judge that s 21 of the Act does not abrogate legal professional privilege. Section 189(1) of the Act provides:‘If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone (other than an excised offshore place) is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person.’REASONS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge found that the Client’s mobile telephone number had been communicated to the Solicitor in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. His Honour concluded that the Solicitor’s claim of legal professional privilege in respect of the communication was therefore properly made unless circumstances were such as to prevent legal professional privilege being attracted to the communication. His Honour rejected the contention of the Minister that legal professional privilege did not attach to the communication because of the purpose of the Client in seeking to keep his mobile telephone number confidential. That purpose was contended by the Minister to be the furtherance of an illegal purpose or the frustration of the processes of the Court. His Honour concluded that it was not illegal for the Client to seek by lawful means to evade detention; he was under no legal obligation to facilitate his detention. His Honour further concluded that while the Client’s failure to comply with the order made by Mansfield J requiring him to attend the hearing in the Federal Court constituted a contempt, the evidence did not establish that the client sought to frustrate the processes of the Court. As mentioned above, the primary judge granted the Solicitor the declaratory relief sought by her.CONTENTIONS OF THE MINISTER ON APPEAL The Minister contended on appeal that, because the primary judge found that the Client’s purpose in seeking confidentiality was to avoid detention under s 189 of the Act, his Honour ought to have concluded that the purpose of the Client in requiring the Solicitor to keep his telephone number confidential was to frustrate the processes of the law or, more specifically, to frustrate the Court Attendance Order. The logic behind the Minister’s contention was expressed in the Minister’s outline of submissions as follows:‘As the client’s purpose in seeking confidentiality was to avert detention, the very purpose the court order intended to facilitate by requiring the client’s attendance, the processes of the law were frustrated.The reason why the purpose of avoiding detention involved the purpose of frustrating the court’s order is that attendance pursuant to the court’s order would inevitably have led to detention (as the client knew). It follows that the purpose of avoiding detention necessarily included the purpose of frustrating the court’s order; otherwise the former purpose could not be achieved.’