FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Hamdan [2005] FCAFC 113
MIGRATION – appeal – notice to give information – unlawful non-citizen released from detention pursuant to court order – telephone number confidentially communicated to legal adviser – intention to avoid detention – notice properly resisted on ground communication attracts legal professional privilege
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – appeal – client confidentially advising solicitor of telephone number – client subsequently failing to attend hearing in accordance with court order – whether communication had purpose of frustrating court order requiring attendance at hearing – whether communication, in the circumstances that the client intended to evade mandatory detention pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), had the purpose of frustrating the process of the law – no error in finding that privilege not defeated
Evidence Act1995 (Cth) s 59, s 140
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 18(1), s 21, s 189(1)Federal Court Rules O 52 r 14AA, r 36
Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124 referred to
Attorney‑General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 distinguished
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Limited (1997) 188 CLR 501 considered
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54 referred to
O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 cited
R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 cited
Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25 cited
SHMB v Godwin (No 2) [2003] FCA 1171 referred to
The Queen v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 distinguishedMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS v ABBY HAMDAN
SAD 223 of 2004
BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ
9 JUNE 2005
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 223 of 2004
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
ABBY HAMDAN
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
9 JUNE 2005
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 223 of 2004
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
ABBY HAMDAN
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ
DATE:
9 JUNE 2005
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
This appeal calls for consideration of the circumstances in which legal professional privilege will attach to the communication to a legal practitioner by a client of an objective fact. The particular communication with which this appeal is concerned is a communication by which a client of the respondent (‘the Client’) disclosed to the respondent (‘the Solicitor’) his mobile…
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- Case
- [2005] FCAFC 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the purpose of the applicant in seeking to maintain the confidentiality of his mobile telephone number was a purpose incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. The court held that the Minister had not satisfied the evidentiary onus of demonstrating that the applicant's purpose was incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. The court found that nothing before the primary judge gave 'colour to the charge' that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was to frustrate the processes of the law or the Court Attendance Order. The court further held that it was not illegal for the applicant to seek by lawful means to evade detention and that he was under no legal obligation to facilitate his detention. The court also found that the applicant's failure to comply with the Court Attendance Order constituted a contempt, but the evidence did not establish that the applicant sought to frustrate the processes of the Court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal and ordered the Minister to pay the respondent's costs.
The court's reasoning in this case highlights the importance of the evidentiary onus in determining whether a communication is protected by legal professional privilege. The court found that the Minister had not satisfied the evidentiary onus of demonstrating that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was a purpose incompatible with the existence of legal professional privilege. The court further found that the applicant's purpose in seeking confidentiality was not illegal and did not amount to a frustration of the processes of the law or the Court Attendance Order. The court's decision in this case therefore reinforces the principle that legal professional privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of incompatibility with the purpose of the privilege. The court's decision also highlights the importance of respecting the rights of clients to seek legal advice and to maintain the confidentiality of their communications with their lawyers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON, NICHOLSON AND JACOBSON JJ
The present appeal is brought from the orders made by Finn J on 1 October 2004.MIGRATION ACT 1958 Section 18(1) of the Act relevantly provides:‘If the Minister has reason to believe that a person (in this subsection called the first person) is capable of giving information which the Minister has reason to believe is … relevant to ascertaining the identity or whereabouts of another person whom the Minister has reason to believe is an unlawful non-citizen, the Minister may, by notice in writing served on the first person, require the first person: (a)to give to the Minister, within the period and in the manner specified in the notice, any such information;….’ Section 21 of the Act relevantly provides:‘(1)A person must not refuse or fail to comply with a notice under subsection 18(1).(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply: (a)to the extent that the person is not capable of complying with the notice; or(b)if the person has a reasonable excuse.’ The Minister accepted for the purpose of the hearing before the primary judge that s 21 of the Act does not abrogate legal professional privilege. Section 189(1) of the Act provides:‘If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone (other than an excised offshore place) is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person.’REASONS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge found that the Client’s mobile telephone number had been communicated to the Solicitor in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. His Honour concluded that the Solicitor’s claim of legal professional privilege in respect of the communication was therefore properly made unless circumstances were such as to prevent legal professional privilege being attracted to the communication. His Honour rejected the contention of the Minister that legal professional privilege did not attach to the communication because of the purpose of the Client in seeking to keep his mobile telephone number confidential. That purpose was contended by the Minister to be the furtherance of an illegal purpose or the frustration of the processes of the Court. His Honour concluded that it was not illegal for the Client to seek by lawful means to evade detention; he was under no legal obligation to facilitate his detention. His Honour further concluded that while the Client’s failure to comply with the order made by Mansfield J requiring him to attend the hearing in the Federal Court constituted a contempt, the evidence did not establish that the client sought to frustrate the processes of the Court. As mentioned above, the primary judge granted the Solicitor the declaratory relief sought by her.CONTENTIONS OF THE MINISTER ON APPEAL The Minister contended on appeal that, because the primary judge found that the Client’s purpose in seeking confidentiality was to avoid detention under s 189 of the Act, his Honour ought to have concluded that the purpose of the Client in requiring the Solicitor to keep his telephone number confidential was to frustrate the processes of the law or, more specifically, to frustrate the Court Attendance Order. The logic behind the Minister’s contention was expressed in the Minister’s outline of submissions as follows:‘As the client’s purpose in seeking confidentiality was to avert detention, the very purpose the court order intended to facilitate by requiring the client’s attendance, the processes of the law were frustrated.The reason why the purpose of avoiding detention involved the purpose of frustrating the court’s order is that attendance pursuant to the court’s order would inevitably have led to detention (as the client knew). It follows that the purpose of avoiding detention necessarily included the purpose of frustrating the court’s order; otherwise the former purpose could not be achieved.’