Wright Prospecting Pty Limited v Hancock Prospecting Pty Limited (3)

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED -v- HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED (3) [2007] WASC 118

CORAM:   MURRAY J

HEARD:   21 MAY 2007

DELIVERED          :   30 MAY 2007

PUBLISHED           :  31 MAY 2007

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1279 of 2001

BETWEEN:   WRIGHT PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED (ACN 69 008 676 417)

Plaintiff

AND

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LIMITED (ACN 69 008 676 417)
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application for leave to amend reply to join issue on a limitation defence - Limitation defence pleaded in answer to unconscionability claim - Whether claim made against defendant as a trustee or in reference to any trust - Whether claim founded upon any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust - Whether limitation period does not run against plaintiff because that party has no interest in the property in possession

Legislation:

Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 47
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 25(2)

Result:

Leave granted in part

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr R M Smith SC & Mr R J Brender

Defendant:     Mr F M Douglas QC & Mr S K Dharmananda

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Lavan Legal

Defendant:     Cocks Macnish

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Akhil Holdings Ltd v Banque Commerciale SA (In liq), unreported; NSWCA; 15 November 1988

Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241

Banque Commerciale SA (In liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137

Beaman v ARTS Ltd [1949] 1 KB 550

Clay v Clay (1999) 20 WAR 427

Clay v Clay (2001) 202 CLR 410

Finamore v Slater & Gordon (1994) 11 WAR 250

Honey v McLennan (1997) 18 WAR 384

In de Braekt v Powell [2007] WASCA 55

Jeans West Corporation Pty Ltd v Archer [2004] WASCA 132

Kitchen v RAF Association [1958] 2 All ER 241

Levi v Stirling Brass Founders Pty Ltd, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 970209; 9 May 1997

McCann v Switzerland Insurance Aust Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 579

Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583

Oldfield Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 255

Paragon Finance PLC v Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400

Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (In Liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514

Seymour v Seymour (1996) 40 NSWLR 358

Thorne v Heard & Marsh [1895] AC 495

Wright Prospecting Pty Limited v Hancock Prospecting Pty Limited [2007] WASC 78

MURRAY J: 

The material pleadings so far

  1. The indorsement of claim on the writ issued on 2 March 2001 included a claim for a declaration that the partners of the partnership of the plaintiff and the defendant held property identified as "the Rhodes Ridge Interest" on trust for the plaintiff.  It is sufficient for present purposes to observe that the reference to that interest is to the subject‑matter of this litigation, the interest of the plaintiff and the defendant as partners in various mining tenements subject to a joint venture in which…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASC 118
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wright Prospecting Pty Limited sought leave to amend its reply in a dispute with Hancock Prospecting Pty Limited. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The proposed amendment sought to raise matters of law in response to a limitation defence, specifically whether the claim was made against the defendant as a trustee or in relation to any trust, whether it was founded on fraud or fraudulent breach of trust, and whether the limitation period did not run against the plaintiff because they had no interest in the property in possession.

The court considered whether the proposed pleading was necessary and whether the delay in seeking leave to amend was justified. The court noted that while matters of law could generally be pleaded without leave, specific pleading was required for fraud to make a defence not maintainable. The plaintiff had originally been granted leave to amend its reply but failed to do so within the specified timeframe. The court found that the plaintiff's explanation for the delay, that the necessity for specific reply was not immediately apparent, did not adequately justify the delay, particularly given the impact on the defendant's preparation and potential cross-examination of witnesses.

The court ultimately denied leave to amend the reply, reasoning that the proposed pleading was unnecessary as it sought to raise matters of law, and the delay in seeking leave was not sufficiently justified. The court emphasised the importance of timely pleading and the potential prejudice caused by delays, especially when the trial had already progressed significantly.

The court made no orders for the amendment of the reply, maintaining the existing pleadings as they stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The proposed pleading, generally speaking, again subject to the matter of fraud, seeks to raise matters of law. It is unnecessary to do so although, if necessary by leave, having regard to the loss of the entitlement to plead without leave, matters of law may be pleaded and it is often convenient to do so to signal to the other side the points of law which it is proposed to take: RSC O 20 r 12. Indeed, if the matter of law is alleged to make the claim or defence of the opposite party not maintainable, then the rule is that it must be pleaded: O 20 r 9(1); Jeans West Corporation Pty Ltd v Archer [2004] WASCA 132 per Heenan J at [12]. Order 20 r 9 specifically requires that fraud alleged to make a defence of the opposite party not maintainable be specifically pleaded. This reflects the long‑standing rule that because of the seriousness of the allegation, the party against whom it is alleged is entitled to have it pleaded specifically and in detail. In Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (In Liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514 at 534 [38], Gummow and Hayne JJ put simply the proposition that, "An allegation of fraud should be clearly and distinctly pleaded and put". In Oldfield Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 255 at [35] ‑ [38], Ipp J observed that this rule in relation to the pleading of fraud was of considerable antiquity and grounded in the proposition that an allegation of any impropriety or misconduct needed to be specifically put before the party against whom the allegation is made, so that in fairness he knows the case which he must meet. There would seem therefore to be two reasons under the rules why a pleading such as the proposed par 25A is required in reply if these matters are to be relied upon. In the first place, there are matters of law which are alleged to make the defence under the Limitation Act not maintainable and, secondly, it is proposed that the plaintiff's unconscionability claim is founded upon a fraud or fraudulent breach of trust. As has been seen, the plaintiff originally had leave following the amendment of the defence to which I have referred to make consequential amendments to the reply within a period of seven days. Nothing was done, hence the current application for leave. The only explanation provided on affidavit is that of one of the plaintiff's solicitors who deposes that she has been informed by counsel that the necessity for specific reply when the amendment to the defence relying on the Limitation Act was made "was not immediately apparent". She says the requirement "came into focus" when counsel were researching submissions in relation to the defendant's appeal against my judgment to which I have referred above. This is an explanation, but provides no basis to ameliorate the impact of the delay as a discretionary factor in respect of the grant of leave, given the fact that the trial has proceeded well beyond the point of hearing the plaintiff's witnesses as to the facts; witnesses the defendant says may have been cross‑examined differently, particularly in relation to an allegation of fraud. I shall refer again later to this matter.