FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hamdan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1267
MIGRATION – unlawful non-citizen released from detention pursuant to a court order – Al-Kateb v Goodwin – telephone number confidentially communicated to legal adviser – desire to avoid detention – whether communication attracts legal professional privilege.
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – unlawful non-citizen who is at large communicates telephone number to legal adviser – whether the number is a mere collateral fact not attracting privilege.
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – confidential communication of telephone number to legal adviser – desire to avoid being detained under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether confidentiality sought in furtherance of an illegal purpose – no offence being committed or proposed – no obligation to facilitate own detention.
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE – whether confidentiality sought to frustrate processes of the Court – non-attendance at hearing at which habeas corpus application dismissed – whether any court process frustrated.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 14, 18, 21, 189, 197A
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 cited
Sorby v The Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 cited
Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124 applied
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Khafaji (2004) 208 ALR 201 cited
Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217 cited
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 applied
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 applied
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 referred to
Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 cited
Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240 cited
Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Crinis [1984] VR 697 cited
Ex parte Campbell; In re Cathcart (1870) LR 5 Ch App 703 applied
R v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 distinguished
Attorney-General of the Northern Territory v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 appliedABBY HAMDAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
No S 205 of 2004
FINN J
ADELAIDE
1 OCTOBER 2004
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 205 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
ABBY HAMDAN
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
FINN J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 OCTOBER 2004
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.the applicant is not obliged to comply with the notice of the respondent Minister which was served on her on 13 September 2004; and
2. legal professional privilege attaches to the information sought in that notice.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. the respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 205 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
ABBY HAMDAN
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 1267
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the scope and rationale of legal professional privilege, noting that the privilege is a rule of substantive law that may be availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of documents which would reveal communications between a client and their lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the provision of legal services. The rationale of the privilege is to serve the public interest in the administration of justice by encouraging full and frank disclosure by clients to their lawyers. The court rejected the Minister’s contention that the telephone number was a collateral fact, holding that legal professional privilege did indeed attach to the information sought in the notice.
The court concluded that the applicant is not obliged to comply with the notice of the Minister and that legal professional privilege attaches to the information sought in that notice. The court ordered that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs and did not consider it necessary to grant the injunctive relief sought in the application. The court’s decision emphasised the importance of legal professional privilege in facilitating the application of the rule of law and protecting the client’s right to seek and obtain legal advice without the apprehension of being prejudiced by subsequent disclosure of the communication.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. the respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FINN J
On 13 September 2004 Ms Hamdan was served by the Minister with a notice under s 18 of the Act requiring her to provide the telephone number she used to speak to her client on 6 September 2004. She sought legal advice from counsel and from the Law Society of South Australia and has refused to provide the information sought for reasons of legal professional privilege.CONSIDERATION I should note at the outset that Mr Wells QC sought and was granted leave to intervene on behalf of the Law Society of South Australia. That leave was on condition that the Law Society would bear its own costs in any event. As I foreshadowed, there are two primary contentions raised by the Minister, the one, that the telephone number is merely a collateral fact to which legal professional privilege does not attach; the other, that privilege did not attach in any event as the client’s purpose was to frustrate the processes of the law.1. “A mere collateral fact” It is necessary that I make some reference to the scope and the rationale of legal professional privilege. It is now well accepted that the privilege is a rule of substantive law which, as was observed in the joint judgment in Daniels Corporation at [9]:“… may be availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of documents which would reveal communications between a client and his or her lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the provision of legal services, including representation in legal proceedings.”See also Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 217. The rationale of the privilege is equally well accepted. It “exists to serve the public interest in the administration of justice by encouraging full and frank disclosure by clients to their lawyers”: Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [35]; see also Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 508. The incentive so held out to a client, and the systemic benefit which results from it, have been variously explained in many judgments of the High Court. I merely note by way of example that in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 114 Deane J observed that a person should be entitled to seek and obtain legal advice in the conduct of his or her affairs without the apprehension of being prejudiced by subsequent disclosure of the communication: see also Baker at 130 per Dawson J; Esso Australia Resources Ltd at [35]. And in Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 both Brennan J (at 127) and McHugh J (at 161) considered the privilege to be instrumental, to use Brennan J’s words, “in facilitating the application of the rule of law”. There have been some number of decisions spanning three centuries which have dealt with the circumstances in which a client’s name or address could properly be the subject of a claim of legal professional privilege. Though there is a tendency in the cases not to distinguish between a claim in respect of a name and one in respect of an address, and to formulate omnibus propositions that apply to both: cf Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240 at [31]; claims in respect of names raise a distinctive, but not presently relevant, consideration which should be noted. That difficulty was encapsulated by the Full Court in Coombes at [31] in the following propositions:“l As a general rule, the identity of a client will not be privileged, as the privilege belongs to the client, and the retainer between the lawyer and the client must be demonstrated in order to establish the privilege. This requires disclosure of the client’s identity. lDisclosure of the client’s identity is necessary before the privilege can arise even if the client’s name was given in confidence, and it was a condition of the lawyer’s retainer that the client’s identity be kept confidential. The client cannot by contract extend the area of privilege.”See also Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Crinis [1984] VR 697.